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AN
EXPOSITION
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THE PARABLES

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THE GOSPELS,

✓
BY EDWARD GRESWELL, B.D.

FELLOW OF C. C. C. OXFORD.

IN FIVE VOLUMES.

VOL. IV.

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CONTENTS

OF

THE FOURTH VOLUME.

PARABLE EIGHTEENTH. MORAL.

The Unjust Steward	P. 1
Material Circumstances	2
The Moral	36
The Application	64

PARABLE NINETEENTH. MORAL.

The Rich Man and Lazarus	103
Material Circumstances	104
The Moral and Application	116

PARABLE TWENTIETH. MORAL.

The Importunate Widow	174
Preliminary Matter	175
The Parable	213
The Moral and Application	ibid.

PARABLE TWENTY-FIRST. MORAL.

The Pharisee and the Publican	242
Material Circumstances	ibid.
The Moral and Application	273

PARABLE TWENTY-SECOND. ALLEGORICAL.

The Labourers in the Vineyard	324
Material Circumstances	325
The Moral	351
The Interpretation	355

PARABLE TWENTY-THIRD. ALLEGORICAL.

The Ten Pieces of Money, or the Pounds	418
Material Circumstances.....	419
The Moral.....	472
The Interpretation	477

PARABLE EIGHTEENTH. MORAL.

THE UNJUST STEWARD.

LUKE XVI. 1—13. HARMONY, P. IV. 43.

LUKE xvi. 1—13.

¹ He said moreover to his disciples also : “ There was a certain rich man, who had a steward ; and this *steward* was accused unto him, as dissipating his possessions. ² And he called him and said unto him, What *is* this *which* I hear concerning thee ? render the account of thy stewardship ; for thou shalt not have it in thy power to be steward any longer. ³ And the steward began to say in himself, What shall I do ? for my lord is taking the stewardship from me : to dig I have not strength, to beg I am ashamed. ⁴ I have concluded, what I shall do ; that when I have been removed from the stewardship, they may receive me into their houses. ⁵ And having called to him each one of the debtors of his own lord, he said to the first, How much dost *thou* owe to my lord ? ⁶ And he said, An hundred baths of oil. And he said to him, Take thy writing, and having sat down, write quickly fifty. ⁷ Then *he* said to another, And thou, how much owest *thou* ? And he said, An hundred cors of wheat. And *he* saith to him, Take thy writing, and write eighty. ⁸ And his lord commended the steward of injustice, because he did prudently : for the children of this world are more prudent for their own generation, than the children of light.

⁹ And I say unto you, Make friends for yourselves of the mammon of injustice, that when ye fail, they may receive you into the everlasting tabernacles. ¹⁰ *He who is trusty in*

“ a very little is trusty also in much : and he *who is* unjust in
 “ a very little, is unjust also in much. ¹¹ If therefore ye have
 “ not become trusty in the unjust mammon, who shall intrust
 “ you with the true? ¹² And if ye have not become trusty in
 “ that *which was* another’s, who shall give you that *which shall*
 “ *be* your own? ¹³ No domestic is able to serve two lords : for
 “ either he will hate the one and will love the other, or he will
 “ hold to the one and make light of the other. Ye cannot serve
 “ God and mammon.”

MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

THE circumstances of an opulent family in ancient times were distinguished from those of a modern, in no respect so much, as in the number of dependent members, composing one household, who stood in the common relation of servants to its head. All these servants, however many, were the personal property of the master, and constituted part of his wealth as much as any other of his possessions : all of them too, by being instructed in some manual trade, or brought up to some liberal profession, were rendered available to the pleasure or profit, the amusement or advantage of their superior ; to whose benefit their time, their talents, their accomplishments, their labours and industry, were exclusively devoted.

The superintendence of an household, which might consist of hundreds, and even of thousands, of members, would require the instrumentality of proper persons, subordinate indeed to the master of the family, but invested with a certain degree of power and authority over his servants. In return too for the devotion of their personal services to their master’s benefit, the inferior members of the household

were provided with the necessaries of life at his expense : the business of which provision would be another reason for requiring in every family the constant service of a proper person.

The existence of an officer like this in the families of antiquity, especially those of the rich, is recognized in more than one of our Saviour's parables, the name by which he is designated being one and the same in each instance ; that of *οἰκονόμος* in the Greek, or of steward in the English version. But the idea of a steward in our language, does not fully answer to the meaning of the term in the Greek ; which, strictly interpreted, denotes the manager, ruler, or governor of an house. Agreeably to this definition of the original name, it may be shewn by a collection of testimonies from various quarters, that the steward of the Gospel parables corresponds most properly to the description of a general manager, superintendent, or governor of a family under the master ; to whom not only his property was committed in trust, but all orders of persons in his household were subject^a. And though, generally

^a In the first place, it is to be observed that the *οἰκονόμος* of the present parable, or of the former, considered and explained, vol. iii. p. 280—335. would not be properly represented by the *dispensator* of a Roman domestic establishment, strictly so called ; though that is the version of the Greek name for the office, sometimes adopted in Latin. It was the duty of the *dispensator* to keep his master's accounts, to balance his income and his expenditure ; or at the utmost, to manage his pecuniary transactions merely ; to lay out his money—to call it in, and the like. It does not appear that he was invested with power or authority over his fellow-servants ; or that he represented his master in reference to them. Nor did it make any difference to the nature of his office, whether the money trans-

speaking, such stewards or procurators anciently were servants themselves—whom their masters had

actions of which he kept the account, related to the *res urbanae* or *res rusticae* of his master; though they were more commonly of the former description. See, Sueton. August. 67, 4: Nero, 44, 2: Galba, 12, 6: Vespas. 22, 5: Lucian. 1, 697. §. 85.

Nor would the same kind of servant be properly represented by the Roman term *villicus*, the version of the Latin vulgate for the Greek; though the *villicus* was a character much nearer to the *οἰκονόμος* than the *dispensator*. The *villicus*, as the name implies, was *præfectus villæ*, *procurator rei rusticae*; in one word the bailiff or *ἀγρονόμος* of his master. In this capacity, indeed, the care of all his master's property in the country was committed to him; and for the management of that trust, the power and authority of a master over the subordinate members of his household, were also lodged in his hands. But the *res urbanae* of his master did not belong to his jurisdiction; whereas an opulent householder of antiquity must have possessed property in the town as well as in the country; and have owned a great number of slaves, whose vocations were confined to the city, and who would require care and government as well as his dependents elsewhere. The *οἰκονόμος* in both the parables represents one who must have had the management of his master's property, of every kind, and who must have stood in the same relation of his delegate or vicegerent, to all his dependents everywhere.

The word *villicus*, it is true, is sometimes used metaphorically for any *locum tenens* of another in the management or disposal of property. But this does not affect the present question. The *villicus* and the *dispensator* are opposed to each other, and distinguished asunder, in the following passages of Cicero, *De Republica*, lib. i. p. 41: *Scipio*: quia animum adverti, nuper cum essemus in Formiano, te familiæ valde interdicere, ut uni dicto audiens esset. *Lælius*: quippe villico. *Scip.* quid domi? pluresne præsumunt negotiis tuis? immo vero unus, inquit.—Lib. v. 127: ergo ut villicus naturam agri novit, dispensator litteras scit, &c.

Ilor. Epp. i. xiv. is addressed to his *villicus*. But the largest

advanced for particular reasons over the heads of their fellow servants, yet it was sometimes the case,

and fullest account of the office and duties of that servant is given in Cato, *De Re Rustica*, v. 56—59. 142: and in Columella, *De Re Rustica*, i. 8, 9. xi. 1. They add, moreover, an account of the office and duties of the *villica*, the wife of the *villicus*, or at least the matron or housekeeper as such; Cato, *loc. cit.* cap. 143: Columella, xii. 1.

It may be quite clear from these descriptions, that the *villicus* had great powers intrusted to him, in his proper department and for his proper jurisdiction; that he represented his master, and exercised his authority, in taking care of his property, looking after his servants, inspecting the conduct of each, punishing or rewarding as he saw fit, disposing of the produce of their labour, supplying their necessary wants, taking care of them when ill, keeping them to their duty when well, being always with them, both at home and abroad, instructing and teaching them when they required it, and encouraging them by his example as much as by his precepts. But it is equally clear that all this was done in the management of his master's property in the country only, and for the superintendence of the various descriptions of persons employed on a farm. Before we can obtain a just idea of the *οικονόμος* in the two parables of our Lord, we must conceive the notion of a servant placed in the same delegated capacity over *all* his master's property, whether in the town, or in the country; and in the exercise of his commission, not confined to one place, or to one description of services, requiring power and confidence, more than to another.

Now this description of servant, I think, is properly denoted by the name and title of the *ἐπίτροπος* alone. Lucian. i. 668. §. 55. *De mercede conductis*, cap. 12. expressly distinguishes the *ἐπίτροπος* of an opulent household from the *οικονόμος*. In the romance of Charito, (*De Chæreæ et Callirrhœs amoribus*,) lib. i. p. 17. l. 17. Leonas, a servant of a rich Ionian, called Dionysius, speaks of himself as *διοικητὴς τῶν ὅλων*; and he is personally discriminated from Phocas, another of his servants called the *οικονόμος*. See lib. ii. p. 22. l. 1. The former would answer to the *ἐπίτροπος*, as being at the head of all his master's property; the latter could be merely his house-steward, with

that the individual who stood in the relation in question to the head of the household, and to its

the management of his domestic establishment, subordinate to, though possibly next to the *διοικητής*. Appian, giving an account of some instances of the escape of persons included in the proscriptions, U. C. 711. mentions an individual who assumed the disguise of a servant, and in that capacity came into the possession of a Roman nobleman, Barbula; who, in a short time, *δεξιὸν ὀρώων ἐπέστησε τοῖς ὁμοδούλοις, καὶ χρήματα διοικεῖν ἔδωκε*—that is, he made an *ἐπίτροπος* of him: De Bell. Civ. iv. 49. Dio Cassius, lii. 20. observes, by the way, that no one thought of committing (*τὰ οἰκεῖα*) his domestic affairs to the care of an *ἐπίτροπος*, until he was at least twenty-five years of age: which implies the importance and responsibility of the office. So Philo Jud. ii. 450. 43. *Quod liber quisquis virtuti studet: ἕτεροι δ' εἰσιν ἐκ γένους δοῦλοι, τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων εὐμοιρίᾳ τύχης μεταόντες· ἐπίτροποι γὰρ οἰκιῶν, κτημάτων, καὶ μεγάλων οὐσιῶν, ἐστὶ δ' ὅτε καὶ ὁμοδούλων ἄρχοντες καθίστανται.* Plutarch, vi. 853. l. 1. De amicorum multitudine, reckons *οἰκέτας, χρημάτων ἐπιτρόπους, ἢ τέκνων παιδαγωγοὺς ἐσομένους*, as those who had the most important duties committed to their charge, and required the greatest length of time to prove their fitness. If he meant by the former of these the *ἐπίτροποι*, or even in a general sense the *οἰκονόμοι*, as such, he must have considered them the head servants of all.

The *ἐπίτροπος*, then, I should consider to be the character which properly answers to that of the *οἰκονόμος* in the two parables; as having both the management of his master's property, and the possession of his master's authority over the rest of his servants, confided to him. Even the *villicus* and the *dispensator* must be classed in subordination to the *ἐπίτροπος* in question, when their respective offices were discharged by different persons; as in great households, and where the master possessed property both *urban* and *rural*, would commonly be the case. Yet it is possible, that under certain circumstances, even one person might fill these several situations, and perform the duties of them all.

The word *οἰκονόμος* in Greek is certainly capable of a wider signification than that of *villicus* or of *dispensator* in Latin.

inferior members, was not his servant in the same sense as the rest. And such appears to be the state

Jerome observes, iv. Pars i. 196, *ad princ.* Ep. ad Algasiam, Villicus autem proprie villæ gubernator est: unde et a villa villicus nomen accepit. οἰκονόμος autem tam pecuniæ, quam frugum et omnium quæ dominus possidet, dispensator est. unde et οἰκονομικὸς Xenophontis pulcherrimus liber est, qui non gubernationem villæ, sed dispensationem universæ domus (Tullio interpretante) significat. Arrian, in Epictet. iii. 22. p. 443, 444, uses the word synonymously, apparently, with ἐπίτροπος: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν οἰκίᾳ καλῶς οἰκουμένη παρελθὼν τις αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ λέγει, Ἐμὲ δεῖ οἰκονόμον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐπιστραφεῖς ὁ κύριος, καὶ ἰδὼν αὐτὸν σοβαρῶς διατασσόμενον, ἐλκύσας ἔτεμεν.

The enlarged sense of which it is capable appears from the Memorabilia of Xenophon, iii. iv. 7, where Socrates is arguing that the best οἰκονόμος would make the best στρατηγός, enumerating the following qualities as common to both, or at least as necessary to both; viz. the faculty of rendering their respective subjects tractable and obedient; of assigning to every one of them that kind of work and duty of which he is most capable; of distributing rewards and punishments, with due regard to the merits of the case; of conciliating the good-will of their inferiors or dependents; of providing themselves with proper helps and assistances; of taking care of what they have, and losing nothing; and the like. He concludes with the observation, that the management of an household differs not in the kind of its duties, but only in the nature of its subject-matter, and the extent of its jurisdiction, from that of a community; that the subjects of both are men, the instruments of both are men; and that the same talents, and the same wisdom or discretion, are requisite for the due discharge of the duties of the master of a family, as for those of the governor of a state.

The *Œconomica* of Xenophon could not fail to speak of the duties of an ἐπίτροπος, who, for the purposes supposed in that treatise, relating, as it does entirely, to the ordering and management of an household in the country, would very nearly answer to the character of the Roman villicus. The first of his requisites which it enumerates, is that of his being well-disposed to his master, and his master's interests (cap. xii. sect. 5); the

of the case in the present instance ; where the party described as the steward of the rich man, is still plainly not represented as his servant.

next, that he be careful of his property, industrious, and attentive to his duties ; a quality of which, he observes, drunkards, sluggards, or persons addicted to women, are incapable, (*ibid.* 6) ; the next, the faculty of governing the labouring part of the household, appointing them their tasks, and seeing that they be duly discharged, *xiii.* 3 ; the next, thriftiness in the management of his master's property, honesty in abstaining from converting it to his own use—and the like, *xiv.* 2.

Cato, *De Re Rustica* v. observes ; *Hæc erunt vilici officia. disciplina bona utatur. . . alieno manum absteineat. sua servet diligenter. si quis quid deliquerit, pro noxa bono modo vindicet. familiæ male ne sit, ne algeat, ne esuriat, opere bene exerceat, &c. &c.* The same topics are much more fully discussed by Columella, *locis citatis*.

The antiquity of a steward, an overseer, or a ruler of an household, next to the master in authority, and representing him in relation to the servants, is as great as the relation of master and servant, that is, slave. We read in *Genesis*, *xv.* 2, that Abraham had an head servant, Eliezer of Damascus, no doubt a slave as much as the rest of his family ; and yet he had at least three hundred and eighteen *vernæ*, or servants born in his house, *Gen.* *xiv.* 4. This servant, we are told, *Gen.* *xxiv.* 2, 10, ruled over all that he had ; all his master's goods were in his hand. He was, therefore, strictly his *οἰκονόμος*, in the same capacity as the person described by that name in either of our Saviour's parables.

Such a kind of steward did Joseph become, in the household of Potiphar in Egypt, *Gen.* *xxxix.* 4 ; and such an one had Joseph himself in his own family, after his elevation to the government of Egypt, *Gen.* *xliii.* 16. We may presume too, that Obadiah, 1 *Kings* *xviii.* 3, stood in a similar relation to the household of Ahab ; with this possible difference only, that the stewards in the former cases might be strictly slaves, but Obadiah was probably a native Jew.

That part of the duties of the steward, or *οἰκονόμος* in ques-

It is a proof, therefore, of that attention to propriety, which may be discovered in all our Saviour's

tion, which the parable, in the former instance, chiefly insisted on, was the giving the household of his master their meat in due season. Proverbs, xxxi. 15, it is reckoned among the other good qualities of a perfect housewife, that "she riseth also while 'it is yet night, and giveth meat to her household, and a portion to her maidens," Jerome, ii. 521. *ad princip.*, Quæstiones Hebraicæ, explains Gen. xv. 2: of Abraham's steward, qui universa dispensat, et distribuit cibaria familiæ suæ.

The due season in question, from very ancient times, was once a month. Thus Hesiod recommends the *τριακάς*, or last day of the month,

τριακάδα μηνὸς ἀρίστην
ἔργα τ' ἐποπτεύειν, ἥδ' ἄρμαλιν δατέασθαι.

Opera et dies 764.

So Theocritus,

πολλοὶ ἐν Ἀντιόχοιο δόμοις, καὶ ἄνακτος Ἀλεύα,
ἄρμαλιν ἔμμηνον ἐμετρήσαντο πενέσται.

Idyll. xvi. 34.

The Penestæ were the native serf population of Thessaly. We find old Hesiod, among other maxims, advising to reduce by one half the allowance of the cattle in the winter months, and by something less the regular allowance of the men.

τῆμος θώμισυ βούσ' ἐπὶ δ' ἀνέρι καὶ πλέον εὔη
ἄρμαλιῆς· μακρὰ γὰρ ἐπὶ ῥόθοι εὐφρόναι εἰσί.

Opera et dies 557.

It is a precept of Phocylides,

γαστρὸς ὀφειλόμενον δασμὸν παρέχον θεράποντι.

Fragm. 210.

Theophrastus, *Historia Plantar.* viii. 4, mentions a particular kind of *σίτος* (bread corn), which was more æconomical for the use of slaves, than any other: εἶναι δ' ἰσχυρὸν τοῦτον καὶ βαρὺν, οὐχ ὥσπερ τὸν τρίμηνον, κοῦφον· διὸ καὶ τοῖς οἰκέταις ὑπάρχειν. The daily allowance to a slave among the Greeks was a *chœnix* or a *chœnix* and an half of flour: for which reason, the Corinthians, who once possessed great numbers of slaves, were called by the Pythian oracle, *χοινικομέτραι*: Athenæus, vi. 103. Seneca tells

parables, that, at the commencement of a narrative, turning upon the conduct of a steward of this description that a slave's allowance, once a month, was quinque modii and quinque denarii: Epp. 80. 7. A monthly payment of some kind is attested also by Lucian, as an usual thing, i. 679: De mercede conductis 23: ἀλλ' ὅποταν, ὦ βέλτιστε, τῆς νομηνίας ἐπιστάσης, ἀναμιχθεὶς τῷ Πυρρίᾳ καὶ τῷ Ζωπυρίωνι, προτείνῃς τὴν χεῖρα ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις οἰκέταις, καὶ λάβῃς ἐκείνο ὃ τι δήποτε ἢ τὸ διδόμενον, τοῦτο ἢ πράσις ἐστί.

Est aliquid, says Seneca, quod dominus præstare servo debeat, ut cibaria, ut vestiarium: De Beneficiis, iii. xxi. 1—Familia vestiarium petit, victumque: tot ventres avidissimorum animalium tuendi sunt: emenda vestis, &c.: De Tranquillitate, viii. 5—Τί γάρ μοι κακὸν ἦν; ἄλλος μ' ἐνέδυνεν, ἄλλος μ' ὑπέδει, ἄλλος ἔτρεφεν, ἄλλος ἐνοσοκόμει, ὀλίγα αὐτῷ ὑπηρετοῦν: Arrian. Epictet. iv. 1. 537. 15—Cf. Xenoph. Cyri Dis. viii. iii. 41—Varro, De Re Rustica, i. 17.

Deterior tamen hic, qui liber non erit illis
Quorum animos et farre suo custodit et ære.

Juvenal. ix. 121.

Rogabat

Denique cur unquam fugisset, cui satis una
Farris libra foret, gracili sic, tamque pusillo?

Horat. Sermon. i. v. 67.

Cf. Juvenal. iii. 141: 166. 167: xiv. 126. 127.

Cum servis urbana diaria rodere mavis:

Horum tu in numerum voto ruis.

Horat. Epp. i. xiv. 40.

Cato, De Re Rustica, v. 56—59, classes the necessities of a family under the head of *cibaria*, *vinum*, *pulmentarium*, *vestimenta*, which he recommends to be distributed in the following proportions at different times, respectively. In winter, four modii of triticum to the labouring slaves (per month;) in summer four and an half. Of wine, mense quarto, that is, from the first to the fourth, an *hemina* a day, two *congi* and an half a month: mense quinto down to mense octavo, a *sextarius* a day, five *congi* a month, that is, twice the former allowance: mense nono—undecimo, three *heminae* a day, an *amphora* a month; half as much more as the last. In the twelfth month,

scription, it represents the superior to whom he stands in his proper relation, as a *rich* man; for

including the allowance for the Saturnalia, something more still. In all, for every man, of wine ten *quadrantalia* annually.

The pulmentarium included olea condita, halecem, acetum, and sal. The allowance he recommended was a *sextarius* of oleum to every man per month; a *modius* of sal per year. Lastly, under the head of vestimenta familiæ, he recommends tunicam P. iii. S: (that is, three feet and an half) saga alternis annis, &c.

The custom previously established in private families, of supplying their various classes of dependents with monthly issues of corn, &c., most probably first suggested the idea of making the whole of the *plebs ingenua* or *libertina* at Rome, corn-pensioners of the state; an idea nevertheless very likely to be combined with the promotion of party purposes, and in fact, attributed with that view, to Caius Gracchus, to Clodius, and even to Cato the younger, indifferently. Vide Cicero, De Officiis, ii. 21: Tusculanæ Disput. iii. 20: Pro P. Sextio, 48: Vell. Pat. ii. 6: Appian. De B. Civil. i. 21: Flor. Epitome lib. lx: Asconius in Ciceron. orat. contra Pisonem: Plutarch. Jul. Cæsar. 8: Cato min. 26: Operr. ix. 258: Reipublicæ gerendæ præcepta: Juvenal. viii. 117, 118: x. 79. 80.

The corn-tickets also were granted once a month: though Suetonius tells us, Aug. 40. 3, that Augustus once thought of issuing them once in four months; Ac ne plebs frumentationum causa, frequentius a negotiis avocaretur, ter in annum quaternûm mensium tesseræ dare destinavit: sed desideranti consuetudinem veterem concessit rursus, ut sui cujusque mensis acciperet. Indeed, from experience of the evil consequences of the custom, the same emperor thought seriously of abolishing it altogether. Inpetum se cœpisse scribit, says Suetonius, frumentationes publicas in perpetuum abolendi, quod earum fiducia cultura agrorum cessaret: neque tamen perseverasse, quia certum haberet, posse per ambitionem quandoque restitui. Aug. 42. 4.

This was not the only mischief resulting from the practice in question. The effect on the moral character of the plebs urbana

none but a rich man, and more especially a rich man of ancient times, could be the head of an household was still worse. Relieved from all concern about themselves or their families, they spent their time in the theatres and amphitheatres; and were ever ready for tumult and disturbances. Yet the example thus set by Rome was followed in other great cities of the empire—and Constantine transferred it to Constantinople also. Individuals would often thus distribute largesses to the citizens of particular communities. See Cornel. Nepos. Atticus, 2: Eckhel, vi. 407.

The danger of the failure of supplies, and the consequent risk of famine, was perhaps the least serious of the mischievous effects of the practice. Yet such dangers were frequently realized, and produced great temporary distress, as well as popular disturbances. Seneca tells us that at the time of Caligula's death there was but a week's consumption of grain in the public magazines: *De Brevitate Vitæ*, 18. 4: *Operr.* i. 532.

Photius, *Cod.* 80. p. 63. l. 17. *ad sinistram*, has a long extract from Olympiodorus, an historian contemporary with the capture of Rome by the Goths in the reign of Honorius and Arcadius, which conveys a wonderful idea of the wealth and magnificence of the citizens of Rome, before that event. Each of the houses of the Roman grandees contained within its precincts the component parts of a moderate-sized city; hippodromi, gestationes, temples, springs of water, baths, &c.—διό, says Photius, καὶ ὁ συγγραφεὺς ἀπεφθέγγετο,

ὥς δόμος ἄστὺ πέλει· πόλις ἄστυ μὲν κείθι.

He informs us also that many of the houses in Rome brought their owners a yearly income of forty *centenaria auri* (that is, 4000 *librae auri signati*) from their possessions (κτήματα), independent of the corn, and the wine, and the other kinds of stores, which they likewise contained; the yearly value of which is reckoned at one third of the above sum more.

The sources of these incomings were most probably the labours of the slaves, who belonged to such great families; and the corn, the wine, and the other necessities, supposed to be laid up in kind, and not to be sold or converted into specie, were most probably intended for their maintenance: that is, for the supply of the daily wants of such numerous households.

hold ordinarily requiring, and ordinarily possessing an officer over it like the steward.

The most comprehensive idea of such an office, as we have observed, may be that of a general manager of the property, and a general superintendent of the family, of a certain master; and the most complete account of its duties, must be as comprehensive also: but there is no reason why it should always be understood in this enlarged sense. Among the most regular of its duties was no doubt the constant provision for the constant wants of a numerous household; and in a given instance no more may require to be regarded in the character and office in question, than the part of one, who is intrusted with the property of a certain master, in order to the supply of the necessities of his family; without taking into account the relation and functions of the governor of the household, under the master, which such an officer may also be supposed to have sustained. In this light is the character of the steward represented in both those passages, Luke xii. 42, and Matt. xxiv. 45: where, even while he is said to be appointed over the complex of his master's servants—that is to be invested with a degree of authority, power, and jurisdiction, over the household in general, second only to the master's; yet the final end of the appointment, the object consulted by that advancement of one above the heads of the rest, is declared to be, to give them “the allowance of provision” (τὸ σιτομέτριον, or τὴν τροφήν) “in due season.”

To this view of the nature of the office of steward, in a family of antiquity, must we restrict the mean-

ing of the term, as far as relates to the circumstances of the present parable ; dismissing the idea of a common superintendent of a variously constituted household, and regarding only that of the person whose duty it was to provide for the supply of the necessary wants of its members—more especially for their daily subsistence—as plentifully and regularly as the nature of the case might require for the benefit of the inferiors, yet with as much thrift and œconomy, as was due to the interests of the superior, out of whose means the expense of that maintenance was furnished.

It is evident, then, that an office like this, generally speaking, was beforehand liable to abuse ; and such an abuse as would consist more especially in waste or prodigality, to the detriment of the property of the master ; which instead of being husbanded with care, and made to go as far as possible, would be lavished and squandered unnecessarily : yet as an office of confidence, its abuse might go on for a length of time, without being discovered or even suspected ; especially if more persons found their advantage in the abuse itself, and were interested in concealing the fact of it from their master. As an office, however, in the discharge of the duties of which, not merely the head of the family, but the subordinate members of his household were proportionably all concerned, its abuse might come to light at last, and very probably in some such manner as is implied in the parable ; viz. by an accusation of the steward to the master, by a formal complaint, as we may presume, from some one or more of the other members of the household, and upon some such ground, as

while it most directly impeached the steward of a breach of trust, was best calculated to excite the indignation of his master; that by his use and administration of the powers of his office, he was scattering, wasting, or dissipating his master's possessions.

The classical sense of the verb, which is rendered to accuse, is as frequently to *calumniate*—that is, to *accuse falsely*,—as to *inform against*, which may mean to *accuse truly*: as often, to raise a prejudice, to excite a suspicion, against an innocent person, as to denounce an unquestionable offender. But the effect of a true charge, as much as of a false one, is to raise a prejudice, to excite a suspicion, against the object of the accusation; with this difference only, that the effect in the one case is natural and just, in the other, is unreasonable and unjust. The word may be used then of the effect of a true accusation, as well as of a false—the deprivation of the particular object of the charge, of that place in the confidence or esteem of another, to which he is no longer intitled: and there are many reasons which require, that though the information against the steward, as a delinquent, and false to his trust, might have been a calumny, or an unjust accusation, it should yet be supposed under the circumstances of the case, to have been founded in truth.

In the first place, his own conduct, upon that supposition, is rendered consistent with itself throughout; and if there is any thing wrong in the expedient which he is seen to adopt at last, to compensate for the loss of his master's favour, it will not appear surprising, as only the act of a man who was already unprincipled enough to adopt it. Besides, if the accu-

sation brought against him, was false, it was obviously the best mode of defending himself against it, to have denied its truth, and to have required it to be substantiated by the necessary proofs : and that though impeached on a charge so seriously affecting his character, he does not resort to this method of avouching his innocence, clearly implies that he knew the accusation to be true ; that his conscience could not but admit the justice of the charge. We observe too, that upon receiving the intimation of his master's displeasure, his only solicitude is about himself—his first consideration is not, how he may clear himself of suspicion, but how he may obviate the consequences of the loss of his place : which resembles the conduct of one who had previously been accustomed to regard his own interests much more than those of his master. The narrative itself, also, confirms in the sequel, the truth of the accusation at the outset, by styling the man “ the steward of in-justice” or iniquity—a designation equivalent to the unjust or iniquitous steward ; and more especially, by classing him with the children of this world, in contradistinction to the children of light. In a word, to exonerate the servant from blame, would be to condemn the master ; for, if the former was innocent of the charge brought against him, the latter was guilty of precipitancy in listening to it, without inquiry, and in acting upon it, as if founded in truth. But the fact is, that the master, as we may well presume, had good reasons for believing the accusation, and the steward, for attempting no defence against it ; and the conduct of each party is consistent and natural ; that of the master, in dismissing

his steward from his service, and that of the steward, in seeking only to indemnify himself for the loss of his situation.

Though however the charge of abusing his trust by dissipating his master's property, should be admitted to be true; still we must understand it of an abuse, attended by such an effect, the natural consequence of any cause, consistent with the relations of a steward, and the character and principles of the man, in the present instance, distinct from the want of ability to discharge the duties of his office aright, had the ability to do his duty been accompanied by the will. Regard to consistency in the circumstances of his history, from first to last, requires this restriction. Were he supposed to be dismissed from his master's service from the defect of capacity as ascertained by experience, rather than for the defect of inclination to take the necessary care of his possessions—that is, because he was found upon trial, unfit for his office, rather than undeserving of it—this supposition would be at variance with the description of his character in general, and with the contrivance and ingenuity which he displays in obviating the effects of his disgrace to himself. The inference from *that* part of his history is obvious; that had he exerted the same ability in the service of his master, which he exhibited in providing for his own interests, he would never have forfeited his confidence, nor been in danger of losing his place.

There is an emphasis in the language of the master, upon discovering the dishonesty of his steward, which is both natural and significant. “What

“ is this which I hear concerning thee? Abuse of
“ trust in a steward! want of fidelity in an office of
“ confidence like thine! Render me the account of
“ thy stewardship; for with such an imputation on
“ thy character, it is impossible that thou shouldest
“ any longer be my steward—with such grounds of
“ complaint against thee, as these, I will take care
“ to trust thee no longer.” Fidelity to his master
is the bounden duty of every servant; but faithfulness in a steward, to whose management the property of another is committed, constitutes the essence of his virtue.

The master's command to the steward to render in his accounts, as a step preliminary to his dismissal, seems to imply that the charge brought against him, however founded in truth, was more or less indefinite; and that the specific instances of the waste or mismanagement whereof he was accused, were to be collected from the particulars of his accounts. It might, therefore, be simply the effect of his suspicions, awakened by the information just received, and desirous to ascertain the extent of the injury done him. Yet it fulfils an important use to the sequel of the history. For as these accounts were called for, we may presume they would be produced; and whatever opinion the master might pass on the conduct of the steward at last, would be founded upon their inspection previously. The production of these accounts seems to be the circumstance, which in expectation of the loss of his situation, as the consequence of their production, suggests to the steward the kind of expedient by which he hopes to guard himself against that

loss. And though he may be considered as virtually dismissed from his master's service, the moment he has lost his confidence—yet until the accounts of his office have been produced and examined, he retains his powers a little longer ; and his accounts being yet in his possession, he is able to do any thing with them, that may benefit himself, however prejudicial to his master.

The train of reflections, which passes through the mind of the steward, when thinking of the loss of his situation, and what he must do, to obviate its effects to himself, is simply and beautifully expressed. “What shall I do? for my lord is taking the stewardship from me—to dig, I have not strength—to beg, I am ashamed.” Perhaps he was grown old in his present situation ; or perhaps, his habits of life had disqualified him for active bodily exertions, like one who must depend upon his own labour for his support. In any case, the office and rank of a steward in an opulent family of antiquity were too respectable, not to make a descent from that station to the condition of a beggar, a degradation not to be thought of. What remained then, except by some such means as the possession of the powers of his office a little while longer, still placed in his reach—to confer a personal obligation on the parties with whom he was officially connected in the relation of steward, which might entitle him to a voluntary maintenance from their gratitude? This is the expedient, which he determines to adopt. “I have concluded what I shall do —that when I have been removed from the stewardship, they may receive me into their houses.”

The particulars of the transaction in which we see him engaged, in consequence of this resolution, are the main business of the narrative, and the moral of the whole resides in this part of the account ; for which reasons it is the more carefully to be attended to.

The description of persons, whose cooperation with the steward, in order to the execution of the scheme which he has formed, is next introduced as necessary, must have stood in some definite relation beforehand, both to himself and to his master ; to the master as his own superior, to himself as his representative, and as authorized to transact all business, belonging to his office, with the proper persons, in his name and stead. The word in the original, which expresses this relation, (*χρεωφειλέτης*,) properly denotes a debtor in the popular, that is, the pecuniary sense of the term ; one who has borrowed money, or bought some thing of another, and so is bound to the repayment of a loan, or for the price of a certain commodity. But the debtors in the present instance acknowledge themselves bound to the master, not for sums of money, but for such and such quantities of corn or oil ; and as the grammatical construction of the original implies, not for such commodities, as received *from* him, and as owed for *by* them, which would lead to the inference that *they* had bought them from *him*—but as due *unto* him, and as owing *by* them : which would imply that *he* had bought them from *them*.

Now the articles in question being corn and oil, they are manifestly the common articles of subsistence, such as would be requisite in some proportion

or other, for the supply of the daily necessities of every family in general; but whether in greater or less quantities, would depend on the magnitude of the family and the extent of its wants in particular. Of the persons, so indebted, some it is observable profess themselves to be bound in certain quantities of one of these commodities, and others in certain quantities of another; but none of them appears to have been indebted in all. And though two only of their number are expressly mentioned, one of them bound in the oil, and the other in the corn; yet it is clearly implied that their whole number was more than two, and that others besides these, must have stood in the same relation of debtors to the master, bound to furnish such and such quantities either of the same articles, or what is equally probable, of other commodities, which would be just as much wanted. Wine for example, and salt, would be necessities of life almost as much in request, and requiring almost as large a provision in every household, as corn or oil^b. It is to be presumed that

^b It may illustrate the above suppositions, that Ezra vii. 22. Artaxerxes (Longimanus) is said to have given Ezra power to draw upon the royal treasury, "Unto an hundred talents of silver, and to an hundred measures of wheat (*cori*), and to an hundred baths of wine, and to an hundred baths of oil, and salt without prescribing how much." Whether this was to be from year to year, does not appear; but there is every reason to presume it would be either from year to year, or from month to month, for a limited time; viz. until the chief purposes of Ezra's commission were accomplished, or he was rendered, by the course of events, independent of royal support.

The Pseudo-Phalaris in one of his epistles, is made to offer the same kind of assistance to one Cleomenides, with a view to defray the expenses of serving the office of Gymnasiarch, which

there would be proper persons, indebted to the head of the family for these, or for similar articles of subsistence, as much as for the former; with each of whom the steward must be supposed to deal, and for the same end or purpose, as with the other two. In other words, the fact of his conduct towards each of these persons, being in general the same, and the end which he had in view by it in each instance, the same also; it was not necessary to specify the

would entail a certain consumption of oil and bread corn: τῶν δωρεῶν ὅσα μὲν σοι πρὸς τὴν γυμνασιαρχίαν ἀνήκουσι πεπόμφαμεν, ἐλαίου μετρητὰς διακοσίους, καὶ πυρῶν μεδίμνους τετρακοσίους. Two hundred metretæ would be about 2500 gallons of our measure, and four hundred medimni nearly 2000 pecks. So that the proportion of oil was very much on a par with that of corn.

Solomon's daily provision, among other things, included thirty cori or measures of fine flour, and threescore measures of meal: 1 Kings iv. 22. Cf. Jos. Ant. viii. ii. 4: and, 2 Chron. ii. 10. (Cf. 1 Kings v. 11.) we read of his engaging to supply the hewers of wood in Mount Lebanon, furnished by Hiram king of Tyre, with 20,000 measures of wheat, 20,000 of barley, 20,000 baths of wine, and 20,000 baths of oil. Josephus, viii. ii. 9. expresses one of these measures by *cori*, and the other by *βάδοι*, which are the two measures respectively in the parable; and understands the contract of a supply from year to year. The number of hewers in the mountain, as we may infer from 2 Chron. ii. 2. 18. was not less than 80,000. If the above supplies were intended for their support, one thousand of each of the measures in question were wanted for every four thousand persons; nor would this be out of proportion to the number; for on that principle, a thousand cori of wheat and as many of barley, would be wanted yearly for every four thousand persons; that is, according to Arbuthnot, about 62,000 pecks of both together; which would be only about 5000 pecks every month, among four thousand persons, or at the rate of one peck and one quarter per man. Yet 2 Chron. ii. 15, 1 Kings v. 11. Solomon also engaged to furnish corn and wine to the people of Tyre in general.

particulars of the fact, except in one or two cases. What he did with any of the debtors, and why he did it, being declared in a single instance, it was a sufficient intimation of what he must be supposed to have done, and why, in every other.

We observe too, that in each of these instances, the steward deals with the debtors, and transacts the business which passes between them, by virtue of his office ; as the person to whom the debts acknowledged to be due to his master, are to be paid in his stead. Laying these circumstances together, I think we may come to the conclusion, that whatever the original word, rendered debtors, may denote in its proper sense, there are but two meanings which it can have in the present parable. Either it describes the farmers of the estates of the master, under the steward, who must be supposed to pay their rents in kind, or it denotes the persons who had engaged to supply his household with the necessary articles of subsistence ; whether all with the same in general, or each with a separate item in particular, yet in such and such an amount, and on such and such terms respectively.

Of these two constructions, the latter is much the more probable : first, because, though the owners of landed property anciently sometimes let out their estates to be cultivated by *coloni* or husbandmen, at such and such rents, yet it was the more usual practice to farm them for themselves, by means of their own servants. Secondly, because we do not know that even such owners of lands as let out their estates to others, were paid their rents in kind, and not in money. Thirdly, because the care and management

of the *res rustica* of their masters, that is, the superintendence of their estates in the country, belonged to that description of servant who is known by the name of *villicus* or bailiff, rather than to him who is called *dispensator*, οἰκονόμος, or steward, in the limited sense of the word. Fourthly and chiefly, because, of the debtors in the parable, distinct persons are seen to stand engaged to the contribution of a distinct item among these productions of the ground, but no one of the number to all: which we may presume, could not have been the case, if the debtors were merely the farmers of the master's estates—and the articles of subsistence which they were bound to render him, were his rents, paid and received in kind: for the estates which produced one of these commodities, would produce the rest; and the same tenant who was indebted to his landlord for one of them, it might be presumed would be indebted for the rest.

But with respect to the other construction of the meaning of the term—it is clear that every ancient family, whether larger or smaller in itself, would require a constant supply of such necessities as corn, and oil, or wine; and it is equally evident, from what has been premised in relation to the office and duties of a steward of antiquity, that it would belong to him to provide this supply. We perceive that the commodities in which the debtors acknowledge themselves bound respectively to the master, are of this description; and as to the particular amount of the supply of each to which they were indebted, it has but to be stated to shew that it could be required for the use only of a numerous household. An hundred *baths* of liquid measure, according to

the Jewish mode of reckoning, would be more than a thousand gallons; and an hundred *cors* of dry measure, more than three thousand two hundred pecks^c. It is more probable too, with a view to the

^c Of the content of the *corus* and the *bath* respectively, very different accounts are given by such ancient authorities as mention these measures: though that the former was properly a dry, and the latter a liquid measure, they all concur to attest. Upon the whole, however, there is sufficient reason to acquiesce in the results of the calculation of the content of each, made by Arbuthnot, in his Tables of Ancient Weights and Measures; where the *corus* is reckoned at thirty-two pecks, one pint, and a certain number of solid inches of another pint of our measure, and the bath or epha, at seven gallons, four pints, and a similar fraction.

The following examples will shew the inconsistency of Josephus with himself on this subject. Ant. Jud. ii. xv. 3, he reckons seventy *cori* equal to thirty-one Sicilian *medimni*, or forty-one Attic, which makes one *corus* nearly half an Attic *medimnus*. Yet Ant. Jud. xv. ix. 2, he estimates the *corus* to equal ten Attic *medimni*; which is quite out of all proportion to the other statement, though nearer to the truth in itself. Ant. Jud. viii. ii. 9, the bath is said to be equal to seventy-two *xestæ*: which may not very much exceed the exact proportion. Theodoret, i. 466, in iii. Reg. Interrogatio xxi. professing to quote from Josephus, says the bath = seventy-four *choes*; a measure which Arbuthnot estimates at six pints of ours. This consequently is much beyond the truth. Eupolemus, apud Eusebium, Præp. Evang. ix. 33. 449. A. reckons the *corus* = six *artabæ*. The ἀράβη, according to Aristotle, as quoted by Suidas, in voce ἀράβη, was = forty-five Attic *medimni*. But Herodotus, i. 192, estimates the Persian *artaba* at one *medimnus* and three *chanixes*. If Eupolemus meant this *artaba*, his calculation of the content of the *corus*, is not much in defect. Jerome, however, iii. 49. *ad calc.* in Isaïæ v. observes, Et pro triginta modiis quos nos pro coro posuimus, qui Hebraice dicitur omer, lxx verterunt *artabas sex*: quæ mensura Ægyptiaca est et facit modios viginti. That this means the six *artabæ* collectively may be inferred from 1122 *ad calc.* in Dan. xi. where

daily supply of the daily wants of a numerous household, that different persons would be engaged for the provision of different articles of subsistence, than any one for the supply of all.

We may conclude, then, that the true description of the debtors in the parable, is that of the parties with whom the steward by virtue of his proper office, and

the *artaba* is put at three *modii* and one third. Six of such *artabæ* would just be equal to twenty *modii*. Epiphanius, ii. 177. De mensuris et ponderibus, xxi. the *cor* or *corus* is put at thirty *modii*, and said to be equivalent to a camel's burden: and generally speaking this is the content which in most instances we find assigned to it: see Hieronym. iii. 1255, *ad princip.* in Osee iii: 1039. *ad med.* in Ezek. xlv.

Theodoret. ii. 1035: in Ezek. xlv. reckons the *corus* = ten homers, and the homer = ten chœnixes, which makes the *corus* = an hundred chœnixes; a proportion much too small for its legitimate content, and, as it is, founded on the proportions of these measures to each other, specified at Ezek. xlv. 11, which make the ephah the tenth part of the homer, instead of *vice versa*, the homer the tenth part of the ephah: see Exod. xvi. 36. From Exod. xvi. 16. 22, the homer, it appears, was as much of the manna as one adult could eat in a day; which, in Attic measure, would answer probably to a chœnix and an half, or at the utmost to two chœnixes. In the next page, however, Theodoret calls the *corus* = to thirty medimni.

The *corus*, says Jerome, iii. 1039, *ad med.* in Ezek. xlv: in utraque mensura, hoc est, tam aridarum quam liquentium, tenet principatum. On this principle he estimates the bath in terms of the *corus*, as = one tenth of a *corus*, or three *amphoræ*; answering to the ephi in dry measure, which equalled the tenth of the *corus*, or three *modii*, also. Eupolemus, too, apud Eus. Evang. Præp. loc. cit. says the *corus* of wine was equal to ten μέτρα. Epiphanius, ii. 178. De Mensuris et Ponderibus, xxi. reckons the bath = fifty *xestæ*, which is something less than Arbuthnot's estimate. Jerome's usual estimate for the bath is three *amphoræ*: whereas Arbuthnot makes it only = one *amphora*.

in the discharge of his proper functions, must have formed the necessary engagements, for the supply of the various articles of subsistence, which an household like that of his master could not fail to require. Between each of these, consequently, and himself, acting instead of his master, it is to be supposed there would be a proper agreement, binding both of them to certain stipulations; the debtors, with respect to what they were to furnish the master; the steward, with respect to what the master was to pay them in return for it. This supposition is confirmed by the parable, in the allusion to certain writings^d, the mention of which occurs in the account of what passes between the steward and the debtors. Each of these debtors, it appears, had a bill or writing of his own; and with each of these bills or writings the same thing is done, and no doubt for the same purpose.

That these written agreements, if they really existed, must have been of a definite nature, and have obliged both the parties in them to certain distinct engagements, may be taken for granted; because no contract is entered into between any two parties,

^d In the romance of Charito, (De Chærea et Callirrhoe) lib. i. p. 20. l. 11, mention occurs of αἱ καταγραφαὶ, writings in relation to a proposed sale, the deed of bargain and contract between the parties.

In this sense, συγγραφαὶ, καταγραφαὶ, συνθήκαι, συμβόλαια, γράμματα, would all mean the same thing. In the remains of the Oratores Græci, frequent allusion occurs to such συγγραφαὶ, which it was often necessary to produce in lawsuits; and under the name of συνθήκαι, they are enumerated by Aristotle, Rhetorica i. 15, among the ἀτεχνοὶ πίστεις, useful more especially to the forensic orator.

without binding to something on either hand, and binding distinctly. And in the present instance, where the subject of stipulation on the one hand, was the supply of such and such an amount of one of the necessities of life—that the subject of the engagement on the other, would be the price to be paid for it in return, may also be taken for granted, not only from the reason of the thing, in all contracts or bargains relating to buying and selling; but also, because as the contributors of these supplies were not the tenants of the master, nor the commodities which they furnished him, the productions of his estates; they must have been tradesmen or dealers in such things—and the articles which they furnished, must have been their own property, which it is not to be supposed they would part with to any one, without an equivalent of some kind or other.

Admitting, however, the specific object of the contracts in question to have been of this description; it would be a further inquiry, whether the amount contracted to be furnished in a given instance, was so much for the year, or so much for a shorter time. That the contract would be for a regular and permanent supply, may be taken for granted: but the amount of the supply to be furnished being specified in one instance, at an hundred baths of oil, and in another at an hundred cors of wheat—it is of great importance to the sequel of the narrative whether this requires to be understood of a supply to be furnished for the year, or for the month.

Now as the necessity of a constant provision of the articles of subsistence could be due only to the

fact of a constant demand for them, we may presume that the mode of the provision in a given instance, would be regulated by the demand. The masters of families anciently supplied the daily wants of their servants at their own expense; but in the shape of a monthly, not of a daily allowance—consisting of so much corn, and by parity of reason, so much of any other article of food, and a certain sum of money. I apprehend then, that the specific object of the contracts in the parable, between the steward and each of his master's debtors, was more probably a monthly, than a yearly supply of the articles of consumption in question. And this conclusion is in unison with the admission of the debtors themselves; who acknowledge that they were bound to such and such an amount of their particular commodities, before, as it seems, they had been called upon to furnish them; whence we may infer that they had already been paid for them: that is, as these supplies were wanted every month, so we may presume they were laid in every month, and if they were laid in every month, that they were paid for every month—in other words, as it was part of the duty of a steward, to distribute the necessary articles of subsistence to the whole of the household, on the first day of the month, so was it probably, to reckon with those that furnished them; in which case, it might frequently happen that stated payments would be made, as at stated times and as for stated supplies, before the supplies themselves had been received. The particular amount too, of each of the supplies in question is more in proportion to what may be supposed the probable demands of an household of ancient times, for its monthly, than for its

annual consumption. To consider the amount of the wheat: an hundred cori of Jewish measure, or 3200 pecks of our measure, reduced to Attic measures, would be equivalent to about 650 medimni. Now a medimnus was equal to forty-eight chœnixes; and at the rate of a chœnix and an half per day, a medimnus of bread corn was as nearly as possible one man's full allowance of provision of that description, for a month. On this principle one hundred cori of wheat would be adequate to the maintenance of 650 persons monthly; but only of one twelfth of that number, yearly: the former of which is not more than a rich household of antiquity may be supposed to have contained, but the latter is much less.

Now the written particulars of all such agreements between the steward, acting in the stead of his master, and the various contractors for the supply of the wants of his master's household, would naturally be in the custody of the former, as the writings in the parable clearly appear to have been—and would make in fact part of his accounts; and if the occasion required it, they might readily be produced or referred to by him. But, as the business in the present instance, between himself and each of these parties, was to alter the terms of their own bond or engagement, such an alteration would amount to a forgery, and would require to be transacted not only with secrecy, but with dispatch. Hence his address to each, as he calls them in, "Sit down and write quickly;" for so his words should be rendered, rather than, "Sit down quickly, and write." The end which he has in view by the proposed change, is

to favour the debtor at the expense of his master, and so to lay him under a personal obligation to himself; and the particular means which he adopts for that purpose, is to reduce the amount of the article which he was bound to furnish, on the one hand, without abating the price which he was to be paid for it, on the other. The question, then, which he puts to each of them previously, "How much dost thou owe to my lord?" we may suppose was not intended for his own information, but to procure an acknowledgment from their mouths beforehand, that they were strictly indebted, and might strictly be called upon for more; in order the better to understand by whose favour they were about to be excused for less.

Besides, as a steward whom his master had virtually deprived of his office, he had not power to make any absolutely new contracts, which would be binding on his employer for the time to come; though, could he succeed in effecting it undiscovered, he might make what alteration he pleased in the terms of former, which his master had never yet seen, or so far as his own part in them was concerned, had already ratified and confirmed. We may presume too, that the end which he has in view by this expedient—under what circumstances, and for whose advantage, he proposes to make the reduction in question—that is, as about to be dismissed from his employer's service, yet before he quits it, anxious to confer a private obligation upon each of his old friends, which they might find an opportunity of acknowledging to him, when he should come to require it—is made known to his partners in the transaction, and meets with their approbation. And should this supposition be said to implicate the

debtors in the same fraud against the master, as his steward, and to represent them as bribed in a certain sense to do a favour to the steward, by a benefit done to them by him at the expense of his master—it is an obvious answer, that little requires to be said in defence of the probity of persons, who acknowledge themselves bound to the whole of a certain debt, yet can be persuaded that they need to pay only one half, or four-fifths of its amount.

The truth is, the parable proposes to represent the matter, on neither side, as better or worse than it really was, or really might have been. Experience proves that men may be readily induced to promote their own interest, at the expense of another person's—and even at the expense of their own honesty and plain dealing, when the proposal comes to them, like this in the parable, unsolicited and unexpected. It was easy for each of the parties to excuse himself to his own conscience, by the reflection that whether right or wrong in itself, the steward, and not he, was responsible for the offer made to him; that he was at liberty to bind his master to what terms he pleased; that he could not do him more injury than he had already done him, nor excite his displeasure more than he had already excited it; and that as to himself, he was merely following his advice, and whatever he was doing, or whatever was likely to be the consequence of it, he was doing or consenting to do nothing but what was proposed by the steward himself.

And as the object of the steward in this alteration of the terms in the contract with each of his master's debtors, was to lay them under such a personal obligation to himself, that when they found he had been

dismissed his master's service, they could scarcely fail to offer him an asylum in their own houses ; so it is worthy of remark, that the saving which he contrives to effect for them, is the saving of what would be ordinarily wanted for the support of a family ; and the amount of the saving in each instance, in all probability, is much more than could be wanted for the support of another member of a given family ; especially, if the alteration was one which would hold good for some time to come, and the saving in question would not be confined to a single instance of reduction in the amount of the supply, which must otherwise have been furnished, but be of stated and regular occurrence, and so the means of permanent advantage. For after what has been observed respecting the allowance made to each member of a family monthly, it requires no argument to prove that a saving of 500 gallons in the amount of the oil—and of 640 pecks in that of the corn, upon an annual, and much more upon a monthly supply ; even if made once for all, and not likely to be repeated in a second instance of the kind—was greatly more than adequate to the expense of maintaining one person throughout the year.

It is observable, that the proposed reduction in the supply of the oil, is greater in proportion than that in the supply of the corn ; which is no more than otherwise might have been expected : for the consumption of bread in a large household, it may be presumed, would always be greater than that of oil ; and, consequently, the amount of the latter wanted for its use, might more readily be diminished than that of the former. Perhaps, too, the waste-

fulness laid to the charge of the steward, consisted in laying in more of each of these articles than was absolutely necessary—and consequently distributing them more lavishly than he would otherwise have done. The reductions made in each instance might bring the amount of the supply within the limits of the demand ; and yet, though more in proportion to the necessities and consumption of the household, might leave the master indebted to those who furnished it, as much as before. That such, indeed, is the result of the proposed change in the terms of the contract with each of the debtors, as it affects the master—there can be no doubt ; nor had it been otherwise, would the conduct of his steward have been to blame. If the price to be paid by the master had been diminished, in proportion to the reduction in the amount of the supplies to be furnished by his debtors, both must have been left in the same relative situation as before ; and the obligation entailed upon either by the change, would have fallen on the master rather than on the debtors. But though it is clearly proposed by the steward, so to alter the terms of an existing covenant, as to reduce the amount of a stipulated supply, nothing is said about a corresponding reduction of the stipulated price ; whence it must follow, that the advantage of the alteration would be altogether on the side of the debtor, who having been paid, or being still to be paid the price of double the amount of the oil, was to furnish only one half the quantity ; and having received, or being still to receive the price of an hundred measures of corn, was to supply only four-fifths.

What the steward is represented to have done in each of these instances, we may presume that he did in every other of the same kind ; and what he hoped would turn out as the effect and result of all, we may conclude actually came to pass ; that those whom he had obliged in this manner, and to this extent, while still steward, did really take him into their houses, as a friend and benefactor, after he had lost his stewardship. Our Saviour's comment upon the parable justifies this presumption ; for it can hardly be supposed that he would have applied the preceding history to the case of his hearers, with such a preamble as this, "And I say unto you, make friends " for yourselves of the mammon of injustice, that " when ye fail they may receive you into the ever-
" lasting tabernacles ;" if those, whom the steward had obliged and made friends of, had not received him into their houses, when his stewardship also had failed. Hence his accounts being finally delivered to his employer, and exhibiting uniformly the same leaning to the interest of the debtors against the master's—combined, as we may presume, with the evidence of the result, that his servant, though discarded by himself, had yet found an asylum with some of them—could not but open his eyes to the fact that he had acted purposely with such a view to ulterior consequences, with a close and keen-sighted regard to his own interests, however much he might have neglected his master's ; and, with that conviction, might extort from him the praise, or if not the praise, the admission that whether he had behaved in his office of steward honestly and faithfully, or not, he had conducted

himself in it *prudently*, that is, warily, shrewdly, circumspectly.

THE MORAL.

The practical import of the preceding narrative is easily ascertained by the light of the comment which our Saviour himself has subjoined to it; but before we proceed to the moral of the parable, two questions require to be considered, as a consequence of the previous account—and not only involving a difficulty, which it would be improper to pass by without attempting to explain, but likely to conduce materially to the just apprehension of the moral use and design of the whole.

If the transaction which we have considered, was truly such as we supposed, a fraudulent transaction—repugnant to the principles of a strict morality—with what view has it been selected as the groundwork of a Gospel parable? And if the character of the steward has been correctly represented, as that of a man who had forfeited his master's confidence by a criminal abuse of his trust; and when about to suffer the consequences of his misconduct, endeavoured to guard himself against them by an unscrupulous contrivance, calculated to promote his own, but at the expense of his master's good—why is a particular encomium pronounced upon his behaviour, and how can we reconcile the fact of this approbation with the nature of his conduct itself? The answer to the first of these questions, might include the answer to the second; but there are special reasons why this should be considered an independent question, and, as such, should be answered

first ; for it is really more important to explain to the satisfaction of an ingenuous mind, in what sense an approbation might be passed, or appear to be passed, upon the conduct of the man, under the circumstances of the case, without any compromise of truth and probity, than why such a transaction as that which is recorded in the parable, should be made the basis of a particular narrative, with a certain moral end in view.

In order, then, to this explanation, we may observe first, that if the matter of fact, related in the parabolic history, taken as a whole, be either real or probable ; and if the judgment pronounced on the conduct of the steward, at the end of the account, be a real or probable part of it ; it was just as reasonable, or just as necessary, to specify this one circumstance, as to relate the rest of the transaction.

In the next place, whatever may have been the moral character of the conduct ascribed to the steward, and whatever the kind or degree of commendation supposed to be passed upon it—it is of great importance to observe, that the lord of the steward, the master in the parable, is the person who passes it, and whose opinion of the conduct of his servant it expresses ; and, consequently, whether right or wrong in itself, it is the master, and not our Saviour, who is answerable for it. The eighth verse of the narrative, in which the fact of this opinion is contained, upon no principle of construction, can be considered St. Luke's account, whether directly or indirectly introduced, of an observation, remark, or opinion of our Lord's, upon any part of the pre-

ceding narrative. St. Luke gives us the account of what our Lord said upon this occasion in general, beginning with the words of verse first, "He said "moreover to his disciples also ;" but our Lord's discourse itself consists of two parts, the parable, and the commentary founded upon it. In the former of these, he speaks as the historian of the words or actions of others ; in the latter, he speaks in his own person, and delivers his own sentiments. He began to speak in the former capacity with the first words of the narrative, "There was a certain rich "man who had a steward ;" and he has not done speaking in the same capacity, except with the first words of verse 9, "And I say unto you, make "friends," &c.^e

^e A reader who was competent to judge of the construction or context of the original for himself, would be in no danger of supposing the commendation passed upon the steward by his master, to have been meant by the historian of the parable, of our Saviour himself ; and even an unlearned reader, by attending to the form and manner in which our Saviour's own observations begin to be introduced at verse 9, would have reason to conclude that he intended to oppose some judgment, opinion, or direction of his own, to a judgment, opinion, or declaration of sentiment, made by some other person. The received translation has rendered the words of the eighth verse, "And the "lord commended the unjust steward ;" a version, as it stands, literally faithful to the Greek, indeed, but which would not have been less so, had it been, "And his lord commended the "unjust steward," which would at once have explained, to readers of every description, that the commendation in question was the act of the lord of the steward, historically related of him, like the rest of the narrative. But the truth is, the ambiguity of the authorized version in this instance, notwithstanding its fidelity to the original, is due to the use of the same term lord, to render the word κύριος, in Greek, both when it denotes

In the third place, the opinion pronounced on the conduct of the steward, might be the natural result of the circumstances of the case, and so far consistent and probable, and yet convey no praise of his conduct itself, upon the score of good desert: it might be founded in truth, and strictly justified by the occasion which produced it, and yet imply a censure, rather than an approbation of the character and conduct of the man.

We cannot imagine that the master in the parable could be so completely a stranger to his own concerns, as not to perceive, upon the inspection and examination of his steward's accounts—that he had done him an injury to a greater or less extent; nor yet so indifferent to his own interests, as not to resent this injury, if he discovered it. Nor does it

our Saviour, and when it stands for any other person. This word expresses merely the idea of a superior; and might be rendered in English indifferently either by lord or by master. As a general rule, it would have been advisable to reserve the former of these for the version of the Greek, where the context clearly implied it to be meant of our Saviour; and the latter, for all those instances of its use, where it was intended for some other person. This distinction, if applied in the present instance, would have removed all ambiguity even from the most literal version of the Greek; for had the words been rendered, “And the master commended the unjust steward”—what reader, however unlearned, would have been at a loss to understand of whom the act of that commendation was meant? That our translators, indeed, actually understood the commendation as something pronounced by our Lord, and accommodated their version of the words accordingly, cannot be collected from the terms of the version themselves. Among commentators of old, however, Jerome understood it in that sense. *Alteram de Evangelio Lucæ quæstiunculam proposuisti: quis sit villicus iniquitatis, qui Domini voce laudatus est: Epistola ad Algasiam, Operum iv. pars i. 195. ad med.*

appear that the judgment which he passes on his conduct acquits him of blame for the neglect of his duty, or declares his satisfaction with him for his attention to his personal interests. It is said indeed that his master praised him, but it is also said, why he praised him; and that reason is such, that the worse the conduct of the man had been, in itself, the more it must have been entitled to praise—at least upon those grounds. The commendation in question amounts simply to this, that while the steward had acted as an unjust steward would act, he had acted wisely; however unjustifiable in its principle, or selfish in its object his conduct might have been, it was exactly adapted to serve his particular purpose. He might have done *foolishly* for his master—but he had done *wisely* for himself; and such was the end which he proposed by his act—the more foolishly he had done for his master, the more wisely he must have done for himself. An admission this, warranted by the circumstances of the case; but as an acknowledgment of the truth, extorted, rather than voluntary, and as an opinion on the merits of the particular act in a moral point of view, a tacit condemnation, much more than a direct approbation of them.

If the approval supposed to be passed on the conduct of the steward, had been expressed unconditionally, it must have been received and construed unconditionally; in which case, it might have been difficult to shew in what part of the preceding transaction the man himself, in the opinion of his master at least, had done any thing amiss. But qualified as the statement of the approval is, by a particular explanation of the reasons of it, it must be received with that

restriction ; and the restriction is such, as to render the idea of praise in the proper sense of the word, nugatory, and to convert a seeming approval into a covert, though not the less real a rebuke.

The construction of the original in the eighth verse of the narrative, virtually contains a number of propositions ; which taken together, supply a specimen of the manner of reasoning, called by logicians the *sorites* ; the nature of which is such that each preceding member in a series of propositions is made to depend upon each succeeding ; and each succeeding proposition supplies a reason for the preceding. Thus, the four following assertions may be extracted from this one verse ; all connected with each other in the manner which we have been mentioning :

First, his master commended the steward of injustice, because he had acted *φρονίμως* ; which, for the present we will render, as in the English Bible, by “ wisely.”

Secondly, the steward of injustice had acted wisely, because he had acted *εἰς τὴν γενεὰν τὴν αὐτοῦ* ; which we will also render, “ in his own generation.”

Thirdly, the steward of injustice had acted wisely in his own generation, because he was one of the children of this world, and not one of the children of light.

Fourthly, the steward had acted so wisely, in his own generation, as one of the children of this world, and not one of the children of light, because the children of this world are all wiser in their own generation than the children of light.

It appears, then, that the reason why his master commended his steward's behaviour, was because he

had acted wisely ; but the reason why he had acted wisely, was because he had acted in a matter which concerned his own generation ; and the reason why he had acted so wisely in such a matter, was because he was one of the children of this world, and not one of the children of light ; and the general principle, which explains this distinction, and assigns the reason why one like the steward should have acted so much more wisely in such a matter than one of an opposite character might have done, is this, “that the children of this world are all wiser “in their generation, than the children of light.”

That the children of this world, then, are here opposed in some sense or other to the children of light, and that the former are said to be superior in some sense or other to the latter, is very evident ; but that the former are not opposed to the latter in *any* sense, nor the former said to be superior to the latter, *absolutely*, is equally clear. The children of this world are opposed to the children of light as having a greater share of a certain common faculty, denoted by the name of wisdom, and a greater power of using it for a certain common purpose, denoted by their own generation ; which is to make the one inferior to the other not absolutely, but relatively—not in *all* respects, but only in a certain respect. The fact of the inferiority of one of these descriptions of character to the other, is plainly asserted ; but the grounds of the inferiority itself, qualified as it is, are not stated. In order then to ascertain these grounds, and to arrive at a just idea of the inferiority asserted of one of these two classes of persons in comparison of the other—it is obviously necessary that we should endeavour to ascertain first,

what is to be understood by the personal denominations of the children of this world on the one hand, and of the children of light on the other ; secondly, what is the nature of that common faculty, denoted by the name of wisdom, more or less of which they are each supposed to possess ; and thirdly, what is the nature of that use and application, to which the possession of this faculty being rendered available in the hands of the one, more readily or more effectually than in the hands of the other, makes the former wiser in their generation than the other ; which is, in other words, what is to be understood by their generation itself. When each of these points has been satisfactorily cleared up, the grounds of the contrast between the two descriptions of character in question, will distinctly appear ; and so far from rendering it surprising that the one should be inferior to the other in those respects, they will shew by an obvious and necessary inference, that the children of light in the reason of things not only must be, but ought to be, inferior to the children of this world, in the exercise of any such common faculty as the wisdom in question, for any such common end and purpose as the generation of each in question.

First, then, the denomination of a child of this world, or of a child of light, however familiar to the readers of the New Testament, it should be remembered is of Hebrew original, and must be understood according to the genius of the Hebrew language ^f.

^f Vide Luke x. 6 : John xii. 36. xvii. 12 : Cf. Matt. xi. 19 : Luke vii. 35 : Acts iii. 25 : Ephes. ii. 3. v. 6 : 1 Thess. v. 5 : 2 Thess. ii. 3.

That such modes of describing characters are metaphorical, is self-evident ; and the foundation of the metaphor is not difficult of discovery ; as being taken from one of the commonest of relations, the relation of parent and child. The intention of such a metaphor is to express a community of nature between the things compared together in that specific relation to each other—such a community as must necessarily subsist between the parent and the offspring. In all cases of this relation, whatever be the nature of the parent, the same must be the nature of the offspring—the properties, attributes, or qualities of the nature of the parent must be communicated to the offspring ; which as deriving its essence from the parent, derives the properties and qualities of its essence from the parent also. The parent, under such circumstances, is reproduced in the offspring, and lives, as it were, again in the person of the offspring ; and the offspring, in its turn, is a continuation of the being of the parent, a reproduction and counterpart of its author.

The metaphor, then, of a child of light, or of a child of this world, to whatever description of real character it may be applied, must be intended to express a certain personal subject by a certain personal attribute and characteristic, between which and the subject, the agreement is by no means arbitrary or contingent, but founded in the nature of things, and in the essential capacity of the subject to possess such an attribute or characteristic. To understand therefore, what kind of person was meant by a child of light, our first business would be to inquire what could properly be meant by the quality of light, when applied as an attribute of

character ; for the person described as the child of light, will be the character possessed of that attribute : and if it must be self-evident that the attribute of light, even when metaphorically applied as descriptive of character, must yet be taken from the simple nature of light—it will follow that in the complex notion of a child of light, as a metaphorical designation for a certain kind of person or character, the predominating ideas will be those which are derived from the simple qualities of light—the ideas of purity, simplicity, candour, plain dealing, ingenuousness, and the like. The children of this world, on the other hand, being metaphorically described by a personal relation to this world, which supposes the nature of this world to be as truly identified with theirs, as the nature of the parent is with that of the children—no doubt must be some description of character in which the attributes and properties of the nature of the world, whatever may be denoted by that name, will be as truly reflected as those of the parent are in the offspring. Nor would it be difficult to shew from the stated, scriptural meaning attached to the mention of the “world” in question, what kind of character that must be, which admits of being described by this supposed unity of nature with it. But for the explanation of the phrase in the present instance, it is enough to observe that a child of this world being opposed by name to a child of light, must be opposed in nature also ; and by virtue of that opposition of nature, must be so far distinguished by the difference of name likewise, that a child of this world can be only another denomination for a child of darkness ; the persons or subjects denoted by which, when used as descriptive of

character, require as little illustration as the description of persons denoted by the children of light, opposed to them.

Secondly, though we have hitherto adopted the epithet, *wise*, to express the attribute of character, and the name of *wisdom*, to denote the faculty, in the degree of the possession of which, or in the power of the exercise of which for a corresponding end and purpose, one of these classes of persons was said to be superior to the other; it must be observed that the word in the original is *φρόνιμος*, and that it is only from deference to the authority of the received translation, that I have hitherto rendered it by “wise.” To ascertain the proper sense of the word which expresses the attribute of character in question—and consequently to arrive at a just idea of the nature of the faculty involved in that attribute—we may refer to a classical passage in the Gospel of St. Matthew; to which I appeal the rather, because, if the word which is rendered wise, must any where be understood in its strict and proper sense—according to which it will be found to mean a very different thing from wisdom—it must be here;—if we make it imply either more or less than this, we entail an error of excess or of defect on the complex of the passage itself, alike inconsistent with its just construction, and the meaning of the speaker.

Γίνεσθε φρόνιμοι ὡς οἱ ὄφεις, καὶ ἀκέραιοι ὡς αἱ περιστεραί: which is part of the charge delivered by our Lord to his twelve apostles, before he sent them upon their mission^s. “Behold, I am sending you forth as “sheep in the midst of wolves,” was the introduc-

^s Matt. x. 16. Harm. iii. 26.

tory part of the sentence: *γίνεσθε οὖν φρόνιμοι ὡς αἱ ὄφεις, καὶ ἀκέραιοι ὡς αἱ περιστέραί*, is the conclusion subjoined to it. It is almost self-evident then, that these words were intended to describe in as complete and beautiful, though as concise and comprehensive a manner, as possible, the perfection of an apostolical, that is, of a truly religious, a truly Christian character. This character, however, is supposed to consist of two very different and very opposite elements; which would not, we may presume, have been recommended only in conjunction, had either of them been sufficient for the perfection of the character, without the other. The reason of which is, that each of these elements of the same character, considered by itself, and independently of the other, contains an evil as well as a good—a principle of defect as well as a principle of perfection—each of such a kind, that, if supposed to belong to one and the same subject, by themselves, and to form the whole of the resulting character, the good or perfection on the one hand would be superseded, or counteracted and rendered nugatory, by the evil or imperfection, which accompanies it on the other. It is manifest, then, that neither of these two ingredients would be adequate by itself to the completeness of the desired effect; for though the good quality in each instance so far as it was free to act, would be a principle of perfection, it would be more than counterbalanced by the evil which goes along with it; nor, until that evil were removed or neutralized, would the good be left free to act. Now this evil is neutralized or removed in each case, by the union of these two ingredients with each other, according to the conjunction which is made of them in the text; for

each of them bringing a good as well as an evil, and the good in the one case being the opposite of the evil in the other, under these circumstances, the one is so critically accommodated to the other—the one has so natural an aptitude to mix and associate with the other—that the good on the one side corrects the evil on the other; the perfection inherent in the one of these elements, supplies the defect contained in the other. Hence, as is sometimes the case with the chemical amalgamation of substances of different qualities—the evil on either side is neutralized, but the good remains; the simple substances might be poisonous and noxious, but the compound is innocent and wholesome; the elements or ingredients of the character separately, might be unsuitable to the subject, contradictory to its nature, and much more inadequate to its perfection—but the composition of both together is a consistent, consummate, and harmonious result, which exactly represents what it should be.

The serpent, in all languages, is the emblem of wisdom in the popular sense of the word—but withal of guile; the dove on the contrary, is the emblem of innocence, but also of simplicity. Yet what is wisdom, when devoid of guilelessness, but subtlety, craft, or malice? and what is innocence or simplicity without wisdom, but ignorance, weakness, and credulity^h? I contend, then, that the proper sense of

^h Ignatius ad Polycarpum, 2. PP. Apostolici 876. Ε: φρόνιμος γενεῶν, ὡς ὁ ὄφις, ἐν ᾧ πᾶσι καὶ ἀκέραιος ὥσπερ περιστέρα. Hieronym. iii. 1283. *ad princip.* in Osee vii: Præcepit Dominus in Evangelio, ut simus simplices quasi columbæ, et astuti quasi serpentes: ut imitantes simplicitatem columbarum, et serpentis astutiam, nec aliis nocere possimus, nec ab aliis patiamur insidias; sed simplicitate et prudentia, exhibeamus hominem tem-

the word which is rendered “wise,” is subtle or cunning, or, if we think fit to adopt that version, prudent; provided that by prudence we understand no more than the power of contrivance in general—the power of the adaptation of means to the attainment of an end—to the nature and exercise whereof it should be indifferent whether the end were good or bad, and whether as employed and exemplified accordingly, the power itself, and the attribute of the character discriminated by its possession, be dignified and ennobled as wisdom and honesty, or degraded and stigmatized as craft and knavery.

That such must be the meaning of the word in the present instance, as descriptive of the character of the steward, might be collected from the testimony of the parable, and the evidence of his conduct itself; which is such as clearly to imply that he may deserve the name of a cunning, a crafty, and in that sense a prudent man—but not of a wise or honest one. The word too which throughout the New Testament answers in Greek, to “wise” in English, is a very different one from this. Wisdom in our language also, as applied to the behaviour of moral

peratum : quia prudentia absque bonitate, malitia est ; et simplicitas absque ratione stultitia nominatur. Basil, i. 283. B. C. in Ps. xlviii : οὕτω καὶ ἡ συνήθεια φρονίμους καλεῖ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον πράγμασι τὸ βλαβερὸν καὶ ὠφελίμον διακρίνοντας· καθὼς εἴρηται καὶ ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ· ὅτι οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου φρονιμώτεροι ὑπὲρ τοὺς υἱοὺς τοῦ φωτὸς εἰς τὴν γενεὰν τὴν ἑαυτῶν εἰσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῶς φρονιμώτεροι, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὴν διεξαγωγὴν τῆς ζωῆς ταύτης τῆς ἐν σαρκί· οὗτοι δὲ καὶ οἰκονόμοι ἀδικίας λέγονται, διὰ τὸ φρόνιμον τῆς περὶ τὸν ἑαυτῶν βίον οἰκονομίας. Theodoret, i. 165. Interpretatio in Ps. lxxvii. 71 : τοῦτοις ὅμοιος ἡ τοῦ Κυρίου νομοθεσία· γίνεσθε φρόνιμοι ὡς οἱ ὄφεις, καὶ ἀκέραιοι ὡς αἱ περιστεραί· ἐκατέρου γὰρ ἐξορίσας κακίαν, καὶ τοῦ μὲν τὴν κακουργίαν, τῆς δὲ τὴν ἄνοιαν ἐξελθὼν, τὴν ἐπαινουμένην ἐκέρασεν ἀρετὴν.

agents, implies an equal goodness and propriety in all parts of a certain action ; and not only that the end, in a particular instance of deliberating or acting with a view to some future result, but the means also, should be right and proper : whereas, in the case before us, however desirable or innocent, however expedient or necessary, might be the end which the steward proposed by his action, the means which he adopted to attain it, were unjustifiable and criminal. A wise man, in our sense of the term, must be a good man, but a merely prudent man need not be so ; and there is almost the same distinction in the popular use of the two words, which answer to these respectively in Greek.

Again, the word which is rendered by “generation,” denotes in the first place, what is properly to be understood by that term, a progeny, race, or succession, of men ; in the next place, the interval of time, or period of being within which each of these races is circumscribed, and within which one of them succeeds to another—a period ordinarily speaking of definite extent ; the limits of which are determined by the laws of nature, and easy to be ascertained from experience. In another acceptation, by a meaning founded upon this second of its senses, it denotes the extent and duration of the present life in the complex ; and in a fourth sense, by an obvious enlargement of its meaning in this third instance, it may denote the temporal interests and concerns of men—whatsoever, as the object of their desires and as the end of their pursuits, must still be desired and pursued, must be attained to and enjoyed, within the limits of this present lifeⁱ.

Of these different significations, none, it is evident, can suit the present passage, except the last. It follows then, that when the children of this world are said to be superior to the children of light in the use of a certain common faculty, with a view to a certain common end—that common faculty being the faculty of prudence, explained as above, and this common end being the generation of each, similarly understood—it is in the use and application of the powers of contrivance, more or less common by nature to both, and for the promotion of their proper temporal welfare, in which both are more or less interested alike, that the former of these classes of moral agents is said to be superior to the latter. And this qualification of the alleged superiority in question is of so much importance, that it ought by all means to have been retained in the version of the terms of the original proposition, wherein it is asserted. The children of this world were not affirmed to be superior to the children of

ⁱ Demosthenes, *Contra Timarchum*, xxiv. 204: *χρήματα κινῶν* *ἱερὰ, ὧν ἔνια οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας γενεᾶς ἀνετέθη*: where *γενεὰ* is used in the sense of our vernacular word, time; “in our time.” Xenoph. *Expositio Cyri*, ii. vi. 30: *ἦσθην δὲ ἄμφω ἀμφὶ τετραράκοντα ἔτη ἀπὸ γενεᾶς*—which means, from their birth. *Cyri Disciplina*, v. ii. 4: *ἀπήγγελλον τῷ Κύρῳ, ὅτι τοσαῦτα εἶη ἔνδον ἀγαθὰ, ὅσα ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων γενεάν* (not one generation or race of men, but while men were in existence) *ὡς σφίσι δοκεῖν, μὴ ἂν ἐπιλείπειν τοὺς ἔνδον ὄντας*.

Acts xiii. 36: *Δαβὶδ μὲν γάρ, ἰδίᾳ γενεᾷ ὑπηρετήσας τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ βουλῇ*—which should have been rendered, not “having served “his own generation by the will of God,” but “having served “the will of God in,” or “by his own generation;” in which sense, the word is used in the third of the meanings above enumerated. The clearest instance of the use of the term in the fourth of the senses in question, is that supplied by the parable.

light in the *possession* of this faculty of prudence, but in the *use* of it; nor yet in the use of it *absolutely*, but with a view to a *special* purpose; nor yet with a view to such a purpose, ἐν τῇ γενεᾷ τῇ ἑαυτῶν, “*in their own generation*,” but εἰς τὴν γενεάν τὴν ἑαυτῶν, “*unto*” or “*for their own generation*.” It is not, *in* their generation, properly so called—that is, so long as they are both alive—both in a state of probation, both in the world, and in the flesh together—that the children of this world are said to be superior in any sense to the children of light; but while they are both alive, and both have a generation to serve—*unto* this generation, in the last of the senses explained above; those worldly interests and temporal concerns of one kind or other, which both are obliged to attend to—and that good of their own, which can neither be provided nor enjoyed except in their proper generation, which both are more or less bound to consult and provide for. It is consequently in worldly prudence, that the one of these classes is supposed to excel the other, but not in heavenly; in that prudence whose views are confined to the limits of the present life, not that whose prospect extends to the next; in prudence whose sole motive to exertion is the temporal good of its possessor, and whose only sphere of operation is circumscribed by the duration of his temporal existence—not that which desires, pursues, and makes provision for his proper good *here*, but hopes to attain to it, and find the reward of its precautions, its labours, and pains in its behalf, hereafter.

It is easy, then, to infer that the children of light must be inferior to the children of this world, with

such a qualification of the inferiority itself, not because of the defect of ability to exert the same natural powers of contrivance for the attainment of the same kind of end in general, but from a defect of will; not because they are destitute themselves of a faculty possessed by their rivals and contemporaries, which they might use as they do if they had it—but because, though they possess it like them, they dare not use it like them; because in fact the cunning of the serpent is tempered and corrected in the children of light, but not in the children of this world, by the innocence of the dove. The children of light are not insensible to the value of temporal blessings, any more than the children of the world; nor do they think them, under all circumstances, unworthy of their desires or their pursuits: but the children of light are much more sensible to the value of their eternal interests likewise, than the children of the world. The children of light are not ignorant of the expediency of endeavouring to retain such goods, when in their possession, no more than of the necessity of labouring for them, when they possess them not; but they have not that exclusive desire of them beforehand, nor that overweening fondness for them when possessed, that they are not always as ready to resign them, if their duty requires it, as to desist from their pursuit—to renounce even the desire of possessing them—when the same duty forbids it: that they will sacrifice their probity and do violence to their consciences, to retain them when gained, any more than to become possessed of them.

The point of the contrast, then, between the conduct of the steward, as one of the children of this

world, and what, under similar circumstances, would have been the behaviour of one of the children of light, consists in this ; that an honourable, religious, and conscientious person would not have acted as he did, nor have hit upon the same expedient, however ingeniously contrived to suit his immediate purpose. Had he fallen into disgrace, as a consequence of his own misconduct, he would have borne it patiently, as only his desert ; and either have made reparation for his fault, by just and honourable means, or have submitted to ignominy, to want, or to any other privation, rather than aggravate his offence by a fresh instance of fraud and guilt.

The children of this world, in fact, are less scrupulous in the use of a common faculty, or in the pursuit of a common object, than the children of light. The latter might prosper as they do, while both are in the world together, if they would but act as they do ; they might have their reward from mammon, by serving him here, as well as the rest of his servants, would they but renounce the service of God ; they might find their account in the present life, as so many of their contemporaries do, could they but forget there was a life to come. Means may always be contrived for the attainment of ends, where men are disposed to look for nothing but what, whether better or worse, will promote their purpose : and frequently the least innocent and lawful of such expedients are the most effectual—the most likely to suggest themselves, and the first to be thrown in their way. It requires no slight degree of principle, and no small exertion of self-denial, to renounce the means of present advantage in such instances, where the renunciation is necessarily attended by some in-

mediate ill-consequence, the sacrifice of some favourite desire, the disappointment of long-cherished hopes, the failure of just and reasonable expectations; and sometimes not only the privation of good, which might otherwise have been attained, but the acquisition of evil, which otherwise would have been avoided. The facilities too, for serving our particular purposes, which we may often be tempted to use, but cannot—without a breach of moral obligation—no human law, perhaps, may prohibit; against which, consequently, not the dread of punishment in this life, such as might deter the worst of men from the violation of human laws, but the fear of displeasing God, and the apprehension of consequences to our future welfare, must be our dissuasive; a motive which can operate only with the good—producing an uniform respect to the laws of moral obligation, or to the sense of duty—from a virtuous principle, and for conscience' sake.

To proceed, then, to the first of the questions proposed for consideration—why a transaction, which appears to have been of so exceptionable a nature, should have been made the subject-matter of a Gospel-parable? The proper answer to this question must, no doubt, be found in the end and design proposed by the parable; that is, in the use and purpose to which the history of such a transaction, exceptionable as it is, may notwithstanding be directed. In a moral example, or practical illustration of one thing by another, we are bound to consider merely the use which is made of the example, and what is the inference or doctrine founded upon it; not the simple matter of fact, or merits of the

history, whether better or worse in itself. The narrator of such an history, as a teacher of morality, is responsible only for the application which he makes of it ; for the doctrines, deductions, or inferences of some other kind, to which, on the principle of analogy, he renders it subservient. He passes no judgment upon the facts of a certain transaction, even when morally wrong, who merely relates them ; nor does he make them less culpable, or give them the sanction of his own approbation, who shews that taken as they are, and neither better nor worse than they have been represented, they may yet be available to such and such practical uses. In the application of one parallel case to another, the analogy of circumstantial, and not the parity of moral relations, between the cases compared together, is all that is properly to be attended to ; and as contrary cases may be comprehended under the same general description, one opposite may possess a community of nature with another, and exhibit a just resemblance to it, in a variety of such circumstantial relations. As the bee sucks honey from every flower, the fragrant and the unfragrant alike—and as poisons themselves, when judiciously applied for the purpose of medicine, are rendered conducive to health ; so amidst the range and variety of parallel cases of all kinds, which observation and experience present to his view, the moralist who teaches by way of example, is at liberty to cull from the evil as well as from the good ; and may even more effectually display his skill, and more forcibly discharge the duties of his office, by extracting good from evil, by fetching the lessons of prudence and virtue from the school of vice, and making the wicked themselves,

under certain circumstances, the most convincing and useful instructors of persons of an opposite character.

There are some things in which even good men, without any prejudice to the innocence of their character, may submit to learn from evil. The case of the former, with respect to the interests of another life, *mutatis mutandis*, is exactly the counterpart of that of the latter, with respect to those of the present. It cannot be said, that even the best and most lawful ends require upon the whole, less sagacity and discernment in the choice of means, less labour and pains in their application, with a view to the attainment of the desired object, than their contraries. The œconomy of providence, both in the visible and the invisible world, has set one thing over against another, and placed one thing parallel to another, however different their nature, and the end and design of their being in other respects. Good is opposed to evil, and evil to good ; but each under circumstances more or less the same, to qualify it for acting according to the laws and tendencies of its own nature, though with results so widely different. The malice of devils, dangerous as it is, and the cunning of devils, subtle as it is, are yet matched and frustrated by the opposite goodness and the equal intelligence of angels. The children of this world, and the children of light, both labour within a sphere of their own, and for an end and purpose of their own, which are as widely discriminated asunder as the character of a child of the world is distinguished from that of a child of light ; but so far as both labour in common, and

after a good which is distant and contingent in common, and dependent for its attainment upon their personal exertions in common, so far they labour under circumstances the same, and for an end the same also. The children of light, then, may be content to relinquish to the children of this world, the guilty preeminence of being more prudent for the generation which *now* is, provided they learn from the example of their superiority in that respect, to vindicate to themselves the true wisdom, the real superiority, the glorious, as well as the innocent privilege, of being more prudent for the generation which is *to come*—to appreciate their everlasting interests as highly as the children of the world are observed to value their temporal; to labour for the life to come as diligently as their contemporaries do for the life now present; to fix their affections on the things in heaven as singly as their rivals on the things in earth; to earn their reward from God by serving him, as the slaves of mammon earn theirs by serving him; to exert the same industry, zeal, and assiduity to make their own calling and election sure—so far as this assurance is left to themselves—as men of the world in providing for their temporal welfare, and worldly advancement; to use the appointed means and opportunities of a state of probation, in order to their natural results upon the condition and circumstances of a state of retribution, with as much sagacity in the apprehension of them, as much skill and dexterity in their application, as the children of this world display in the readiness with which they perceive, the subtlety with which they contrive, the skilfulness with which they accommodate every expedient that design may sug-

gest, or accident throw in their way, for the promotion of their particular purposes.

In answering, then, the question proposed for discussion, we ought to consider, not what our Saviour has related, but with what view he has related it—whether to sanction by his own approbation an act of fraud, or cunning, (supposing the narrative to turn upon such a transaction,) or without passing either censure or commendation upon the act itself, to derive from it a practical lesson which it was calculated to supply, worthy alike of the teacher and of those for whom he intended it. As the readiest solution indeed, of the difficulty suggested by this question, it might have been said, that if the parabolic narrative records a real, and not a purely imaginary event, the objection to the propriety of its introduction for a doctrinal use and purpose, is sensibly mitigated, or rather is totally removed. The most delicate sense of propriety, I think, must admit, that there could be no reason, *a priori*, why even a moralist like our Saviour, might not relate in detail, a series of particulars which some time or other actually came to pass, as they are recorded—for the sake of the moral reflections which he founds upon them. And in this solution of the difficulty I would willingly acquiesce: for it has been shewn upon the strength of such arguments as applied to this class of parables in general, and to none of the number more than to the present^k, that all those histories which our Saviour relates after the manner of true histories, for a doc-

^k Vide vol. i. Introd. chap. vii. pp. 82—95.

trinal purpose, that is, all the moral parables in particular—may justly be presumed to be what they appear, and what from the mode in which they are narrated, and the uses to which they are directed by their author, we should naturally conclude them to be—not fictitious, however probable narratives, but real and actual accounts.

Now, it is manifest that in considering the application of the conduct of the steward, to some moral use and purpose beyond itself, we have nothing to do with his history as furnishing such an example, except from the point of time, where the parable enters into the circumstantial account of his conduct. Whatsoever precedes this point of time, may have its use in accounting for his conduct—in explaining the principle on which he is perceived to act in the particular transaction which is the subject of the narrative—but for the sake of the practical inference proposed to be derived from that particular transaction, it may be disregarded as irrelevant to the end in view. It is evident, however, that in this part of his history the real defectiveness of his character chiefly resides: that the abuse of trust, of which he had been systematically guilty previous to the transaction recorded in the parable, constitutes the true offence—the actual criminality of the man. He had renounced his principles, and forfeited all claim to the character of an honest servant, long before we see him engaged in a particular scheme to defraud and injure his master. We should therefore have been prepared to expect from such a man, if there was occasion for it, some such conduct as is ascribed to him: it would have been

surprising had the case been otherwise, or the close of his history in his capacity of steward, had exhibited a different turn of things: if one, who had already fallen into disgrace, upon good grounds, for a supposed breach of trust, had proved himself worthy of confidence, at last; if one, who had embezzled his master's property until then, had suddenly become careful of it; if one, whose conduct had been uniformly selfish heretofore, had all at once become tender of another's and careless of his own interest and advantage.

Now what, we may ask, is the precise situation in which, from the point of time when the narrative descends into detail, he is supposed to be placed? As a servant, until then intrusted with an office of confidence, and the care of something in behalf of another, who, for some reason—which so far as the result was concerned would require to be no further specified, than that it was a valid reason, and likely to lead to such a result—has forfeited the confidence of his superior, and is about to be dismissed from his trust: as a confidential servant, who, for reasons arising out of the necessity of the case, which also would not require to be further specified than that they lead to such a consequence—though virtually dismissed from his office already, and in a short time about to be actually so, yet necessarily retains it a little while longer, and consequently all its rights and privileges, as before: as a confidential servant, who, having the prospect of losing for ever a lucrative and valuable employment, yet retaining a little longer its powers and privileges, skilfully avails himself of the opportunity afforded by the suspension of his sentence, the brief prolongation of

his former authority—to do something by virtue of that power, and not inconsistent with his previous character, which will effectually guard him against the consequences otherwise to be apprehended to himself, from the loss of his master's favour, and the place which he held in his service. What his previous character might be, and what the particular moral quality of the expedient upon which he fixes, so far as the end which he has in view by it was concerned, it would not be necessary to inquire, further than to know, that better or worse in itself his character was consistent from first to last in prompting him to this expedient—and right or wrong in itself, the expedient which he adopted was critically adapted to serve his purpose.

Such, we may contend, would be a correct outline of the principal, material facts in the parabolic history, considered as supplying the grounds of analogy to justify the application of the narrative to any thing beyond itself. But with regard to this application—or whom it might concern, and in what respects—as the parable is ushered in by a remark of the evangelist who records it, that it was addressed by our Lord to his disciples—as the reflections, which he himself founds upon the facts of the narrative, are directed to them—as though the Pharisees, and probably others, might hear what was said by him, as well as the disciples, yet it appears that they heard it only because they were present at the same time, and in the same place, as they—it seems superfluous to observe that in the intention of the speaker of the parable, the parallel or example therein contained, must have been designed to apply

in a special manner, to the case of his own disciples. But if it was designed for his own disciples, we may conclude that it was designed for those, who either were, or should be, Christians: and if it was specially designed for Christians, we may take it for granted it was designed for an use and purpose highly evangelical, and becoming all Christians both to know and to observe accordingly: something, in short, if we may judge from the dislike of the doctrine, exhibited by the Pharisees, and the manner in which they gave vent to their feelings upon hearing it, not only new and unheard of until now, (and consequently either not taught, or not clearly taught in the writings of Moses and the Prophets,) but withal highly offensive to antecedent prejudice, or natural inclinations. What this doctrine was, may be collected from the statement of the four following propositions; in which we may sum up the moral of the parable, as deducible from that outline of its most important circumstances, given above.

First, by virtue of such a representation as is contained in this parable, Christians in general may and ought to know that they stand, or are capable of standing to some master, in the relation of confidential servants in general, and of stewards in particular; and therefore that they are, or they may be, invested with a certain responsible trust.

Secondly, by virtue of the same representation, as applicable to their own case, Christians may and ought to know that the trust in question is one which they hold, or are liable to hold, only for a limited time; which they must render up at last however long they may retain it previously, and may be called upon to resign prematurely.

Thirdly, by virtue of the same representation Christians may and ought to know that on the use and administration of this trust, so long as it remains in their possession, certain consequences, affecting themselves, in the way of retribution, that is, in the shape of reward or in the shape of punishment, when they come to render it up again, necessarily will depend.

Fourthly and lastly, by virtue of the same representation Christians may and ought to know that it is their interest as well as their duty, so to use and administer the trust in question, while it is their own, that when it is taken from them, or when they cease to retain it, they may be no losers in personal advantage by the change of circumstances—they may not fail of the good, attached to its right use, nor become liable to the evil, entailed by its abuse, previously.

THE APPLICATION.

If the moral of the parable is rightly comprehended in the four preceding propositions, and if the persons to whose case it was intended to apply, are Christians, then, it may certainly be collected from it that Christians in particular are, or may be, invested with a peculiar trust; that they are, or may be responsible accordingly; that they have, or they may have a direct personal interest in the consequences whether of the use or of the abuse of their trust. But responsibility is simply the consequence of the delegation of a trust from a proper superior to a proper inferior; and the idea of such a trust may apply to every thing which can be committed by one person

upon certain terms, to the care or disposal of another. The question, then, may be asked, what is the specific character of that trust with which Christians, by the light of the parable, may conclude themselves to be invested, or capable of being invested? and in particular, what is its subject matter, or the thing committed to their trust—as well as who is the superior from whom they must be supposed to have received it, and to whom they are responsible for its use?

Now the analogy of the parable leads to the inference, that if the persons, to whose case it is applicable, are placed in circumstances corresponding to those of the parties in the parabolic transaction; they stand in the relation of servants to some master in general, and of stewards who have the care of his property in particular; and if these persons are Christians, then as the only master to whom Christians in general can stand in the relation of servants, is God, so the only description of trust with which they can be invested as a consequence of that relation, and be placed by it in the relation of stewards to their proper master, is the use and enjoyment of temporal wealth. The specific description of the trust, then, with which Christians in general, by the light of the parable, may know themselves to be invested, or capable of being invested, is that of a stewardship under the temporal providence of such a master as God; and the particular instance of the thing committed to their charge, for the use or the abuse of which they are or they may be responsible to this master, is temporal wealth.

This conclusion is shewn to be just both by the

application which our Lord himself makes of the parable in his own comments and reflections upon it, and by the conduct ascribed to the Pharisees, who were present and heard what he said. It appears from the tenor of his observations, that the case which he had supposed as applicable to the situation of his hearers, applied to them in the capacity of owners and holders of *mammon*—that is, of owners and holders of *money* or *wealth*; for *mammon* in the vernacular language of Palestine, answers to *Plutus* in Greek—and both, as properly denoting wealth or riches in general, are metaphorically capable of being applied to designate the power or divinity supposed to preside over, and to regulate the distribution of this species of temporal good¹. The immediate cause of the conduct ascribed to the Pharisees, is no doubt attributable to their dislike or contempt of the doctrine of our Saviour, whatsoever it was; the ultimate cause, or the motive to this dislike or contempt itself, is resolved by the evangelist into their love of money: from which it is necessarily to be inferred that the doctrine so offensive to their prejudices, or so absurd to their apprehensions, concerned in some manner or other the subject of money. It is to be supposed that their dislike or contempt of the doctrine, was arrived at its height, when it broke out in insulting language, or in

¹ *Mammonas autem est secundum Judaicam loquelam, qua et Samaritæ utuntur, cupidus et plusquam oportet habere volens: Irenæus, 211. lib. iii. cap. 8.—Mammona autem, non Hebræorum, sed Syrorum lingua, divitiæ nuncupantur, quod de iniquitate collectæ sint: Hieronym. iv. pars i. 196. ad calc.: Epistola ad Algasiam.—Mammona sermone Syriaco, divitiæ nuncupantur: Ibid. 22. ad princip.: in Matt. vi.*

gestures of scorn and derision; both which may be implied in the words, (ἐξευκτῆρίζον αὐτόν,) which the evangelist applies to their conduct; properly denoting, to sneer at a person, “*naso suspendere adunco.*” Now this was, when our Saviour had pronounced the last words of verse 13, “Ye cannot serve God “and mammon:” an assertion which affirms so palpable a contradiction between the service of God and the service of mammon, as to leave room for no alternative but one—whosoever would to any extent prefer the obedience of either, to the same extent must renounce the service of the other. There is no possibility of a compromise in balancing between two services like these. The incompatibility of the one with the other is insuperable; the natural repugnancy of the one to the other is invincible. Considering mammon, and God, each in the light of a personal subject, possessing a character, a disposition, a nature of his own—the opposition of personal qualities between them is such, that the servant who loves the one, must hate the other; and considering both in the relation of masters, who have proper services due to them, and proper persons who are bound to render them—such is the opposition and contrariety of the service itself in each instance, that the servant who renders the one, must neglect the other—the servant who holds to, or respects the will and the commands of the one, must by that very act, make light of the injunctions and despise the wishes of the other^m.

^m That such are the reasons of the impossibility asserted of the same servant's serving two masters, must be evident. When it is said, no domestic can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other—it is taken for granted that their personal characters will differ, and differ in such a manner,

It is true, that in our Saviour's further allusions to the mammon in question, it is discriminated by an epithet which literally construed, denotes unrighteous or unjust : on which account, without calling in question the truth of the conclusion that riches in general are meant by the word employed, there have yet been commentators, especially in ancient times, who have understood this unrighteous mammon in the literal sense ; as that particular description of wealth, which, among the various possible modes of acquiring riches, is the fruit of injustice, of fraud, of violence, or any other iniquitous means. The unlearned reader should beware how he puts a construction like this, upon the drift of our Lord's admonitions—so unworthy of the simplicity of Christian morality, and more characteristic of the cunning of the serpent, than of the innocence of the dove. The doctrine of allowing of evil that good may ensue, or of the use of improper means for the sake of the goodness of the end, is too strongly condemned both by reason and scripture, to suppose it could ever be sanctioned by our Saviour, or that his teaching upon this point could hold one language, and St. Paul's anotherⁿ. The best possible use which

that if the one is properly an object of love, the other must be properly an object of dislike ; and when, that he cannot serve two masters, because he will hold to the one, and despise the other—it is presumed that the services which they would respectively exact, must differ, and so differ, that to attend to the one must imply to neglect the other, to make much of the one, must be to make light of the other. Now both these things are eminently true of two such masters as God and mammon, and of two such kinds of services, as each in his proper capacity of master, and according to his proper character, would require of a servant.

ⁿ Rom. iii. 8.

might be made of ill-gotten wealth, would not avail to compensate for the sin of its acquisition originally, and the guilt of possessing it so obtained; a guilt which may be aggravated by an improper use of the wealth itself, but can never be expiated by using it well. And however desirable it might be, that a good use should be made, if possible, of ill-gotten wealth—generally speaking, those who are capable of obtaining wealth by improper means, are naturally least disposed to use it well, when obtained. Nor can it be said to be more desirable that wealth should be well used, even under such circumstances than under any other; for it is equally desirable that wealth should be well used under *all* circumstances, without regard to the mode of its acquisition, and simply for the sake of its application; because it is equally desirable, under all circumstances, that wealth should be used according to its own nature and tendencies. Under no circumstances are riches applied according to their natural intent and purpose, unless they are well applied; and not more, when they have come into a man's possession by improper means, than when they have not. It is only in the way of alternative, or on the principle of a choice between evils, that the propriety of the use and application of riches, when acquired, can be or ought to be proposed as a kind of compensation for the impropriety of the mode of their acquisition, when ill obtained: for as the least of two evils, it is certainly better that wealth, though improperly obtained, should not be improperly applied, than that it should be both ill gotten and ill applied. In one of these cases, something appears to be done towards correcting a preexisting evil by a subsequent

good ; but in the other, what was bad before is made in the sequel still worse.

The acquisition of wealth by improper means may be very common in the practice of the world ; but no one will say that it is the natural or legitimate mode of acquiring it : that however many may labour to get rich by such means, and however frequently riches may be obtained thereby, they are acting agreeably to their duty, who do so—the effect should result from such means ; or that such modes of acquiring riches are according to the ordinary appointment of Providence. It is not to be supposed, therefore, that a moral teacher, under any circumstances, and much less our Saviour, presupposing the possession of riches in some way or other, and discoursing upon the best manner of subsequently using and applying them, would proceed upon any assumption of the mode of their acquisition, but the most natural and legitimate one ; or prescribe rules for their subsequent use, as obtained and possessed in any mode but that. In the present instance, the directions which our Saviour lays down, for the use and application of riches, are intended for their use and application in general—and consequently under the circumstances in which they come into men's possession in general ; not with a special reference to a particular mode of acquisition, requiring special rules and directions for the mode of their application.

The truth is, the characteristic epithets attached to the mammon in question, possess among their other significations, the classical sense of truth and falsehood, of faithfulness and inconstancy, as well as of

simple righteousness and unrighteousness, or justice and injustice; because truth and fidelity, falsehood and inconstancy, are necessarily component parts in the complex idea of justice and injustice, righteousness and unrighteousness, as predicated of things or of persons. That such is the meaning of the phrase, "the mammon of injustice," in the ninth verse, may distinctly be collected from the eleventh verse; where the *unjust* mammon is directly opposed not to the *just* or *righteous* mammon, but to the *true*. As the same subject is spoken of in each of these instances, it follows that the *unjust* or *unrighteous* mammon must be simply the *false* mammon, or the *true* mammon must be simply the *just* and the *righteous* mammon. In either case, one species of mammon in general is opposed to another; each of them belonging to a common genus, according to the well-known principle of logical abstraction, that contrary species may both be comprehended under the same genus; yet as contraries, as such, have nothing in common—each of them widely discriminated from the other in its specific, or differential properties.

Nor, with the light of the present description to assist us in arriving at a true idea of either, is it difficult to perceive both what kind of mammon that must be, which is properly opposed to the true; and why the opposition of nature and properties between them should be of this kind, and of no other. For the true mammon, it appears, is something which must be earned by the use of the false; and the false is something which must conduct to the possession of the true: the false mammon is something which we are, or we may be, possessed of

already; the true is something which we cannot possess as yet, but may sometime come to possess: the false mammon is something with which we must be intrusted here; the true is something with which we can be intrusted only hereafter: the former must be had and used, must be possessed and enjoyed, in the present life; the latter, in the life which is to come.

It is clear, then, that the false mammon is mere temporal wealth, but the true mammon is the spiritual or heavenly riches; between which, with the utmost diversity of essential properties, there may yet be an identity of name, and to a certain extent, a community of nature. Without entering into the enumeration of particulars, or attaching to the idea of riches that gross and carnal sense in which the word is used of temporal affluence and its constituent parts—let a man define what he means by wealth in the abstract—let him say what it is, which under all the varieties and modifications of circumstances, by its presence will make rich, and by its absence will make poor—and this may agree even to the idea of the treasures of heaven; and the false mammon itself may so far assist us to a comprehension of the nature of the true. The blessings of an heavenly state can consist in nothing which ordinarily constitutes affluence and abundance upon earth; yet, doubtless, they will consist in something which, when it comes to be possessed, may be strictly denominated affluence and abundance also. For possession must be understood in reference to possessors; the mode and measure of supplies to the kind and degree of wants; and the means and opportunities of fruition to the powers and capacities

of enjoyment. Even in the present life, the variation of external circumstances is estimated according to the same rule ; and one who might justly be considered rich, with such and such means, in one station or lot of life, would be pronounced poor, if advanced to another, which required or admitted of more, without an enlargement of his means in proportion. And whatever be the change which transition into another state of being and a new scene of things, may make in our necessities, our faculties and capabilities—we shall still be rich, we shall be truly and properly rich, if the means of enjoyment are strictly proportioned to the capacity of it ; if the provision of the supply is commensurate to the necessity, and both our sentient and our intellectual natures are left destitute of nothing which the altered state of their circumstances may require, for their happiness and their perfection.

The opposition, then, between these two kinds of mammon is that which exists between a better and a worse species of the same thing. The heavenly mammon does not differ from the temporal, in not having the common nature of wealth, as well as that, but in possessing the essential properties of this common nature, purified and perfected to a degree incomparably above it. The spiritual mammon does as much exceed the temporal, in the truth and reality of all such properties, as the substance the shadow, or the gold seven times refined from the furnace, the ore which is dug from the earth. The proper modes of designating or describing the one, are consequently applicable only on the principle of negation to the other : the positive qualities of the one are negatively the attributes of the other. If the one be

transcendent in dignity, and invaluable in price, the other is low in the scale of rank, and worthless in the rate of estimation ; if the one is infinite and unbounded in its magnitude and degree, the other is limited and finite ; if the one is lasting and indeprivable, the other is insecure and transient ; if the one is our own, in the sense of propriety or ownership, the other is not our own, but some one's else, in that sense ; if the one is really what it is called, the other is but nominally so ; if the one is actually what it appears to be, the other is only the semblance thereof ; if the one is the truth of the thing itself, the other is but the likeness, the image of the truth, and so far counterfeit and false.

It remains, then, to be shewn that the possession of the temporal mammon is to be considered strictly a trust—and answers to all the conditions of such a trust as that with which, from the analogy of the parable to the circumstances of their own case, Christians in general may or ought to know that they themselves are or may be invested.

Now, if all good giving and every perfect gift, according to the apostle, comes down from the Father of lights, the Fountain of goodness—riches, one of the chief of external blessings, and in the dispensations of his providence the appointed instrument of so much benefit and advantage both to the possessors and to their fellow-creatures, may well be supposed in an especial manner *his* gift. But if the possession of the temporal mammon, that is, of riches commonly so called, is rightly to be considered the effect of the providence of God, it cannot but entail a trust ; since God bestows nothing

on his rational creatures, directly or indirectly, in this life, which he does not give for some moral or probationary purpose, and does not design to be held and applied accordingly.

The arguments which our own reason might supply in favour of both these conclusions, would not be few nor inconsiderable^o: the scriptural proofs

^o There is no one object of pursuit, upon which a greater number of rational and intelligent beings are at all times labouring in common, than on wealth. There is none which, when possessed, contributes in more ways to the personal gratification, or personal enjoyment of its possessor; none, which is more calculated to flatter his vanity and self-importance, to procure him admiration or deference, adulation or respect; to embellish and give a charm to his virtues, and to throw a veil over his imperfections:

Omnis enim res,
Virtus, fama, decus, divina humanaque pulchris
Divitiis parent; quas qui contraxerit, ille
Clarus erit, fortis, justus—Sapiensne? etiam, et Rex,
Et quicquid volet.

It is no wonder, therefore, that of all the blessings which they can enjoy in the present life, and for which they must be alike indebted to the providence of God, men should be most disposed to plume themselves upon this; and least inclined to attribute the accident of its possession to any cause but their own merits, their own exertions, and their own success.

But the very notion of temporal good, presupposes that which can neither be acquired nor enjoyed except *in time*, that is, except in the present life; and if riches, whether justly entitled to the preeminence assigned them in this class of goods, or not, are still only one of the number—they too can neither be acquired nor enjoyed except in time. Now to the acquisition and possession of goods of this description, nothing is so manifestly necessary as the gift, and the continuance of the gift, of *life*; and where two things are so connected, that one of them cannot have a being without the other, the question of the ori-

also of the same truths, dispersed through the Old and New Testament, are many and various.

gin of the one is the question of the origin of the other ; the true first cause of the one is the true first cause of the other. Such is eminently the connection between the possession of life, and the possession of any among the manifold varieties of good, which can neither be acquired nor enjoyed except in life. A man has only to compare the nakedness, helplessness, and destitution, in which every human being, by the laws of nature, must be first brought into the world, with those numberless comforts and conveniences, those luxuries and indulgences, with which riches and affluence in particular are seen to be surrounded ; to be convinced how much human existence stands in need of for the satisfaction of its necessary wants, or how much it is capable of for the measure of its possible enjoyments ; both of which every human subject must procure more or less for himself. Now it is superfluous to prove, that both the first gift of life, and the subsequent continuance of it, are alike independent of the possessor of the gift. It may be asserted with equal truth, that no man can fix the time and the mode of his coming into the world, and except by an act of usurpation, and by forcibly intruding into the province of his Maker, that no man can fix the time and the mode of his departing from it again. The termination of existence in the present life is something, by the laws of their being, as independent of men themselves, as the beginning of it. In every question, then, relating to the true first cause of any description of temporal good—of good, which, however acquired and however enjoyed, yet presupposes of necessity the gift, and the continued possession of the gift of life—to overlook the true first cause of the effect in the latter instance, is to overlook the most indispensable condition, and in fact the true first cause of the result in the former instance. It is quite clear that ultimately the effect in the latter instance must be resolved into the effect in the former ; that whatever is necessary to life and its continuance, is necessary to the possession of the goods of life. Other things also may be necessary to the same effect, and things more or less dependent upon ourselves ; but nothing can be necessary *before* this, and nothing can be so necessary *as* this. . And if life and its continuance are

But the necessity of the case requires us to confine ourselves at present to those which are furnished

at all times to be resolved into a cause beyond men themselves, the goods of life and their enjoyment—every thing, which men can acquire and possess only in life—are virtually resolvable into a cause beyond themselves also.

The question which St. Paul puts to the Corinthians, with respect to the extraordinary gifts bestowed upon them, would be equally applicable to the ordinary blessings of the Divine providence: "What hast thou that thou didst not receive?" and the inference which he draws from this true view of the origin and first cause of the one, to repress the pride, the vanity, the presumption of their possessors, would be equally pertinent to the other; "Now if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?" It is true, that in the usual acceptation of terms, as the idea of a giver supposes a receiver, and either, the transfer of something from one possessor to another—we should naturally expect in every case of giving and receiving, the giver to be as distinct a person as the receiver, and the mode in which the gift passes from the one to the other, to be as obvious to our apprehensions as the subject-matter of the gift. But where God is supposed to be the giver, and one of his moral creatures to be the receiver, and the gift itself to be some one of the goods of fortune—though the receiver may be very obvious, the giver is invisible; and though the subject-matter of the gift may be very intelligible, the mode in which it passes from the giver to the receiver is not overt, but concealed. Though God be the giver in such cases, he gives indirectly; and the receiver perceives not the hand which conveys the gifts of his providence unto him, even while he tastes of its bounty in its sensible effects.

But it is a very unphilosophical view of things, to allow the reality of nothing, which is not apparent to the senses; or to call in question the efficiency of a variety of causes, because while the effect of their agency is palpable and indisputable, the mode of it is latent or inscrutable. The difficulty, indeed, which encumbers the question of the ultimate origin of tem-

by the analogy of the parabolic illustration, or by the comment of our Saviour subjoined to it.

poral blessings, with reference to the peculiar manner of their dispensation, as gifts which the providence of God bestows in particular instances, though not directly, nor at once as from himself—is one which extends to the whole order both of the physical and the moral world. To the eye of a superficial observer, not only the business of life, but the œconomy of the universe, is carried on by a series of causes and effects; which a more philosophical language would denominate a succession of stated antecedents and consequents. It is the regularity of such antecedents and such consequents, which renders them liable to be mistaken for causes and their effects; for as to any necessary connection between them—though the course of nature may be maintained and perpetuated visibly to our senses, by the instrumentality of infinitely numerous and infinitely complicated secondary causes—a wise philosophy, as well as an enlightened piety, has long since decided, that without the *Deus in nodo*, without the constant presence, interposition, and agency of some great first cause, the will or power of the Author of nature, not one secondary cause now in operation, could possess the least efficiency, not one stated consequence, according to the laws at present established, could take place. Nor are those effects which depend more or less upon the agency of men themselves—the causes of which it is usual to designate by the name of moral, in opposition to physical—excepted from the general rule. The only difference is, that in the production of moral effects, the part sustained by the Divine providence, concurrently with agents possessed of a freedom of will and an independence of their own, is more wonderful and inexplicable, though not less real, than in the production of natural.

The philosophers of antiquity, in order to account for all possible effects, made a fourfold division of causes—the material, the formal, the instrumental, and the final: a division, *mutatis mutandis*, intended to apply to the relations of cause and effect in every instance, but first and properly to the productions of art or nature. Let us apply it to an effect of this description, the production, for example, of a sword. The material cause in

And first, if the temporal mammon, in whatsoever way acquired, and by whomsoever possessed, were

this instance, would be the iron of which the sword was made; the formal, the shape or character which distinguished the sword, as one instrument of iron, from any other composed of the same material; the instrumental would be the forge and anvil by which the iron was wrought into that shape; and the final would be the use to which the sword, when made, was intended to be put.

It is evident, however, of this enumeration, that it leaves out of sight the most important of the elements to the given result—the true efficient cause, as contradistinguished to the material, the formal, the instrumental, and the final, in every instance. For that there must be some true efficient cause, to account for every actual effect, can require no proof; and that this true efficient cause, in a given instance, is none of the four above enumerated, will be just as evident, when we consider that something must lie at the bottom even of each of them, to give them the power of causation—to make them what they are, the real efficient agents in a real and actual effect. For example, without matter itself, there could be no such thing as a material cause, to give birth to the various kinds of material productions: and without the properties, powers, and capacities of matter, there could be no such thing as a formal cause, to discriminate one material production of a certain kind from another of like kind. And with respect to the instrumental cause—without the materials of which instruments are composed, there could be no such thing as instruments—and this case is so far the same as the former; and even when the materials are in existence, as no instrument can contrive, or use itself—without something to invent and fashion the instrument beforehand, and to use and apply it afterwards, there could be no such thing as the instrumental cause, to account for the production of any of the works of art. And with respect to the final cause—the contemplation of ends beforehand—the prospect of the uses to which artificial productions of any kind may be rendered subservient—is the province of foresight, and presupposes the exercise of reason, and the power of contrivance; and that, a rational and intelligent subject: so that the

not a trust—derived from the bounty of an heavenly

efficacy of this description of cause is no more independent of something beyond itself, than that of any other of the four.

It appears then, that the true efficient cause in the production of any work of art, and by parity of reason, of any other result to which a similar distinction of causes is applicable, is neither the material, nor the formal, nor the instrumental, nor the final—but something implied in each of them, and necessary to them all in common. It is the power of the Creator of the material universe, and the bestower on matter of its various attributes and properties, in the material and the formal; it is the same power, as the first author of matter in general, or as the Maker of man in particular—the framer of his bodily organs, the Creator both of his rational and his sentient nature—in the instrumental and the final. Now let this distinction in the principles of causation—which the more it is reflected upon, the more just and reasonable it will appear—be applied to the question at issue; the true cause of the acquisition, possession, and enjoyment of wealth. Among the particulars which are ordinarily considered to constitute riches, what can be mentioned, that is independent of a power and agency beyond the acquirer or possessor himself; without the cooperation of which he could not possess, or even be competent to possess it? Let us take the definition laid down by Aristotle, *Rhet. i. v. 7.* to describe the complex idea of riches and opulence, in ancient times—*νομίσματος πλῆθος, γῆς, χωρίων κτήσις, ἐπίπλων κτήσις, βοσκημάτων, καὶ ἀνδραπόδων*—all the best, or at least, all excellent, of their kind; to which little can be added to make it more suitable to the same idea in modern times, except perhaps such things as paintings, sculptures, books, equipages, gardens, parks, and the like. Is there any one, then, among these possessions, of which the owner, however he may have acquired them, can be said to have been the true efficient cause for himself? Is it his grounds, the useful or the ornamental—his farms, his parks, his gardens? Is it his woods, his lakes, his trees? Is it his flocks, and his herds; his corn, his wine, or his oil? Is it the marble, the stone, or the timbers, which compose his dwelling? Is it the materials of his household furniture within? Is it the fleeces,

friend, and designed to be administered, in some

the silks, or the dyes, which supply his dress, and cover or adorn his person?

That we may not descend too minutely into particulars on these points, let us confine ourselves to one of the parts of wealth, enumerated above, the possession of money. Money is indeed so generally recognised as the representative of every other kind of valuable, that property in money is virtually property in every thing which constitutes wealth: there being nothing of that description which if it is to be purchased, money will not procure, and scarcely any thing of the same kind, which may not be had for money. Now property in money, as the possession of such and such portions of the precious metals, is that species of possession the first cause of which, above all things, must be referred to the author of nature. Were all the gold and silver of all the world amassed together in the hands of one possessor, it would make him certainly the richest of mortals, but he would not have a grain more of either than the Almighty Demiurge originally produced out of nothing. Men have not yet found out the philosopher's stone, or the means of creating gold and silver for themselves, *ad libitum*: nor if they had, would it make any difference to the present question; for those baser materials which by the invention of the philosopher's stone, they might hope to convert into gold, would still not be their own creation, but merely such as nature had provided.

Among the ways in which wealth of any kind comes into the possession of particular individuals, one of the commonest and most general is that of inheritance, or the descent of property from the father to the son. In a case like this, the individual owner of property cannot pretend to deny that he owes its possession entirely to the accident of his birth—in other words, to the particular, and we may even say, the express dispensation of Providence in his behalf; for nothing but that dispensation can determine not only the time, but also the circumstances, at which, and under which, every human soul must be born into the world—and consequently of its own will

manner or other, according to the will and pleasure

and pleasure it must appoint, who shall be born to affluence and plenty, and who to poverty and want.

The successor to the possession of wealth, then, by the right of inheritance, undoubtedly steps into the immediate enjoyment of opulence, and after a natural and regular way ; yet he can assign no reason for the effect, so far as he himself is concerned, which will not imply it to be the necessary consequence of a pure accident, the accident of his birth. Does it make any difference therefore, to a case like this, whether the individual who has thus become rich, has acquired his wealth by an express gift from God, or through the instrumentality of certain appointed means, if he receives it in either case, alike from God? if the gift, which is handed to him through the channel of a father, or of some other natural relation, is still the gift of God, derived to its possessor by an appointment of his providence in his behalf, and as much to be attributed to him, as if it had dropped from the sky into the arms of the receiver?

St. Paul has observed that the parents are bound to lay up for the children * ; and the common consent and practice of all mankind, justify and illustrate the truth of the assertion. It is indeed a part of the due course of things, that some should labour to accumulate wealth by their personal exertions, which they must leave to be possessed by others without any cooperation of their own at all. We may contend then, that this is a standing method, according to the œconomy of Providence in the present life, for the dispensation of temporal wealth, in particular instances ; and that wealth, even when acquired by personal labour, is acquired that it may be transmitted independent of any such labour : in which case, too, that it comes into the possession of its owners in a manner resolvable into the dispensation of Providence in their behalf, follows of course.

It cannot however be denied that the method of personal acquisition is another very general and common one, for coming into the possession of riches ; and is that by which millions

* 2 Cor. xii. 14.

of an heavenly friend ; it would not be possible, by

of human agents are at all times labouring to get rich. It is difficult to make such persons believe that what they know themselves to be personally engaged in obtaining, and frequently find themselves possessed of, in consequence of the labour and pains bestowed by themselves on the pursuit, is not after all the effect of their own exertions. We must remind such persons, that their own personal labours and industry are but mediate or secondary causes of the results—the stated or regular means by which such and such an antecedent is connected with such and such a consequent ; and only partially so, after all. For however much, in every one of the modes of the pursuit and attainment of wealth, exemplified in the practice of the world, may appear to depend upon man, still more depends upon God. It is with the œconomy of providence, as with the œconomy of grace : man may plant and man may water, but God must give the increase. When men have done the utmost which human wisdom and human labour are competent to achieve, how much remains to be done for the desired effect, which must be left entirely to God ? who takes up the process where man leaves it, either to bless or to curse, either to make or to mar, the residue of its progress. Among the infinite variety of the ways of acquiring wealth by personal means, whether it be an art, a trade, or a profession—which can be mentioned that does not require at every moment, the continued enjoyment of health of body, and health of mind, the free use of the limbs, and the integrity of the mental faculties ? which, that is independent of the necessity of training and education ; of natural competency, or of acquired ability, founded on natural ? which, that does not presuppose all along, an uninterrupted course and succession of things in the natural, the moral, and the political world ? the vicissitudes of the seasons, the accidents of the weather, the civil and social order, and a thousand contingencies, over which human power has no control, and to which human foresight cannot even extend—all to conspire with human exertions, if the result which is aimed at, may be expected as a stated or probable effect ?

The community of the Jews, for a certain period of their his-

the use of the temporal mammon in this life, to con-

tory, were placed under the dispensation of an equal providence* ; but God wrought no miracle to render the dispensations of his providence equal even among them. An observer might have perceived in this nation, while that state of things continued, what he would not have perceived in any other community—that the good were uniformly happy in the present life, and the bad were not ; that the righteous was never seen to be forsaken, nor his seed begging their bread. But he would not have perceived that the instances of temporal happiness or temporal unhappiness among them, were any thing different from the ordinary instances of good or bad fortune every where ; nor the mode in which temporal good fell then to the lot of one description of persons, and temporal evil to that of another, to be any thing different from the way in which both are dispensed to their respective possessors still. He might have perceived the dispensation itself to be regulated by a peculiar rule, but he would have perceived no peculiarity in the manner of its working according to that rule. The effect would doubtless have appeared extraordinary, that one class of goods should invariably fall to one class of persons, and the contrary to another ; but the means employed to produce even this effect, so far as they were open to observation, would have exhibited no unusual character.

The history of Solomon is the history of a king who was blessed, by a special dispensation of Providence, not only with wisdom and knowledge, but with riches and glory, far beyond the proportion of either, usually enjoyed even by the most favoured of men. Yet what are the specified sources of his wealth and prosperity, divinely bestowed as it was ? Agriculture, arts, and commerce ; the ordinary means of national or individual wealth and prosperity every where. The history of Job is the history of a private person, and therefore so much the more applicable, as a case in point, to the situation of the great bulk of mankind. It is the history of one, too, who was, at different times, both eminently rich and eminently poor, in the strictest sense of the terms ; and it is the more curious and instructive, because it lays open to us the true cause of his

* Levit. xxvi. Deut. xxix.

ciliate the favour of an heavenly friend in the next ;

wealth, and the true cause of his poverty, each in their order of succession. Yet, without the light of this revelation, what should we see in the instrumental or secondary means by which the effect was brought about in either instance, but the operation of familiar causes ; which a careless observer might have called accident, and a fatalist might have resolved into necessity ; but which the pious believer in this truth, that all the good and evil which can befall the creatures of God in the present life, are ultimately the dispensations of his providence—recognizes as the finger of God, and as the means by which his providence works in effecting its own purposes ?

If a guest at the table of another person, should fancy himself the provider of the good things which he was merely invited to partake of, his conduct would not be much different from that of the world at large ; who being surrounded in the present life, with the creatures of the divine bounty, and liberally empowered to taste thereof, are too much disposed to forget the true source of their enjoyments, and to use and appropriate what they owe to the goodness of their Creator, with as much freedom and recklessness, as if of their own procuring and their own deserving. Or if one of those automaton, which by an ingenious combination of mechanical contrivances, are made to execute sundry performances, that seem to require reason and intelligence in the agents—should begin to think itself independent of its maker, and really endued with that reason and intelligence, the appearance of which his art and skill have communicated to it ; who would be more aware of the unreasonableness of such an idea, and more apt to smile at its absurdity, than the framer of the automaton itself ? If mankind are not mere automaton in the hands of God, like those self-actuated instruments which Homer ascribes to Vulcan, yet such as they are, they are the work of God ; their bodily organs and their mental faculties, are all derived from their Maker. It must be well known to him, however little it may appear to ourselves, how completely, in either part of human nature, we are his creatures ; and how entirely, not only for the first acquisition, but for the constant use and enjoyment of all our powers and faculties, we

nor would there be reason to hope that the tempo-

are dependent upon him who made us, and having made us, continues us in being; how entirely, even when we live and move, and have our being apparently in and of ourselves, we live and move, and have our being in him. Nor would there be less reason to smile at the absurdity of the idea that any one of the works of God, even the most perfect, might presume on its own sufficiency, and its independence of its Creator, any more than an automaton upon its self-derived powers of art and skill—were it not, that the extravagance of the idea, which in the automaton would provoke a smile, in the rational creatures of God involves an ingratitude and impiety, as well as an absurdity, which cannot be too severely reprobated.

No one who has paid the least attention to the style of scripture, can have failed to observe, how different is the language of sacred narrative, in speaking of effects and their causes, from that of common history; and how regularly those effects are ascribed in the one, to the true efficient cause, which would be attributed in the other, to the secondary or instrumental*. In holding such language, scripture speaks according to its proper character, and not more piously and humbly than philosophically and justly. A common historian would tell us, that Brutus delivered the Romans; Timoleon the Syracusans; Aratus the Sicyonians: that Miltiades was the saviour of Greece, at one time, and Themistocles, at another; that Nebuchadnezzar overthrew the Assyrian empire, and Alexander the Persian, or the like. But an inspired historian would tell us, in each of these instances, that God wrought the effect by their means, that God

* Vide Gen. xvi. 2: xx. 17, 18: xxi. 6. 19: xxvii. 20: xxix. 31: xxx. 2. 22: xli. 16: xlii. 28: xlv. 16: xlv. 7, 8: l. 20: Exodus i. 20, 21: iv. 11: vii. 13: ix. 12: x. 20. 27: xi. 10: xviii. 1: xxi. 13: xxxi. 3. 6: xxxv. 30—35: xxxvi. 1, 2: Numbers xxii. 38: xxiv. 11: Deuteron. ii. 15. 30. 33. 36: iii. 3: Joshua ii. 24: xi. 20: xxiii. 1: Judges iv. 9: vii. 22: ix. 23. 56, 57: xiv. 4: 1 Sam. ii. 25: xiv. 45: xvi. 14: xix. 5: xxv. 32: xxvi. 12: 2 Sam. xvii. 14: xxiv. 1: (1 Chron. xxi. 1:) 1 Kings ii. 15: xii. 15: 2 Kings v. 1: vii. 6: viii. 1: x. 32: xv. 37: 2 Chron. xxii. 7: Nehemiah ii. 12: vii. 5: Job xxxv. 4: xxxix. 17: Proverbs xvi. 33: xxi. 1. 31: Isaiah x. 6, 7. 15: xxxvii. 26. 44: lvii. 19: Jeremiah i. 5. 10: Daniel i. 17: Acts xii. 23: xvii. 28: xxvii. 24: James i. 17.

rary enjoyment of an earthly tabernacle, with every

gave deliverance to Rome by Brutus, that God overthrew the Assyrian empire by the Babylonian conqueror; and so forth. And who will say that this is not the just and philosophical mode of specifying the effect? that any other would include more or less of misrepresentation, and would transfer to the simply mediate or instrumental, what strictly belonged to the true final or efficient cause of the result? Even the ordinary gift of common sense, the ordinary faculty of learning, and the ordinary capacity of following, men's several trades and occupations, are ascribed in scripture to the same source; and both in their causes and in their effects are ultimately resolved into the agency of God. The weaver cannot sit at his loom, nor the husbandman follow the plough, but by virtue of a power and skill, which they are supposed to derive from their Maker*. It is no wonder, then, that the possession of wealth, under all circumstances, as well as of every other temporal good, should be uniformly spoken of in scripture as the effect of the Divine blessing, and riches be represented as his creature and gift†; that when men devote their possessions to his honour and service, they should be said to give to him of that which is his own‡—to worship him so far with that which costs them nothing—and in the most legitimate application of their temporal abundance, to the good of their fellow-men and to the glory of their common Creator, to be returning a loan, or paying a debt, rather than making a present, or conferring an obligation.

This truth indeed is so obvious, that it does not require the light of revelation expressly to assure us of it. If the being of a God, and the interference of his providence in the course of

* Cf. Isaiah xxviii. 23—29: liv. 16.

† Vide Gen. xxiv. 1. 35: xxvi. 1. 12: xxvii. 28. 37: xxviii. 20—22: xxx. 27. 30: xxxi. 8, 9. 15: xxxiii. 10: xliii. 23: Deuter. viii. 18: xv. 4: 2 Sam. vii. 11, 12: 1 Kings iii. 11. 13: Job i. 3. 10. 21: xxii. 24, 25: xlii. 10. 12: Proverbs iii. 9, 10: x. 22: xxii. 4: Ecclesiastes iii. 13: v. 18, 19: vi. 2. Cf. Exod. xxiii. 25, 26: Leviticus xxvi. 4—6: 9, 10: Deuter. i. 10, 11: ii. 7: vi. 10, 11: vii. 13. 15: viii. 10—18: x. 18. 22: xi. 10—15: xxviii. 2—13: xxxii. 13, 14: 1 Sam. ii. 7. 2 Sam. xii. 7, 8: 1 Kings iii. 5—13: iv. 29: 2 Chron. i. 11, 12: Ps. cxliv. 15, 16: Daniel ii. 37: Luke iv. 6: 2 Cor. ix. 10: 1 Tim. vii. 17: James i. 5. 17.

‡ 1 Chron. xxix. 12—14. 16.

thing which it contains, might possibly lead in its consequences to admission into the mansions of eternity^p.

Again, if the possession of the temporal mammon were not a trust, and such a trust as constituted the trustee, for the time, a steward—engaged in the service and charged with the property of some other person—the abuse of the thing possessed would not expose him of necessity to the imputation of *faithless* and *dishonest*, nor its right and legitimate application entitle him to the praise of *honesty* and *fidelity*.

human affairs, be once admitted—that every temporal blessing must be ultimately attributed to him, that man can lay claim to no good which he possesses, as entirely derived from himself—as something which he did not receive, and which he could still possess, even though not bestowed upon him—seems to follow as a spontaneous inference. Not scripture alone, then, but human reason, might have taught us the moral enforced by the parable ; that the good things of the present life are ultimately the gift and dispensation of God ; that their possessors are stewards of the Divine bounty, which they hold and retain only by the permission, the favour, the forbearance of him who gave it ; and which they are bound to consider and to use, while possessed, as not their own, but the property of another.

Τὰ τῶν θεῶν ἔχοντες ἐπιμελούμεθα

ὅταν δὲ χρήζωσ', αὐτ' ἀφαιροῦνται πάλιν.

Euripides, apud Plut. vi. 441. Consolatio ad Apollonium.

Μηδέποτε ἐπὶ μηδενὸς εἶπης, ὅτι ἀπώλεσα αὐτό· ἀλλὰ, ὅτι ἀπέδωκα. τὸ παιδίον ἀπέθανεν ; ἀπεδόθη. ἡ γυνὴ ἀπέθανεν ; ἀπεδόθη. τὸ χωρίον ἀφῆρέθην. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦτο ἀπεδόθη. ἀλλὰ κακὸς ὁ ἀφελόμενος. τί δέ σοι μέλει διὰ τίνος σε ὁ δοὺς ἀπήτησε ; μέχρι δ' ἂν διδῶ, ὡς ἀλλοτρίου αὐτοῦ ἐπιμελοῦ· ὡς τοῦ πανδοχείου οἱ παριόντες.—Epiceteti Manuale, xi.

^p The same metaphor to describe the opposition between the temporary, and the everlasting abodes in question, is employed by St. Paul ; οἶδαμεν γὰρ ὅτι ἐὰν ἡ ἐπίγειος ἡμῶν οἰκία τοῦ σκήνους καταλυθῇ, οἰκοδομῆν ἐκ Θεοῦ ἔχομεν, οἰκίαν ἀχειροποιήτον, αἰώνιον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς.

For these are terms, which however applicable to the relations of dependence and inferiority in general, and therefore to the relation of masters and servants under all circumstances, are most strictly and properly applicable to the relation of a steward, and his employer ; the relation of one in whom an absolute confidence is necessarily placed by another, and who represents the rights and jurisdiction of the owner, in the care and disposal of a thing so liable to be abused, as property.

Again, if the temporal mammon did not constitute the subject-matter of a trust, in its commission derived from a different person, and in its use and administration intended for the benefit of a different person, from him who possesses it—it would not be pronounced a thing not *his own*, but another's, even while in the hands of its possessor *here*, nor be expressly opposed to *something his own*, as what may be expected in consequence of it *hereafter*. It is not the intension of these words, to oppose that which is our own, to that which is not our own, and therefore another's, as that which we ourselves possess, is opposed to that which we do not ourselves possess : for both are supposed to be in our possession alike, even when one of them is called our own, and the other, another's. Nor are they intended to oppose that which we have acquired for ourselves, to that which we may have acquired in any other way ; for it also appears, that even that which is possessed as our own, must be given us by some one else, as much as that which is not. It follows, then, that by that which is our own, we must understand that, which though given us by another, and therefore originally not our own, is to be received and enjoyed

as our own—as something which, after it has once been given us, becomes our own in propriety for ever, and may be used and enjoyed accordingly: and consequently by that which is opposed to it as not our own, we must understand something which though proceeding from some one else, and received by ourselves, is neither given nor received as our own; something, which though acquired and possessed by ourselves, is on no account to be considered and treated as our own, but as the property of some one else; something, which we can never lawfully dispose of, as we might of our own, according to our own will and inclination—but in the use which we make of it are bound to consult the will and inclination of another.

Again, if the possession of the temporal mammon were not a trust, and a trust derived from God, which upon the ordinary principle of obligation incumbent on parties connected with others by the relations of responsible trusts, binds the holder of the trust to certain specific services in behalf of its author; it would not be declared an impossibility to serve God and mammon; an impossibility, which is not to be understood of serving either independent of the other, but either as well as the other. It is possible to serve mammon instead of God; but impossible to serve mammon along with God. And such being the incompatibility of these two services with each other, the impossibility of an union between them must be the greatest, and the absurdity of attempting to unite them, the most flagrant and palpable, in their case, who are laid beforehand under a specific obligation to serve one of these masters, yet nevertheless endeavour to serve

the other. The possibility of serving mammon presupposes the possession of the goods of mammon, in the use and appropriation of which after a certain manner, the service of mammon consists; but the goods of mammon themselves are not to be possessed, except as given by the providence of God; and that which is given by God lays the receiver under a specific obligation towards and in behalf of God, for the application of his own gift according to the will and intentions of the giver. It is impossible to use what is so received, in any other manner, without a breach of the terms of the tenure, and so far an abuse of trust. It is impossible, then, for the possessor of the temporal mammon, under such circumstances, to serve mammon in the use of those possessions which go by his name, without forfeiting his duty to God; nor to honour another in the use and application of *his* gifts, without dishonouring their true author. The impossibility would be as great in this instance, as if the same servant were of right bound to serve two masters, or the same subject to owe allegiance to two kings. But no such impossibility would be the consequence of the possession of the temporal mammon, if the possession of that mammon left the possessor free to use it as he pleased; that is, unless though his own, with respect to its possession, it were still not his own, with respect to its use and application. If so, the possession of the temporal mammon is the possession of a trust—the holder of which is not free to use it as he pleases himself, but according to the terms of an engagement; the very tenure of which binds him to certain conditions, which he is not free to disregard—which make it impossible, without a

breach of faith, to act except in one way, in the discharge of the duties of his trust.

In the next place, that the possession of the earthly mammon, considered as a trust, is such an one as we cannot but know to be of temporary duration, and sometime to be resigned by its possessor—it seems almost superfluous to prove. For as we brought nothing into the world with us, at our birth, so shall we carry nothing out with us, at our death; and whatsoever we can acquire, we must acquire it here, and whatsoever we can enjoy, we must enjoy it here. The possession of the temporal mammon, then, considered even as a trust, is comprehended within the limits of the present life, and cannot be held any longer than the term of its duration; which, at the utmost, is comparatively brief—and in particular instances, may be still shorter. And even while it continues, in how many ways is a man's external condition liable to be altered; as often for the worse, as for the better! by how many accidents and turns of fortune may the wealth of the rich melt away to nothing, or be at one stroke snatched from its possessors! To insist indeed upon the instability of fortune in the present state of things, and on the various changes to which the lot of humanity is at all times exposed, is to insist on the tritest and most familiar of the subjects of moral reflection. But should we rather suppose that the case of a particular person was so far exempted from the general rule, as to be liable to none of these reverses; in other words, that the same good providence which gave him wealth at first, did not prematurely recall its gift—but ex-

tended the term of his stewardship to the last moment of his temporal existence—it would scarcely be necessary to convince such an one, for the satisfaction of his reasonable doubts, though it might be desirable to do so, to remind him of his bounden duties—that he can never cease to be a steward of the goods of mammon, if he has begun with being one, however long he may continue to be so ; he can never lose the obligation entailed by the original commission of his trust, because the author of it permits him an undisturbed possession of it. There is some danger, however, that what has truly been received from another, and is held only, while possessed, on sufferance, by being long enjoyed, and seldom or never reclaimed, the temporary possessor may imagine at last to have become his own, and that he is responsible to no one for it. The trustee of the temporal mammon, under such circumstances, would run the risk of forgetting his true relation as the holder of a delegated trust ; and would require to be most constantly reminded, that however absolute his right, and permanent his interest, in his worldly goods may appear, it is but the right of a tenant at will, it is but the security of a life-interest at the utmost ; however abundant his basket and his store, like treasures of gold laid up in vessels of clay, the richness of the possessions is but the more strongly contrasted with the precariousness of the tenure by which they are retained. Our Saviour inculcates the same conviction when he tells his hearers, that, however long the mammon of unrighteousness may have been previously enjoyed, it must be forsaken at last ; and that its possessors hold it meanwhile in a temporary tabernacle, which

like the tent of the wandering Arabian, is never permanently fixed—never affords a lasting receptacle to property, an unchanging habitation to its inmates: but whether, upon bidding adieu to these temporary and perishable abodes, and their equally temporary and perishable possessions—they must pass into the dwellings of heaven, which like the treasures they contain are eternal and indeprivable—must depend upon the use they should have made of the false riches, in that transitory scene of things, to which both the possible duration of their possession, and the possible opportunity of their enjoyment, were confined.

In the third place, that the possession of the temporal mammon, if truly represented as a trust, is such an one, the use or the abuse of which must entitle the holder to certain proper consequences, affecting himself, in the way of reward for the one, or of punishment for the other, follows from the necessity of the case. For every trust being something which one person imposes on another, by virtue of a preexisting right to his services—the relation of the author and the receiver of a trust, is the relation of superior and inferior; and every superior, as such, must possess a certain degree of power and jurisdiction over an inferior. And as the holder of every trust is the vicegerent of him who imposes it, and the final end of the commission of a vicarious or representative power, in such instances, by one person to another, is that the one may do something in behalf of the other, in the proper application of that power, which he must otherwise have done for himself—in the nature of things the vicegerent, un-

der such circumstances, must be responsible to him whose person he represents, for the exercise of the powers received from him, and some account, sooner or later, must be expected to pass between them. No master can want the necessary powers to punish a servant; nor any superior, whether placed in the precise relation of a master or not, authority to call to account a responsible inferior, whether placed exactly in the situation of a servant, or not. And whatever might be true of human masters and their servants, and whatever might be expected in the ordinary instances of the delegation of trusts from human superiors to human inferiors, must *a fortiori* be true of such a master and superior as God, and with respect to such trusts, as are in any manner delegated to his own creatures by him. No human inferior can be so absolutely dependent on any human superior as all his creatures are upon God; and no trust delegated by an human superior to an human inferior, can be so strictly responsible, as whatsoever is committed in the shape of a trust to any of his creatures by God. The Lord in the parable dealt with his steward as an injured master might be expected to deal with a dishonest servant, both for the proof of his guilt, and also for the punishment of it: and every Christian, as well from the analogy of that case to his own, as from the comments of our Saviour, which follow on the parable, may learn, that if responsible for the use of riches, as a steward in any sense under the providence of God, he must expect to be treated at last, for the abuse of his trust, as a servant, convicted of infidelity to his employer, may look to be treated; though he may hope to be dealt with as a meritorious servant also, if he con-

tinues to the end faithful to the duties of his relative station.

We should not indeed be commanded to make ourselves friends, *out of*, that is, by means of, the temporal mammon, for the special purpose of being received into the everlasting mansions, when the enjoyment of the temporal mammon was at an end; were it not the final design of the gift of this mammon, so far as regarded the interest of its temporary possessors in it, that by such an use of their gift they should ensure to themselves such a personal good effect; and were not admission into, or exclusion from the mansions in question, so far as the reception of such persons into them was concerned, more or less dependent on that use itself. Nor would the use which has been made of this gift, in a given instance, by the possessor of the temporal mammon, be made the criterion of his personal worthiness for the reception of the eternal riches; if the possession of the latter were not conditionally attached to the use of the former as its reward, and the non-possession as its punishment; if, consequently, the good use of the temporal mammon, were not so far the test of the personal zeal, the ability, the fidelity, which must qualify any one for an office of confidence, and the bad use of the same, the proof of the sloth, the incapacity, the unfaithfulness, which would disqualify for any trust. And hence, in declaring the rule by which the Divine equity itself will be regulated, in awarding to the several holders of the trust of the temporal mammon, the proper personal consequences of their respective use or abuse of their trusts, it is affirmed to be a good conclusive argument, that he who has

been found trustworthy in the temporal mammon, described as that which was a very *little*—will be trustworthy also in the eternal, described as that which is, or which will be *much*: and so, in every other instance of the opposition of these two things to each other, and the presumption of worthiness or unworthiness for the one, as justified by the proof of fitness or unfitness for the other: an argument founded on the declared principle of the Divine retribution in general, that God will deal with all his creatures, as they shall be found to have dealt with him, but in the application of that principle to the case of those who are accountable for the use of something, which they could not have had, unless received from God, but must render up again, whether better or worse, whether neglected or improved, as left while they retain it, to themselves—resolvable into the particular rule, and the grounds of the rule elsewhere laid down, that “whosoever hath, it shall be given to him, and shall be made to abound: and “whosoever hath not, even that he hath shall be “taken from him”¹.”

¶ Nor ought it to be objected to the above mode of proceeding, that it is regulated by a criterion liable to deceive, and to lead to erroneous results, in the distinctions of worthiness and unworthiness between the different subjects of its dispensations, which it professes to draw and proposes to observe. Under ordinary circumstances, there might be some truth in this objection; but under the special circumstances of the case, it cannot apply. Generally speaking, it might be said, that he who had been faithful in a very little, would not necessarily be faithful in much, nor he that was unjust in a very little, necessarily be unjust in much. But the fidelity, or infidelity, spoken of here as a personal attribute of the holder of the trust, in-

¹ Mark iv. 25. Luke viii. 18.

And hence, in the last place, that it is not only the duty, but manifestly the interest of every Chris-

volves two things—his personal fitness in point of competency, and his personal worthiness in point of principle, for a former and a subsequent trust which are virtually one and the same ; and the very little, and the much, which describe, and oppose to each other the subject-matter of the former, as compared with that of the subsequent one, are not to be understood of more at one time, and less at another, of the same thing, but of certain degrees, whether more or less in themselves, at different times, of intrinsically different things externally resembling each other ; of things which do not differ from each other, as one degree of the same thing in point of quantity might differ from another, but as any degree of a certain thing, vastly superior in intrinsic worth and excellence, would differ from the utmost degree of another, merely resembling it in those respects. In this point of view, the evidence of competency for the very little, may be a sure criterion of competency for the very much ; and the presumption of fitness or unfitness for the latter may be made to depend on the discovery of worthiness or unworthiness for the former ; for that in fact amounts to no more than saying, that he who is competent to the use of what only appears to be a certain thing, must be competent to the use of what it really is ; he who can use a certain thing because it resembles another, agreeably to the law of its being as determined by that resemblance, *a fortiori* can use the thing itself.

Incapacity indeed for a very little is always a decisive argument of incapacity for very much, of the same kind of trust ; and he that has been unfaithful in a very little, will almost necessarily be unfaithful in very much, where the defect of fidelity is resolvable into the defect of principle—or the integrity which has not been proof against a smaller temptation, is about to be exposed to a greater—though capacity for a very little, humanly speaking, would be no proof of capacity for very much of the same thing, nor fidelity in a very little a voucher for faithfulness necessarily, in very much. But these last are distinctions, applicable only to different trials of the same capacity in a new kind of way ; to different tests of the same strength of principle, by exposure to new kinds or degrees of temptation. They can-

tian, who knows himself to be invested with the trust of the temporal mammon, so to administer his

not apply to the case in which the temporal is opposed to the heavenly mammon, as the subject of one trust to that of another; and the use of the temporal mammon, as the subject of a past trust, is the test of fitness or unfitness, of capacity or incapacity, for the use of the heavenly, as the subject of a future. For by virtue of the difference between the temporal and the heavenly mammon in nature—entailing a difference in the mode of their tenure—in the former the possessor had the right of an occupant, but not of a master, in the latter he has the right of both: it seems therefore an almost necessary inference that he who could use the one, will never and can never abuse the other—he who has proved himself by experience fit for the one, will not and cannot be unfit for the other; just on the same principle that he who is competent to take care of another person's property, cannot be unable to take care of his own. By virtue too of the same difference—a difference such that the one is really what the other appears to be—he who could make such an use of that which was only reputed and called wealth, as its own nature, so far as it approached to the true idea and description of wealth, admitted and required, will equally well appropriate to their natural use and purpose, the true riches when they come to be possessed—he who was qualified to use as riches, that which was not, and could not be, what all riches should properly be, in reference to their possessor, viz. his own, must be qualified to use and enjoy what may truly be said to be his.

In a word, consistency of character alone will effect, that he who has been faithful in a very little thing, in this sense, will be faithful in the thing which is much, in the sense opposed to it. Change of circumstances can entail no change of capacity in the power of using, nor any change of disposition in the will to use, on the part of the holder of the trust—whatever difference it may make in the nature of the subject of the use. The reality of this subject-matter may be substituted by the change, for the appearance—that which has truly the nature of riches for that which only seemingly had it—but the power to use riches, as riches, must remain in the possessor still, and the use which must

trust as to avoid the evil, which is the consequence of its abuse, and to secure the good, which may be expected from its right use, becomes too obvious to need any proof. We may conclude, then, that the moral of the parable which we have been hitherto considering, is the doctrine of the true view of the origin, the tenure, the final end and application of the gift of riches, denoted by the eastern name of mammon, as one of the instances in which the probation of the present life, whether in reference to moral agents in general or to Christians in particular, consists; a doctrine from which every Christian, possessed of temporal abundance, and so far as he is possessed of it, may learn that he is placed thereby in the relation of a steward, intrusted with that which, directly or indirectly, is the gift and dispensation, in

be made of that power must be according to the true nature of riches still. The heavenly mammon may infinitely excel the temporal, and be infinitely more deserving of the name; but if it is riches, though riches of an exalted and transcendant kind—the question of the right use of the heavenly mammon is the question of the right use of riches, and the question of the capacity or incapacity of a particular person for the right use of the heavenly riches, is the question of his capacity or incapacity for the right use of riches—and one, whose capacity for the right use of riches has been already proved and ascertained by the experience of his conduct in the use of the temporal mammon, is already ascertained thereby to be competent for the right use even of the heavenly. The only difference in the circumstances of his new relation, compared with those of his old, may be, that the subject-matter of his trust is something now which has truly the nature of riches, but before had only the semblance of it; and the use to be made of these true riches, is for and upon himself, whereas the use to be made of that which only resembled them, whatever else it might be, was not for and upon himself.

his individual instance, of the Divine providence ; and in that capacity, is specially responsible to God, as every steward must be to his master, and is liable to be rewarded or punished, as every steward is liable to be, for the use or abuse of his trust.

With respect, indeed, to that use and application of a trust like this, which he would be as much bound to make in the capacity of a steward of the Divine providence, for the benefit and advantage of God, as every steward, of his particular trust for the benefit and advantage of his particular master—the parable is silent. We are directed, indeed, to conciliate friends, by the use of such trusts ; and friends ordinarily so called, are not to be conciliated except by something done in their behalf. But an heavenly friend like God, must so far differ from all other descriptions of friends, that as he stands in no need of any thing from his creatures, which the possession of wealth could supply ; so neither is he to be conciliated by such services, considered to be done to himself, as might be the means of conciliating his creatures. And if these services are such as the possession of wealth more particularly enables to perform—though done unto God, with a view to conciliate his favour, they cannot be done directly to him, nor produce the desired effect, as directly affecting him. If conferred upon him at all, they must be conferred upon him through the medium of something else ; and if acknowledged by him at all, they must be acknowledged as actually conferred on some other subject, and virtually only upon himself ; which seems to point to that kind of the use and application of wealth, which alone can render it availing to conciliate the good-will and friendship of God, with-

out directly affecting himself—the use and application of it in the good offices of beneficence, almsgiving, and charity to the poor and destitute among the creatures of God, whom his providence has made dependent upon their richer brethren for the supply of those necessities which they cannot procure for themselves; and the good offices conferred upon whom, he has promised to acknowledge and reward, as if personally done unto himself. But on this subject more will appear in the ensuing parable.

PARABLE NINETEENTH. MORAL.

THE RICH MAN AND LAZARUS.

LUKE XVI. 19—31. HARMONY, IV. 43.

LUKE xvi. 19—31.

19 “ Now there was a certain rich man, and he was wont to
“ be clothed in purple and fine linen, enjoying himself sump-
“ tuously day by day. 20 And there was a certain poor man, by
“ name Lazarus, who had been laid at the entrance of his gates,
“ being full of sores, 21 and desiring to be satisfied with some of
“ the crumbs that fell from the table of the rich man : nay even
“ the dogs used to come and lick his sores. 22 And it came to
“ pass that the poor man died, and that he was carried away by
“ the angels into the bosom of Abraham : and the rich man also
“ died, and was buried. 23 And having lift up his eyes, in
“ Hades, being in torments, he seeth Abraham from afar, and
“ Lazarus in his bosom. 24 And he called out himself and said,
“ Father Abraham, have pity upon me, and send Lazarus to dip
“ the tip of his finger in water, and to cool my tongue ; for I
“ am pained in this flame. 25 And Abraham said, Son, remember
“ that thou receivedst thy good things in thy lifetime, and
“ Lazarus likewise *in his lifetime* his evil things : but now he
“ here is comforted, and thou art pained. 26 And beside all these
“ things, a great gulf is fixed between us and you, that they
“ who are desirous to pass over from hence unto you may not
“ be able, neither may they from thence cross over to us.
“ 27 And he said, I pray thee, therefore, father, to send him to the
“ house of my father : 28 for I have five brethren : that he may
“ testify effectually unto them, lest they also come into this
“ place of torment. 29 Abraham saith to him, They have Moses
“ and the prophets ; let them hear them. 30 And he said, By

“no means father Abraham ; but if one went to them from the dead, they will repent. ³¹ And he said unto him, If they hear not Moses and the prophets, they will not be persuaded even if one arose from the dead.”

MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

SO little of the material history, in the present instance, is agreeable to our own experience, and competent to be judged of for ourselves, and so much more must be received on the ground of implicit belief ; that perhaps the distinction drawn by commentators between a narrative, which constitutes a parable, and one which makes a true history, will be considered so applicable to none of the parables as to this of the rich man and Lazarus.

That there is no reasonable foundation for this distinction—that every parable must contain more or less of history, and that every history, with such and such an application, may be a parable, has been shewn by me elsewhere^a. The distinction, indeed, would confine the name of an history to the narrative of a real event ; and the name of a parable to the account of a fictitious transaction. But that there is no necessary connection between a parable and a fictitious history—that every parable of the moral kind, is an history adduced in the way of example—and that for the sake of example, real history may be just as subservient to the purpose of moral instruction, as fictitious—has also been shewn.

Upon these points then it is not necessary to enlarge afresh. With respect to the material circumstances of the parable, I shall observe first, that

^a General Introd. chap. vi.

though the transaction recorded in it begins in the upper world, and for a time is confined to the limits of the present life, yet the course of its details speedily passes into another scene of things; of the nature of which, neither from any grounds of analogy which this life furnishes, nor from the extent of our capacities, as at present limited, nor even from the light which the revelations of scripture themselves have furnished—are we competent to form an adequate idea. This circumstance of peculiarity must no doubt communicate a corresponding interest and solemnity to the parable in general, which no narrative, relating to a familiar occurrence, however interesting in other respects, could be calculated to possess; but it must render it proportionably more difficult, and even impossible, to explain its material circumstances, especially with a view to any such purpose, as the illustration of the truth and propriety of the narrative, the coherency of its several parts, the preservation of character, and the congruity of actions or sentiments to the circumstances of time and place.

Secondly, the consideration of the material details of the parable, is so intimately connected with the determination of its use in a moral point of view, that the former could not be entered into, without anticipating, and taking into account the latter. We may reserve therefore the explanation of these circumstances so far as they admit of explanation, for another opportunity; and at present may confine ourselves to the examination of the question, briefly adverted to already, the discussion of which seems only necessary before we can enter upon any other; viz. in what point of view the parable of Dives and La-

zarus, is to be regarded—whether as a fictitious representation, or as a real narrative.

The general arguments by which I endeavoured to render it probable that every one of our Saviour's parables contained a true history, either in itself, or under the disguise of a fictitious, were stated in the Introduction^a; yet for the reasons mentioned above, the truth of this conclusion will perhaps be more liable to be called into question in this instance, than in any other: in other words, though there might be every reason to conclude that each of the moral parables besides consisted of a real transaction, yet this is manifestly so different from the rest, that what had been proved to hold good of them would be no necessary argument why the same thing should be supposed of this.

The question which we have to consider upon this point, however, is whether the parable of Dives and Lazarus is altogether a real, or altogether a fictitious, history. To suppose it partly the one, and partly the other, would be manifestly absurd. And having to choose between these alternatives—among the special reasons which may induce us to conclude it altogether real, rather than altogether fictitious, we may observe, that if there was any ground for supposing the preceding parable to be the history of a real transaction, it is only consistent with it, that a narrative which follows so closely upon it, and for ought which appears to the contrary, carries on the same train of ideas, should be the account of a real transaction also. No good reason, at least, can be as-

^a Chapter vi. vol. i. page 82. &c.

signed, why real history should be the means employed to promote a certain common end in one case, and fictitious in another: nor why two examples, which agree in being produced almost in the same breath and almost for the same purpose,—should not agree in being both alike true, or both alike fictitious.

It will readily be admitted that so far as we are competent to judge of the narrative, it might have been real; that is, so much of the parabolic transaction as is placed in the upper world, not only comes within the bounds of possibility, but, estimated by any criterion we may please, is sufficiently probable to have actually happened. And with regard to so much of it as from our present knowledge and experience, we cannot judge to be antecedently probable or improbable, that is, the part transacted below—it is to be observed, first, that this part is not the commencement of a new, but the sequel of a former history, in which the agents or characters are nearly the same as before, and the parts attributed to them, to all appearance are but the consequence of the parts attributed to them in their former state of being. The parabolic transaction is one and entire as a whole; but it is made up of two parts, one of them transacted previously, and the other subsequently; one of them in the world above, and the other in the world below: the connection of which however, as parts of the same transaction, is not broken by the change of scene, any more than by the order of succession. In this case, the truth or probability of the first part ought to vouch for the truth or probability of the second; for it would obviously be inconsistent to suppose the first part of a

continuous transaction to be probable or real, and the second to be improbable or fictitious.

Secondly, if our knowledge or experience, as at present limited, does not qualify us to judge *a priori* of the truth or probability of a narrative like this, neither does it to judge of its falsehood or improbability; for our apprehensions of either of these things *a priori*, in a given instance, must ultimately depend alike upon the limits of our knowledge and experience at present. We should have no more reason, then, from what we know or have experienced ourselves, of the like kind, to conclude that the part which passes in Hades was false, than that it was true: nor could we have any assurance upon either of these points, however competent to the solution of all doubt about them, which was not equally independent of our own knowledge, and of our own experience. Now one ground of such assurance, and the most satisfactory of all, would be the deference due to the testimony of a competent person; whose knowledge or whose experience should abundantly qualify him to judge whether what he proposes and relates as matter of fact, really was so, or really might have been so, or not. Such an assurance, in the estimation of every unprejudiced mind, must be supplied by the testimony of our Saviour himself; who could not but be competent to know what passed, or was capable of passing in Hades, as well as in the upper world; and the circumstance of whose having related, after such and such a manner, a series of particulars, the scene of which is laid in Hades, is itself sufficient to convince us that this detail of particulars, whether agreeable to our own apprehensions beforehand, or not, either actually

came to pass, or was capable of coming to pass, as it is related. In this case, that antecedent presumption of the probability of a certain representation, which we must otherwise have derived from our own knowledge and experience, is the natural effect of the deference due to the authority of the author of the representation. It is quite enough to know that though we may not be competent to judge for ourselves of the probability, much more of the truth, of such a representation—yet he is; and we may ground upon that conviction, the inference, that what he has related, however incomprehensible to ourselves, must be probable, and may be true.

It is not necessary to insist afresh on the argument, urged elsewhere, in reference to this question in general; that whatsoever our Saviour himself has related after the manner, and in the language of true history, more especially with a moral or didactic end in view by it, ought on every account to be considered truly what it appears to be, and just as real as the practical inferences founded upon, and deducible from it. But could we suppose that fiction in his hands might properly be employed for the purpose of moral instruction—still even fiction so used must be employed as tantamount to truth, must be cited by way of example, or of the case in point; and whatsoever is used as tantamount to truth must possess the appearance of truth at least; whatsoever is cited on the principle of the example, to be applicable as a case in point must be considered possible at least. Even the apologue, strictly so called, which consists of circumstances purely improbable, purely impossible, as well as purely fictitious *per se*, yet when cited as a parallel case to an actual reality,

would not be excepted from this rule, but must be received as a reality, as much as any other example. Were the parable of Dives and Lazarus, then, made up of circumstances physically impossible, and such as must appear so even to ourselves—yet if used for any doctrinal end or purpose, it would require to be received as possible. That it actually consists of such circumstances, throughout, would be an assertion contradicted by the nature of that part of it which is transacted in the upper world; and that it consists of such even in the rest of the transaction, can no more be proved by the aid of our present faculties of apprehension, our present knowledge of what passes, or may pass, in the world of spirits, than that it does not. All that we need to contend for, is, that whether intelligible throughout to ourselves, or not, yet taken as a whole, it is proposed to our belief as possible.

Combining then, this conclusion with the preceding, of the inadequacy of our capacities to judge for themselves, from their own knowledge or their own experience, of the antecedent probability or improbability of a certain representation—when such a representation is proposed to our belief as possible, which we cannot judge of for ourselves as probable—what alternative have we, except to conclude that it is real? There seems no other mode left of reconciling the two things together—the necessity of receiving a certain representation as possible, and our own inability to conceive it even to be probable. Nor is this too refined a distinction, between the qualities of possible and of improbable, as predicable of the same subject. Many things may be admitted on competent assurance to be facts, and

therefore possible, which we could not undertake from our own knowledge before or after to say were probable: and there may be every certainty in the conviction that a thing is so and so in general, with the utmost ignorance or obscurity how it is so, or why it is so, in particular. The most characteristic of the doctrines of the Christian religion are instances of this truth; and even a variety of physical facts, or rather almost every phenomenon in the natural world, would supply an illustration of it. But what I contend for, in reference to the present point, is this. We are required to believe that so much of the parable of Dives and Lazarus as passes in Hades, is *possible* at least; and yet we cannot even conceive how it might be *probable*. Admit it to be real—and without prejudice to its incomprehensibility, it will at once be admitted to be possible. We shall have the same reason for acquiescing in the truth of this representation, as with respect to a multitude of other things which we know to be so and so, but not how nor why they are so, nor even how or why they should be so. It may be as mysterious and as incomprehensible *per se*, as ever, and yet it must cease to appear incredible.

It is possible too, that the final end of the parabolic representation in the present instance, may be, not more to enforce a certain moral conviction with respect to a certain moral obligation, than to delineate a certain resulting state of things, the consequence of the neglect of such an obligation. In that case, the history contained in it is a picture, as much as an example; which not only by being considered real, acquires a force, a solemnity, a propriety, obviously necessary to its effect, but without being considered real, could pourtray or personate

nothing, beyond, or distinct from itself. A real picture presupposes a real original, and a real original only is capable of an actual copy. The case of Dives in the lower world may be one of a certain class of actual cases; produced as a specimen of the rest; in which case, it must be considered as real as any one of the class which it represents. And if the first part of the same description, that which exhibits the fact of the person's neglect of the moral obligation, in the upper world, which leads to such consequences in the lower, be a real or probable picture—that which represents the fact of these consequences at last, on the principle of consistency, should be real or probable likewise.

Such, indeed, is the connection between the circumstances of the narrative from first to last, that if any part of the whole may be assumed as real, the rest may be assumed to be so. Now the character of Abraham in particular is a real character; and the characters of Dives and Lazarus respectively, may be those of real personages. It is no objection to this last supposition, that the rich man is not specified by name, nor that the word Lazarus, so far as its etymon is concerned, may stand for an indigent person in general. The part attributed to the rich man might be real, yet not require that his name should be distinctly mentioned; and as to the word Lazarus, it would not be peculiar to it, in the Hebrew language, to have a meaning of its own considered as an appellative, and yet to be used as a proper name. The case of Lazarus, the brother of Martha and Mary, proves that it was a proper name among the Jews^c.

^c Theophylact mentions a tradition that the Lazarus in the

One circumstance there is, incidentally mentioned in the narrative, which seems to be of critical moment in the decision of the further question, whether the series of particulars in the midst of which it is found, is altogether fictitious or not. It is, where the rich man is represented to say, "I have *five* brethren." This manner of speaking has all the appearance of a reference to a matter of fact. For had he meant simply to imply that he had brethren, whether more or fewer, whom he left alive at the time of his death; it would not be easy to say why the definite should have been preferred to the indefinite form of speaking of them, that he had five brethren, instead of many brethren, or simply brethren; nor yet, if the number of his brethren must be specified, why it should be said that he had neither more nor less than five, could any other have been specified as their number, consistently with the truth.

The great difficulty in the way of the literal construction of the text of the narrative throughout, resides, no doubt, in the part which passes below; to the mysterious nature of which we have frequently adverted already. It may contribute somewhat to the removal of this difficulty, if we consider that this part of the story concerns the conduct and the capacities of disembodied spirits—a department of real

parable was an historical character, and his case, as there portrayed, so far as relates to what passes in the first part of the narrative, was an actual matter of fact: ἐστὶ δὲ λόγος, ὡς ἡ Ἑβραίων παράδοσις ἔχει, Λάζαρον εἶναι τινα ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις κατ' ἐκείνο καιροῦ ἐσχάτην πενίαν κεκληρωμένον, καὶ ἀρρώστIAN, οὗ μνημονεύσαι τὸν Κύριον εἰς παραβολὴν αὐτὸν λαβόντα, ὡς ἐμφανῆ καὶ γνώριμον. Theophyl. i. 417. E. in Luc. xvi.

existence, of which we are totally ignorant, except so far as it has been partially revealed, by the scattered rays of light which scripture has cast upon it. We know not for certain either what Hades is, nor how departed spirits subsist, or carry on an intercourse with each other, in their state of disunion from the body; nor of what affections, whether of joy or pain, and in what manner, as the proper medium of each, they are still capable: and yet we may be sure, because we have the assurance of competent testimony to that effect, that there is some such place as Hades, the receptacle of spirits after death—there is some mode of existence of which the soul is capable when separated from the body—there are some means of mutual correspondence, some proper acts of consciousness, some memory of the past, some feeling of the present, some anticipation of the future, some capability of pleasure and pain, of joy and grief, of desire and of aversion—even among the inhabitants of Hades—and as characteristic of a rational, a moral, an intelligent, and individual essence, in a state of disunion from the body, as in one of communion with it.

It is true, that those who are still in the flesh, and acquainted with the passive or the active powers of the human soul, only as developed in and through the body, can form no adequate idea of any of her faculties of either kind, in a separate state of existence; and for the same reason, should there be occasion to speak of them, yet to do this in a manner intelligible to our apprehensions, the language of inspiration itself requires to be modified accordingly; and must describe the soul, even out of the body, as actually still in the body, and as retaining in her

separate state all those members of action, and organs of sensation, which she left behind her at her death ; and with these, all the modes of action of which they were naturally the instruments, and all the affections and sensations of which they were naturally the media. She may be suffering all the time in some manner peculiar to herself, and yet must be represented as still subject to bodily pain : she may be enjoying some proper pleasure and gratification of her own, and through some medium as natural to her independent mode of existence, as the enjoyment—and yet must be described as deriving it still from sensation of one kind or other : she may be carrying on an actual intercourse with the objects around her, in some proper manner, without the sight or the tongue, and yet be represented as seeing or speaking by the help of the same natural organs as heretofore.

This mode of personating intellectual or spiritual ideas, by means of sensible and corporeal, is not peculiar to the present parable ; but, as founded in a common necessity of accommodation to the capacities of such beings as men, it is the established language of scripture wherever it has occasion to speak of purely spiritual and incorporeal natures, their actions or passions, their habits of thought, their perceptions or modes of being ; whether the Supreme Being, or angels, or the souls of men. On none of these subjects would it be possible even for inspiration, without a miracle, to speak intelligibly to human apprehensions, except in the language of metaphor—in terms which may convey a general idea of the meaning intended to be expressed, but are no exact measure of the truth ; and though the nearest ap-

proximation to propriety, compatible with the power of being comprehended by those to whom they are addressed, which involve more or less of error, if literally understood.

THE MORAL AND APPLICATION.

OF the two divisions of the parables, it cannot require any proof that the parable of Dives and Lazarus does not belong to the allegorical, and therefore, that it must come under the head of the moral. It is peculiar to this class, however, to have an explanation of their scope and import either prefixed or subjoined to them, by our Saviour himself; which, at first sight, does not appear to be the case in the present instance. Nothing at least is either directly premised, or directly subjoined to it by the speaker of the parable, which would at once afford a clue to the discovery of the end proposed by it^d.

^d That the parable of Dives and Lazarus, standing where it does, stands somewhat detached from its proper position in the context, is evident upon inspection. A classical reader would be led to infer this even from the occurrence of the particle *δέ*, at the outset of the narrative; for that possesses, among its other uses, the power of denoting transition from one distinct topic to another—from one integral division of a subject to another—or the resumption of a former topic which happens to have been laid by or suspended. For this reason, it ought by all means to have been preserved in the English version, and rendered by some such corresponding particle in our language, as “Now.” “Now there was a certain rich man,” &c.

I have repeatedly had occasion to observe that the whole of our Lord's discourse, from the first verse of the sixteenth chapter, was properly addressed to his own disciples. The Pharisees and others, not his disciples, were certainly present when it was spoken; but it does not appear that either they, or any who were not disciples, were directly concerned in what was

We find it follow, it is true, upon a discourse just before addressed to the Pharisees, who were

said. They might hear what was said, therefore, upon this occasion; and so far as they heard it, and could understand its meaning, they might like or dislike the doctrine itself, as they had reasons or motives of their own so to do. But their giving vent to their feelings, whatsoever they were, their expressing their liking or disliking of what they heard—and more especially the latter—whether by contemptuous gestures, or by insulting language, or by both—would be strictly and properly an interruption, and either an act of impertinence and rudeness, or something worse. The occurrence of such an interruption, and so expressed, could not but interfere with the prosecution of our Lord's previous discourse; and if there was something more than usually offensive in the manner of it, would lay him under the necessity of suspending the train of his reflections, to rebuke and reprove it; for it could scarcely be passed over without notice.

Such appears to have been the origin of that part of the present chapter, which records the discourse addressed to the Pharisees, between the close of the comment on the parable of the steward, and the commencement of the parable of Dives and Lazarus. And as its origin seems to have been accidental, and foreign to the general occasion of the whole discourse previously, so does its insertion, where it stands, shew it to be purely parenthetical, and to have none but an accidental connection with what goes before or follows it. The analysis of its contents will prove that it is directed to three points only; the exposure of the self-righteousness of the Pharisees; the insufficiency of the grounds on which it rested; and the practical influence of their principles on their conduct, as exemplified in one capital instance, the unrestricted liberty of divorce.

The interruption which proceeded from the Pharisees, actuated as it might be, is recorded to have happened when our Lord had arrived at the concluding words of verse 13: "Ye cannot serve God and mammon." But why this particular declaration should have led to the direct expression of contempt on their part for the speaker and his doctrine, was probably this; not that, in opposition to this declaration, they thought

present from the time of the beginning of all the proceedings recorded on this occasion, and heard

it possible to reconcile the service of mammon merely with the service of God, but because they thought it easy to reconcile the service of any idol with the service of God, the breach of any moral obligation with their duty to God. The moral and religious use of money is certainly a principal part of moral and religious obligation—but still it is only a part; and there are many other duties to which moral agents are bound as well as to that, and which they would be just as much tempted to violate, could they do it with impunity, or without forfeiting their duty to their proper moral superior, as well as that. Had our Lord had occasion to say, like one of the prophets of old time, “Ye cannot serve God and Baal,” that is, the idol of lust and impurity, instead of “Ye cannot serve God and mammon,” that is, the god of avarice and gold; the Pharisees would probably have found as much to except against in that assertion, as in the other.

For it is a fact, of which the evidence meets us in a variety of ways, upon the face of the gospel history, that the men of this generation, and the sect of the Pharisees in particular, believed themselves to possess a ready means of pleasing God, whatever their moral character might be, and of rendering themselves perfect in his estimation, whatever their actual deficiencies might be. So long as purely legal or ceremonial righteousness was supposed to possess the efficacy of moral, and to do as much to make the comers thereunto perfect, as the laws of virtue and religion themselves; there was no vice, in the practice of which they might not persist, no passion, in the indulgence of which they might not allow themselves, with perfect complacency and self-satisfaction. The punctilious obedience of certain ceremonial precepts, the scrupulous observance of certain ceremonial ordinances—the law of circumcision—the law of sacrifice—the law of tithes—the law of the sabbath—the law of baptism—a formal fast, and an equally formal prayer—would expiate all, would compensate for all, and make them free not merely from ceremonial, but from purely moral guilt.

Some such persuasion as this seems to have been uppermost in the minds of the Pharisees, at this time, as well as to be im-

every thing said by our Lord, whether meant for themselves or not. But that address arose out of

plied in the tenor of our Lord's address to them ; whose observations are as often directed to the secret thoughts and latent motives, as to the open declarations, or the overt conduct, of his hearers. "Ye Pharisees are they that justify yourselves before "men;" which is to recognize indeed the fact of the presumption of their own righteousness, but as resting on their own persuasion ; as having no foundation but in their imagination. "But God knoweth your hearts ; for that which "is high among men—that which is highly esteemed among "men, is abomination in the sight of God." The affectation of superior goodness, the semblance of purity, sanctity, perfection, to which the Pharisees made pretence, might impose upon men, and gain them the applause and admiration of the world ; but it could not deceive God, nor screen from his view the impurity which lay concealed in their hearts ; with reference to which the outward show and appearance was but the more offensive and disgusting, the more worthy of his indignation and reprobation. This declaration, then, was substantially the same with that which had been made to the same persons not long before, Luke xi. 39. Harm. iv. 31 : "Now do you, the Pharisees, make clean the outside of the cup and the platter, but "that which is within you—your inward *part*—is full of ravin "and wickedness ;" on which account, and as specious hypocrites, whose real impurity was but the more strongly contrasted with their apparent sanctity—he compared them on the same occasion (verse 44), to graves or monuments which were not seen, and on a subsequent one (Matt. xxiii. 23, 27. Harm. iv. 77.), to whited sepulchres ; the latter full of dead men's bones within, the former not known to be what they were.

"The Law and the Prophets *were* until John ; since that "time the kingdom of Heaven is preached:" which taken in conjunction with what immediately precedes, the rebuke of the imaginary righteousness of the Pharisees—points both to the grounds on which it was placed, the observance of the ceremonial part of the law of Moses, and to the instability of these grounds—that not only the ritual part of the ancient law, but every other part too, whether enforced by the teaching of Moses,

an interruption of his discourse previously, which proceeded from the Pharisees themselves; and the nature of which was such, that it became the dignity of our Saviour's character, to suspend even his previous reflections, in order to resent it by a grave and severe, though well-merited rebuke, on the spot. The nature of the reproof which he accordingly addresses to them, and the particular topics on which it turns, are such, that on no principle of association in the order of thought, or of the transition from one topic to another, could it be shewn to have led, or been likely to lead, to a parable like that which

or by that of the prophets, since the commencement of the Christian dispensation, the first step to which was the appearance and ministry of John the Baptist, unless readopted and reenforced by the gospel and its proper ministers, was already antiquated, and should shortly be entirely superseded.

Lastly, by a natural association of ideas, our Lord passes from the principles which actuated this sect, to the practical effect of such principles on their lives and conversation; instancing in one of these effects, as a sample or specimen of the rest, as crying and as notorious, and as well calculated as any to shew that the fruit of such seeds, like its source, must be impure and unhallowed; the breach of the law of marriage, in the indulgence of sensual caprice. The affected sanctity of the Pharisees and their followers, would not allow them to live in the practice of open fornication, nor yet their concupiscence to remain contented with the chaste enjoyment of one wife. And hence, as a ready expedient to reconcile unrestrained indulgence with regard to decorum, and the appearance of propriety, externally—the liberty granted to divorce—not merely for grave and serious reasons, but for any frivolous and trivial pretence. But what is marriage, except a specious cloke for promiscuous concubinage, if bounds are not set to the liberty, if not to the desire, of change; if a man may take a wife, under pretence of the marriage union, and for any cause, however slight, as soon as he is tired of her, may put her away again for another?

follows it. Unless, then, this parable, in possessing no direction to the discovery of its meaning, is an exception from the class to which it belongs—the analogy of the other moral parables justifies the inference that if nothing is subjoined, something must have been premised to it, calculated to throw light upon it. And as this is not found to reside in the part which precedes it most immediately—the substance of the reproof addressed to the Pharisees—where can we look for it, except in the general comment, and the general train of reflections arising out of the preceding parable, which our Saviour was engaged upon at the moment when he was interrupted?

The explanation which we have given of this discourse has shewn, that it was intended to inculcate a certain doctrine with respect to the origin, the possession, the use and application of the gift of the temporal mammon; whereby the hearers of our Lord, his own disciples—and consequently Christians in general—might be taught to look upon it in the light of a responsible trust, delegated to its possessors by the providence of God, and intended to be administered, so long as it was retained, like every other trust, in some manner or other, to the honour and service, the good and advantage of its author. Upon the grounds of the obligation so to consider and so to apply this trust—upon the personal consequences to the holder thereof of the use or abuse of his trust—upon the wisdom of ever remembering the responsibility of his relation, and ever faithfully discharging the duties of his commission, so as to deserve and to gain the good-will of his proper superior—the language of the commentary, subjoined to the parable, was

copious, precise, and clear. But upon the express method of administering a trust like this—upon the nature of the use and application to which the possession of the temporal mammon, considered in the light of a stewardship derived from God, ought especially to be directed—it was comparatively silent, further than the general injunction of making such an use of it in the service, as to deserve the good-will, to conciliate the friendship of God ; and so to earn its reward from God.

We cannot doubt, however, that the only acceptable, as well as the only authorized way in which the temporal mammon can be so employed by its nominal possessor, as to serve and please God, while it intitles its owner to the praise of a meritorious steward of the Divine bounty, is upon the offices of philanthropy, kindness, charity. Had the design of our Saviour in his practical reflections upon this subject, led him to speak distinctly of the use and application most fitting to be made of money, considered in this peculiar light, of a delegated trust from God ; we may safely conclude that the duty of charity to the poor and needy, the doctrine of the eleemosynary use and application of the temporal mammon, would have been specially insisted on, and prominently inculcated^e, as the best and fittest mode in which the possessor of riches could most

^e There is no direct mention of almsgiving made in the text, yet Cyprian understood the precept, to make ourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness, in that sense ; *Nam cum Dominus in Evangelio de eleemosynis disputaret, et ut nobis amicos de terrestribus lucris provida operatione faceremus, qui nos postmodum in tabernacula æterna susciperent, fideliter ac salubriter præmoneret, &c. : De opere et eleemosynis, 202.*

effectually discharge his obligation to his proper master, as the steward of the bounty of another.

Now since examples teach more forcibly than words—and since it was more in unison with our Saviour's manner to instruct by parable and precept in conjunction, than by either without the other; he might always intend to conclude his discourse upon this subject, with a moral history convenient for his purpose, and calculated to supply the omission in question, if not directly, yet indirectly; inculcating the doctrine of the right use of the temporal mammon, by representing the penal consequences of its abuse. On this principle, the end and the beginning of his address to his disciples, would harmonize together; a parable introducing, and a parable closing the discussion of the same subject, and cooperating together in enforcing a common moral with reference to it. The history of the iniquitous steward furnished an opportunity of representing the case of every moral agent, endowed with the possession of wealth, as the case of a steward—and of drawing the consequent inference of the obligation incumbent upon him, to use the subject-matter of his trust, as became a steward, to the honour and advantage of some other than the possessor himself. The reflections which this representation naturally tended to excite, the train of ideas which his own practical commentary on the previous narrative might spontaneously have raised, suggested perhaps the design of embodying in a second historical picture, remarkable for the force, the liveliness, the strength and distinctness of its colouring, the substance of all which had yet been said, or still remained to be said, in reference to this topic; and of

inculcating over and above, the specific nature of the use, by shewing the specific nature of the abuse of wealth, as well as the personal ill-consequences to be apprehended from it.

It is observable that as far as the thirteenth verse, our Lord was allowed by the Pharisees to proceed without interruption : no second parable, therefore, whether designed to prosecute the general subject of the former or not, could have followed upon it before that point of time. But one might have followed after that verse, and yet have conspired with the preceding to produce a common result. For the incompatibility there asserted, between the service of God and the service of mammon, as we before observed, is to be understood of the absurd and impossible attempt to serve both at the same time ; not of the impossibility of serving the one, at the expense of the service of the other. Whosoever, then, embraces the service of mammon, by that act necessarily renounces the service of God ; and by one of these acts, as he may hope to gain the goodwill of mammon, so by the other he may expect to encounter the displeasure of God. Whosoever, then, prefers the service of mammon to the service of God, even with this liability to the displeasure of God, and to the consequences of it to himself—it is not implied that he will meet with no reward from his adopted, any more than with no punishment from his deserted master. He may hope for his reward from mammon, in consequence of the choice which he has made, as reasonably and as certainly as he may expect his punishment from God. And insomuch as the goods of mammon, generally speaking, are given to their temporary possessors by the

Divine providence, as a trust for the term of their lives—and, consequently, so long as they are still in the body, they are still upon trial, and still have both the use and the abuse of their trust in their power; it is to be presumed, that whosoever embraces the service of mammon by renouncing his allegiance to God, with an equal certainty of obtaining his reward from the one, and his punishment from the other, may hope to receive, and must be represented as receiving, his reward from the master whose service he has chosen—where only it can be enjoyed, viz. in this life—but may expect his punishment in the next, and cannot be supposed to experience it from the master whose service he has abandoned, except in the next. The offence which intitles him to punishment at the hands of this master, is committed here, because the trust, in the mis-use of which that offence consists, is delegated to its proper possessors here, and is to be administered, whether for better or for worse, here; but the retribution which awaits the crime of its abuse, as well as the reward which is promised to its right use, cannot begin until the period of the trust is over, and there is no longer opportunity either for its use, or its abuse, as before; which is, properly speaking, hereafter.

Now let us suppose that a parable, calculated to illustrate these various truths by a case in point, had always been intended to follow at the proper time; what are the material circumstances, which we might reasonably expect, *a priori*, such a narrative would be found to contain? First, the history of some rich man—of some one endued with the possession of the temporal mammon; and conse-

quently, if such a possession can constitute a trust, of some one invested with a responsible trust; bound, therefore, like every other person in such circumstances, to certain proper and corresponding duties, which constitute its use—yet capable, like every other person in similar circumstances, of neglecting and contravening them, which would constitute its abuse; liable to the praise of faithful and meritorious for the one, and equally obnoxious to the charge of dishonest and unfaithful for the other: and the subject-matter of his trust being the good things of the present life—capable of doing much good to others by the one, and of lavishing all upon his own enjoyment by the other; that is, along with the possibility of incurring his punishment from God, having the equal possibility of earning his reward from mammon, by one and the same use of his trust.

Secondly, the history of some poor man, as the special instance in reference to which, the use or the abuse of the trust, committed to the rich man, should be exemplified and put to the test; an history consequently, subordinate to the former, and necessary to its developement. And the more striking might be the evidence of poverty and distress in the history of this second person, so much the more urgent, and so far more just, would be his claim to relief; and so much the more glaring, as well as inexcusable, would be the abuse of his trust on the part of the other, if, under such circumstances, he withheld that relief.

Thirdly, the undoubted fact of such an abuse, on the part of the superior, in some instance of his behaviour towards the inferior party in the two histories in question—of so critical a kind, that the treat-

ment of the one, under the circumstances of the case, must be a direct proof and test of the abuse of his proper trust, by the other.

Fourthly, the representation of some penal consequences as following upon the fact of this abuse, and directly or indirectly to be attributed to it, and to be accounted for only by it; which consequences, as they could not ensue upon the fact in question, in this life, must be supposed to begin and to be felt first, in the next; and therefore, if the narrative such as we are supposing, had occasion to describe them, it must travel for that purpose, out of the limits of the present life, into another scene of things. And since upon the truth and certainty of such penal consequences, to follow hereafter upon such an abuse of the trust in question here, the moral effect of the whole representation would obviously depend, more than upon any thing else—the part assigned to the description of these consequences, it might be expected, would be the most prominent of all; in other words, the history supposed to be transacted in another state of things, however intimately connected with that which passed in the upper world, would be paramount in importance to it.

Now the parable of Dives and Lazarus, which actually ensues at this point of time, answers to each of these descriptions; and therefore is such an one, as with the particular view of illustrating the preceding doctrines by a case critically in point to them, might be expected, *a priori*, to have followed where it does. For, first, the history of Dives is manifestly of greater importance than that of Lazarus. It is the first introduced to notice; and

having once been begun, it is never after omitted or suspended. The history of Lazarus is brought in by the way, solely in connection with the details of the history of Dives, so long as both are still confined to the present life; and when each has passed into the next life, the history of Dives is still distinctly prosecuted, while that of Lazarus is left to implication. It is reasonable therefore, to presume, that even in a representation applicable in common to both, the part sustained by Lazarus is subordinate to that sustained by Dives; and that the proper moral of the representation, however much it may be promoted by the former, resides more immediately in the latter. The history of Lazarus, taken by itself, may have an use of its own; but considered as part of a more comprehensive narrative, it has no use except in subserviency to that of Dives.

Secondly, the history of Dives itself is begun in this life, but it is not completed in this life; and it speedily passes out of the present life into the next. That the parts of the transaction therefore confined to the upper and the lower world respectively, are connected together, must be evident; and that the final end of the account of what passed in the upper world, would not have been complete without the account of what passes in the next life, must also be obvious. The latter part of the history of the same individual is, in this case, paramount to the former; and the account of the one, we may presume, was premised because it was necessary to the other. The greater length and circumstantiality of this part are so far a proof of its superior importance. The history of Dives in the present life is dispatched in four

verses ; but the account of what befalls him in the next, extends through nine. On this subject, however, we shall have occasion to enlarge hereafter.

Thirdly, the history of Dives is the history of a rich man, and the history of Lazarus is the history of a poor man. “ There was a certain rich man”—and, “ there was a certain poor man”—these are the terms in which the narrative first introduces each of them to notice, respectively. Nor is this all—but, with that lively description which it proceeds to give of the opposite condition and circumstances of each, a greater distinction and contrast of external fortune cannot well be supposed to have discriminated any two individuals of the time ; a richer than Dives, or a poorer than Lazarus, it would not be easy to conceive. It is not necessary to shock the sensibilities of the reader, by expatiating on the wretched condition, the loathsome infirmities, the exquisite bodily sufferings of the poor beggar, who was cast at the rich man’s gate, full of sores—which the simple and concise, but graphic and forcible summary of the original, has so well expressed in one or two words. It is equally superfluous to enlarge on the ease and comfort, the splendour and profusion of the rich man’s estate, in comparison with the misery and privations of the beggar ; which also the parable in its own simple, but expressive manner, has sufficiently characterised by one or two strokes of the pencil. Thus much only it seems but reasonable to observe by way of additional explanation ; that besides the delicacy and finery of the rich man’s apparel, which is one of the circumstances of his outward fortune dis-

tinctly mentioned—besides the luxuries of the table, which appear to be first and properly intended by the terms of the further description, enjoying himself sumptuously day by day ; the full force of the original (εὐφραυνόμενος καθ' ἡμέραν λαμπρῶς) without any straining of its meaning, opens a wide scope to the supposition that much more is included in it than simply the nature of the rich man's daily fare. Every pleasure or convenience which wealth can procure ; every distinction, which rank can challenge ; magnificent dwellings—costly furniture—the embellishments of painting or sculpture—beautiful gardens—extensive prospects—the pomp and pageantry of retinue—all kinds of diversions, spectacles, music, dancing—if these are any sources of pleasure, and of pleasure peculiar to, or proper for, the rich—each might be comprehended and each be intended to be comprehended in that summary mention of the daily enjoyment, amusement, and self-satisfaction, in which the life of Dives is supposed to have been past.

Fourthly, the history of Dives, so far as relates to the present life, is the history of the abuse of wealth ; and so far as the abuse of wealth is the abuse of a trust derived from the providence of God—agreeably to the doctrine already inculcated about it,—it is the history of the abuse of such a trust. And it is the history of such an abuse of the temporal mammon, considered as the proper subject of a delegated trust, as alone was to be expected consistently with the true view of the first origin of the trust, or from whom the temporal mammon is received—and of the final end of its commission to the hands of its pos-

essor, or for what it is given and intended; viz. the appropriation of all to the possessor himself, as if he were exclusively the owner of his trust, and bound to administer it in no way that would be as much for the good and advantage, and therefore as much for the service, of another as of himself. The fact, however, of this abuse is not to be precariously assumed. The moral of the narrative depends principally upon it; and we are bound to demonstrate it, if possible, with a clearness and exactness equal to its importance. And though we may admit, it is nowhere explicitly asserted in the words of the narrative, yet if it is but necessarily implied in its facts and circumstances, there will be no reason to doubt of its truth.

For, if the possession of the temporal mammon is correctly to be described as a delegated trust from God—and if the appointed method of its administration, consistently with its nature as such a trust, is on the various offices of humanity, of charity to the poor and needy, of relief to all such as stand in need of relief—it is obvious that there are two ways in which the temporary possessor of such a trust may prove unfaithful to it, and contravene the purpose of his heavenly Master, by whom it was confided to him: first, by withholding from those who want them, and in some proportion or other are intitled to share in them, all participation in those blessings of fortune, or good things of the present life, which have fallen to his lot; secondly, by appropriating all to himself, and making them exclusively subservient to his own enjoyment.

True it is that both these species of the abuse of the trust, are connected in the principle from

which they proceed, an equal forgetfulness of the tenure of the trust; and in the effects to which they give birth, an equal neglect of its common duties. It is manifestly possible, however, for the former of them to take place in a given instance, without the latter; though not the latter, without the former. They are sufficiently distinguished therefore in their line of operation, and in their first and most immediate effects, respectively, to constitute two different species of a common abuse; in one, or in both of which, if the history before us designed to exemplify the fact of any such abuse, the instance selected for the purpose would be found to consist. Accordingly, the history of Lazarus, so far as it is recorded in the parable, contains, in my apprehension, the instance in point to such a simple abuse as the first of the two in question, and that of Dives, the evidence of such a simple abuse as the second; and the two histories together the evidence of such a complex abuse as both.

For first, the history of Lazarus is manifestly the history of a poor man, reduced by privation to the last extremity of want, and labouring moreover under acute bodily suffering; of a poor man, too, who being in that situation, is conveyed to the mansion of a rich man living in the midst of abundance. And as to the object which brings him there, even had the narrative been silent about it, it might have been collected from the personal description of him who was brought there. The poor and infirm do not repair to the houses of the rich and affluent, except in quest of assistance and relief. That no relief, however, was accorded to the poor man—that

his claims to pity were treated with indifference—we may argue, for several reasons: as first, the silence of the narrative, which mentions no such fact as his meeting with the least relief, and by omitting to mention it bears, by implication, the strongest testimony to the contrary. For it must be in the highest degree improbable, that an history which describes so pathetically the calamitous situation of the poor man, previous to his being cast as a suppliant at the portals of the rich man—would have been entirely silent on so material a circumstance, so grateful to philanthropy in general, so agreeable to the benevolent disposition of the author of the parable, so necessary too to the just and equitable appreciation of the conduct of the rich man himself, as the mitigation of the sufferings of Lazarus, by the means of Dives; could that mitigation have been supposed with truth. Secondly, from the absurdity of the contrary supposition—an argument which it may suffice briefly to allude to, at present. For, if the rich man is described as punished in Hades, and punished for any part of his conduct in the former life, it must be, among other things, for his treatment of Lazarus: and that fact alone would be decisive what the nature of his treatment of Lazarus had been.

Thirdly, the very moderation of the desires of Lazarus—a circumstance distinctly insisted on by the narrative—is some argument to the same effect. This moderation proves two things—both the urgency of the wants of the suitor, whose necessities could be satisfied with so little, and the cheapness of the sacrifice by which the rich man, of whom he was the suitor, might have earned the praise of liberality,

while he discharged the commonest office of humanity. The poor man neither begged for, nor expected, more than the crumbs from the rich man's table—the superfluities of his abundance, the overflowings of his well-filled cup—the very waste of his daily good cheer—which if not given to him, and to such as him, must be swept away as refuse, or thrown to the dogs. It is reasonable to infer that the modesty of that petition, which asked for no more than this, is purposely mentioned the more forcibly to contrast with it the inhumanity and want of feeling which could deny it even that.

One circumstance too, there is in the personal history of the poor man, which however pathetic in itself or even horrifying to our sensibilities, yet, if considered as mentioned to impress this conviction of the total neglect with which the poor man was treated by the rich man, acquires a moral use and meaning over and above itself: I mean, that incidental stroke of the description which completes the picture of the wants and the sufferings of Lazarus: “Nay even the dogs used to come, and lick his sores.” Whether these be considered the dogs of the rich man himself, or what is more probable, dogs which roamed at large in the cities of Judæa, the property of no master^f—the final end of specifying this circumstance, so harrowing to the imagination, seems to be, intentionally to contrast the tender mercies even of brutes with the insensibility of men, in one and the same case of distress and

^f Vide Exod. xxii. 31 : 1 Kings xiv. 11 ; xvi. 4 ; xxi. 23, 24 : 2 Kings ix. 10. 36 ; xvii. 9 ; xviii. 8 : Psalm xxii. 16. 20 ; lix. 6. 14 : Ecclesiastes ix. 4 : Isaiah lvi. 10, 11 : Jeremiah xv. 3 : Cf. Matt. xv. 26, 27 : Mark vii. 27, 28.

suffering requiring sympathy and relief. Lazarus meets with that pity, and as far as they were able to afford it, that mitigation of his misery from dogs, which was denied him by his affluent fellow-creature: something like compassion humanizes and softens the one, while an unfeeling indifference to the spectacle of humanity in distress, hardens and brutalizes the other.

When, therefore, we are told, as the next step in the order of events, that the poor man died—we are told of that, which, on the supposition of antecedent neglect and insensibility in those who both might and ought to have relieved him, was but a natural consequence. If he was sick and destitute, and no notice was taken of his condition—it is no wonder that in a short time he died. But if the contrary was the case—if oil and wine were poured into his sores, if bread was supplied to his hunger, and clothing provided for his nakedness—the fact of his subsequent decease would be, by no means, so probable or so necessary a circumstance.

The disposal of the soul of the poor man, too, immediately after this event, is so described as to lead to a similar conclusion. It passed into the hands of the angels—as soon as it passed out of the body; that is, out of the hands of men into the hands of those who would cherish, protect, and befriend it, disjoined from the body, as much as it had been slighted, neglected, and abandoned by its fellow-creatures, while united to it. It was received into Abraham's bosom—that is, into the abode of peace, comfort, and rest—immediately after death; to shew that before, nothing but trouble, privation, and suffering, had been its portion. Nor would Abraham,

we may presume, have asserted that Lazarus had received in his lifetime *his* evil things, and his evil things only, had that evil been tempered, in ever so little a degree, with good—had the hand of compassion mingled one drop of sweetness with that cup of bitterness which it had fallen to his lot to drain. For the comfort which he was then enjoying, was not a more certain fact than the misery which he had endured till then ; nor was his present pleasure more free from the alloy of pain, than his former pain from the admixture of pleasure.

Secondly ; the personal description of Dives, from the first, is such as would answer to the liveliest conception which our imaginations could form of the slave of mammon, reaping to the fullest extent, from his adopted master the reward of his services, where only it can be reaped ; viz. in the present life. For what has the most selfish enjoyment of temporal abundance to bestow on its possessor, more than that splendid array of the body—and that luxurious indulgence of the appetites of sense—not to mention those other sources of pleasure and gratification, peculiar to the rich, alluded to above—in which his life is said to have been passed ? Superior dignity of dress, and greater delicacy of fare, may both, indeed, be the decent privilege of the rich ; who are not to be debarred from their proper share in the enjoyment of those good things with which the providence of God has blessed them : but this enjoyment to be innocent in the receivers, ought certainly to be moderate, and to be becoming the giver, ought never to be exclusive ; whereas the most characteristic circumstance of the pastime of Dives is selfish-

ness and excess, systematic and habitual excess. He was wont to be clothed in purple and fine linen, enjoying himself sumptuously day by day. His habits of life, then, were those of a voluptuary. The same softness and effeminacy of apparel distinguished his person; the same luxury and profusion reigned at his table, every day. This is sufficient to discriminate the votary of mammon, tasting his reward to the utmost from the master whom he is serving. And that the difference of character may be sustained to the last—when Lazarus dies, we know not what is done with his body; the disposal of his soul alone is mentioned, and burial we may presume, he had none, or such only as became a beggar; but when the rich man died, we are told he was buried—nor is it too much to suppose, was buried with every circumstance of pomp, with all the parade and ostentation, which distinguishes the funeral obsequies of the rich.

Further—the sequel of his personal history represents him as undergoing some punishment; it must be therefore for some personal offence. The punishment is undergone in Hades; the offence therefore was committed in the present life. But it would be idle to look for any explanation of this result, except in the history of his past existence; nor in the circumstances of that history further than they have been made known to us. And what has the parable recorded of the conduct or character of Dives in the upper life, more than the nature of his daily mode of living in general, or of his treatment of Lazarus in particular? In one of these two things, then, or both, must that offence have consisted in the upper life, which intitled him to punishment in

the lower world : in one of these things or both must be comprehended the essence of his character in general, and the tenor of his conduct through life. In the former, we see the use which he made of temporal good for and upon himself ; in the latter, the use which he made of it for and upon another ; the former, immoderate and selfish ; the latter, insensible to pity, and regardless of the claims of humanity.

The death of the rich man itself, an event which follows apparently so speedily upon that of the poor man—may be a critical circumstance in the decision of this question, to establish the fact of a necessary connection between the two events, almost like that of cause and effect. For if the guilt of Dives, which required to be punished in the next life, was mainly contracted by his treatment of Lazarus in the present life—that guilt would be most complete, when in consequence of the rich man's neglect of him, the poor man was now dead ; and when the guilt of the offence was most complete, the punishment of the offender might most properly begin. No sooner, therefore, are we informed that Lazarus died, than we are told the rich man also died ; no sooner are we told that he died, than we perceive him to be in Hades, and no sooner there, than crying out in torments ; all which seems very far from a fortuitous combination of circumstances, and not rather intentional and designed.

If Dives had not been acquainted with Lazarus in the upper world, it may be contended that he could not, without a direct revelation from some other quarter, have known him again in the lower : but if he knew him at all in the former life, he must

have known him for what he was—a poor, an afflicted, and ulcerous fellow-creature, who had been cast at his own doors, craving a morsel of his bread. Could he have known him, however, in that capacity, and yet without a direct violation of the laws of humanity, have persisted in denying him his request? Or could he have granted his indigent suitor even the pittance which he asked for—and yet be reminded by Abraham, that Lazarus in his lifetime had received his *evil things*, as much as he himself his good things—as if both facts were equally notorious to him? Or would he at once acquiesce in the truth of this remonstrance, as a satisfactory reason why *he* should expect no relief, nor mitigation of *his* existing evil after death, at least *through* the instrumentality of Lazarus—except from the recollection, of which he could not but be conscious, that the evil of Lazarus in the former life, had experienced no relief nor mitigation through means of himself?

When he is represented as praying that Lazarus might be sent to his father's house, to testify to his surviving brethren—and specifies this as the end which he proposed in *their* behalf by such a testimony—"lest they also come into this place of torment;" it is plainly insinuated by such a prayer, what had brought himself there, and what, in process of time, unless obviated by a timely repentance and change of life, would bring his brethren there likewise. For to propose to send Lazarus from such a quarter and upon such an errand, was directly to confess that his own treatment of Lazarus, as recorded in his previous history—a treatment involving the habitual neglect of the great duty in-

cumbent on the rich in behalf of the poor and destitute—had brought himself into Hades ; and directly to forewarn his surviving brethren that the same treatment of such as Lazarus, the same neglect of the duties of charity and humanity, on their part, if persisted in to the end of their lives, would infallibly bring them there too.

And when he declares it to be his conviction that in deference to the testimony of such a messenger, they would repent, he clearly intimates both that *they*, the survivors, stood still in need of some repentance, and that *he* himself, while one of them, had done the same ; both that, without this testimony to produce their conversion, they would live and die in their unrepentant state, and that he himself had once done the same. But of what could *they*, his surviving relations, still have need of repentance, and of what consequently could he himself have died unrepentant, except of that sin in general which the warning admonitions of such a preacher as the soul of Lazarus, more especially, was calculated to denounce ; that sin from which he himself had suffered in his own person, and suffered so deeply, and for which their dead brother was tormented in Hades ? the sin of the abuse of wealth in luxurious and voluptuous living, peculiar to the rich ; the sin of indifference to the wants and necessities of others, which their own abundance qualifies them so easily to relieve ; the sin of forgetting that by the tenure of their temporal trust they are the stewards of God, not the servants of mammon ; the sin of squandering the bounty of the giver on themselves, instead of sharing it with those for whom a part of it was always intended, the humbler

and more destitute class of his creatures, whom his providence makes poor, as well as others of their brethren rich ; and so employing it reflexively to the honour and glory of God, by devoting it directly to the good and advantage of men.

Fourthly ; that the history of Dives after death, is the history of one who is punished ; that the punishment is incurred there, where only the punishment of offences committed in this life, can properly take place ; that an œconomy of retribution, strictly so called, is related in the sequel of the parable ; that the state of things which results from that œconomy, to the proper subject thereof, is fixed and unchangeable, and therefore is properly penal ; and that all this, in the instance of Dives, is the consequence of an abuse of wealth, in both its kinds, defined as above — is either self-evident, or after what has been premised may reasonably be taken for granted. The proof then, of the fourth of our general propositions as to what might fairly be expected beforehand of the constitution of a parable expressly designed to inculcate the doctrine of the right use, by drawing a lively portrait of the penal consequences of the abuse, of the trust of the temporal mammon, might appear to be sufficiently well made out. But there are still some circumstances of distinction, observable in the narrative, which will tend to confirm it yet more, and which the importance of this part of the subject requires to be specially pointed out.

When we are informed that Dives, being in torments, lifted up his eyes in Hades, and beheld Lazarus from afar, the effect which follows seems

to have been by no means an accidental consequence of the act which preceded. Lazarus even in Hades was present to the rich man's thoughts; and conscience applied even there the fact of his conduct towards him beforetime, as the key to his present condition, miserable as that was. He remembered Lazarus, and was permitted to see him, that the true grounds of the offence for which he was suffering, and the justice of his punishment, might be the more strongly impressed on his conviction.

Now as the history of both these parties is combined together from the first, and opposed one to the other in a determinate manner from the first, so is this conjunction and opposition between them preserved to the last; and what is more, the state in which they are each left at last, relatively to one another, is directly the reverse of the relation in which they stood to each other at first. The change which transition to another scene of existence produces upon their relative circumstances in the former world, is that the one passes by his death into the state of the other in his life; what the one had been in his life, the other becomes by his death, and *vice versa*. There is the same relation of opposite circumstances between them, taken in conjunction, after death as before; but the individuals in whose relations to each other this opposition of circumstances continues to be exemplified, have changed places. It is the opposition of a poor man and a rich man, after death, as well as before; but who is the poor man and who is the rich man, is not the same as before. Lazarus was the poor man in the upper world, and Dives was the rich; Lazarus has become the rich man in the lower world, and Dives

has become the poor. The former in his lifetime had received his evil things, and by his death has obtained his good; the latter had his good things before, and is awarded his evil things now.

Still more exquisite will the retributory effect of this dispensation appear, when it is considered, that as poverty under all circumstances consists in the privation of those things, the possession of which constitutes wealth—not only the good things which fell to the lot of Dives in the former life were exactly the coordinates of the evil things which had fallen exclusively to Lazarus, but the same parity of ratio prevails between the subject-matter of their respective lots still. Lazarus is rich, and Dives is poor—both still with respect to the presence or the absence of the very same things. The evil which has befallen the one, is the exact reverse of the good which has happened to the other. Lazarus is comforted and Dives is tormented; and *this* torment is manifestly the coordinate of *that* comfort, just as pain is of pleasure, or want of abundance. Nor is it without an apposite moral fitness in the mode of the retribution, to the kind of the offence, that the rich man is admitted to the spectacle of the happiness of Lazarus, after death, as Lazarus had been to the contemplation of his own, before—but only from *far*, and without the power of partaking in it himself; as the poor beggar had been a spectator of his own pomp and grandeur in the upper life, without the privilege of sharing in it. Nor yet that the rich man should be exhibited as desiring in general, and notwithstanding as denied, some participation in the felicity of Lazarus, in the altered state of their respective circumstances, who had not been willing to

divide his own good things in any proportion with Lazarus before. But the law of retaliation goes yet further, and visits the letter of his offence on the head of the offender. How accurate and striking an adaptation of the punishment to the guilt, in its own kind, is it, that he who had refused to Lazarus in the midst of his worldly distress, one of the crumbs from his well furnished table, should crave in his turn, at the hands of Lazarus, a drop from those fountains of comfort at which he was drinking to his fill: and how just, but how impressive, the retribution which condemns him to fail of this now, who had denied Lazarus that, before^g!

^g That an œconomy of retribution, then, of a very critical nature, must be supposed to begin as soon as the scene of the parable changes into another state of being, it is not possible to deny: but whether it is such a retribution as is complete, and final in itself, or partial, and preparatory to something else, is a different question, which we need not enter upon at present. Suffice it to know, that by a change of circumstances in what manner soever effected, Lazarus immediately after death, finds himself comforted, and Dives by the same transition finds himself tormented; that this comfort is the reverse of that torment, and the one exclusive of the other; that the comfort of Lazarus, whatever be the positive degree thereof, has no particle of the torment of Dives; and the torment of Dives, whatever it be in itself, has no mixture of the comfort of Lazarus. And were the comfort of the one no more than the enjoyment of present peace and rest, with the well-assured anticipation of greater good to come; the torment of Dives would consist at least in immediate disquietude and uneasiness, with the certain prospect of greater evil hereafter.

It is true, that the active cause of the torment in question, is represented to us under the material image of fire. But there is no more necessity to consider this fire a reality, than those organs of the body which are supposed to be suffering from the flames of this fire, or than that water, which is sup-

That the parable, then, of Dives and Lazarus, answers the conditions which might have been expected to meet in the structure of a narrative, adapted to illustrate the previous doctrines by a case in point to them all—that it contains the history of a rich man, and the history of a poor man; that it specifies the fact of the abuse of wealth in both its ways, and that it draws a vivid picture of the penal consequences of this abuse to the author thereof—is sufficiently evident from the preceding review. But as all effects must be resolvable into their causes, and all actions must be founded in some motives or principles, it may still be asked whether the parable defines, or supplies the data by means of which to define, the motive to the fact of the

posed to be wanted to administer relief to the pains of those organs. It is impossible, in fact, as we observed before, to speak of the actions or the passions of disembodied spirits, in a manner intelligible to our present apprehensions, except by attributing to them the continued possession of the same bodily organs, of which they were disencumbered by death; except by supposing, that as to their modes of acting, or their capacities of suffering, their habits of thought, or their powers of perception, they remain after death *in statu quo*. But if they are to be so spoken of, it follows that the images of bodily pain—of pain which the sentient part of our nature can be made to feel, only from and by the union of the soul with the body—must be the medium fixed upon to represent even the real, incorporeal pain of the soul; such pain as it may very possibly be capable of in its state of disunion from the body, though in some other way than through the members or senses of the body. And the more acute the pain requiring to be intelligibly represented, the more terrific those images of bodily suffering, made choice of for the purpose, will naturally be; of which number none is more harrowing to the imagination, than the image of burning by fire—no sensation is more painfully acute to the perceptions, than the pain of being burnt in the fire.

abuse in question—the principle which actuates the conduct of the rich man, regarded as unfaithful to a delegated trust?

In answer to this question, we may reply that in investigating the sense of any of the parables, the scope, the connection, the bearing of *all* their particulars, should be taken into account; nothing should be regarded as superfluous—nothing explained as independent of the rest, or at variance with it. If, then, the object of the parabolic history were simply to delineate by a case in point, the abuse of the gift of wealth, however occasioned, and the penal consequences to be expected from it; if the question of obedience or disobedience to the declared will of God, were not more or less concerned in it also—whence arises, we might ask, the allusion to Moses and the Prophets? And what is that principle of connection in the order of thought, and in the course of circumstances, which without any violence, shall conduct the narrative from the point where it begins, to the point where it ends, widely remote as these appear from each other—“There was a certain rich man,” whose daily mode of life was of such and such a kind, and the general declaration, “If they hear not Moses and the Prophets, they will not be persuaded even if one arose from the dead?”

There is no means of answering this question, except on the assumption that the history of the abuse of wealth, in the parable, is the history of the abuse of a trust derived from the providence of God, founded in contempt or disregard of the known will and commandment of God; and consequently involving more than the simple fact of the abuse, by including over and above the guilt of irreligion and

infidelity. It is superfluous, indeed, to argue, that whosoever knows himself to be invested with a trust which he holds under another, and is bound to administer after a manner of *his* appointing, cannot fail of his duty in his relative capacity, unless deliberately. There can be no medium in such a case between wilful fidelity or wilful infidelity. A mere negative abuse of the trust would be criminal, under such circumstances, and much more a positive; since not to administer a delegated trust according to the intentions of its author, would be as repugnant to his will, and as inconsistent with the final end of the commission, as actually to pervert and misapply it. And in the case of any such trust, as, by whomsoever possessed, may be contended on good grounds, to have been delegated to them, for a certain purpose, by the providence of God; the misapplication of it in any manner, whether negatively or positively, must involve the high misdemeanour of acting against the intentions of God, and be ultimately founded in impiety. The possession of the temporal mammon is a trust of this kind—which the providence of God bestows upon the rich with the further end that they may serve God by their mode of administering it, in doing good to men. Nor could any excuse be pleaded for the breach of their proper duty by the rich, except the excuse of ignorance; nor would that excuse be available, if this ignorance were the result of their own culpable neglect and inattention, to know the relation in which, as possessors of the temporal mammon, they were bound to consider themselves placed: a knowledge which the word of God was never sparing to communicate, neither among Christians, nor yet

among the Jews. But no such excuse even as this, can be pleaded in extenuation of the conduct of the rich man in the parable ; for the circumstances of his history will shew, that he was aware of his duty, and wilfully disregarded it.

We might argue, indeed, that the terms in which he is at first described, as clothed in purple and fine linen, and faring sumptuously every day—would not be unsuitable to the character of a Sadducee, among the Jews, or of an Epicurean, among the Gentiles ; who are known to have agreed in a common persuasion that there was nothing to be hoped for, nothing to be feared, beyond the limits of the present life ; that the souls of men became extinct with their bodies ; and had no interest in any state of being but the present. It was only consistent with such a persuasion, that they should think of making the most of the present life ; eating and drinking, and enjoying themselves to the best of their ability, every day. But to argue in proof of the principles of the man, from the recorded facts of his history—we may observe that Dives, as well as Lazarus, is undoubtedly a Jew ; for he calls Abraham, father, and acknowledges Moses and the Prophets. We may next observe, that, among the Jews, by the appointment of their law, the superfluities of the rich were the right and property of the poor. The same Divine authority which gave the former a title to the lordship of the soil, and to the principal share of the produce of their fruitful corn fields and well-stored vineyards—gave the latter a claim to the gleanings of both ; nay more, expressly commanded the owners to leave some of the productions of the ground on purpose for the poor ; and made it

criminal to appropriate to themselves all the bounty of nature, and the whole blessing of the year, as their own, with an unsparing greediness^f. God,

^f In proof of the positive right to such and such portions of the abundance of the rich, which by the appointment of the law was acquired to the poor; we need only appeal to such passages as the following:

Exodus xxiii. 10, 11: "And six years thou shalt sow thy land, and shalt gather in the fruits thereof:

"But the seventh *year* thou shalt let it rest and be still; that the poor of thy people may eat; and what they leave the beasts of the field shall eat. In like manner thou shalt deal with thy vineyard, *and* with thy oliveyard."

Cf. Leviticus xxv. 3—6. Leviticus xxv. 11, 12. the same provision is made with respect to the year of jubile.

Leviticus xix. 9, 10: "And when ye reap the harvest of your land, thou shalt not wholly reap the corners of thy field, neither shalt thou gather the gleanings of thy harvest.

"And thou shalt not glean thy vineyard, neither shalt thou gather *every* grape of thy vineyard; thou shalt leave them for the poor and stranger: I am the Lord your God." Cf. Levit. xxiii. 22. and Deuteron. xxiv. 19—22.

Deuteron. xiv. 28, 29: "At the end of three years thou shalt bring forth all the tithe of thine increase the same year, and shalt lay *it* up within thy gates:

"And the Levite (because he hath no part nor inheritance with thee), and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow, which *are* within thy gates, shall come, and shall eat and be satisfied; that the Lord thy God may bless thee in all the work of thine hand which thou doest."

Deuteron. xxiii. 24, 25: "When thou comest into thy neighbour's vineyard, then thou mayest eat grapes thy fill at thine own pleasure; but thou shalt not put *any* in thy vessel.

"When thou comest into the standing corn of thy neighbour, then thou mayest pluck the ears with thine hand; but thou shalt not move a sickle unto thy neighbour's standing corn."

I mention these two last provisions, because, though it is not specified for whom they were intended, the indigent and

who declared to his people by Moses, that the poor should never cease from among them[§], told them also of the final end of that constitution of things; and purposely to soften its asperity, to mitigate its inequality, and to bind both classes of society, the rich and the poor, by mutual good offices, in the closest and tenderest ties of dependance and gratitude, commanded the affluent to open their hands liberally to their poorer brethren, and never on any account to suffer them to want. One part therefore of this community, were the almoners of the Divine bounty, in behalf of another; and the appointed instruments of Providence in dispensing their share of

destitute would manifestly have the greatest personal interest in them.

Leviticus xxv. 35—37: “And if thy brother be waxen poor, and fallen in decay with thee; then thou shalt relieve him: yea, though he be a stranger, or a sojourner; that he may live with thee.

“Take thou no usury of him, or increase: but fear thy God; that thy brother may live with thee.

“Thou shalt not give him thy money upon usury, nor lend him any victuals for increase.” Cf. Deuteron. xv. 7—11.

Deuteronomy xv. 12—14: in behalf of an Hebrew servant, going out in the seventh year, after serving six years, provides, verse 14, as follows: “Thou shalt furnish him liberally out of thy flock, and out of thy floor, and out of thy winepress: of that wherewith the Lord thy God hath blessed thee thou shalt give unto him.” The rights of the poor are further specified and legislated for, Deuteron. xxiv. 10—18.

For Philo’s commentaries on these charitable enactments of the law, see his treatise, *De Caritate, or De Humanitate*, ii. 383. sqq.

§ Deuteron. xv. 11: “For the poor shall never cease out of thy land: therefore I command thee, saying, Thou shalt open thine hand wide unto thy brother, to thy poor, and to thy needy, in thy land.”

its ordinary blessings, to such as stood most in need of them. Whatever might be the case elsewhere—among the Jews, the rich were literally the stewards of the poor; the superfluities of the rich were the *peculium* of the poor.

Among the Jews, then, a poor man and in distress, might boldly ask, and reasonably expect, from a rich one, the supply of his most urgent necessities at least; and to withhold even thus much from him, would not be to deny him a favour, but to deprive him of a right. It would not be only inhumanity, but injustice also. Let this consideration be taken into account in passing a judgment on the nature of the transaction between the rich man, in the parable, and the poor man. The language of the original, besides asserting the fact that Lazarus was laid at the doors of Dives, if literally rendered implies the reason thereof likewise; and that no other, than because *he* was poor, and *Dives* was rich; he was in urgent need of relief, and Dives was abundantly able to have given him relief. “There was a
“certain poor man, by name Lazarus, who had been
“laid at the entrance of his gates, being full of sores,
“and desiring to be satisfied with some of the crumbs
“that fell from the table of the rich man.” Such is the order and literal version of the words of this account; from which the reader may judge for himself, whether it does not imply that because Lazarus was in such and such a case, he resorted to the house of Dives, as a matter of course—while in supposing him to desire only the crumbs, and some portion of the crumbs which dropped from the rich man’s table, it is strictly scrupulous to inform us that the poor man desired nothing but the over-

flowings of the rich man's abundance, nothing but his own right, because that of every poor man besides.

Now it is impossible that if Dives was a Jew, he should not have known the justice of the claim which Lazarus, as a Jew also, was intitled to make to this small share of the enjoyment of his own good things ; nor if he knew it, that he could otherwise than wilfully disregard it ; nor if he wilfully disregarded it, that he was not deliberately guilty of a breach of his own duty, a disregard of the Divine commandment, and a consequent slight or contempt of its author. It appears from the sequel, that he was no stranger to the doctrine of Moses and the Prophets, on this very point of compassionate sympathy for the poor ; yet their teaching had not influenced his conduct. But the question of that Jew's religion, who could hear and yet not regard, Moses and the Prophets, must be easily decided.

When we consider, however, the answer of Abraham to his petition—in what terms it is conveyed, and in excuse of what it is intended—it will supply the strongest argument of the previous irreligion and infidelity of the man. The request which produced that reply amounted substantially to this ; that some mitigation of his present torment might be vouchsafed to Dives—some portion of the comfort enjoyed by Lazarus, might be imparted to *him*. The substance of the answer amounts to this ; that the proposed change in the condition of Dives, even if possible, would still be unreasonable ; and even if reasonable, would still be impossible.

The latter part of this statement might be dismissed at present, because irrelevant to the question

under discussion—the character and principles of Dives, in the upper life. It is sufficient to observe upon it, that however reasonable might be his petition for relief, it was impossible to administer it to him in the way he requested, viz., through the hands of Lazarus—because of the fact, that though Hades is the common receptacle of the souls of all, both the good and the bad, yet the spirits of the good are received into one part of Hades, and the spirits of the bad into another, between which an insuperable barrier, called in the parable a mighty depth or gulf, is fixed, confining each to their proper habitation, and allowing neither to be the instrument whether of good or of evil to the other, after death, as they might have been in their lifetime. But the first part of the statement is to the point; and furnishes an instance of the *argumentum ad hominem*, or that mode of replying to an adversary which satisfies, or labours to satisfy him that he is in the wrong, even on his own principles.

The language of Abraham is remarkable. He begins with reminding Dives of a certain *fact*; that is, with an appeal to something which, even in Hades, he could not but recollect and acknowledge, though it happened before he came there. The fact which he bids him remember is expressed in the words, which follow; and the whole proposition is obviously intended as a reason, convincing to Dives himself, that he who had received his good things in his lifetime, ought not to expect to receive any further share of them after his death.

But there is a peculiarity in the original verb, rendered by to receive (ἀπέλαβες)—the full force of which will not be appreciated unless by supposing it

equivalent to receiving *once for all*, receiving *in toto*, receiving the *whole* of a given thing, *at once*, so as to leave no fair pretence for asking, no reasonable ground for expecting, more of the same any longer. The words which convey this assurance, then, upon the whole, ought to be rendered as follows: “Son, “let me remind thee, that thou receivedst thy share “of good—that kind of good, and that measure of “it, which was thine—which thou wast intitled to “have—in thy lifetime, and Lazarus received the “contrary.”

But with respect to the further object of the patriarch, in reminding his son of this fact—we can scarcely suppose that all he intended by it was to remind him of the fact that he had been rich, and that Lazarus had been poor, in the upper world—as if that fact alone were enough to explain the difference of their circumstances respectively, in the lower world—much less to assign a reason, satisfactory even to himself, why he should expect no change nor improvement of his state and condition there: nor yet, to remind him of a fact which he could not be supposed to know, nor therefore could be reminded of; viz., that it was hopeless to expect any change in his condition after death, because God had never designed him any kind of good, or any amount and degree of it, which he had not already enjoyed in his former life. It must rather have been intended to remind him of something which his own conscience could not but acknowledge to be true in point of the fact, and his own reason to be just as to the inference deducible from it; viz. that he had so valued, and so enjoyed, the kind and measure of good, which he had possessed in the upper world, as

to desire nothing, to expect nothing, to seek for nothing, and to deserve nothing, in the shape of good of any kind, or to any degree, in the present state of things. But if this was a just conclusion—all doubt concerning the past irreligion and impiety of Dives must be at an end. He was first an unbeliever, and afterwards a voluptuary—a deliberate traitor to God, and a self-constituted slave of mammon; and the same principle of infidelity, and contempt of the revealed will and word of God, which made him luxurious, and lavish in his enjoyment of wealth upon himself, rendered him unfeeling, and uncharitable in communicating of it to others.

His next petition, the nature of which we have partially explained already—and the grounds upon which that too is declined, corroborate the inference obtained from the first. It was requested by Dives, that Lazarus should be sent to his surviving brethren; and it was answered by Abraham, that his brethren had Moses and the Prophets; that there was no need of another and a special messenger to teach them that duty which they might and they ought to learn of them.

It is clearly implied by this reply, that even were Lazarus to be sent from such a quarter and upon such an errand, the purpose of his mission could not be to instruct the surviving brethren of the rich man in new and unheard-of principles of duty, but simply to remind them of old; simply to reinforce what they knew, or were bound to know, and to practise already: why else should it be superfluous to send a teacher to those who had Moses and the Prophets? or what could be taught by this messenger, that was not taught at that very time by

Moses and the Prophets also? And what could be taught by such a messenger as the spirit of Lazarus, expressly dispatched from the dead to admonish the rich of their duty, but the practical lesson of temperance and moderation in the enjoyment of wealth themselves, and of charity and liberality in communicating a share of it to others? what could be impressed on their conviction but the doctrine of the terrors of Hades, and the fact of retribution to come?

But Dives, notwithstanding this refusal, ventures to urge again, that the teaching of Moses and the Prophets would not be effectual to persuade his brethren to do the duty belonging to their rank and fortune. Nor is there any thing unreasonable in this reply, if we suppose him to be arguing from his own experience, and from the parity of the circumstances of his brethren at present, to his own in time past, both as to the means of knowing, and to the disposition to practise, a common duty. For what his brethren still were in the upper world, he himself had been while alive; his temporal circumstances the same, the duties to which he was bound, the temptations to which he was exposed, the quarter to which he had to look for instruction, the obedience which he owed to this teacher, the disobedience of which he was capable—all the same. Judging then from his own experience—if the doctrine of the prophets had failed to influence himself, he concludes, with presumptive assurance, that it would fail to convince his brethren; but by so arguing, he pronounces his own condemnation, and unravels the secret of his former conduct, as an habitual disregard of the revealed word of God, which would have taught him

the obligations incumbent on the rich, had he been willing to learn and to observe them.

That the ordinary teachers of their duty, then, Moses and the Prophets, if left to themselves, would not possess the necessary influence with his brethren, he might well argue from his past experience ; and therefore, that they must either come into that place of torment, in their turn, for the same neglect of duty which had brought him there, or that an extraordinary teacher must be dispatched for their benefit, to remind them of their duty, to warn them of their danger, and to keep them, if possible, from that abode of misery. But in taking it for granted, as we must suppose him to do, that a special messenger from the dead would possess that influence with his brethren, which the ordinary teachers of their duty had failed, and would fail of obtaining, he reasons from his present experience, and no longer from his past ; that is, from a circumstance in his own case, to which there was nothing as yet parallel in the case of his brethren ; and consequently inappositely to the question at issue—though with regard to the principles of his former conduct, and the truth of his own character, to the same effect, as before. The reality of those doctrines, which he had disbelieved or disregarded in his lifetime, was too seriously matter of present conviction to himself, to be discredited or slighted any longer. The terrors of Hades to his apprehension, were no more the subjects of a precarious possibility, but of a tremendous certainty. A man may live an infidel, and he may die an infidel ; but he cannot continue an infidel in the world of departed spirits, though it is his doom, under such circum-

stances, to awake to the faith of the devils, who believe and tremble.

To this representation, also, the answer of Abraham is just and reasonable: "If they hear not Moses and the Prophets, they will not be persuaded even if one arose from the dead." The doctrines which even a messenger from the dead, under such circumstances, would have to teach, could be nothing different from those which Moses and the Prophets had always taught, and always been commissioned to teach; the authority of a messenger from the dead could be no greater than that of any divinely commissioned, and duly accredited teacher besides; the evidence which even one from the dead would have to produce that he was what he professed to be, could be no clearer, or more decisive, than what every messenger from God would have to produce in support of his own character, and in confirmation of his own professions. In no instance, indeed, of any such effect as the failure of a messenger from God, in attaining the object of his mission—whether to instruct mankind in the knowledge, or to persuade them to the practice of their duty—has the failure been due to the want of the necessary proofs of the authority of the teacher, or to any good reason to call in question the divinity of his commission—but solely to the dislike of what he taught. Under such circumstances, it would be in vain to add to the light which before was clear enough for its purpose, or to multiply proofs in support of a conclusion which was sufficiently well ascertained. These additions to the weight of evidence and the means of conviction, might aggravate the sin of re-

fusing to be convinced ; but they would not contribute to the chances of conviction. If one duly accredited messenger from God unto men, notwithstanding the proofs of his mission, would not be competent to produce the effect designed by sending him—neither would more ; and he who would shut his eyes to the light of one sun, would not be disposed to see by the light of two. The first principle of unbelief is the unwillingness to believe ; and what seems to be the fault of the judgment, under such circumstances, is in reality the corruption of the heart. St. Paul argues in the case of a certain description of apostates, that having once fallen away again from their first faith, it is impossible to reclaim or renew them to repentance^h ; they are in a more hopeless state than those who have never believed ; no doubt for this reason, among others, not only because they are more likely to be given up to a reprobate mind—to a judicial hardness—the penal consequence of their apostasy itself—but because all the ordinary means of conviction, which might be successful with such as had never been converted, must have been tried with them, and have proved ineffectual. As no fresh conviction, then, under such circumstances, could be produced upon the understanding, so neither could any of the legitimate effects of a sincere conviction, in repentance and amendment of life, be expected again from the conduct. If men violate their sense of duty, against a sufficient degree of light, they will not be restrained from violating it against any degree of light ; for it is of the essence of presumptuous sin to persist in spite of conviction, to rise in obstinacy with the re-

^h Hebrews v. 4—6.

straints opposed to it, and to hate the light which reproaches it, in proportion to its intensity.

If the brethren of Dives, then, were capable of persisting in their present mode of life, notwithstanding the warnings of Moses and the Prophets, whose authority as the messengers of God, and whose right to teach in that capacity, they could not but acknowledge; it may well be presumed that they would not have been brought to repentance though one had come to them from the dead : their impenetrability to conviction would have been insuperable even to a preacher from the dead. The experiment indeed, how far the preaching of a messenger from the dead was likely to succeed with those whom the ministry of the living had failed to convince, may be said to have been tried, when the doctrine of Christ crucified and raised again to life, was preached to the Jews, and served in its effect, to confirm them only the more in their infidelity and impenitence. It is certain, however, that whether such an experiment, as the mission of a teacher from the dead, would succeed if made, with the infidel and profligate, or not ; the infidel and profligate are not they, in whose behalf more especially we should think it deserved to be made.

The history of Lazarus, as we before observed, in its primary intention may be subordinate to the moral effect designed by that of Dives ; and yet as we also observed, it may possess a meaning and use of its own. The instructive lesson which it is calculated to supply by itself, is this ; that Lazarus though poor, was a good man ; and his conduct in poverty was as exemplary, as that of Dives in wealth

was blameable: we have the same reason, at least, to conclude that the former, notwithstanding the inferiority of his worldly circumstances, was not destitute of moral worth and goodness, as that the latter, in the midst of the pomp and splendour of his external fortune, had nothing to recommend him to the approbation of his judge: for the one we perceive, after death, is immediately happy, and the other is forthwith miserable—a difference between their respective lots in another state, which must have a reference to the distinction between their good and their ill deserts in the former life.

The particulars of his personal history, as far as it enters into details, bear a similar testimony to the worth of the poor man. No evil is recorded of him, and virtually much that is good. For though reduced by the inequality of his lot to the most abject indigence, aggravated moreover by personal infirmity and distress—he feels no impatience, he utters no murmur, against the dispensations of Providence in his own behalf. Though defrauded too, by the inhumanity of his more affluent brother, of what might be considered his right, he makes no complaint of the injustice from which he was suffering; committing his cause, in all probability, to the hands of God, as a righteous Judge, to redress his wrongs, or not, as he saw fit ⁱ. From his example

ⁱ Theophylact. i. 418. B. in Lucam xvi: ἄρα οὖν ἐν τοσούτοις δεινοῖς ὧν ὁ Δάξαρς ἐβλασφήμησεν, ἢ ἐλοιδορήσῃ τὴν τρυφήν τοῦ πλουσίου; ἢ τὴν ἀπανθρωπίαν κατέκρινεν; ἢ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἐμέμψατο; οὐδὲν τούτων ἐνόησεν, ἀλλὰ μετὰ πολλῆς τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐκαρτέρει. πόθεν δῆλον; ἀφ' ὧν οἱ ἄγγελοι αὐτὸν ἀποθανόντα ἐδέχοντο· οὐκ ἂν γὰρ, εἰ γογγυστὴς ἦν, καὶ βλάσφημος, τοσαύτης τιμῆς ἡξιώθη, καὶ τῆς παρ' ἀγγέλων δορυφορίας.

then, as contrasted with that of the rich man, the humblest in worldly circumstances may learn that even poverty in its most depressed and frightful form, if adorned by those religious feelings and dispositions, which are peculiar to it, resignation, patience, meekness—an humble trust and reliance upon God, and a perfect acquiescence in the wisdom, the goodness, the fitness of *all* his dispensations—is a condition more compatible with real goodness of character, and more favourable for the attainment of happiness, in another world, at least, than wealth in its highest and proudest state, except it be tempered with moderation, through the fear of God, and sweetened with charity, from the love of man.

When we consider the rank and estimation which are confessedly due to riches, among the whole class of external goods—the multitude of other possessions to which they are singly equivalent—the universality of the diffusion of this one blessing—the common eagerness and anxiety to possess some share of it which distinguishes all orders of persons—and the almost infinite variety of ways in which it may become instrumental to the glory of God, and the benefit of mankind—we shall not be surprised that three of our Saviour's moral parables, the parable of the rich man's ground—the parable of the iniquitous steward—and the parable of Dives and Lazarus, should be devoted to the doctrine of the use and the abuse of the temporal mammon.

Their own reason was competent to teach the reflecting Gentiles, who acknowledged the being of a God, and believed in a superintending Providence, that wealth, like every other temporal good, must

ultimately be referred to this Providence: but that particular view of its origin and tenure, according to which the possession of temporal abundance is strictly the possession of a delegated trust, the merit or the demerit of its right or its wrong application is strictly that of a steward, who is faithful or unfaithful to a master, in the care and disposal of property—is peculiar to the gospel, or is only by implication to be collected from the teaching of Moses and the Prophets. The duties incumbent on the rich for the enjoyment of their good things themselves, and for communicating some share of them to others, more especially the poor and needy—are plainly inculcated both in the Law and in the Prophets; but not with this presumption beforehand of their specific capacity as the depositaries of a delegated trust, nor on such a principle as the specific conviction of their own responsibility to a proper master, for the use or the abuse of something committed to their charge by him. If the doctrine of our Saviour upon this point, as he had just been illustrating it in the parable of the iniquitous steward, had not been *new* to the Pharisees who heard it, as well as offensive and unpalatable; it would scarcely have led to so marked and indecent an expression of their feelings, as that which they adopted to shew them. And though every well-informed Christian at the present day, or since the promulgation of the gospel, would be ready perhaps to acknowledge this view of the origin and tenure of the gift of wealth, as one of the first principles of gospel morality, and one as consonant to reason as agreeable to scripture—it ought to be remembered that this conviction, so generally received among moral agents,

wherever Christianity is professed, is ultimately founded upon the authority of these parables, or of similar passages of the gospels, and the rest of the scriptures of the New Testament. Hence, in whatever proportion moral agents, since the diffusion of the gospel, have acted upon this conviction, by bestowing the temporal blessings which they happened to possess, as became the stewards of the Divine bounty, in acts of public or of private beneficence—and vast as may be the sum total of good, both public and private, which by these means has been done in Christian communities, from the publication of the gospel to the present day—good too, of which before the propagation of purely gospel principles upon the duty of the use and application of the trust of the temporal mammon, there was no instance to be met with, I do not say to the same degree, but not even of the same kind, among the most enlightened of Gentile communities; the first cause of all, and the principal share of the merit of all, must be ascribed to the authority of these and similar passages.

It was a question much debated by the moralists of antiquity, whether the essence of virtue consisted in the habit or in the energy—in the intention or in the act—in the wish and inclination, or in the power and capacity to do good: from which doubt itself Aristotle justly infers, that its perfection must consist in both^k. If charity, according to the apostle, not less than faith, without works, is dead—the practical value of riches is due to this circumstance, that they give effect to kind and benevolent intentions, and prevent the law of charity from be-

^k *Ethica*, Lib. x.

coming a mere dead letter. The inclination to do good may not be confined to one rank or order of persons in society, more than another; but though the lowest might possess the same charitable dispositions as the highest, and the poorest as the richest, the power of carrying their inclinations and wishes into effect, would be the peculiar privilege of the rich and affluent: and a truly inestimable privilege too¹.

The description of the proceedings at the last day, which forms the concluding scene of our Lord's prophecy on the mount, whether it apply to the judgment of moral agents from the beginning to the end of time, including Christians as well as others, or as I rather apprehend to be the truth, only to the trial of such as never heard the name of Christ—will abundantly shew that the duties of benevolence, charity, and sympathy with distress, are especially those for the discharge, or the non-discharge of which they, who are then to be tried, will be ac-

¹ Marcus Antoninus, *De Rebus suis*, i. 17, enumerates the following among the benefits which he had directly received from the gods, τὸ ὁσάκις ἐβουλήθην ἐπικουρῆσαί τινι πενομένῳ, ἢ εἰς ἄλλο τι χρήζοντι, μηδέποτε ἀκούσαί με ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι μοι χρήματα, ὅθεν γένηται. Perhaps Virgil meant the same privilege of possessing enough for his own wants, on the one hand, and the ready power of relieving the wants of another, on the other—when he specifies this among the other characteristics of his happy man:

neque ille,

Aut doluit miserans inopem, aut invidit habenti.

Georgica, ii. 498.

Lactantius observes—Hic divitiarum maximus ac verissimus fructus est, non uti opibus ad propriam unius voluptatem, sed ad multorum salutem: non ad præsentem suum fructum, sed ad justitiam quæ sola non interit: *Divin. Institt.* vi. xii. 540.

cepted and rewarded, or condemned and punished. Peruse, however, the minute and affecting catalogue of the good offices enumerated, Matt. xxv. 35, 36, and say, whether as they must have required in those who were to experience them, the most indigent, helpless, and destitute; so they must not have required in those who were to confer them, the possession of more or less of this world's good, of more or less of that ability which nothing but affluence could bestow. Can we doubt, then, that the true principle of the value of riches is the power to do good, which they convey? that they are the right hand of benevolence, without which it would be nerveless and impotent? that the only way in which they can be rendered useful to their possessor himself, and available to his personal benefit, is by being rendered most useful and serviceable to others?

True it is that every moral agent, though equally accountable with another, is not rich: but neither is every moral agent poor. Nor, indeed, would it be desirable that all should be rich in the present life, even if it were possible; nor would it be possible, even if it were desirable. It would not be desirable, even if possible; because, were all placed above the necessity of each other's assistance, there would be an end to the operation of charity, and with that to the power of imitating God in the most amiable and attractive of his attributes. There would be an end too to the blessed effects of charity both on the agents and upon the patients; upon the former, in the inability to cultivate those heavenly dispositions, which prompt to the exercise of disinterested and indiscriminating benevolence—upon the latter, in the absence of gratitude, and the reciprocal sense of endear-

ment and obligation which binds the receiver of a benefit to its author. Nor would it be possible, even if it were desirable; for though the external circumstances of all mankind were to be placed upon a level to-day, yet, unless the nature of man, and the course of things in the physical and the moral world, were proportionably altered and modified also, some would again be comparatively poor, and others comparatively rich, to-morrow.

When, however, we reflect upon the uncertain tenure of all temporal blessings, and especially of that of wealth, and the surprising revolutions which are every day taking place in men's outward fortunes; there is no one, we shall conclude, who, however poor at one time, may not become rich at another: there is no one, consequently, who is not virtually concerned at all times in knowing the duties incumbent on the rich, and who may not be actually concerned sometime both in knowing and practising them. Besides which, the meaning of the word rich is of very extensive application; and it is by no means necessary it should always signify the same thing. It may denote all possible degrees in men's outward circumstances, between absolute poverty and unlimited abundance. A man is rich whose situation in life is raised above dependence—whose means are not only adequate to his wants, but ever so little above them: and who is there, that by dint of common industry, and with the chance of common success, may not hope to attain to this degree of competence at least? Now these are in every community, the middle, and probably the most numerous class of society.

It is to be remembered too, that a man is accepted

according to that he hath, and not according to that he hath not—and as he has well or ill applied the means which he possesses, and not as he might have well or ill applied opportunities which he possessed not. There are certain virtues, the essence of which consists in magnitude of some kind or other; and which could have no opportunity of displaying themselves, or acting according to their powers and tendencies, except in corresponding peculiar circumstances. But we may be sure that those good qualities, in the possession of which the moral excellence of the great bulk of mankind must consist, cannot be of this rare description; nor those good actions, which they are especially bound to perform, be such as they must necessarily seldom have the opportunity of performing. Aristotle draws this distinction between the two virtues of liberality and magnificence, which in other respects are very closely allied to each other—that liberality may be shewn in little things, relating to the use and application of money, magnificence only in great; liberality does not require ample means, but magnificence does; liberality may be a virtue even of poverty, magnificence only of wealth. It is a case in point to this distinction, that the widow's mite, which amounted to one farthing, was pronounced by our Saviour a more liberal donation than the largest contributions of the rich; who could better afford to spare *much* out of their abundance, than she her *little* from her penury. And who is there so needy and destitute, that he may not hope to emulate the generosity of this poor widow? nor afford to reserve from his necessary wants, for the purposes of charity, or any other good act, so much as drew down a blessing on

her? A cup of cold water, given to a disciple who requires it, in the name of Christ—will by no means lose its reward; and by parity of reason, a cup of cold water, denied to a disciple, though solicited in the name of Christ, will by no means lose its punishment. But where is the man, and in what rank of life, who is not capable of so much good or ill desert at the hands of his judge, as may be acquired by conceding or denying to a brother-christian, or even a fellow-creature, an act of kindness like this?

Of the three parables, relating to the use or abuse of the temporal mammon, which have been considered in their turns, the two which distinctly specify the abuse in question, are the first and the third; and in both of them the supposed species of the abuse is that of voluptuousness and prodigality. In none of them is any thing said of an equally possible abuse; that of the miser, or of covetousness. Now as these two species of a common abuse of the same thing are totally different in themselves, one mode of description could not have applied to them both; and in exemplifying the former, in order to condemn it, the parable in each instance, has exemplified, in order to condemn, the worst and most dangerous of the two. Many reasons might be alleged in support of this assertion; but it will be sufficient for our purpose, briefly to insist on the following:

In comparing the character of the miser, with that of the voluptuary or prodigal, in a moral point of view, we are bound to consider not what either of them is in himself, but with respect to the goods of mammon committed to his care and disposal; and that, agreeably to the doctrine already inculcated,

is the character of a steward, who is entrusted with the property of some master, to be used and applied accordingly. Regarded in this light, the abuse of his trust by the prodigal is more repugnant to the final end of its commission to him, and more inconsistent with his duty in his specific relation to it as a steward, than that by the covetous; for he who lavishes the property of his master upon his own enjoyment, must do more to violate his duty, than he, who though he may not apply it in the proper way, does not dissipate it on himself. The servant in the parable who hid his lord's money in a napkin, or buried it in the ground, that he might return it to him exactly as he had received it, certainly acted against his master's will, and contrary to his own duty; but he would have acted much more against both, if, instead of rendering it up to him only as he had received it, he had spent it before his return, and placed it out of his power to restore it in any shape at all.

The truth is, there is a negative as well as a positive mode of abusing any thing—and money among the rest—that is capable both of a wrong and a right application; the former consisting in making no use of it at all, the latter in actually using it amiss. The former is properly an abuse, only because it is not a right use of the subject in question: inasmuch as where the subject is such as naturally to admit, and naturally to require a certain proper use, not to apply it to any use, is so far to abuse it by rendering it useless in its proper and natural way, as well as in any other. Money is a subject of this description, which according to the law of its own nature, admits and requires a certain use and application, as

the only legitimate and proper one. It is an abuse of this subject, and a contravention of the laws of its nature, even to withhold it from this, without putting it to any other, whether contrary to its own, or not. But while there is but one negative mode of abusing a given subject, there may be a thousand positive modes; any one of which, by going to the extent of actually perverting and misapplying it, in some improper way, must be acknowledged to go further than one, which stops short of abusing, though it may fail of using the subject in question. The former is the abuse of his trust which is made by the prodigal and voluptuary; the latter, that which is made by the miserly and covetous man.

The avaricious man, indeed, who accumulates money only to hoard it, and values it solely for the pleasure and satisfaction of possessing it, may be said to make it his idol, in the strictest sense of the word, but not to use or abuse it, *per se*; because he renders it totally useless not only to others but to himself, and derives no profit nor advantage from its possession beyond the mere idea and imagination of the good of possessing it. And this may be the reason why, though every sublunary and overweening affection may be said to be placed on an idol of the subject's own making or selection—yet the lover of money in particular should be emphatically styled by St. Paul, *the worshipper of an idol*^a. It is essential to the idea of an idol to be *nothing* at all, to be a vain, an unreal, and purely imaginary thing; and such is eminently the case with money when loved and hoarded on its own account; that is, as the object of the affections of the miser. The miser,

^a Ephes. v. 5.

as the worshipper of money, may be the servant of mammon, as much as the prodigal and voluptuary ; but he is the slave of a master who pays him no wages, and puts him to a kind of Egyptian bondage, of making him bricks without straw. The voluptuary is the votary of Baal, as well as the retainer of mammon ; but the slave of the demon of avarice is condemned to an unmixed service, or offers the sacrifice of Moloch upon the altar of mammon, pinching and starving the body to immolate and murder the soul.

The character of the prodigal and voluptuary too, is more dangerous than that of the miserly and covetous, because it is more specious, and exhibits a false show of liberality, humanity, and refinement. It is more agreeable to our natural inclinations, and finds more imitators in the world at large. The abuse of wealth which is consequent upon it is one in which numbers are interested, besides the author of the abuse himself ; and consequently which numbers are ready to applaud, to defend, to encourage. Hence the pernicious maxim, to justify or palliate so much immorality and licentiousness ; that private luxury is public good. Measuring both kinds of the abuse of wealth, then, by their possible consequences,—each on as large a scale as the nature of the case will admit—that is, supposing each to be responsible for all the mischief, directly or indirectly resulting from it—we cannot hesitate to conclude that the abuse of his trust by the voluptuary is infinitely more criminal than that by the avaricious ; for the bad effects of the one are confined to the abuser himself, or are most directly and sensibly felt in his own person—but the influence and effects of

the other, may extend as widely as the sphere of social intercourse, and diffuse a moral contagion far beyond the circle of the first offender. The character of the miser too is as generally detested and reprobated, as that of the prodigal is admired or excused; and he is considered as much the enemy of all mankind as of himself. His sin goes before him to judgment—and meets with its punishment in this life, in the infamy or contempt which it procures its author; but the sins of the prodigal follow after—and may pass current for virtues in this life: and men require as little persuasion to avoid the one, as encouragement to imitate the other.

PARABLE TWENTIETH. MORAL.

THE IMPORTUNATE WIDOW.

LUKE XVII. 20—XVIII. 8. HARMONY, P. IV. 47. 48.

LUKE xvii. 20—xviii. 8.

²⁰ And being demanded of the Pharisees, when the kingdom of God is coming, he answered them and said, “The kingdom of God is not coming with observation: ²¹ nor shall *men* say, “Lo here! or Lo there! for behold, the kingdom of God is “among you.”

²² He said moreover to the disciples, “Days shall come when “ye shall desire to behold one of the days of the Son of man, “and shall not behold *it*. ²³ And *they* will say to you, Lo here! “or, Lo there! Go not away, nor follow after *it*. ²⁴ For as “the lightning, that lighteneth out of the one *part* under heaven, shineth unto the other *part* under heaven, so shall the “Son of man also be in his day. ²⁵ But first it behoveth him “to suffer many things, and to be reprobated of this generation. “²⁶ And as it came to pass in the days of Noe, so shall it be “in the days also of the Son of man. ²⁷ They were eating, “they were drinking, they were marrying, they were giving in “marriage, until the day when Noe entered into the ark, and “the deluge came and destroyed them all. ²⁸ In like wise also “as it came to pass in the days of Lot. They were eating, “they were drinking, they were buying, they were selling, they “were planting, they were building; ²⁹ but on the day when “Lot went forth from Sodom, fire and brimstone rained from “heaven, and destroyed them all. ³⁰ According to these things “shall it be, in the day when the Son of man is revealed. ³¹ In “that day, let not him, who shall be on the housetop, and his

“ implements in the house, go down to take them up ; and in like
 “ manner, let not him who is in the field, turn behind *him*. ³² Re-
 “ member the wife of Lot. ³³ Whoso may seek to save his life,
 “ shall lose it ; and whoso may lose it, shall quicken it. ³⁴ I
 “ tell you, this night there shall be two *men* on one couch ; the
 “ one shall be taken, and the other shall be left. ³⁵ Two *women*
 “ shall be grinding together ; the one shall be taken, and the
 “ other shall be left.” ³⁶ And they answered and say unto him,
 “ Where, Lord ?” And he said unto them, “ Where the car-
 “ cass *is*, there will the eagles be gathered together.”

¹ Moreover he spake a parable also unto them, in respect to
 its being needful to pray at all time, and not to grow weary,
² saying, “ There was a certain judge in a certain city, who
 “ feared not God, and respected not man. ³ And there was a
 “ widow in that city, and she went to him, saying, Avenge me
 “ of mine adversary : ⁴ and he would not for a time. But after
 “ these things he said in himself, Even though I fear not God.
 “ and respect not man, ⁵ yet because this widow is giving me
 “ trouble, I will avenge her ; that she may not come continually,
 “ and weary me.” ⁶ And the Lord said, “ Hear what the judge
 “ of injustice saith. ⁷ And shall not God cause the avenging of
 “ his elect ones, that are crying to him nights and days, though
 “ forbearing unto them long ? ⁸ I tell you, He will cause their
 “ avenging speedily. Nevertheless when the Son of man is
 “ come, will he find the faith on the earth ?”

PRELIMINARY MATTER.

THE most obvious division of the preliminary
 matter in the present instance, is into the question
 of the Pharisees, and its answer, which precedes,
 and the discourse addressed to the disciples, sub-
 joined to it. The connection between these divi-
 sions will be pointed out by and by.

If any thing had recently transpired to produce
 such a question from the Pharisees, as this, when
 the kingdom of God should come, the evangelist has

passed it over; whence he may infer, that the immediate cause of the question, whatsoever it was, was of no importance to the answer, returned to it; and still less so to the disclosures, immediately after vouchsafed to the disciples. The remote or ulterior cause however of such a question from such a quarter, may probably be explained as follows:

The substance of the ministry of John the Baptist, in his proper order of time, was comprised in these terms, Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand^a. The substance of the ministry of our Saviour, from the time that he succeeded to the Baptist, was summed up in the same words, Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand^b. The proper character therefore, both of the Baptist in his order of time, and of our Saviour in direct succession upon him, was that of the heralds or harbingers of this kingdom; the proper business of each, in the discharge of his ministry, was to announce it as coming, but not yet arrived, as ready indeed to be revealed, but not yet declared and manifested; and by inculcating the necessity of repentance and amendment of life, as founded upon faith in the assurance of its proximity, and in the prediction of its arrival ere long, to prepare their contemporaries for its reception^c.

There can be little doubt that the first and proper sense of the phrase, *kingdom of heaven* or *kingdom of God*, in this regular mode of describing the business of the ministry of John the Baptist and of our Lord, is the Christian religion; and there can be as

^a Matt. iii. 2.

^b Matt. iv. 17.

^c On this subject the reader may consult Diss. v. of vol. ii. of my former work.

little, that its first and proper acceptance in the language of the times, was the kingdom of the Messiah; and that until undeceived by the event, the people at large would understand by the news of the approach of the kingdom of God, the tidings of the approach of the kingdom which they all unanimously attributed to their Messiah, and expected to see realized when he appeared.

The eagerness and impatience to witness the actual coming of a kingdom, which all had so long expected, and which all so confidently anticipated—occasioned by the first announcement of its approach—are strongly illustrated by the figurative language of Matthew xi. 12: the meaning of which was explained in my former work^d. It was natural that this expectation should become more restless and impatient, the longer the arrival of the expected event seemed to be procrastinated; and it should be remembered, that at the present period of our Saviour's ministry, the announcement of the approach of the kingdom first made by John, had been going on nearly three years and an half, and still the kingdom was not come.

We have but to suppose therefore, that as the Pharisees partook in the persuasion of the times, that the kingdom of God whose approach was announced, must be the kingdom of the Messiah, which they all expected—so they partook of the impatience to see the actual arrival of a kingdom which had so long been predicted, and so long been coming; and we probably account for their present question. It might indeed be presumed from the general character of the Pharisees, and their disposition to-

^d Vol. ii. Diss. v. 160, 161.

wards our Lord in particular, that a question, proceeding from them, and touching so closely on the subject-matter of his own preaching and ministry, both heretofore and still, was more or less ironical; and covertly designed to insinuate that a kingdom which had so long been predicted, ought long since to have appeared, if there was any truth in the prediction itself. If so, it might be intended to sneer at the preaching and ministry of our Lord himself. But this is no necessary consequence. A question relating to the futurity of the expected kingdom, might be put to our Lord, with a serious intent, even by the Pharisees—as whatever they might think of the credibility of the prophet, even the Pharisees must have believed in the truth of the prophecy, that the kingdom of God was sometime to appear. The answer of our Saviour favours the inference that the inquiry was seriously intended; for concise and dignified as it is, (in which respects it is very remarkable,) it contains no direct rebuke, and it vouchsafes sufficient in the way of information, respecting the object of inquiry, to serve for a reply to the question, had the interrogators been disposed to profit by it.

This conjecture of the probable origin of the question may prepare the way for the better apprehension of the answer; “The kingdom of God is not coming with observation: nor shall *men* say, Lo here! or Lo there! for behold, the kingdom of God is among you:” in which words, whatever difficulty there may be in their particular explanation, no more is contained in general, than a certain assertion upon the question at issue, and the reason whereon it is founded; the assertion being, that the

kingdom of God was not coming with observation—the reason of the assertion, because the kingdom of God was among them.

Another proposition, it is true, is interposed between these two—“Nor shall *men* say, Lo here! or “Lo there!” but this is not a distinct assertion from the preceding, only a different way of expressing the same truth. If we fill up the ellipsis in this second proposition, it will stand; nor shall *men* say *of the kingdom of God* Lo *it is* here, or Lo *it is* there; whence it appears that it contains an assertion concerning the same kingdom, and the mode of its manifesting itself, as before; that the thing asserted of it in both instances is substantially the same, and whatsoever the fact be, the reason subjoined to account for it, applies to it in common in both.

Now though there may be a degree of perplexity about the meaning of such a proposition, as “The “kingdom of God is not coming with observation”—arising from the difficulty of comprehending at first sight what must be understood by “coming or “not coming, with observation;” there must be much less uncertainty about the sense of one like this, “Nor shall men say of the kingdom of God, “Lo it is here, or Lo it is there.” To say of the kingdom in question, Lo it is here, or to say Lo it is there, must describe the acts or expressions of those, who discover it, as they imagine, in *this* quarter, or in *that*; who recognise it, as they believe, under *this* symptom, or under *that*, for the *first* time; who have their attention drawn to it, when they were least expecting it, by a sudden perception of its presence, which takes them by surprise—or if they were expecting it previously, who had

been able to discover nothing, to satisfy them of its appearance, until a certain moment, when the evidence of its arrival becomes too clear to be overlooked.

If then, the second of these propositions is substantially the same with the first—the kingdom in question's not coming with observation, must be tantamount to men's not saying, or having occasion to say of its coming, *Lo here!* or *Lo there!* Not to come with observation, therefore, must mean, not to come *for being observed*, or *with any thing to be observed*; upon either of which suppositions it would follow alike, that men could never have occasion to say of the kingdom, when come, *Lo here!* or *Lo there!* upon the former, if they should be supposed to be waiting and looking for that, which was never to appear; upon the latter, if what they expected, should have nothing to distinguish it externally, and to point it out to the view, when come.

The meaning of the words in the original might admit of either of these constructions^c; but that the former is truly the sense intended by them, appears

^c The occurrence of the word *παράρησις* in the New Testament, is peculiar to this passage of the gospel of St. Luke. The verb *παρηρῆναι* is frequently to be met with in the gospels; always in the sense of watching or observing with a sinister intent—a meaning which it derives from its composition with the preposition *παρά*. The noun, however, has not of necessity any such meaning, but denotes observation, notice, watching, and the like—whether the act itself, or with respect to some subject of it in the thing observed, noted, or watched—without implying the nature of the end proposed by the act, whether good or bad. It is often used with respect to the observation of things of regular occurrence, as natural phenomena, &c. And it seems to be so used in the present instance, where the question was about the coming of that with observation, *hereafter*, which had come with all the observation it was ever to possess, *already*.

from the reason assigned for the assertion; “For behold, the kingdom of God is among you.” The truth of the assertion then rests on the fact, not that the kingdom whose coming was inquired about, possessed nothing in itself—nothing in the circumstances of its appearing—to deserve the admiration, to rivet the attention of the beholders—in a word, to be observed and noted, as something curious or extraordinary, something grand or illustrious—(all which, notwithstanding, might be very true of the nature of the kingdom itself, and of the mode of its actual manifestation); but simply on the fact, that it was already come, it was actually in the midst of the persons, who were expecting it, and inquiring about it, as still distant and yet to appear.

That such is the import of the words in the original, and consequently, that it is not the object of this last proposition to oppose a kingdom, expected to appear with observation, to a kingdom that must reside within, and consequently be unseen—a kingdom distinguished by external characteristics, to a kingdom essentially of the heart and soul—a temporal kingdom in short, to a spiritual—(though that also may be very true of the kingdom of God, in the sense of the Christian religion, considered as opposed to that worldly kingdom which the people of the time expected from the Messiah) we may assert without fear of contradiction. For the important words in the Greek, (*ἐντὸς ὑμῶν*), rendered in the English Bible “within you,” are more properly to be rendered “among you;” the meaning of which no one would think of confounding with that of *within* you. *Among you*, in our language, can be understood as equivalent only to, *in the midst of you*;

and *in the midst of you* could denote no more than a local residence or habitation *in* and *among you*.

It confirms this construction that the words are addressed to the Pharisees, that is, to those who both then and subsequently were the unbelieving part of the Jewish community; into whose hearts and dispositions the spiritual energy of the Christian religion never gained admission, and within whom no kingdom of Christ, like that which may be said to be established in the affections and principles of true believers, ever got footing either during his ministry or after it. Yet the kingdom about whose coming they were inquiring, was said to be even then among them, when they were asking after it, as not yet come. It must, therefore, be a local indwelling or residence, properly so called, of one literal subject in the midst of more, which by a natural figure of speech, is here predicated of the kingdom in question: and our Lord's reply to the demand of the interrogators substantially, will amount to this, That it was in vain to expect that still, which was already come; it was idle to be looking out for that abroad, which must be found at home. The kingdom of God would come no more for being observed, for being watched or waited for. The season of such observation, the time for such watching and waiting for it, was past. Men should never have occasion to say of it, as of a thing discovered or recognised for the first time, Lo it is here, or Lo it is there. And good reason why: it was already come, already in the midst of the persons who were inquiring when it should come.

Now it is observable of this answer, however

plainly it asserts that the kingdom in question was among them, it says nothing of the mode in which it was so; which leaves us at liberty to assume, without any prejudice to the truth of the assertion, that though among them, it might not be known to them—though arrived, it might not yet have become public. Speaking in the language of metaphor still, it might be a stranger, although it was present—and unknown to the inhabitants of the place, though in the midst of them. And so it was with the kingdom of God at this time. The true date of the formal publication of the Christian religion, is the day of Pentecost, ten days after the ascension of our Lord into heaven; and so far the first open manifestation of the kingdom of God, understood in the sense of formal Christianity, might be yet to come. But formal Christianity rests upon the facts of our Saviour's personal history. The ministry of the apostles could not begin until his was over; and there was no more difference in the effect of either, in comparison of that of the other, both being considered as subservient to a common end, than between laying the foundation of a building, and erecting the superstructure—committing the seed to the ground, and raising and maturing the plant. It is perfectly consistent then to say that the kingdom of heaven began and continued to be announced in one sense, as future, during the whole of our Saviour's personal ministry, and yet in another sense was arrived, from the moment when he entered upon it. Certain, at least, it is, that no other commencement of the kingdom was still to be expected, than that which had already been notified by the mouth of its proper herald. The progress of the kingdom to

this consummation, which had then begun, had been gradually going on since; and if it was already near at the commencement of our Saviour's ministry, it must have been close at hand a few weeks before its termination.

If we consider that the words of the original question were, when the kingdom of God was coming—and the terms of the answer are, the kingdom of God is not coming with observation—it will be manifest that the terms of the reply are not conformed to those of the inquiry; and therefore, as we may presume, are in all probability, addressed to the thoughts of the persons who put it. In this case, though the kingdom, about which the Pharisees appeared to be inquiring, might seem to be the same, to announce which was the business of both our Lord, and his predecessor in the work of his ministry; yet in reality it was a different thing—a kingdom of their own creation; while intent upon which, as yet to come, they had naturally overlooked, and must still continue to overlook that which was already arrived. It was no wonder, then, that though the kingdom of God was even then in the midst of them, they knew it not; that it had prevented them^f, ere they were aware, and was already arrived before they suspected it to be even approaching. They had pictured to their own imaginations a superb and magnificent likeness of the future kingdom, not one feature of which could they distinguish in the signs of the times, or recognise in any thing present to their senses. Like men who had gazed too long on the sun, they had one dazzling image before their eyes, while all besides was dark and indistinct. The

^f Matt. xii. 28.

kingdom of heaven was at the doors ; and they were looking for it a long way off.

The question of the Pharisees, however, on this occasion, like the saying of Caiaphas on a later occasion ^g, besides its obvious import, admitted perhaps of another meaning, which they themselves were far from intending, and much more from understanding. The kingdom which they supposed to be coming, when they inquired about it, was already in the midst of them ; and if they recognised it not in that, no watch, nor ward, no vigilance, nor observation, should discover it in any other. But there was a kingdom still to come, in one respect such as they expected, a visible display of power and majesty—in others widely different ; because of power and majesty exerted for the purpose of vengeance on them, and their unbelieving countrymen. Of this kingdom too, it might be said that it should not come with observing or watching for—but for a different reason from the other ; not because this too was already among them, as the other was, or that this had already given notice of its coming, as that had done, which made it superfluous to look for any fresh intimation of its approach ; but because the final end of the coming of this kingdom just as much required that it should be preceded by no warning or note of preparation, as that of the coming of the other, that it should be duly announced and proclaimed beforehand. The coming of this kingdom, like a thief in the night, was for the sake of stealth and surprise ; and to effect its purpose, it must approach unseen, unheard, and unsuspected, until its

^g John xi. 49—52.

victims were within its grasp. They too, who had voluntarily shut their eyes to the recognition of the first kingdom, not only before its arrival, but when it was actually among them, should be judicially blinded to the perception of the second, until it was too late. If this was the case, we may perceive a reason for the discourse addressed to the disciples—as taking its rise from the question and answer immediately preceding. The demand of the Pharisees might give the first occasion to these further disclosures ; their own nature and subject-matter, and the final end of the disclosures themselves, might require the knowledge of them beforehand, to be confined to the disciples.

It must be evident that the discourse which follows from this point of time, addressed to the disciples, is prophetical ; and that the subject of the prophecy in general is the days of the Son of man. These days of the Son of man are doubtless the days of our Saviour in his human capacity, but as exalted to be the head of all things ; and therefore in his human capacity in conjunction with his divine. They are his days, therefore, in his specific capacity of the head of the mediatorial kingdom, to which he was exalted by his reception into heaven at the ascension ; and the first open assumption of which was his session at the right hand of God, consequent upon that event. But in order to explain whether his days in that capacity, are the acts of his mediatorial kingdom in general, or certain dispensations and functions thereof in particular, we must reason as follows.

From the time that all power was committed to our

Saviour both in heaven and in earth^h, subordinate only to him who committed it unto himⁱ—we cannot set bounds to his jurisdiction, which was thenceforward universal, nor divide the integrity of its functions, considered as matter of right, and as entailed by the possession and administration of universal sovereignty at one time as much as another. But if the relations of kingly government, under all circumstances, may possibly be different; if the possession of power and supremacy on the one hand do not necessarily imply subjection and obedience on the other; if kings may have enemies to resist or rebel against their authority, as well as subjects to acknowledge and obey it; the functions of regal government may be diverse also, and from the necessity of the case, the administration of sovereign power in behalf of subjects, may be as different from the duties of a king in respect of enemies, as protection and assistance, reward and encouragement are, from coercion and animadversion, suppression and punishment.

And if the duties of regal government may thus differ in general, yet all must be wisely and fittingly administered, according to the exigency of times and occasions; the first exercise of the functions of the one class may differ from that of those of the other. The beginning of the tutelary may not be the same with that of the penal. There can be no season when the ordinary duties of a king towards servants and subjects, must not always be necessary and alike in course: but there may not be the same occasion for the extraordinary duties of his office, or not the

^h Matt. xxviii. 18.

ⁱ 1 Cor. xv. 27.

same propriety in them, at one time as at another. The guilt of the enemy or rebel, contracted by opposition to a lawful authority, the justice of the punishment inflicted upon it in the end, each may require the interposition of a period of trial—an interval of suspense—that each may become the more apparent. Thus though the possession of the same royal power may be equally necessary to all the functions of sovereignty—and the right by which these functions are administered may be the same in one as in another of them—the functions may differ, not only in themselves, but in the times of their commencement, yet each be alike the exercise of sovereign power, and the first visible display of each be so far the first visible criterion of the possession of it.

The testimony of Scripture, with respect to the beginning and administration of the mediatorial kingdom delegated to Jesus Christ, is in unison with this distinction. The formal acquisition of this kingdom, and the formal commencement of its administration, both take their rise from the same date, the period of his reception into heaven and session at the right hand of God. The first visible attestation of his possession of this kingdom, and the first visible discharge of the acts and functions of royalty, in the administration thereof, was made on the day of Pentecost, next ensuing; a display which the nature of the case shews to have been, of the providential or tutelary powers of the kingdom, as held and administered for the benefit of his followers, his subjects, and servants. This was the first open coming of the Son of man in *his* kingdom; besides which, the scripture speaks not of his coming in any other

kingdom, though it may of his coming in the same kingdom, after another manner and with a different specific effect.

The kingdom then of Jesus Christ, in his mediatorial capacity, must be one and the same—held by the same right, and administered for the same purpose—from the beginning to the end of its duration. But from the reason of things, and the necessities of the case, the times and modes of its overt assertion may differ: the discharge of all its duties, the assumption and administration of its utmost powers, may not be simultaneous, but successive. The tutelary department must precede the penal; and the golden sceptre become visible, before the iron. The servants and subjects of such a government must be made to feel and to acknowledge their guardian, and preserver, before its enemies their judge, or their destroyer, in their king.

The first acts too of the distinct administration of each department of its functions, may be so far analogous to each other, that while neither is the entire of the operations of its proper class, it may be an item of the whole, an earnest of the rest, and a pledge of the continuance and exercise of the same class of duties, ever after. The supernatural aids and graces, communicated at first to the apostles, were a voucher of the accompanying power which was subsequently to attend them for the foundation, protection, and wellbeing of the church. The destruction of the Jewish name and nation was the first open instance of penal retribution on the declared enemies and opponents of the Christian religion; and a pledge and assurance of the exercise of the same power of coercion or punishment, against

every future antichristian adversary. And hence it is, that the first coming of Christ in his kingdom in this sense, is so clearly identified with his second, for the same or a similar purpose; and the first act of retributive vengeance itself, though confined to the Jews—not only in the event or effect, but in the prophecies which speak of it, represents and prefigures the last, or what may be expected at the end of the world, in the way of similar retribution upon adversaries of a like description.

To apply these conclusions to the question at issue, or what it is, which we are to understand by the days of the Son of man. We cannot indeed suppose, that the exercise of divine power by its proper possessor, for the good of the church, or even for the common purposes of God's moral government, in the way of control, is ever suspended; or that the power of any adversary of God or of goodness is permitted to work, except within such bounds and restrictions as the Supreme Governor of the universe himself prescribes to its operation. But the more signal exertions of omnipotence in the way of vengeance, or retribution, may be reserved for peculiar periods, each of which, from the purpose to which it is devoted, and from the specific character of the dispensation itself, may be called its *day*. The term is properly forensic, especially when used absolutely^k; and of itself such a name might lead to the inference that these days are so many periods and intervals of time, devoted to corresponding penal, judicial, and vindictive dispensations in the œconomy of the government of the world. The

^k Vide 1 Cor. iv. 3.

days of the Son of man, then, are times and occasions of this description, in the œconomy of his mediatorial kingdom. Taken together they form the complex or body of the penal dispensations of his providence, each of them distinguished by a peculiar effect, but all of them directed to a purpose of like kind—for the defence, the support, the assertion and vindication of the Christian religion against every adversary—beginning with their first overt display in the desolation of Judæa, and the destruction of Jerusalem—and going on, and destined to go on, from time to time, to the end of the world.

They are called the days of the Son of man, because they are the occasions on which he reveals himself in a more especial manner, as invested with universal power and sovereignty, and as the king of all, both his enemies and his servants, and equally powerful to save and to punish, according to the deserts of the subjects. For these days which are days of vengeance in one instance of their effects, are days of redress in another; judgment and mercy, destruction and deliverance go hand in hand together in each of them; and in executing and dispensing both the Son of man is exclusively the agent. The vengeance inflicted on his enemies, the deliverance accorded to his subjects, is equally his act, as the head of the church, and has an equal respect to the merits of either at his hands, in that capacity.

Nor is He the instrumental and efficient, but also the final cause of such dispensations, as are properly to be called his day. It is the honour of his own person, the glory of his own name, the possession of his own rights, which these special interpositions of his

power and majesty are intended to vindicate. The Son of man is the party affected by the *crimen delicti*, and the Son of man, therefore, administers the punishment. It was so, with respect to the first of his days—the vengeance inflicted on the infidel Jews ; and it will be so, with respect to the last—the vengeance to be inflicted on the enemies of his church, at the end of the world. The Son of man was first to suffer many things, and to be reprobated of that generation, before his day could appear ; a preliminary, which may well be understood of the necessity of his suffering not only in his own person, but in that of the apostles and evangelists, and of his being rejected by that generation not only in himself, but in his religion. It was not until his sufferings in this respect also could no longer be aggravated, and his rejection in the same capacity admitted of no further proof, that they were considered to be ripe for vengeance.

The remarkable agreement not only in the sentiments but in the words and expressions, of almost the whole of the discourse addressed to the disciples on this occasion, and of parts of the prophecy delivered upon mount Olivet, naturally leads us to conclude, that so far as they coincide, they have a common subject-matter, and are directed to a common use and purpose. It contributes to strengthen this conclusion that the present discourse preceded the prophecy on the mount, by a certain distance of time, though probably not many days ; for the order of prophetic disclosure is generally progressive, and later prophecies are fuller and more circumstantial than former.

That the present disclosures were not intended to

anticipate, but rather to prepare the way for future, which might possibly be of an ampler and more particular nature, may be inferred from the fact that they assume as known, the principal subject of discourse itself—the days of the Son of man—the reasons of their denomination—the purposes to which they were devoted—the personal interest of the hearers in the fact of their coming, and in the nature of their effects: a knowledge which, from any evidence to the contrary supplied by the gospel narrative, there is no reason to conclude the disciples as yet possessed.

It appears indeed, from a comparison of the present with the subsequent discourse—that considering both as prophetic in common, and directed to an end more or less the same, the relation between them is that of a sketch or outline, and the filling up, and distinct bodily representation of the same picture of futurity. There are omissions throughout the one, which are supplied in the corresponding places of the other. General intimations are given here, particular descriptions there. In this first reference to the common topics of both discourses, circumstances of individuality are purposely postponed, which the resumption of the subject will be found to specify.

In the meantime every particular in the allusions, and every expression in the terms of the present discourse, is admirably calculated to serve such a purpose as that of exciting the curiosity of the hearers, awakening their attention to the disclosures themselves, and raising in their minds a strong conviction of their own interest in the events thus made known to them beforehand; and not the less so that all was

not clearly revealed, that somewhat was left for future communication, and at present remained in uncertainty. Thus, the ominous assurance that days should come when they should desire to see one of the days of the Son of man, and should not see it; the command not to go away, nor follow after, *before* a certain time, implying that both were to be done *after* it; the *whence* and the *whither* neither of them specified; equal danger in departing before some fatal moment, and in not departing after it; the nice and critical discrimination of the interval between these two points of time—the promise of a strong, a vivid, and decisive mark of distinction to shew where the one was to end and the other to begin,—yet what that should be, left unexplained; the comparison of the days of the Son of man to the days of Noah and the days of Lot, contrasting security the most profound, beforehand, with destruction the most complete, afterwards; the mention of a *night* to precede that day, an opportune, but brief interval of suspense, to cover and facilitate flight; all this personally applied to their own case, by a series of practical, and most significant injunctions; the marked manner in which the speaker declined the question put to him at last, apparently in the desire of eliciting more particular information, and the indefinite, yet fearful assurance, conveyed in the figurative language of his answer: these circumstances could not fail to take deep hold on the hearers, and to leave in their minds an immediate persuasion of their personal concern in what they heard, and a present conviction of its practical use and value, which when the same disclosures were renewed, enlarged, and reinforced by subsequent accessions of

knowledge, might prove of incalculable benefit to their individual welfare.

The present prophecy, then, is the first of a series of predictions, on record in the gospels or in other parts of the scriptures of the New Testament, relating to a kindred subject, the days of the Son of man, explained as above—and extending from the first of the number, the day of the destruction of Jerusalem, to the last of the number, the day of the great consummation of all things. The design of the first of these prophecies, relating as it does to the first instance of the days in question, is practical; and regards, as was natural, the particular case of that class of Christians, whether present or to come, who were immediately addressed by the discourse, or should live to be witnesses of the advent of that day, and to be more or less involved within the sphere of its action and effects. Nor is more made known with respect to the event, than was calculated for this purpose. If the Hebrew Christians were to escape that day, and to be spared from its disastrous consequences, they must be enabled to recognise it before, or at the time of its arrival. Specific directions are given them throughout, first for their conduct *before*, and then for their conduct *after* this period, that they might neither mistake it ere it was yet come, nor overlook it when it was. The analysis of the discourse itself will shew the truth of these statements, and set the subserviency of the prophetic to the practical part of its contents, in a clear light.

Our Lord begins his address with this declaration; “Days shall come when ye shall desire to

“ behold one of the days of the Son of man, and “ shall not behold *it*:” where, if the words could be rendered according to that idiom of the vernacular language of Palestine, by which the cardinal number possesses the sense of the ordinal—the special reference of the disclosures about to ensue, to the *first* of the penal dispensations, expressed by the name of the days of the Son of man—the destruction of Jerusalem—would become more distinct and emphatic. But be this as it may—even *one* of the days of the Son of man, agreeably to what has been premised of their common character, as so many individual periods, in the course of a much longer duration of time, devoted to particular purposes of judicial interposition for the support, the protection, the redress of the church, must denote the *first* of these extraordinary dispensations—all of them equally future, when the prophecy was delivered—the beginning of the series, and in its own order, the prelude and earnest of the rest.

The cause which should produce the desire to see one of the days in question, is not specified; and consequently this is the first of the omissions observable in the prophecy, with reference to the proper subject of its disclosures. Enough, however, is intimated about it to imply that it could be nothing good. The prophecy upon mount Olivet supplies the omission, and confirms the truth of this conclusion, by ascribing the personal interest which the disciples should take in the coming of the Son of man, to a cause only too likely to produce that effect—to a motive only too cogent to make them desire to see even the beginning of the days of the Son of man.

Yet they are told that they should not behold this day, though they should desire to behold it. But the day itself was sometime to arrive ; and if it was the day of the visitation of the Jews—some-time in the natural lifetime of those who heard this assurance itself. The necessity of the case then requires us to understand the assertion of not seeing—subjoined to the prediction of desiring to see—the day in question, not as absolute and unconditional, but with a certain reservation. The much desired day was not never to be seen, but not to be seen for a time. This second omission, which is even more observable than the former, and in order to the perception of the true meaning of the speaker, more requisite to be filled up even than that, is supplied in its proper place by the subsequent prophecy ; which does not leave it to implication, but plainly specifies the interposition of a certain interval, between the time when the hearers should first be convinced of the necessity of the coming of the day of the Son of man for themselves, and the consequent beginning of their desire to see it, and the actual period of its arrival ; an interval devoted to the trial of their faith and constancy—which being successfully undergone, the day of redress and deliverance, so long expected and so long delayed, would come at last.

The connection of the words which follow, “ And *they* will say to you, Lo here ! or Lo there ! ” with the preceding, is best explained, by supposing that while earnestly expecting the arrival of the day of the Son of man, the disciples should have their attention drawn to *this* quarter or to *that*—that is, to the observation of passing events, which might be construed into

symptoms of its approach, and which their very desire to see it, and very conviction of their personal interest in its coming, might make them too ready to mistake and prejudge accordingly; if they were not cautioned against it. Now these passing events; to possess even the semblance of harbingers of the great day of visitation coming on their country, we may presume must be something calamitous, something formidable in themselves; with this possible difference, between them and that which they might be supposed to prefigure, that these would be local, particular, and temporary, while that should be every where present, every where felt, and lasting in its effects. These would be instances, therefore, of visitations, producing effects like those of the day of vengeance, on a smaller scale; yet possessing a character of their own, so far resembling it, that unless expressly admonished to the contrary, the contemporaries and observers of such events, (we may presume, the Hebrew Christians,) might be induced to consider them the pregnant symptoms, if not the first acts and preludes, of the approaching visitation itself.

They are warned therefore, against this misconstruction of passing events, by being commanded not "to go away, nor to follow after," or as the words are rendered in the English Bible, and as they will bear to be rendered, "not to fly." Yet the caution itself must imply that there should be danger to the hearers, not only *of* the misconstruction, but *from* it: the warning not to *go away* is an argument that they should not only be tempted to yield, but probably exposed to risk by yielding, to some inducement to the contrary. Meanwhile, neither

the particular events which should be liable to this power of misleading their judgment; nor the grounds of the warning against them; nor the nature of the danger to be apprehended from disregarding the warning; neither where they were to stay, nor whither they were to fly, before and after a certain time respectively—are specified in this first allusion to these subjects, and therefore must be added to the number of its omissions. The subsequent prophecy on mount Olivet will be found to supply this also, and with a minuteness and circumstantiality which leaves nothing to be understood.

If the sense of the present necessity of the day of the Son of man to their own relief, and the ardent desire of its coming, produced by that conviction, were calculated to make the disciples only the more intent on watching for the symptoms of its approach, and only the more liable to be deceived into a belief that it might be near at hand, when it was perhaps still distant; if it was to be preceded by significant events, which though not the true sign of the expected visitation, might be mistaken for it; if there would perhaps be as much risk to the personal safety of the observers, from anticipating the true sign in these false indications, as from overlooking the actual notification of itself which might precede and announce its arrival—the propriety of fixing beforehand on some clear, some positive and indubitable criterion of the momentous period—will be admitted. It would be wisely and graciously designed, both for the present and for the future good of the disciples; both to relieve them from unnecessary fears and anxieties before the time, and to keep

their vigilance alive—their foresight and their apprehensions always on the alert against it.

Such a criterion is accordingly promised in the words which follow; Be not too hasty to prejudge the approach of my day, whatever the signs of the times may seem to imply. It shall notify its own advent in a manner that will leave no doubt both what is coming and when. “For as the lightning, “that lighteneth out of the one *part* under heaven, “shineth unto the other *part* under heaven; so “shall the Son of man also be in his day.”

The significancy of the sign in question, as qualified to serve a certain purpose, is thus described; but the particular event which should possess this nature is left undefined: yet we may form some judgment of it, from the description of its significancy, as follows. The comparison of it to the lightning, in this specific point of view as issuing from one part of the heaven, yet shining unto the other, is a comparison of it to that natural phenomenon, as possessing an intensity of brightness, and a rapidity of motion, which make it every where visible with equal lustre, and every where present with the same sensible evidence of its existence, in all parts of the field of space, bounded by the horizon: whence it must be inferred, that the sign to be accorded, if possessed of a nature analogous to this, should be something clear and decisive of its kind—universally evident, and universally intelligible—which all who were concerned in observing and knowing it, wheresoever they were might see, might recognise, might construe and apply alike.

And provided the significancy of the sign in ques-

tion were to be thus indubitable, it would manifestly be indifferent to the effect intended by it, whether the sign were something in its own nature qualified to possess this significancy, or by virtue of an express appointment, affixing beforehand a certain meaning to a certain sign ; but to nothing else. Both the sign, and the signification, might be originally arbitrary and positive, yet the connection between them, when once established, be thenceforward necessary and unchangeable. And if our Lord had thought proper to say to his hearers, on this occasion, “ When such an event comes to pass, then “ know for certain that such and such a consequence “ will follow after it”—none of them, we may be assured, would have felt disposed to doubt of the futurity of one of these things, if the fact of the other had preceded it—whether the reasons of the connection between them were perceptible to himself or not. On this point also there is the same omission of particular information, in contradistinction to general, as in former instances : and on this point too, the omission will be found to be supplied by the prophecy upon mount Olivet.

The words of the next verse, “ But first it be-
“ hoveth him to suffer many things, and to be repro-
“ bated of this generation,” with regard to their place in the context, are obviously to be considered parenthetical ; on which account they may be set aside from the rest of the discourse, as not connected with the details of the prophecy before and after ; besides that they have already been anticipated, as virtually assigning the reason, why the days of the Son of man in general, and the first of their number in

particular, are extraordinary displays of his sovereign power and authority, made from time to time, for the sake of punishment and retribution on his enemies; in opposition to the constant discharge of his tutelary functions, which is going on at all times for the good and well-being of his church.

After the promise of an infallible sign to notify the arrival of the day in question, the next step in the order of disclosures, is to pass to the description of the days themselves; the propriety of which order will be apparent, if we consider the subserviency which that description is made to bear to the practical directions, from the same point in the discourse to the end. Now the characteristic marks of the visitation to come, as illustrated by the analogy of the parallel cases of the days of Noah, and the days of Lot, are reducible to two; its unexpectedness before it arrives, and its destructiveness when it does. In each of the former instances of the same kind of visitation, the advent of the visitation was entirely unlooked for beforehand; and so it must be in this, if the mode of its approach was to resemble theirs: the effects of the visitation in each were universal and indiscriminate; and so they must be in this, if its consequences were to be parallel to theirs.

The rhetorical beauty of the language employed to describe the characteristic properties of a visitation which was to possess a nature, and to produce effects like these, must be perceptible to every reader of taste. No construction could be better adapted to heighten the force of the contrast between the state of things before and after the time of the event,

than the *asyndeton*, in which the varied and multi-form engagements of social life, are represented as still going on, all at once—and the animated scene of a crowded and busy world is shewn still pursuing its different occupations—up to the moment which precedes the arrival of the visitation in question, followed as it is by an instant and total destruction °.

It would be a great mistake to conclude from the nature of the particular images, collected into this one delineation of the situation, the conduct, the pursuits and employments of men at the time, that the picture was intended as the portrait of a world immersed in sloth and sensuality, when surprised by the days of Noah or of Lot, or by the day of the Son of man. The portrait so graphically drawn, is the likeness of society, such as it always was, and such as it always would be, if the ordinary course of things were never to be disturbed or interrupted. It is the picture of human life, as destined to be surprised in the midst of security—as found destitute of precautions, because unsuspecting of evil, and as taken off its guard by the danger, because not aware of any thing to be feared. Trusting to the promise of present appearances, and calculating on the continuance of things as they were, the subjects of the future visitation should be acting, at the time of its

° There is a similar beauty in the following passage from M. Antoninus, *De Rebus Suis*, iv. 32 : ἐπινόησον λόγου χάριν, τοὺς ἐπὶ Οὐεσπασιανοῦ καιροῦς, ὅψει τὰυτα παντά' γαμοῦντας, παιδοτροφοῦντας, νοσοῦντας, ἀποθνήσκοντας, πολεμοῦντας, ἐορτάζοντας, ἐμπορευομένους, γεωργοῦντας, κολακεύοντας, αὐθαδιζομένους, ὑποπτεύοντας, ἐπιβουλεύοντας, ἀποθανεῖν τινας εὐχομένους, γογγύζοντας ἐπὶ τοῖς παροῦσιν, ἐρῶντας, θησαυρίζοντας, ὑπατείας, βασιλείας ἐπιθυμοῦντας' οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ τούτων βίος, οὐκ ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ, κ', τ. λ.

arrival, as men who had long to live, and so far from apprehending their own destruction to be at hand, were extending their view far into futurity itself; not only eating and drinking—for the continued support of existence, but marrying and giving in marriage—in the hope of perpetuating their families and multiplying their connections; buying and selling—accumulating property and providing for posterity; planting and building—for future generations, as much as for present use. All this may be strongly expressed; and whether literally to be understood in every circumstance, or not, the general assurance designed by it, is too plain to be mistaken; viz. that the day of visitation, whensoever it arrived, should come unexpected and unforeseen; that they who were to suffer from its effects, should be unconscious of their danger until it should be too late to escape from it.

If such was eventually to be the nature of the catastrophe itself, it seems to imply that the notification of its approach, as first given, should be succeeded by an interval of apparent repose and tranquillity. If the ominous sign, promised to precede, was calculated to act as a warning—to arouse the suspicions, and to alarm the fears of the disciples for their personal safety—the immediate consequences to follow upon its appearance, might seem to allay them again, and to remove the causes of apprehension, at least for the moment. The thunder might once be heard—but should then be still. The lightning might flash forth once, but must be succeeded by darkness as before. The symptoms of the approaching storm should seem to disappear, and the

storm itself perhaps might be apprehended no more. On this point, indeed, there is the same silence in the present instance, as upon other subjects, but we shall find the omission supplied here also by the prophecy on the mount.

The circumstantial allusions, however, which occur in the remainder of the prophecy, would lead to the same conclusion respecting the probable interposition of some interval between the appearance of the sign and the consummation of the thing signified by it. One who is surprised by danger, however suddenly, on the house-top, would naturally wish to descend before he makes his escape, and to carry his effects away with him, if there is time to do so; and one who is alarmed under the same circumstances, while at work in the field, would naturally stop if he has it in his power, to cast his garment about him, before he is gone. And in the present instance, for some cause or other the hearers, it may be taken for granted, would be liable to this natural inducement; or they would not be cautioned against it.

The final end of a sign, indeed, which is intended to serve as a warning, requires the interposition of time and space, long enough at least to profit by the warning. The thing signified must be at some distance behind the sign which notifies it, or the previous notification would be of little use for any practical direction and benefit. It was necessary, therefore, that the Hebrew Christians should not only be enabled to judge with exactness, of the time when they were to provide for their safety by escaping, but be allowed also the means and opportunity of escaping; and the promise of a warning at the proper moment to notify the approach of danger, would so far amount to a

presumptive assurance that the notification of the danger itself should be followed by a suspense of some kind, before its arrival.

In the present prophecy, the interval in question—the awful pause between the first intimation of the proximity, and the actual advent of the days of vengeance—in the words of verse 34, if not of verse 31, is called *the night*; either on the principle of analogy, that if the visitation itself was the day, the interval which immediately preceded it, must be styled *the night*; or because of the use and application intended to be made of it—the night being the season of silence and secrecy, which best facilitates concealment and flight, and most effectually guards against discovery and prevention; an use and purpose for which this intervening period was graciously intended in behalf of the Hebrew Christians, who had been prepared to expect it, and previously instructed to avail themselves of it. Nor should it be forgotten, that the *darkness* of the night well expresses the infatuated blindness of the rest of their countrymen, during the whole of the same period preceding that day; for these were so far from discovering in it the symptoms of future danger, or applying it to the purpose of self-preservation, that it served but to confirm them still more in the confidence of their safety. Thus was this night, which most directly foreran the day of the Son of man, in its different aspects to each of the proper subjects of the impending visitation—to the one in its effects of deliverance, to the other in those of penal retribution—like the pillar of the cloud which went between the army of the Israelites, and the host of the Egyptians their pursuers. It was impenetrable darkness on

one side, and daylight brightness on the other. It was error and perplexity to the adversaries of God and his church; safeguard and protection to his people.

The assurance of a period of delay between the first visible notification of the approach of the predicted vengeance, and its ultimate advent and consummation, having been thus conveyed—the rest of the discourse from verse 31 downwards is taken up with a series of practical admonitions; the tendency of all which is to enforce this one conviction, that the interval in question would be short and transient—barely sufficient for the purpose of escape from the impending danger, and therefore to be instantly applied to the end and effect designed by it. It is observable, how every expression in these personal admonitions conspires to produce the strongest persuasion in the hearers, that to give effect to the agency and cooperation even of Divine providence in their behalf, all must ultimately depend on their own watchfulness, diligence, and activity to profit by the means and assistances provided them. Enough had been done, or would be done by a power, beyond themselves, in warning them of their danger at the time of need—in placing within their reach the means and opportunities of a ready escape—and in guaranteeing the safety of those who should avail themselves of them accordingly. The remainder must rest with themselves—whether to give effect to these provisions for their good, or to defeat and frustrate them, in the way to their consummation.

He who should be found on the housetop, when that day arrived, and his household furniture within

it, is forbidden so much as to descend, to carry all or any part of his effects, away with him. He whom it should surprise in the country, employed on any of the occupations of the field, half naked as he might be, is commanded to fly straight before him, as from an enemy close in pursuit, without stopping to cast even his upper vesture about him. They are emphatically warned to remember the wife of Lot; who, turning for a moment, to gaze on the work of destruction behind her, or repining at the loss of a favourite abode, was wrapt in a sheet of fire, and encrusted with salt; a standing monument of lingering diligence, or of lukewarm faith and reluctant self-denial¹. The very words addressed to Lot, while hesitating at the gates of Sodom^m, “Escape for thy life; look not behind thee,” may be said to be virtually repeated in the declaration, “Whoso may seek to save his life, shall lose it; and “whoso may lose it, shall quicken it.”

These are strong expressions—the necessary interpretation of which seems to be this; He who at the time of need should renounce all the ties of place, the attractions of property, the endearments of social and domestic intercourse—and think of nothing but obedience to the Divine command, which had enjoined the duty of escaping—whatever danger he might appear to be encountering in departing, what-

¹ Clemens Rom. I. ad Cor. cap. xi: De uxore Loti: συνεξελθούσης γὰρ αὐτῇ τῆς γυναικὸς, ἑτερογνώμονος ὑπαρχούσης καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὁμοιοίᾳ, εἰς τοῦτο σημεῖον ἐτέθη, ὥστε γενέσθαι αὐτὴν στήλην ἀλὸς ἕως τῆς ἡμέρας ταύτης· εἰς τὸ γνωστὸν εἶναι πᾶσιν, ὅτι οἱ δίψυχοι καὶ οἱ διστάζοντες περὶ τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως, εἰς κρίμα καὶ εἰς σημείωσιν πάσαις ταῖς γενεαῖς γίνονται.

^m Gen. xix. 17.

ever sacrifice he might be obliged to make, however uncertain whither to go, and where to find the means of present or of future protection and support—should possess in the Divine providence a friend and guardian, which, though unseen, should accompany his flight, recompensing him for the loss of all which he had left behind him, conducting him to a place of safety, and providing for each of his wants. He on the contrary, who should hesitate to be gone at the fatal moment—balancing probabilities, calculating the chances of escape, postponing the apprehension of distant danger to the appearance of present security, choosing between the kinds or the modes of flight, stopping to provide for the necessities of the way, or for future wants, trusting, in short, to the resources of human foresight, instead of depending solely upon God—should find the very precautions which he deemed so essential to his safety, and expected to conduce to it, the causes of his destruction; and be overtaken and overwhelmed by the danger, while he was hoping to secure himself against it.

The coming of the event in question would surprise all alike, whether Jews or Christians, whether strong or lukewarm in faith, active or remiss in vigilance and observation—similarly situated at the moment, with the same chance of escaping by a timely flight, with the same risk of perishing by remaining in the same situation. Two women should be grinding at one mill the corn for the next day's use^o—two men should be sleeping on the same bed,

^o The business of preparing corn for use is thus supposed to be peculiarly the duty of females. Exodus xi. 5. spoke of the "maid servant behind the mill;" so long before as the time of

or supping on the same couch—when the promised warning should be given: where, we may observe, that as the interval between the warning and the event is called the night, so the various occupations in which the occurrence of the warning would find those who were interested in observing and profiting by it, are such as are characteristic of the night; some should be sleeping or supping; others preparing overnight for the necessities of the morning; but all be intent on the ordinary duties of their several stations, or the ordinary employments of the time, as if nothing different from usual were likely to happen.

The effect which ensues is consequently such as was to be anticipated from the circumstances of the parties in point of preparation, and in point of expectation, beforehand, when the promised sign is given; and illustrates in a lively manner both the requisite practice of the duty of vigilance and observation up to a certain time, and its reward at last. One of the two, who was mindful of the

the departure from Egypt; and it is still the custom in the East for the grinding of corn to be done by female slaves, who execute their task either overnight, against the next day, or early in the morning; so that nothing, we are told, is to be heard in an eastern city at these times but the sound of their corn mills (which are in fact handmills); see Harmer, vol. i. 250. 253; and iv. 30, 31. Chapter iv. Obs. iv. chapter vii. Obs. cxxv. Cf. Jeremiah xxv. 10: Isaiah xlvii. 2.

It appears from the *Odyssey*, xx. 105—119, that such was the custom in Greece in Homer's time. Simonides also, *Fragm.* ccxx. *περὶ γυναικῶν*, 59, recognises the work of handling the mill, as peculiarly incumbent on females—by specifying this as a characteristic of an indolent wife;

κούτ' ἂν μύλης ψάύσειεν, οὔτε κόσκινον
ἄρειεν, κ', τ. λ.

charge received, and always on the alert to discover and profit by the warning promised, recognises it as soon as it appears—rises from his unfinished meal, breaks off his fatal slumber, or leaves his task half executed, that he may instantly be gone; and to him the consequence of his watchfulness and activity is that he is received into protection, he is snatched from the danger, and saved. The other, who knows not the meaning of the same signal of alarm, continues his employment regardless of it; and to him his ignorance of it and his inattention to it, is fatal. He is left to himself, and perishes. The morning surprises him, and he is lost ^p.

It would seem that the curiosity of the disciples,

^p The members of this proposition, ὁ εἷς παραληφθήσεται, καὶ ὁ ἕτερος ἀφεθήσεται—are so opposed to each other, that whatever is denoted by παραληφθήσεται, the contrary must be denoted by ἀφεθήσεται: and the sense of παραληφθήσεται is commonly good—"shall be taken into the care of another, shall be received into "protection and safety;" and consequently ἀφεθήσεται must mean "shall be left to himself, shall be abandoned to destruction without help and defence, and perish." That the text has nothing to do with the doctrine of election or reprobation properly so called, that it applies only to the opposite distinctions of fate or fortune, in the case of particular individuals, the effect of human contingencies—because in the case of individuals one of whom should profit, the other not, by the same prophetic warning of an approaching danger, and by the same interval allowed for flight and escape from it, according to their previous knowledge or ignorance of both these things—must be evident from its place in the context, and from the scope and tendency of this part of the discourse in general. It was the last assurance addressed to the disciples, as personally concerned in all that had preceded: and that they understood it accordingly, appears from the question which they founded on this part of the discourse more immediately: Ποῦ Κύριε—in reference to our Lord's last words, ἡ ἑτέρα ἀφεθήσεται.

or their anxiety for further information, was more excited by these words of our Lord, twice repeated, "One shall be taken, and the other shall be left," than by any other part of the discourse; for we find it added, upon the second occasion of their being pronounced, "And they answered and say unto him, "Where, Lord?" Shall be abandoned to his fate, was the declaration—"Where, Lord?" is the question founded upon it. The answer of our Saviour either declines a direct reply to the inquiry itself, as not proper to be satisfied at present, except in general terms, or indirectly conveys the assurance, that where the destruction to ensue would be indiscriminate and universal, as well as complete, to specify particular places of its operation, or particular instances of its effects, was superfluous. Galilee, Judæa, Jerusalem, all should be visited in their turns. The harvest would be ripe for the sickle, wherever the sickle could be thrust; and the organs of destruction could not be wanting while the subjects of it were to be found. "For where the carcass is, "there will the eagles be gathered together." The mention of eagles, the well-known insignia of the Roman legions, might suggest that under this figure the appointed instruments of Providence, in executing its penal purposes against the Jews, the Roman armies, are darkly described. But the saying is simply proverbial; intimating no more than that the instruments of destruction will never be wanting, where the work of destruction is to be performed; and in its first and proper intention, it is obviously taken from Job xxxix. 30. in the literal description of the eagle, "Her young ones also suck up blood: "and where the slain *are*, there *is* she."

THE PARABLE ^a.

The words which the evangelist premises to the account of the parable, are rendered in the English

^a The parable of the unjust judge is too short, and the circumstances of the history contained in it too few and simple, to require much illustration. It was not necessary, therefore, to adopt the same formal method in treating of this, which we have observed in other instances ; viz. to explain the material circumstances first, and then to pass to the moral, and the application. Instead of that, I have begun with the consideration of its moral and application ; introducing the material circumstances of the narrative, such as they were, where the occasion required it.

We may observe, however, that there is nothing in the circumstances of the narrative, which would lead to the inference that the fact recorded in it may not have been an actual event. By the appointment of the law, judges, belonging to the tribe of Levi, were to be found among the Jews in every city ; and no doubt widows might be found in every city too. It is very possible that among the former, many might live at different times, answering to the description in the parable, who feared not God, neither regarded man, as well as others of a very opposite character ; and it is far from impossible, that were such an application to have been made to a judge of that sort, by an injured party, like the widow in the parable, the consideration of his personal ease, and freedom from annoyance, might induce him to concede that relief or redress, with a view to escape constant solicitation and importunity, which a regard to the duties of his office, to the justice of the suit itself, to the approval or disapproval of God, or to the opinion and estimation of men, would not have prevailed upon him to grant.

The word which occurs in his supposed soliloquy, to express the effect of the widow's importunity on himself—*ἵνα μὴ εἰς τέλος ἐρχομένη ὑπωπιάξῃ με*, is peculiar, and occurs only once more in the New Testament, 1 Cor. ix. 27. where St. Paul is speaking of keeping under his body. *ὑπόπιον*, whence the verb is derived, denotes the appearance produced by a blow on the face, properly under the eye ; caused by the extravasation of the

Bible, “ And he spake a parable unto them, *to this* “ *end*, that men ought always to pray, and not to

small blood vessels—the effect of the blow. Consequently, it is what we should call a *black eye*. It occurs in the *Rhetorica* of Aristotle, lib. iii. cap. 12. §. 15, where he is treating of the hyperbolic metaphor or simile, as one of the sources of the *ἀστέιον* in writing; and is quoting a comparison of a certain person, whose face presented this black and blue appearance, to a basket of mulberries. It is manifest, that *ὑπωπιάζω*, denoting to give or to cause *ὑπόπια* in this proper sense, may be used to describe the effect of any disagreeable personal importunity, any reiterated application, productive of weariness, fatigue, and irksomeness, like that of the widow in the parable, which until granted, was likely to cause nothing but annoyance to its object the judge.

It appears from verse 6, that after relating the parable, our Lord must have made a pause, before he added his own observations upon what had been related; as he does in the two next verses; for the words, *εἶπε δὲ ὁ κύριος*—are evidently to be understood as said *of* him, not *by* him. This too is an argument that the parable is the account of a real matter of fact; for it is hardly to be supposed that our Lord would stop to call the attention of the hearers to what the unjust judge had just said, if he himself had said it for him, and the words supposed had not actually been said, under the circumstances of the case, by somebody or other, sometime or other.

The last clause of verse 7, *καὶ μακροθυμῶν ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς*—requires to be construed, “ though forbearing unto them long”—that is, though long in forbearing to answer their cries, long in suffering his anger to rise in their behalf; in other words, before he interposes for their redress. This is certainly a novel sense of *μακροθυμεῖν*, which properly denotes longsuffering and patience with provocation and guilt, rather than with importunity in prayer. It is used, however, in the simple sense of patience, both Matt. xviii. 26. 29, and James v. 7, 8. and especially v. 7. *μακροθυμῶν ἐπ’ αὐτῷ*—of the husbandman’s waiting with patience, after sowing the seed, until the due time of reaping the fruit. And in the simple sense of patience, the word may be used here.

“faint:” from which it seems a necessary inference that the translators conceived the moral of the ensuing discourse to be the duty of perseverance in prayer, without reference to special circumstances, but as an ordinary exercise of religion, and as incumbent upon Christians in general.

It would be no objection, perhaps, to the truth of this construction, that the duty of prayer, contemplated in this general light, had often been inculcated by our Saviour before; that a manual or form of prayer had twice been provided for the use of his disciples, once of his own accord, and a second time in answer to their request^b; that perseverance in prayer, without reference to special circumstances, was recommended on the second of these occasions^c, and enforced by appropriate arguments; that our Saviour himself was constantly inculcating this, as well as every other duty of practical religion, by his own example: for the obligation to prayer is confessedly universal, the duty itself is among the most spiritual services of the spiritual worship which is most agreeable to the Divine nature, and most acceptable to God; nor is it easy to conceive times or occasions when it is not alike reasonable and alike necessary.

When, however, it is considered that the doctrine in relation to prayer, whatever it be which the parable enforces, is not recommended upon general principles, but as an inference deducible from a special example; it will follow that even though the moral of the discourse be the duty of importunity in

^b Matt. vi. 5—15. Harm. ii. 23. Luke xi. 1—4. Harm. iv. 29.

^c Luke xi. 5—13. Harm. iv. 29.

prayer as addressed to God, it will be importunity as directed to him for a specific purpose, and the success of importunity as illustrated by a specific example. The nature of the occasion which calls for the importunity, the specific direction of the importunity itself, the proper relation of God, as the object of the importunity prescribed, the corresponding relation of Christians, as concerned to practise it—in that actual state of the case, which the application of the parable has in view, must be something analogous to the state of things previously supposed in the parabolic example.

Now there are two parties concerned in the parabolic example, one of them described as a judge, the other as a widow, who is a suitor to that judge; and there are two parties concerned in the application of it, God and his elect, between whom the same relation must be conceived to prevail, if the state of the case with reference to them, is to be analogous to that which is represented in the parable. The conduct of the judge towards the widow, is proposed as an argument of what may be expected, under the corresponding circumstances, from God towards the elect; the behaviour of the widow towards the judge, is stated for the imitation of the elect towards God. It is not, therefore, to God, as the object of prayer in general, but as the object of prayer in the special character of Judge; nor to the elect as ordinarily bound to the duty of prayer, but as bound to it in the particular relation of suitors, that the doctrine enforced by an example like this can be supposed to refer.

The office of a judge, generally speaking, is vindictive; and of a judge whose duty is to administer

criminal justice, it is always so. It is to do right between the injurer and the injured, to resent and to punish oppression, to redress and repair wrongs. The office of the judge in the parable is clearly of this description; for the widow in the parable is a suitor for redress, and the judge in the parable accords that redress. Something analogous must hold of the relation between the parties concerned in that actual state of the case, which the parable is intended to illustrate. The sovereign Governor of the universe, in his judicial character as the avenger of wrongs, must be the antitype on the one hand—his elect, as the objects of his care and protection, under circumstances which call for his interposition after a more especial manner, must be the counterpart on the other^d.

Now how exactly a state of the case like this, in a parabolic example designed to enforce a particular duty on the grounds of a perceptible analogy between the example and something else—would ap-

^d The above conclusion follows not only from the analogy of the circumstances in the parable to any real case considered as parallel to them—but from the express words of our Saviour in the application which he makes of it to such a case. The relation between God and his elect, and the precise character in which he is addressed by their prayers, are clearly intimated in the words, “Shall not God cause the avenging of his elect ones, “that are crying to him nights and days, though forbearing “unto them long?” That they are previously petitioners, and importunate petitioners, appears from the supposed continuity of their prayers—nights and days; that they are petitioners importuning a judge, that is, suitors, strictly speaking, who call for redress, appears not only from the same supposition of the language and purpose of their prayers, as *crying* to God for *vengeance*, but from the effect which is promised to attend them; “I tell you, He will cause their avenging speedily.”

ply *a priori* to the peculiar circumstances of a Christian community, undergoing persecution for the sake of their religion, seems almost too obvious to require proof. For, in the first place, as the representative of such a community in the example is a widow woman—the state of widowhood, whether with or without the additional privations of poverty, is proverbially disconsolate, lonely, and unprotected; and such, humanly speaking, must appear the condition of a Christian community, abandoned for a time to the violence of its enemies, destitute of the means of self-defence, or forbidden to use them. The widow has an adversary to contend with; and so, by the supposition of the circumstances in which it is placed, must every Christian society have, which is suffering persecution. The widow is a suitor at the tribunal of some judge; and so must those, who are suffering for his name's sake, be before the tribunal of their Master. The suit of the widow is just—or else to have refused her redress would not have been criminal in the sight of God, and shameful in the opinion of men; and most just and reasonable must their suit be, who are suffering for righteousness' sake, and pleading for redress on that account. It is not to guard herself beforehand against her adversary, but to deliver herself from his violence; it is not to meet him upon equal terms, to defend a disputed or a disputable title, but to recover a right unjustly usurped from her—that the widow appeals to the judge; and so must it be with a Christian community, to produce their prayers in the quality of suitors for redress. The liberty of conscience for which they supplicate, must have begun to be denied them, and the safe and unmolested

exercise of their religion, for which they pray, must have been endangered by the open opposition of its enemies. The widow in the parable is an helpless, as well as an injured woman—without wealth or power, without friends or influence, to second or promote her suit; with nothing in short to rely upon, in the hope of success, but the justice of her cause and the urgency of her own importunities: and similar to this must be the situation of every Christian community, from the time that passive resistance becomes its duty. The ordinary means of self-protection, if it does not want, yet from the necessity of the case—from the nature of the injustice to which it is exposed—it is forbidden to use: for they who are suffering for righteousness' sake are commanded to bear, not to retaliate, the injuries done them. The redress of their wrongs being wholly to be resigned into the hands of God, it would be to usurp his province, and to distrust his providence, as well as to disobey his positive injunctions, to take it for a moment into their own^e.

^e It is scarcely necessary to refer the reader to those passages of the New Testament, which inculcate the duty in question, and make passive endurance the obligation binding upon Christians, suffering from persecution, without desiring to retaliate, much more without actually retaliating, upon their persecutors, however provoked they might be to do so, and however competent, humanly speaking, to take the business of righting themselves into their own hands. It will be more worth our while to collect a few testimonies from the writings of the early Christians, who were placed in the circumstances necessary to the practical observance of such injunctions—to shew in what sense they understood them, and to account for their conduct, under such circumstances, accordingly.

Thus Athenagoras, *Legatio pro Christianis*, pag. 6: οὐ μόνον τὸ ἀντιπαίειν, οὐδὲ μὴν δικάζεσθαι τοῖς ἄγονσι καὶ ἀρπάζουσιν ἡμᾶς, με-

The Christian under persecution has consequently no shield but his patience, no sword but his prayers;

μαθηκότες· ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν, καὶ κατὰ κόρης προπηλακίζωσι, καὶ τὸ ἕτερον παῖεν παρέχειν τῆς κεφαλῆς μέρος· τοῖς δὲ, εἰ τὸν χιτῶνα ἀφαιροῦντο, ἐπιδιδόναι καὶ τὸ ἱμάτιον. Again, pag. 157: De Christianis, οἷς οὐδὲ παιομένοις μὴ παρέχειν ἑαυτοὺς, οὐδὲ κακῶς ἀκούουσι μὴ εὐλογεῖν ἔξεστιν.

Also Tertullian, iii. 203, ad Scapulam, cap. 2: Et utique ex disciplina patientiæ divini agere nos, satis manifestum esse vobis potest, cum tanta hominum multitudo, pars pene major civitatis cujusque, in silentio et modestia agimus, singuli forte noti magis quam omnes: nec aliunde noscibiles quam de emendatione vitiorum pristinorum. absit enim ut indigne feramus ea nos pati quæ optamus, aut ultionem a nobis aliquam machinemur, quam adeo expectamus. Again, v. 89, Apologeticus adv. Gentes 37: Quid tamen de tam conspiratis unquam deo-tastis, de tam animatis ad mortem usque pro injuria repensatum? quando vel una nox pauculis faculis largiter ultionis posset operari, si malum malo dispungi penes nos liceret. sed absit ut aut igni humano vindicetur divinitas sectæ, aut doleat pati in quo probatur. si enim hostes exertos non tantum vindices occultos agere vellemus, deesset nobis vis numerorum et copiarum? externi sumus, et vestra omnia implevimus, urbes, insulas, castella, municipia, conciliabula, castra ipsa, tribus, decurias, palatium, senatum, forum, sola vobis relinquimus templa. possumus dinumerare exercitus vestros: unius provinciæ plures erunt: cui bello non idonei, non prompti fuissimus, etiam impares copiis, qui tam libenter trucidamur? si non magis apud istam disciplinam magis occidi liceret, quam occidere.

And Origen, i. 452 C. Contra Celsum, iii. 8: περὶ δὲ Χριστιανῶν, ἐπεὶ διδασκόμενοι μὴ ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους ἐτήρησαν τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ φιλόανθρωπον νομοθεσίαν· διὰ τοῦθ' ὅπερ οὐκ ἂν ἐξουσίαν λαβόντες τοῦ πολεμεῖν, εἰ καὶ πάνν ἦσαν δυνατοὶ, ἤνυσαν· τοῦτ' ἀπὸ Θεοῦ εἰλήφασιν, τοῦ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν πολεμήσαντος αἰεὶ, καὶ κατὰ καιροὺς παύσαντος τοὺς κατὰ Χριστιανῶν ἰσταμένους, καὶ ἀναίρειν αὐτοὺς θέλοντας, κ', τ. λ.

Cyprianus ad Demetrianum, 192: Lædere servos Dei et Christi persecutionibus tuis desine; quos læsos ultio divina de-

and though these cannot but prove effectual both for his support meanwhile, and for his relief at last, yet the very supposition that he is to wage the contest with such weapons, implies that, for a time at least, the proper arms of his warfare must appear little competent to sustain him from defeat, much less to ensure him the victory. The blood of the martyr, calling aloud for vengeance; the tears and sighs of the appointed victims of death, standing in jeopardy every hour; the prayers of all, whether alive or dead, ascending day and night from the altar, and piercing the clouds to enter into the presence of God; must plead successfully at last, and effect in due time a plenary deliverance^f. But until this due time arrives, and the avenger of wrongs is awakened to take the redress of the suffering into his own hands, there is no relief to the pressure of present distress, except in the capacities of passive endurance; no weapon of defence against imme-

fendit. inde est enim quod nemo nostrum quando apprehenditur, reluctatur: nec se adversus injustam violentiam vestram, quamvis nimius et copiosus noster sit populus, ulciscitur.

And Arnobius, *adv. Gentes* i. pag. 18: Da veniam, rex summe, tuos persequentibus famulos: et quod tuæ benignitatis est proprium, fugientibus ignosce tui nominis et religionis cultum.

^f Ecclesiasticus xxiv. 17, 18. 20: "The prayer of the humble pierceth the clouds: and till it come nigh, he will not be comforted; and will not depart, till the Most High shall behold to judge righteously, and execute judgment."

"For the Lord will not be slack, neither will the mighty be patient toward them, till he have smitten asunder the loins of the unmerciful, and repaid vengeance to the heathen" "till he have judged the cause of his people, and made them to rejoice in his mercy.

"Mercy is seasonable in the time of affliction, as clouds of rain in the time of drought."

diate violence, except the importunity and urgency of prayer.

It was no doubt to enforce this particular conclusion, and to lead to the inference that every thing under such circumstances must depend upon the urgency of prayer, and the natural tendency of importunity, by dint of perseverance, to gain its own object, that the case selected in the parable, as analogous to that of God and the elect in the application, was that of an unjust judge, and a suitor to *him* for justice, not of a just one, and a corresponding suitor. It may appear at first sight a very inapplicable supposition, that one whose moral character is evidently so defective—who is described as neither fearing God, nor respecting man—should be proposed as the counterpart and representative, *mutatis mutandis*, of the supreme moral Governor of the universe: and so it would be, if the personal character of the one were the ground of resemblance, in the comparison of his case to that of the other. But the personal and moral character of the man has nothing to do with this analogy—simply his relative, or his official character as a judge; in which respect, whatever his personal character might be, yet that he was a man in authority, bound by his office to redress wrongs, and invested with power for that purpose—that his was the proper tribunal to which an injured and unprotected party would have a right to apply, and to expect from it satisfaction and defence—would suffice to establish a distinct resemblance between his official character and that of the great moral Governor of the universe, the sovereign redresser of wrongs and injuries, himself.

Meanwhile the moral defectiveness of the private character of the man, and the influence which under ordinary circumstances that might be supposed to exercise on the discharge of his duties as a judge, is the very circumstance which eminently qualified his case to supply an argument *a fortiori* in favour of what was to be expected, under circumstances of a similar description, from a judge of a very different character, like God. If the final end of that case was to illustrate the natural tendency of mere importunity to gain its point, it is with reason that the example of its success with an iniquitous judge is selected for that purpose. The example of its success under such circumstances suggests at once that if importunity could prevail with an unjust judge—what must it do with a just one? if it could make a person in authority, who feared not God and cared not for man, do right even against his inclination, and for no better a motive than his personal ease and quiet, what must it do with the Sovereign Governor of the universe, who needs no motive to his interposition in defence of the injured and oppressed, but his own love of justice, and his own regard to his proper character and relation, as the supreme arbiter and redresser of wrong? It is manifest that with a view to a conclusion like this, and consequently to serve as a ground of encouragement to perseverance in prayer to God, for the special purpose of redress, no example would have answered the end intended, but that of an unjust judge. The suit of the widow would no doubt have been granted as effectually, had it been addressed to a just judge; but withal it would have been granted more readily: and of the possible moral uses to which the example

of the success of a suitor with a righteous judge might have been turned—the only one absolutely excluded by the necessity of the case, because incompatible with the supposition on which it proceeds—a righteous application to a righteous judge—would have been this ; of illustrating by a case in point the power of simple perseverance, to carry its object—the sufficiency of mere importunity, by dint of its own urgency, to surmount every obstacle opposed to its success.

I think, then, we may conclude that the parable and the application made of it, recorded in the first eight verses of the eighteenth chapter of St. Luke—are directed to an use and purpose, connected with the doctrine of perseverance in prayer, in the probable hope of success—which is best explained by supposing this whole additional discourse a continuation of that which was recorded in the preceding chapter, from which it ought not to have been detached. The first part of the evangelist's preamble to the parable, " Moreover he spake a parable also unto " them," (*εἰπε δὲ καὶ παραβολὴν αὐτοῖς,*) sufficiently intimates that the same persons continued to be addressed by the parable, who had been addressed by the preceding discourse—that is, our Lord's own disciples, to whom he had begun to speak, chap. xvii. 22, after answering the question of the Pharisees ; and that what he was proceeding to deliver in the shape of a parable, was delivered over and above what he had just pronounced—not in the form of a parable, and at the same time with it^s.

^s The connection indeed between the two parts of the discourse, the parabolic which follows, and the prophetic which

The former discourse, as we have seen, was occupied with disclosures relating to the advent of the Son of man; its certainty, as sometime to happen; its presages, while still distant; the infallible mark of recognition whereby to know it—when close at hand; the nature of its effects, and consequences; what was not to be done before, what was to be done immediately upon the discovery of its approach, by the persons addressed, to avoid those consequences themselves. But there was no more of direct admonition in it, than what was intended to regulate their behaviour before and after the fatal moment of the visitation, with a view to this specific effect. On another point, in which they were personally concerned, viz. the grounds of that interest which they were told they should take in the coming of the day of the Son of man—the reasons why they should so earnestly desire to behold it long before they should actually see it—much more as to any personal duty incumbent upon themselves, connected with each of these facts, both the conviction of an interest of their own, in the speedy coming

preceded, is evident from the resumption, in the last verse of the latter, xviii. 8. of the topic which formed the entire subject of the former from xvii. 22. downwards—the coming of the Son of man. This resumption of a common topic intimates that the parabolic is but a continuation of the prophetic matter, in reference to that topic; while the place in the order of the parabolic, where the resumption of the subject of the prophetic is interposed, viz. just after the promise of a speedy redressing of the elect, as the answer to their importunate cries on the part of God, presumptively encourages the inference that the period of the two events would be the same; the redressing of the elect, in answer to their importunity, should coincide with the coming of the Son of man.

of that day, and yet the necessity of an interval of suspense, between the first sense of that interest, and the time of its actual advent—a duty consequently requiring to be practised meanwhile—the prophecy was observed to be silent.

Now if we were right in concluding, that the true grounds of the first conviction of their personal interest in the coming of the day in question, would be found to reside in the circumstances of the Hebrew church, when it should begin to endure persecution, and consequently to be placed in the situation of a Christian community, answering in all respects to what has been shewn of the case in the parable, corresponding to theirs; then, from a comparison of the date of the time when they were first placed in that situation, with the actual advent of the day which was to serve the double purpose of deliverance and relief to them, and of vengeance and destruction to their adversaries, it will follow, that the evil was long to be felt, before the remedy, appointed for its cure, was to come—the period of suffering was to precede by many years the period of redress. What was the church meanwhile to do? How was it to spend the wearisome interval of trial? What was the principle of hope and consolation, whence it might derive never failing comfort and encouragement, through this dismal and disheartening period? What was the ray of cheering light, which amidst the darkness of the surrounding scene, would gleam on the distant horizon of the future, and grow brighter and brighter as the day approached? and where was the anchor, sure and steadfast, which like the sacred refuge of the ancient mariner, would buoy up and confirm the soul of the believer, when every

other stay appeared to be failing—every other security seemed to be lost?

These questions are answered by the declaration of the scope of the parable, premised to it, and considered in part already; the whole of which being rendered as the sense requires, will stand as follows: “Moreover he spake a parable also unto them in “respect to its being needful to pray at all time, and “not to grow wearyⁱ.” The practical duty, then, inculcated by what follows, was doubtless importunity in prayer; the practical evil, against which it was directed, was the possible neglect of that duty from weariness, fatigue, despondency. But neither the object of the importunity, nor the grounds of its

ⁱ The words in the original are, *εἴπε δὲ καὶ παραβολὴν αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸ δεῖν πάντοτε προσεύχεσθαι, καὶ μὴ ἐκκακεῖν*—in which it is evident that the preposition *πρὸς* has the particular sense of defining the *scope* of the speaker, in what he was going to say; *πάντοτε*, would bear to be rendered, according to its etymon, as *πάν τὸ τότε*—*all the time, all the while, all along*, or the like; and *ἐκκακεῖν*, which occurs in the gospels only in this instance, (though several times in the epistles) being derived from *ἐκ* and *κακῇ*, will denote to grow faint, or to give way, as under the performance of an hard, a difficult, or dangerous duty; to falter, from want of courage, or defect of fortitude, from weariness, fatigue, or despair. If the preposition compounded with it, is also to be taken into account, as the force of that preposition is intensive, it will make the word further mean, to grow *utterly* faint, to give way *altogether*, and beyond the power of *further* endurance, or *fresh* recovery. I know not whether this is not intended by it. To grow faint to a certain extent—to give way more or less—under the circumstances of their situation, might be excusable in the disciples, and not more than was to be expected from human nature. The evil against which they required to be cautioned, was growing faint utterly, giving way beyond the power of recovery. They were to feel their situation as men; they were to bear up under it, as strengthened and supported by God.

necessity, are distinctly stated in the preamble—and therefore would require to be ascertained from the parable itself; and from this it appears, that the object of the importunity in the first place, is deliverance, redemption, or redress of *some* kind—and in the next, a deliverance, redemption, or redress closely connected and almost identified with the coming of the Son of man; so that to pray for the one, was virtually to pray for the other. The object then of the required perseverance in prayer, apparently left undefined, is in reality the coming of the Son of man: the necessity of perseverance in prayer for its proper object, is the necessity of perseverance in prayer for the coming of the Son of man.

Now as the necessity of importunity supposes some obstacle in the way of its success; so its expediency supposes an obstacle which may be overcome. The widow in the parable had a difficulty to contend with; and so must the disciples have, if their case was to resemble hers: her importunity surmounted that; and so might theirs be expected to overcome this. What then, was the impediment to be thus overcome? Perhaps we shall not err, if we assume it to reside in the counsels of the Divine providence; which had not only preordained the event, but appointed the time, of the coming of the day of Christ, with its twofold effects, of deliverance in behalf of the believing, and of vengeance on the unbelieving part of the Jewish community.

Times and seasons, like every thing else, are in the hands of God; nor independent of his will, can there be any fatality in one period, as appropriated to such and such purposes, more than in another. The

course of human events is appointed or permitted by him, and may be controlled at his discretion. He may accelerate a judgment, or antedate a mercy, as the purposes of his moral government require; and the seasons of *his* dispensations, whensoever they occur, because they are *his*, are on that account the fittest and the best. Every contingency may be provided for, long before, and the whole issue of things may be comprehended at once by the Divine omniscience, with a perfect liberty of disposal in the order and succession of particular events; and while all moves on regularly towards the same result, and the uniformity of the scheme, as a whole, remains unimpaired, the subordinate relations of its parts to each other, may be any wise modified or altered, as he who regulates and adjusts them all, shall think proper.

From the time the disciples of Christ should begin to suffer persecution, they would acquire, on that account alone, a presumptive right to be succoured and relieved in his own good time; and as there can be no disinclination on the part of God to listen to the prayers of his servants under any circumstances, still less can there be so, to listen to them when they are enduring tribulation for their faith and righteousness' sake. But in the present instance, not only was there this general ground of presumption, but the sanction of a positive assurance beforehand, to authorize the expectation of the interposition of Providence, in due time, for the relief of the church. If the day of distress was certainly to precede, the day of comfort was as certainly pledged to follow. Now when a promise is admitted to have been made—when a debt is

acknowledged to be due—the object of importunity under such circumstances, cannot be to extort the promise, or to obtain the recognition of the debt; but it may be, taking for granted the performance of the promise, or the discharge of the debt, some time or other—to procure the performance of the one, or the payment of the other, sooner than might else be expected.

The disciples then are invited to pray continually for the coming of the Son of man, not merely on its own account, as a period of redress to themselves, of which they would stand only in too much need—but with the presumptive assurance that it might thereby come the sooner; the more earnestly and importunately they desired to see it, the more likely it should be to be seen. Whatever indifference might appear to be shewn to their complaints and cries; however slow the avenger of wrongs might seem to be in suffering his anger to be kindled on their account; yet if they persisted undiscouraged in the urgency of their suit, their perseverance should at last be crowned with success. An earlier, and a not less effectual deliverance, should be accorded to them, as the fruit of their prayers and patience.

Besides then, that support which they were capable of deriving from the well-assured conviction of the truth of that religion, in whose cause they were called upon to suffer; besides those aids and consolations which the Holy Spirit would not fail to impart in the hour of trial to such as needed them; besides the glorious recompense of reward, and the hope full of immortality, which in the last extremity is the crown of the martyr's joy; the Hebrew church

would possess this ground of encouragement, derived from the promise of their Lord and Master, that the triumph of their adversaries, however complete for a time, and their own sufferings, however acute while they lasted, would not be perpetual; a day of deliverance would come at length, with plenary satisfaction to themselves, and plenary retribution to their persecutors. Besides this motive to hope and encouragement, they would possess, moreover, on the authority of the same promise, the still greater consolation of knowing that the period of this future deliverance was in some manner placed in their option, who should have most occasion for it; and that in obedience to the persuasive efficacy of their prayers, the overruling providence of God might be induced to accelerate its own dispensations—according, at an earlier date, as a special boon to the importunities of the elect, the very blessing which it always intended to give them at a later. When men have reason to know and feel something to be absolutely necessary to their good—to their present comfort and their future happiness—it is natural that, if it seems to be within their reach, they should be impatient to obtain it; and in this case, the indulgence of a natural inclination is not only permitted, but commanded, as a means to its speedier gratification. The more the disciples should desire, the more likely they should be to procure, the object of their wish. Thus was the evil to which the Hebrew church, in the day of its distress, was destined to be subject, calculated to be the author of its own cure; the galling sense of present inconvenience leading to the restless desire of removing it, and that restlessness breaking out in

the natural expression of prayer and importunity, contributing most effectually to remove it: and so beautifully do the beginning and the conclusion of the present prophecy harmonize together; and if the former, by announcing the danger that was approaching on the hearers, had alarmed their fears, the latter, by prescribing the remedy, and suggesting the means of protection, allays their apprehensions, and revives their hope.

Supposing then, an encouragement amounting almost to a promise, was now held out, that the period of the Jewish visitation, considered as the period of deliverance also to the suffering Hebrew church, might, on a certain condition, be accelerated; the question would still remain, whether any such promise appears to have been verified by the event? The proper answer to this question might anticipate what may be better reserved for the consideration of the prophecy on the mount. I will observe only that it is scarcely possible to peruse the history of the troublous period, between the time of our Lord's ascension and the destruction of Jerusalem, so far as the Jews were concerned—and not to perceive the agency of causes steadily at work in converging on one result—the ultimate rupture between the Jews and the Roman government, which was destined to end in the loss of their place and nation; while after a certain time, the march of events towards this catastrophe, like the increased momentum of a falling body, is visibly accelerated in its progress; as if the overruling providence which had always preordained the futurity, were impatient to begin the execution of its own work of vengeance. The last of the

Roman procurators of Judæa, Gessius Florus, was mainly instrumental in hastening on this consummation—in driving the Jews into rebellion against their will—in stopping at the outset all attempts at an early accommodation of their differences with the Roman government—in keeping the breach open by insults and outrages, and inflaming and irritating the national sore, until the evil was past all remedy, and the hope of peace and reconciliation was now become desperate. If, as we are told in the later prophecy, for the sake of the elect the days of vengeance were to be prematurely shortened, for the sake of the elect they might be prematurely accelerated; and indeed, in order to be so shortened, they might require to be so accelerated. The latter effect would be but preparatory to the former. Besides the evident infatuation of the Jews, through the whole of the war—and besides the remarkable interposition on numerous occasions of a special providence *for* their enemies, and *against* them—both which causes contributed to abridge the duration of the final struggle—the struggle itself, if prematurely begun, on their part who waged it, could scarcely fail to be prematurely terminated; and like a seed, cast into the ground before it was ripe, in the very act of its developement would involve the elements of its dissolution.

We have yet to consider the latter part of verse 8. the concluding words of the whole discourse, “Nevertheless, when the Son of man is come, will he find the faith on the earth?” The first thing to be remarked on these words is, that they are couched in the form of a question, to which notwithstanding

no answer is returned. The answer, then, is left to the judgment of the hearers—the speaker himself is silent upon the decision of his own doubt; it rests with those addressed to choose between the alternatives proposed—with the significant intimation, however, that whichever they might prefer, even the most favourable opinion of the two—there would still be a possibility, there would even be a probability, that the contrary might be just as true^k.

As the whole of this discourse, from xvii. 22. was addressed to our Lord's disciples, that is, to the present representatives of the future Hebrew church, the first Christian community, properly so called; and as this mention of the coming of the Son of man, at the end of it, is evidently a recurrence to the subject of the discourse from the first—the analysis of which has shewn that the coming originally spoken of, and again reverted to, is that special dis-

^k The adverb, “nevertheless,” (πλὴν,) which introduces this sentence, is commonly adversative in its signification; and may be intended to contrast one thing which might naturally be expected, under the circumstances of the case, beforehand, with another, which is found notwithstanding, to have actually occurred afterwards. The substantive (ἡ πίστις) “the faith,” used absolutely, and preceded by the article, may be shewn to stand in a multitude of instances, for the Christian religion in the abstract*. The inferential particle too, (ἄρα,) combined with the interrogative (ᾗ) in ἄρα may admit of being taken into account in the version; and with these explanations, the whole proposition would require to be rendered as follows; “Nevertheless “when the Son of man is come, will he then find the faith on “the earth?”

* Cf. Acts xiii. 8; xiv. 22; xvi. 5; 2 Cor. xiii. 5; Gal. i. 23; vi. 10; Coloss. i. 23; ii. 8; 1 Tim. iii. 9; iv. 1. 6; v. 8; vi. 10. 12. 21; Titus i. 13; ii. 2; 2 Tim. iii. 4; iv. 7; 1 Pet. v. 9; Jude 3.

pensation of redress to the servants, and punishment to the enemies, of the Son of man, in which the believing and the unbelieving part of the Jewish community respectively, would be properly concerned; it seems only a necessary inference, that whatever further meaning the speaker might propose by the words, "finding the faith on the earth" when he came, he must have intended by them first of all, "finding the faith *in the land*," that is, in and among the Jews, at the time of his coming to the destruction of Jerusalem¹.

The meaning of this proposition, then, in its primary sense, when divested of the ambiguous form in which it is stated, may perhaps be represented as follows: "Notwithstanding, however, all this which " has been said—notwithstanding the promise of an " effectual redress in due time—notwithstanding the " gracious encouragement, in particular, to hope " that the redress itself, the more it should be needed, " and the more it should be desired, the sooner it " might be accorded—would there not yet be reason " to doubt, whether the day of relief to some and

¹ It is not improbable, that when our Saviour delivered the above words, though primarily in reference to his coming to the destruction of Jerusalem, he had in view also a coming of his own, on another occasion, which would be much more literally an advent of the Son of man—and a state of things upon the earth with respect to his religion, before and at the time of that coming, to which the words would be much more literally applicable; I mean his coming in person to the decision of the great antichristian contest; an event to be preceded by an almost universal apostasy from Christianity, in those countries where the religion of the gospel, as founded upon faith in the true Christ at least, was previously in being. On this subject, however, we shall find an opportunity of speaking elsewhere.

“ of visitation to others, of the Hebrew community, “ would find the faith in the land, the Christian religion still maintaining its ground, still active, and “ unimpaired in the faith and constancy of its professors ?” A doubt and an apprehension, which cannot be understood of the possible defect of knowledge in the speaker, what the event would be, but simply of the possible defect of firmness, endurance, and perseverance, on the part of the professors of his religion—lest the faith and patience, which had sustained them previously through a long, laborious, and apparently unequal struggle, up to the time of his coming—should haply be found to have failed at the critical moment of their deliverance.

Persecution for righteousness’ sake—to the fact of which it is equally necessary that every thing may be done, on the one hand, with impunity, and every thing must be borne on the other, with submission and resignation ; that free license may be given to the malice, the power, the violence of the agent, and even the wish to retaliate his aggressions must be forbidden to the patient—is the hardest trial to which human constancy and human fortitude can possibly be exposed. Before those searching times which separate the ore from the dross, and the wheat from the chaff, a lukewarm faith and an unsteady principle cannot but speedily give way ; and when long, and violent, and unintermitted, there is a natural tendency in the power of persecution to overcome the firmest and strongest obstacles. Some substances the more they are compressed, the more they will resist ; and a precious metal, subjected to a fiercer heat, acquires only a deeper and brighter

glow, parts only with more of its spurious, and less of its real, substantial, nature. But it is rarely so with human fortitude, when strained beyond a certain point. The sublimest heroism of endurance might prove unequal to certain achievements ; the utmost energies of the power of resistance might succumb beneath a certain degree of pressure. Or, though the principle of reaction in the constitution of human nature were in itself indomitable, and in the moment of active distress, the more violently it was assailed from without, the more it might be supported and strengthened, by its own elasticity within ; yet what shall sustain it, in the seasons of temporary relief from exertion, under the faintings and sinkings of past exhaustion ; where shall it take refuge from itself, and find consolation and assurance against its own fears and forebodings—while the prospect is covered with perpetual gloom, the evil is present and sensible, the probable cure is distant and unseen ?

The parable of the Sower, relating as it did to the first publication and reception of the gospel, prepared us to expect both the subsequent fact of persecution in every community where the gospel profession should have obtained a footing, and the effect which it should produce in discriminating among its professors, and putting to the test their faith and patience. The seed once committed to the ground at the time of sowing, under all the circumstances of its position would be alike exposed to the scorching effects of the same summer's sun ; and unless supplied, by the advantage of its situation, with a sufficient degree of moisture and nourishment from within, would alike infallibly succumb to

the heat and drought from without. There can be no question that this description of the future course of things, which is no more than the history of what the gospel might expect to encounter every where, would be first and properly verified by the matter of fact among the Jews. The first Christian community which could possibly be placed in circumstances, to realize the evangelical lesson of suffering for the faith's sake, and suffering without a wish or desire to retaliate upon their persecutors, was the church of Judæa. The persecution of this church, properly so called, began within *seven* years after the ascension; and though it cannot be shewn that the interval from that time to the commencement of the Jewish war—an interval of twenty-nine years—was one uninterrupted period of suffering, yet there is good reason to believe it was all spent more or less in a struggle between the believing part of the community, and their unbelieving countrymen, by which the faith and patience of the Hebrew Christians was long and severely tried. Few and short were those respites from external violence, during which it might be said that the churches of the mother country were “enjoying rest;” and as the bitterness of no animosity which the profession of the gospel any where encountered among the Gentiles, could exceed the malice and violence cherished against it by the Jews; so until this malice was paralyzed by the loss of the power, not the disposition, to do it harm any longer, no persecution afterwards sustained by it among the Gentiles, was perhaps, so continued and harassing, so wearisome and unintermitted, as that which it experienced from its own countrymen.

Under these circumstances, what Christian society we may ask, would have more need of faith and patience, than the Hebrew? or, if the length and severity of the trial is proportionably dangerous to the constancy of those who are tried, who would be in greater jeopardy, than the members of this community? That some risk was to be apprehended for their ultimate perseverance, under the difficulties by which they were beset, may safely be inferred, not only from the reason of the thing, and our Saviour's allusion on this occasion, to the possibility of such an event, expressed as it is—but from his recurrence to the subject, and his allusions to a similar possibility, in still plainer terms, in the prophecy on the mount. That the danger was not to be apprehended without reason, may be inferred not only from the same considerations, but from the Epistle to the Hebrews, written, as I endeavoured to shew in my former work^m, in the ninth of Nero, U.C. 816. A.D. 63, and consequently towards the close of the dark and calamitous periodⁿ, when suffering had continued longest, and the sense of the present evil was become the greatest. This epistle abounds in topics of encouragement to patience under distress, from every motive of hope or of fear, which Christianity has to supply; all abundantly demonstrating the fact of

^m Vol. ii. Diss. i. p. 74—86. Cf. Supplem. Diss. 455—460.

ⁿ That it was so written, might be collected from its own evidence, in such passages as these; x. 25: καὶ τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ βλέπετε ἐγγίζουσιν τὴν ἡμέραν: x. 37: ἔτι γὰρ μικρὸν ὅσον ὅσον, ὁ ἐρχόμενος ἥξει καὶ οὐ χρονεῖ—the object of which is to encourage the persons addressed to an additional patience under their present trials, by this among other considerations, that the time of their deliverance itself was at hand—their sufferings would not be of much longer continuance.

some existing and urgent necessity for them, in the situation of those addressed. It is impossible to peruse it, and not to conclude that the practical scope of its author was to "raise again the hands " which had begun to droop, and to strengthen the " tottering knees ;" in other words, to reanimate the courage, and to revive the confidence of the Hebrew community, just as they were beginning to sink. Nay more—if we must allow their utmost weight to those awful warnings—those solemn and purposely-laboured denunciations of the inexpressible guilt, the irretrievable consequences of the sin of apostasy in particular, which are to be met with in it^o ; they would almost necessarily lead to the inference that the faith of the Hebrew church had more than begun to waver—that some of its members had already lapsed, and others were in imminent danger of lapsing, from the open profession of a religion, so full of tribulation, so destitute as it might appear, of present ease and comfort, if not of future hope.

It is true, the mere apprehension of danger is no proof of the fact of it ; and in the present instance there might be a provision already made, to anticipate the danger by a timely interference, before it was realized. It is an axiom of practical religion, on which the duty of passive endurance under every trial, however severe, is based, that neither communities nor individuals are tried beyond what they can bear ; and when the test of the strength is about to overpower the ability of the patient, a seasonable interposition takes off from the pressure, or

^o See Hebrews vi. 4—8 ; x. 25—31. Cf. 2 Pet. ii. 20—22.

communicates fresh capabilities of fortitude. The precise moments of the Divine dispensations, either in favour of God's moral creatures, or against them, are determined by the nicest regard both to the claims of justice, and to the suggestions of mercy. The day of their deliverance, however long delayed, would no doubt arrive in time for the twofold preservation of the Hebrew church ; both from the fury of its enemies, now ready perhaps to swallow it up—and from a still worse risk to be apprehended from itself ; the risk of losing its original righteousness, of the decay of its zeal, of the growing lukewarmness of its love, of the wavering of its constancy, of the abjuration of its first profession, of the renunciation of its former trust ; the risk, in short, of apostatizing from *the faith*.

PARABLE TWENTY-FIRST. MORAL.

THE PHARISEE AND THE PUBLICAN.

LUKE XVIII. 9—14. HARMONY, IV. 49.

LUKE xviii. 9—14.

⁹ Moreover he spake this parable also, with respect to certain persons, those that were persuaded of themselves that they were righteous, and set at nought the rest. ¹⁰ “Two men went up to the temple, to pray ; the one a Pharisee, and the other a Publican. ¹¹ The Pharisee, having taken his stand by himself, began to pray in these *words*, God, I thank thee, that I am not as the rest of the men *of this generation, being* rapacious, unjust, adulterers, or even as this *man*, the publican. ¹² I fast twice in the week, I give a tenth of all things soever that I get. ¹³ And the publican, having stood afar off, would not even lift up his eyes unto the heaven ; but was smiting on his breast, saying, God, be propitious to me the sinner. ¹⁴ I tell you, this man went down to his house accounted righteous *rather* than the other : for every one that exalteth himself shall be made low, and he that maketh himself low shall be exalted.”

MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

THE parable of the Pharisee and the Publican, short as it is, is conspicuous not only for the very serious and important moral uses to which it is subservient, (a property which entitles it to an higher feeling of respect than admiration,) but for the sim-

plicity of its narrative, and the force and liveliness of its delineation of character ; in which respect it is so perfect of its kind, that it may be said rather to paint than to describe ; and conveys as clear an idea to our imaginations, as the most finished picture could have done to our senses.

The material circumstances of the narrative, strictly so called, are few, and consequently afford scope for but little explanation ; and such explanation as may be requisite will be found to turn mainly on questions more or less of verbal criticism ; that is, on the proper method of rendering the sense of the original—with respect to which there is some reason to question the accuracy of the authorized version.

The historical notice premised to the account of the parable, and so far specifying the occasion which produced it—is the first of these questions that requires to be considered ; that preamble being on the whole inadequately perhaps represented by the received version : “ And he spake this parable unto “ certain which trusted in themselves that they were “ righteous, and despised others.”

It would have been more strictly correct to have rendered the first part of this sentence, “ Moreover “ he spake this parable also”—an introduction to what follows, which would have implied that one or more parables had been delivered already, and that Jesus proceeded to add another, before he made an end of what was said at one time, and on one occasion. The truth is, that the discourse which begins to be related at the twentieth verse of the seventeenth chapter of St. Luke, the ostensible occasion of which

was the question put by the Pharisees—there recorded—for any thing which appears to the contrary, was continued without interruption down to the conclusion of the present parable; so that in this portion of St. Luke's Gospel, from xvii. 20. to xviii. 14, we have probably a connected account of the particulars of a discourse of our Saviour's, which whether relating to the same topic throughout or not, was delivered on the same occasion. The last part of this discourse, from xviii. 1—8, consisted of a parable, that of the unjust Judge—which we have shewn to have been as much addressed to the disciples of our Lord, and to have been as much intended for their special admonition and instruction, in certain peculiar circumstances of situation, as any thing which preceded, from xvii. 22. to the end of that chapter. This circumstance is sufficient to account for the introduction premised to the present parable, supposing it to have followed soon after the preceding; that as our Lord had already delivered one parable, for such and such a purpose; so he added another, whether with the same purpose in view or not, yet in all probability addressed to the same persons.

And with respect to the remainder of the sentence—if the received translation is faithful to the sense of the original, it must imply that the parable was addressed to certain, which trusted in themselves that they were righteous; and though these persons are not otherwise specified, than so far as such a description was qualified to specify them—yet if the parable which follows, contains an instance in point to the description, or an actual example of

one who trusted in himself on the grounds herein supposed—the persons in question must be the Pharisees ; and the parable must have been addressed to the Pharisees.

But the Pharisees had ceased to be addressed since the reply to their own question, Luke xvii. 20, 21. At verse 22 of the chapter, our Lord began to address himself to his disciples, and through the rest of the chapter he continued his address to them. The first part too of the next chapter, which relates the parable of the unjust judge, we have shewn to have been simply a continuation of the discourse begun in the preceding. And this being the case, St. Luke's manner of speaking in introducing the account of another parable directly after it, " More—over he spake this parable also," presumptively leads to the inference that this too was addressed to, and intended for, the same persons who had just heard the former.

In fact the persons, to whom the evangelist must have supposed the parable addressed, whether mentioned by him or not, must be the same to whom our Saviour also directs his concluding observations on his own narrative ; " I tell you, this man went down to his house accounted righteous," *or* " justified rather than the other." That he is speaking in these words, to some persons, and that those must have been the proper hearers of the parable just related—would be evident enough : the only question would be, who these persons were, whether the Pharisees, as present at the beginning of the whole discourse, and possibly still so to the end, or his own disciples ?

The probability is that the persons addressed in

the parable immediately subjoined, were the same who had been directly addressed in the parable immediately preceding; and that had our Saviour, when passing to a new subject of discourse, passed to a new class of hearers likewise, St. Luke, who specifies the first of these facts, would not have failed to specify the other. But having already intimated that the disciples, and not the Pharisees, were addressed in the whole of the discourse which had preceded till then, he had no need to specify that they began to be addressed in what followed; if that too was directed to them.

It appears from our Lord's own remark on the parable at last, that it was designed for a practical lesson—independent of the mere narrative; that it would be a very improper conception of its final end to suppose it intended to give any description, however lively and graphic, of two opposite characters, and of two different modes of behaviour under the same circumstances, except as furnishing a case in point to the same inference and application, the one as striking in a negative point of view, as the other in a positive; the one with respect to what ought not to be done, and the other with respect to what ought to be done, in order to the same result, the justification of man in the sight of God. In other words, that this is a moral parable, in the strictest sense of the word, and a moral parable directed to a corresponding use and purpose of the most important kind, does not admit of a question. If so, it may well be presumed, *a priori*, that it could never have been addressed to such hearers as the Pharisees. There is no instance on record in the Gospels, of a moral parable, or even of a moral and didactic dis-

course of our Lord's—having ever been addressed to them, or intended for them. The Pharisees were not that portion of the contemporaries of our Lord, or of his brethren according to the flesh, who were at any time predisposed to have attended to his admonitions, or to have profited by them ; or had there once been a time in the course of his ministry, when such an effect was possible or probable, that time, at the period when this parable was delivered, only a few weeks before the close of his ministry itself, must long have been past ^a.

Indeed, it is scarcely to be supposed that the persons whose character and conduct are selected as the subjects of the ensuing representation, could possibly be the same who were intended to profit by the representation itself. For that this character and this conduct are selected as the object of animadversion and rebuke ; and that the more faithfully each is delineated, the more the final end of the delineation is answered, and the more worthy of censure and reprobation the picture appears—must be evident. But of what use, in a moral point of view, we may ask, would it be, to hold up to the Pharisee the true picture of himself and his sect ; or what hope could there be of correcting his characteristic vices, whatever they were, by laying them bare, and exposing them openly and nakedly before himself ? Such an exposure might be well calculated to irritate and offend, but not to reform and amend them ; for it cannot be supposed that they would willingly be parties in their own disgrace, or patiently acquiesce in their own condemnation. To draw the just and

^a On this subject, I refer the reader to the note, at page 552 of vol. iii. of the present work.

natural inference from either member of the representation, for their own instruction and direction in a very important article of their duty, might well be expected of the disciples of our Lord ; to whose apprehensions the more distinctly each of these opposite pictures was conveyed, the more striking would the moral truth, designed to be impressed on their minds by it, appear. But it was not to be expected from those, who were concerned in the representation as the originals of the picture therein delineated ; whose portrait was consequently to be drawn, as a study for others—not for themselves—and the more exactly and after the life, the more likely to answer the end of the representation ^b.

^b The matter of a moral example is of course always different from the application made of it. It is one thing consequently to adduce the history which shall be parallel to a given case, and another to apply it ; and in every such instance of the reasoning from analogy, as there must always be one thing to apply, so there must always be another to apply it to ; which, separately considered, must consequently be distinct. An example without a thing to be exemplified by it, would be an absurdity ; and an example which could not be applied without defeating its own end and purpose, would be little better. Such would be the result in the present instance, in applying the example of a Pharisee to the case of a Pharisee, with this particular object in view, of correcting some fault in the one, by the production and exposure of the same fault in the other. This is not what is meant by the argument from analogy in general, or the reasoning from the example in particular. The case of one Pharisee would not be analogous to, but identical with, the case of another. The example, and the thing exemplified by it, under such circumstances, might change places, and be substituted one for the other, indifferently. The case of the former would no more be applicable to that of the latter, than *vice versa* ; nor could either learn or infer any thing from the other, which he might not have learned from himself. To the just application

The truth is, that the Greek preposition which the received version renders by "unto," has here also the same sense of "with respect," *or* "in reference to," which we shewed it to bear in the introductory observation to the preceding parable. Its proper use, then, in the present instance, is to point out not the persons *to* whom, the ensuing discourse was about to be directed, but the persons *of* whom, it was about to be pronounced; in other words, the end or object proposed by the parable, in its representation of character or conduct, which follows. This part of the proposition, then, ought to have been rendered on the whole, "Moreover he spake "this parable also, with respect to certain persons."

And as to the words which follow, we may observe, first, that had they been intended to assert no more of the persons in question, than the fact that they trusted in themselves, that is, they were *persuaded concerning themselves*, that they were righteous, it is probable the original would have been differently expressed; more especially in the part which is rendered by, *in themselves*. It is manifest that this version makes the words signify simply that the persons in question believed themselves to be righteous—believed themselves to be so perhaps, with confidence and unhesitatingly; but still

of the argument from the example, it is obviously necessary, that the illustration which constitutes the example, should be taken from one set of cases, or description of persons, and the parallelism which makes it applicable, reside in another. The final end of the parabolic representation in the present instance required that the Pharisees should supply the example, but our Lord's disciples should make the application of it; and from the graphic delineation of a certain characteristic vice or fault in them, should learn to avoid the same in themselves.

only the *fact* of such a persuasion, not the *grounds* thereof. The verb, however, which is rendered by *trusted*, is familiarly used to denote a moral trust, a moral dependence or confidence, as well as a simple act of belief; a trust and a dependence consequently, which must suppose some ground or other, on which to be founded. It appears to me that this ground is further specified in the words which follow, and are rendered, *that they were righteous*; which therefore ought rather to have been rendered, *because they were righteous*. The Greek preposition, which occurs in this instance, followed by the dative case, is the ordinary preposition, and followed by its usual case, where the object is to denote the ground, or reason, or condition, of a thing; an use and meaning manifestly proper in the present instance, if the meaning of the whole introduction was to inform us, that Jesus spake the parable, about to follow, with reference to certain persons, who trusted upon themselves, because they were righteous. Such a trust upon themselves, because they were righteous, must no doubt include a persuasion of themselves that they were righteous; but the simple statement of such a persuasion would not imply the grounds upon which it was placed, much less decide the question, whether those grounds were right or wrong, whether the persuasion was properly or improperly placed. If it is possible for men to be righteous in *any* sense, it is possible for them to be persuaded, that is, certified and assured of their own righteousness in *that* sense. Now it is possible for men to be righteous in a certain sense, and therefore to be assured or persuaded of their own righteousness in that sense. Men may become, and may have

reason to know themselves, to be *righteous*, by merely believing and acknowledging that they are *unrighteous*.

It is of manifest importance, then, to the good or bad moral quality of such a persuasion as this, that the grounds thereof should be stated along with the fact of it; and therefore that the words which assert the persuasion, in the case of the persons concerned in the material representation of this parable, should if possible be so rendered, as over and above to include its grounds, and to specify their nature, whether such as to authorize the confidence in question, or not. For though there may be some proper ground on which men might be persuaded of themselves that they were righteous, there can be none which is founded in and upon themselves. And this distinction, besides being founded in the necessity of the case, as well as agreeable to the letter of the original, is further confirmed by the moral tendency of the parable. The practical question which that parable was designed to illustrate by a case in point, is this; of the acceptance of the persons of men—of the means of their becoming and being acknowledged as righteous—in the sight of God: and it instructs us, not that there are no means available for such an end, and within the power of men to use and apply, but only one such mean for any such purpose, which is legitimate and effectual; not that there is no sufficient ground even of human merit and human acceptance, in the eyes of God, but none which is placed upon men themselves—none which is founded on imaginary self-desert—none, in short, which does not disclaim all reliance upon the man's self, and

rest absolutely on the free pardon, the uncompromised mercy and forgiveness of God.

Again, with regard to the last part of the description, rendered in the words, “and despised others;” the full force of the original is not expressed by either of the terms of this version. In the first place, those who are there set forth as the objects of the contempt in question, are not indefinitely, but definitely, expressed; not as others in general, but as “the rest,” the residue, in particular: a mode of designation which necessarily implies that both they who felt the contempt in question, and they of whom, or towards whom, they felt it, made up together the complex of a certain community—divisible into these two members, and each of them exclusive of the other. The use of such language opposes *all* the remaining part of a certain complex, as the objects of such and such an opinion, to this portion of it in particular, as those who entertained that opinion of them; and *vice versa*, it sets these in particular, who entertained this opinion, as part of the community in question, in opposition to those of whom they entertained it, as the rest.

Secondly, the word which is rendered by *despised*, is compounded of elements in the original, which will not allow us to suppose that a merely less favourable idea was entertained by this one part of the same community, of the rest than of themselves; but an opinion so much at variance with, and so much inferior to the idea they had formed of their own worth and excellence, as to amount, in comparison, to an utter contempt of the rest. They must have esteemed all but themselves, to be literally worthless

and insignificant—literally nothing^c. Now this is such a difference both in the kind and the degree of the estimation which one class of persons, composing a part of the same community, entertained of themselves, compared with their opinion of the rest, as constituting the other—that whether founded in truth or not, we cannot suppose it could even be conceived, much less be openly avowed, without the *notorious* possession of some specific merit or desert in one of these members, and the equally *notorious* want of it in the other; and that desert of such a kind, so necessary to perfection or so sufficient for it—that its absence must depress as low in the one scale, as its presence must elevate on high in the other.

Into the nature of this meritorious quality, and in what it must be supposed to have consisted, to account for this difference in their estimation of themselves, who possessed it, and of all others who possessed it not—we shall find an opportunity of in-

^c Οὐδενὸς ἀξίους, οὐδενὸς λόγου—or the like.

ἄμμες δ' οὔτε λόγου τινὸς ἄξιοι, οὔτ' ἀριθματοὶ,
δύστανοι Μεγαρῆες, ἀτιμοτάτῃ ἐνὶ μοίρᾳ.

Theocritus, xiv. 48.

The verb ἐξουθενέω, is not peculiar to this passage. It occurs besides in the Gospels, at Luke xxiii. 11: in the Acts, at iv. 11: in the Epistles, Romans xiv. 3. 10: 1 Cor. i. 28; vi. 4; xxvi. 11: 2 Cor. x. 10: Galat. iv. 14: 1 Thess. v. 20. In each of these instances, the inspection of the passages will shew, that it is the same feeling of contempt, founded in the idea of the worthlessness of the object, which is intended by it; and consequently that the etymological sense of the word which makes it signify τὸ οὐδενὸς λόγου ποιεῖσθαι, οὐδενὸς ἄξιον κρίνειν, is still more or less the true.

quiring hereafter. In unison however with the spirit of such a distinction, we may observe by the way, are the language and the professions ascribed to the Pharisee. He thanks God, in the first place, that he was not as the rest of the men, that is, of *his own time, of his own age and nation*; whereby he opposes himself, and such as resembled him, to all his contemporaries and countrymen besides. Under this affectation of gratitude that he was not as bad as the rest of the world, it is sufficiently clear that he believed himself to be much better. He assigns the grounds of this superiority, in the next place, by specifying that personal distinction which made him not only unlike to, but so much better than the rest of his nation; and this it appears, was a supererogatory righteousness, to the acquisition of which he and his sect alone thought of aspiring, and to the possession of which, and the consequent personal desert entailed thereby, none but he and his sect could lay claim.

To the sect of the Pharisees, then, to the exposure and condemnation both of the arrogancy of their self-estimation, and of the uncharitableness of their opinions of others, the ensuing narrative, it must have been concluded from the introduction premised to it, was primarily intended to refer. And that these, and none but these, could properly be intended by such a description as that which follows, might have been inferred from the description itself: the Pharisees, and the Pharisees alone, among the contemporaries of our Saviour, being they, who, as he himself told them on an occasion of recent occurrence, justified or made righteous themselves—(οἱ δι-

καιοῦντες ἑαυτοῦς)—the Pharisee, and the Pharisee alone, even though his name had not been announced in the narrative, being capable of holding the language or professing the sentiments, ascribed to him therein, both of himself and also of others : for it is of the essence of an imaginary righteousness to think as disparagingly of others as presumptuously of itself ; and the less foundation there is for the imagination, so much the more to increase in pride and self-conceit, on the one hand, and in superciliousness and censoriousness, on the other.

The very preamble of the parable, then, might have taught us that the narrative which follows, considered as a moral example, was levelled against three capital errors in practical religion, affecting the duty of such a being as man, in each of his threefold relations, to himself, his Maker, and his fellow-creatures ; the want of sobriety of judgment in his estimation of himself—an ignorance or dissimulation of his true moral position in respect to God—and an equal injustice and uncharitableness in his estimate of others, whose situation in all moral respects is the same with his own. The origin of the two last of these errors is in truth to be traced up to the first ; for it cannot be doubted that an ignorance of a man's own self, of his natural sinfulness and unworthiness, which is the cause of his self-conceit and self-righteousness, involves an ignorance of his moral position with respect to God, and will lead to the presumption of his acceptance with his Maker, when there is only too much reason to dread his condemnation ; and in the strength of the same persuasion, will induce him to depreciate his neighbour as much as he advances himself. For the same

principle of self-delusion which blinds him to the perception of his own unworthiness, or prevents him from acknowledging so disagreeable a truth—renders him the more quicksighted to the demerits of another; nor is it less natural to false pride and vanity to be gratified by an invidious comparison with others, than by an overweening conceit of itself. None of those causes which interpose between a man and himself, to blind his eyes to the discovery of his true character, and to his own situation in a moral point of view, comes between his judgment and the character of another. Nor, indeed, is it possible for any one to think too highly of himself, without at the same time thinking too lowly of others; for whether real or not, superiority on one hand must imply inferiority on the other, and the greater the superiority, or the stronger the persuasion thereof, the lower the inferiority, and the more disparaging the conception of it also. No one could imagine himself to be a giant in bodily stature, who did not think the rest of the world comparatively pigmies; and no one could suppose himself to have attained exclusively to the pinnacle of excellence, without looking upon all others to be proportionally as much beneath him.

If then, it be inquired why the historian of the parable preferred to describe rather than mention, the class of persons against whom it was directed; we may answer that so far as the name of Pharisee is concerned, that designation appears on the face of the narrative, and leaves no doubt that in whatever manner the class of persons against whom the parable was levelled, had been described beforehand, the sect of the Pharisees must have been meant. In the

mean time, the sketch of character which precedes, illustrates, as well as appropriates, the example which follows. A moral portraiture, however unfavourable, yet of some original, is premised; the sequel both shews whose picture it is, and vindicates its truth^d.

^d If St. Luke wrote for the information of Gentile readers more especially, it would be a more intelligible kind of representation, to describe by their peculiar characteristic attributes, rather than to specify by name, a sect among the Jews. It should be considered also, that were there any among Gentile Christians, who inherited, or were disposed to inherit, the same peculiarities; this mode of description would be alike applicable, and seen to be applicable to them also, as well as to their predecessors among the Jews; and be as well adapted to convince these of their error, upon the authority of our Saviour, as to expose and condemn those. Now in St. Luke's time, there were Judaizing Christians, dispersed in great numbers over the church: in other words, there were Christian Pharisees, pretending to the same kind of superior righteousness, and on grounds much the same, in comparison of the rest of their brethren, as these Jewish ones had done before them.

We may conclude, therefore, our observations on the preamble of the parable, which nothing could have induced me to extend to such a length, but the necessity of vindicating the above constructions from the charge of differing, without due cause, from the meaning expressed in the English Bible—by repeating the remark which we have had occasion to make before—that supposing the parable to have followed where it does, and been delivered to the same persons who had heard the whole of the previous discourse, we should not be bound to shew by what principle of association the latter part of this discourse was probably connected with the preceding. Nor would it be necessary to inquire, whether the Pharisees who were present at the commencement of the whole, continued to be present to the end, or not; and consequently, whether they might hear the parable, in the representations, though not in the application of which, they themselves were concerned. Yet I should consider the nega-

When treating in the General Introduction, of the question, whether the parables were real or fictitious narratives, while we contended for the affirmative upon this question with respect to all the moral parables in general, we observed, that whether it could be proved of the rest or not, there was one of the number, of which it was almost demonstrably certain. This parable is the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican; and a little consideration will

tive on this question more probable than the affirmative; and that our Saviour having answered their question at Luke xvii. 20, in all probability publicly put to him, retired into some private house, as he had done upon former occasions, and held the rest of his discourse with the disciples there. Nor would it be necessary to inquire, whether some instance of that characteristic self-conceit on the one hand, and contempt of the rest on the other, which distinguished this sect, had recently been displayed, to give the immediate occasion of that graphic delineation which is made of both in the parabolic narrative. Such a delineation of such a sect would be at all times in character, and at all times apposite, whether suggested by a passing occurrence, or provoked by some more striking instance of the characteristic presumption in question than usual, or not. Thus much, however, we may observe upon the connection between the first part and the last of a discourse, delivered apparently at the same time; that as the question of the Pharisees, relating to the coming of the kingdom of God, had been declined unto them, but answered to the disciples; so, in the intermediate disclosures concerning that advent, and the present parable, there may have been a greater community of subject than at first sight appears. The Pharisees had an interest in that advent, as well as the disciples—but a very different interest from theirs; and the grounds of this distinction may possibly be traced in their case, who had no interest in the fact but a penal and retributive one, to that defect of character and conduct, which is held up to censure and reprobation in the moral picture drawn of it for the instruction and admonition of the others.

satisfy an impartial reader, that it must be regarded in the light of a true history, and not of a fictitious narrative.

In the first place, antecedent probability is in favour of this conclusion. The transaction of which it gives an account, is such as *might* have happened; the agents who take part in it, are such as *might* have been concerned in it; the parts respectively attributed to them are such as they *might* actually have sustained. "Two men went up to the temple to pray." The temple was a place of resort to all among the Jews, who were near enough to have access to it, twice in the day at least—for this very purpose of praying there. "The one a Pharisee, the other a Publican." The Pharisees were an actual division of the Jewish community, and the Publicans were another: the former almost all lived in Jerusalem, or in its vicinity, and great numbers of the latter. It is morally certain, then, that twice in the day, at the stated hours of prayer, both Pharisees and Publicans would repair to the temple, to offer up their devotions in common. And with respect to the sequel of the narrative—in what manner the Pharisee prayed, when arrived in the temple, and in what manner the Publican—different as might be the way in which the same office of devotion was performed by either, no one, at least, will contend that the Pharisee might not have prayed as he is represented, nor the Publican as he too is described to have done; nay more, that such a prayer—that such language and sentiments as are attributed to the former, were not *a priori* to be expected from him, and the contrary, whether to be expected beforehand or not, was still

impossible even of the latter. It was just as natural for a Pharisee, considering his sect, to pray as this Pharisee is said to have prayed—as it was becoming and proper for a Publican, considering also to what class of men he belonged, to pray in the strain opposed to that. It was not only probable, beforehand, that a Pharisee would pray as this man did—it was scarcely possible, if he is not to be considered a singular exception to the rest of his sect, that he could pray otherwise; and unless we should pronounce this one Publican a singular exception to his body also—unless we should deny that there might be as deep a sense of repentance, as there was a necessity for it, in this class of men—that there might be as heartfelt a consciousness of sin, and as sincere an acknowledgment of it, as there was a certain presumption of sinfulness, in those who were proverbially classed with sinners—it was scarcely possible that a self-convicted, and humiliated Publican could pray otherwise than this man is supposed to have prayed.

It will not, I apprehend, be deemed an objection to this opinion, that if the parable is the account of a real transaction, it supposes our Lord to have been acquainted with the letter of the prayers howsoever and by whomsoever, as well as wheresoever offered up. For what is there more extraordinary in this kind of knowledge, than in the knowledge of men's thoughts in general; which no one who is familiar with the Gospels, can deny to have been possessed by our Saviour? and what difference can it make to the exercise of this knowledge, whether the thoughts which are known to be passing in a man's

mind in secret, are passing in prayer or in any other way, are passing near at hand or at a distance? It requires the same faculty of omniscience to know men's thoughts, under any circumstances—to discern what is passing in their minds, unknown and unconsciously, as it appears, to all but themselves, whether they are present or absent at the time. It is a case in point to our Saviour's knowledge of men's prayers, in what manner soever delivered, that as he saw the body of Nathanael, while still at a distance, and still as he himself conceived, unseen by any human eye; so he knew what was passing in his mind, while engaged as there is every reason to believe in an act of private prayer: and so it is evident that Nathanael himself understood it^e.

In his divine capacity, indeed, as the very Being addressed by the devotions of all who repaired to the temple, it is absurd to suppose that our Lord could be ignorant what prayers, and in what terms, and by whom, were at any time offered to himself there. Nor is it less conceivable that he should be just as much present at every act of worship in the temple of old time, and just as conscious of every thing said or done, or thought or expressed there—as he is still, under the same circumstances, at every act of Christian worship, and of what passes, it may be, in innumerable places and among innumerable congregations, at once: for where any two or three are, being met together in the name of Christ, there is Christ also in the midst of them^f. In the present instance, however, it would be a sufficient answer to the whole objection, that if our Lord knew the effect

^e John i. 46—52.

^f Matt. xviii. 20.

and consequence of the prayers offered in the temple, he must have known the prayers themselves ; if he was aware of the result of this act of his worship to the worshipper, he must have known both who it was that had performed it, and in what manner he had performed it.

Now it does appear from his own declaration, subjoined to the account of the prayers in question—that he did know the effect which followed on the prayers respectively. “ I tell you, this man “ went down to his house accounted righteous *rather* “ than the other.” It is plainly asserted, then, that both went down to their houses, from the temple, when they had done praying, as both had gone up to the temple, from their houses, for the purpose of praying ; and that the one went down to his house, as certainly justified or made righteous, by virtue of *his* prayers, as the other, not justified or made righteous, in consequence of his.

This account of their going home from the temple, when they had done praying, is properly no part of the parable ; nor has the assertion that the one went down thence, justified by virtue of his prayers, and the other not justified by virtue of his, any thing to do with the account of the behaviour of each while there. It was in the nature of things impossible that either of them, himself, should have known the effect of his prayers, or in what manner they were construed by God, and determined the divine judgment respecting the merits of the worshipper. And it would have been equally impossible for any others, though privy to the prayers which these worshippers might have offered, to have pronounced with certainty, how they had been received by God, and

determined his opinion of the merits of the worshippers respectively: for men can no more know the effect of other men's prayers, than they can of their own. The proper answer and effect of prayers can be known only to the Being who is the object of prayer, and whose construction and reception of it accordingly, determine its answer and effect; or only by another who is equally omniscient with him, who is privy to what is passing in the mind of the Being addressed by prayer, as well as to the thoughts and expressions of those who pray.

Now that our Saviour pronounces on the effect of the prayers in question, that he asserts one of the worshippers to have been accounted righteous, as the specific result of his mode of praying, and the other not, as the effect in like manner of his—no one can deny, in the face of his own declaration. That he pronounces this judgment in terms which seem to imply a comparative justification on the one hand, and non-justification on the other, is resolvable into the idiom of the Greek language^g, and does not affect the general truth and clearness of his meaning; which is that the one, who had glorified himself in unmeasured terms, was not justified before his Judge at all, but the other, who had acknowledged and proclaimed his baseness, was on that account esteemed righteous. That our Saviour, then, in declaring the effect of the two prayers respectively, speaks instead of God, and pronounces on that which could be known only to God, or to one

^g There is a very similar phrase, Gen. xxxviii. 26: according to the Septuagint—ἐπέγνω δὲ Ἰούδας, καὶ εἶπε, Δεδικαίωται Θάμαρ ἢ ἐγώ. For instances of this ellipsis in the gospels, see my Dissertations, vol. ii. Diss. viii. part iii. 295.

as omniscient as he is, and could be pronounced upon only by God, or by one who was authorized to speak in his stead—must be evident. Is it to be supposed then, that he would undertake to pronounce upon any thing, in that capacity, but a *fact*? that he would give the sanction of such an assurance to any thing but a *fact*? that he would speak in the name of God, and assert any thing of the opinion and judgment, the approbation or disapprobation, of the Supreme Being, directly concerning the exercise of his own prerogative, that was not strictly borne out by the truth, because strictly in unison with the matter of fact?

There is no qualification in his language. He does not say—"It is probable, *this* man was justified rather than *that*—we may presume, that if either of these two was justified, by virtue of his prayers, it was *this* man rather than *that*;" but he declares plainly, "I tell you, this man *was* justified rather than the other." Nor does he shape his final observation on the narrative just recorded, so as to make this declaration of consequences an hypothetical inference from an hypothetical statement, and the one only as certain as the other. He does not express himself so as to imply, that had such an act of prayer preceded, then such a consequence would have resulted from it; if a Pharisee had prayed so and so, and a Publican so and so, then the one would have been accepted, and the other would not; but he expresses himself as one would do, who was stating the actual consequence of an actual antecedent; the Pharisee *had* prayed so and so, and the Publican contrariwise, and such *had* been the effect of their prayers, upon their own

justification, or non-justification. On this principle, it must be certain that every thing which had preceded, up to the conclusion of their prayers, was as real, as every thing which followed after it : the last circumstance in the narrative of the same transaction, could not be real, and the rest purely fictitious. It must be as certain that these two men went up to the temple, as that they went down to their houses; and that they prayed so and so while there, as that they went home, accounted of so and so, in consequence of their prayers.

The truth is, that the different personal consequence of their own prayers to the authors of the prayers, was the very thing intended to be impressed on the hearers by the account of their prayers themselves : to the force of which impression, it is necessary that the effect should be considered real, not imaginary, an actual event, not an hypothetical consequent ; that the Publican should be understood to have been justified, and the Pharisee not, each by virtue of his proper sentiments and proper language, as declared in his prayer. Nay more, the same supposition of a *real* difference in the personal consequences of these respective prayers, is indispensable to the moral effect designed by the exposure of the one, and by the testimony borne to the propriety of the other. It would little have concerned the hearers to be told how ill the Pharisee had prayed, or how much better the Publican, unless they had been certified at the same time, how unlike, and to themselves how unlooked for was the event of the prayer in either instance. That the person of the Pharisee was finally rejected, and that of the Publican accepted, was the very thing requisite to be made

known, to understand the difference in the merits of their prayers, and as a proof or token that there was something essentially wrong and displeasing to the Object of prayer, in the one, and something essentially right, and worthy of the Divine approbation, in the other. It was the assurance of this actual distinction in the personal effects of the two kinds of prayer, respectively, which must admonish the hearers what they were to avoid in prayer, and what to aim at themselves, if they wished their prayers to be successful; for which purpose, the non-acceptance of the person of the Pharisee was a fact as necessary to be declared, by way of warning, as the justification of the Publican, by way of encouragement^h.

^h Though we may admit, however, that the transaction recorded in the parable is a real one, which sometime or other actually happened—yet there is no reason why both the Pharisee and the Publican may not each be supposed to stand for the rest of his proper class, and the particular mode of prayer used by either, may not be a specimen or sample of the kind of prayers, which were, or which might be, used by the rest. The persons of both, on this supposition, acquire a dignity, and the conduct attributed to them becomes possessed of a meaning, which as simple individuals, whose behaviour would prove nothing except of their own character; or their own deserts, they would not have. The preamble to the parable shews that the Evangelist considered our Lord to have had in view by it, not merely individuals, answering to the description in question, but a class of persons, of all whom that was the characteristic; and therefore, even if the history of individuals was primarily concerned in the material narrative which followed, that they were to be considered the representatives of a class. The principle of *ab uno disce omnes*, is strictly applicable in this instance. It is no breach of charity to suppose that any Pharisee of the present day, would have thought as highly of himself, and as disparagingly of all besides, as this one Pharisee; and therefore that any

But to proceed. The first circumstance which the narrative points out in the different behaviour of the two men, after their arrival in the temple, and upon addressing themselves respectively to the business of prayer, is as characteristic as any. “The Pharisee stood and prayed thus to himself,” or, as the words should rather be rendered, “The Pharisee stood by himself, and prayed thus; the Pharisee, having taken his stand by himself, began to pray in these wordsⁱ.” This preliminary circumstance of his taking his stand by himself, before he began to pray, is purposely mentioned to shew that he avoided the society of the rest of the worshippers,

Pharisee, under the same circumstances, would have expressed himself even in an address to God, much as this one Pharisee did. Nor is it an unwarrantable presumption, on the other hand, that the character and demeanour of this individual Publican might serve as a specimen if not of all, yet of many, of that degraded and despised body to which he belonged; that not only he, but many a publican besides of our Saviour’s day, was predisposed to acknowledge and bewail his only too real sinfulness in the sight of God, instead of glorying in an imaginary righteousness—of whom, we find St. Luke observing, vii. 29, 30. that the publicans and sinners had justified God, being baptized with the baptism of John, while the Scribes and Pharisees had defeated the counsel of God with respect to themselves, in refusing to listen to his preaching; and our Saviour, Matt. xxi. 31. that the publicans and sinners, with all their supposed deficiencies prevented the Scribes and Pharisees in entering into the kingdom of God—were more likely to become converts to the gospel, and nearer to salvation than they.

ⁱ Ant. Jud. x. 3; Josephus observes in reference to Daniel’s retiring apart, before the interpretation of Nebuchadnezzar’s dream was revealed to him, ὁ δὲ παῖς, μετὰ τῶν συγγενῶν, ὑποχωρήσας πρὸς ἑαυτὸν, κ, τ. λ., which illustrates the phrase in the parable, σταθεὶς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν, and so far shews that πρὸς ἑαυτὸν should be taken with σταθεὶς.

he disdained to mix too promiscuously with the crowd of persons whom he found in his proper court, on the same occasion, and in the performance of the same act of religion which had brought him too there ; lest forsooth, by such familiarity, he should put himself on a par with them, or by preferring his prayers in common with theirs, he should virtually imply that his own claims to acceptance rested on no better a foundation than theirs. He takes his stand, therefore, in some quarter where he might be alone, as if his person possessed a sanctity which would be profaned by too near an approach to the common herd of worshippers, and his adoration a well-pleasingness of its own which would be endangered if mingled with the prayers or supplications of sinners ; and he may be said to have proclaimed by this act, to all but such as himself, like the pretenders to superior righteousness in the days of Isaiah, “Stand by thyself, come not near to me ; for “I am holier than thou^k.”

The preliminary description of the attitude of the Publican before he began to pray, the dejected look which presumed not to lift up an eye to heaven, the convulsive beating of the breast, bespeaking the agonies of an uneasy conscience, and still more his standing afar off, from the moment of his entering the temple—are just as characteristic of the man, and shew the self-humbled sinner, as much as the contrary bearing of the Pharisee the presumptuous boaster in his own righteousness. The latter stood proudly by himself ; in a more conspicuous station, or at least in a more exclusive and unoccupied one ; nearer perhaps to the presence of

^k Isaiah lxxv. 5.

God, and more in advance of the attendance in his proper court, towards the vicinity of the sanctuary itself, than otherwise might be his due—sufficiently far removed at least, to avoid the contact of the crowd, and to let them perceive, he was not to be too closely intruded upon: the Publican, as if in doubt whether a sinner like himself was entitled to appear before God at all—retires to an humble distance—to the verge of the sacred precincts; presumes not, it may be, to cross the threshold of the temple; or not venturing to take possession of his proper station, as a male Israelite, in the court appropriated to the men, hesitates in the next to that, or lingers in the first court of all, as worthy to mix only with Gentiles or proselytes of the gate. Perhaps too, as the words of the original will bear to be understood, knowing the Pharisee by his dress, and aware of the presumptive holiness of his sect in their own and the public estimation, aware also of the contempt with which they regarded others, and especially such as himself—he concludes that where *he* was it did not become *himself* to be, and therefore takes his stand, and offers his prayers to God, a long way from him. On either supposition, the modesty, the reserve, and the timidity of the one, are strongly contrasted with the pride, the presumption, and the forwardness of the other.

The prayers which they proceeded to offer respectively, will require to be more particularly considered hereafter; and may then be found to be as pregnant with meaning, and as instructive in the inferences to which they lead, as they are characteristic of those who offered them. I will observe at present

only, that when the Pharisee returns thanks to God that he was not like the rest (*οἱ λοιποὶ*) of the men of his age and nation—had he intended to imply that he was not so bad as they were, his language would probably have been expressed accordingly, that he was not as they were, an extortioner, an adulterer, or the like; not as it is, that he was not like the rest, *being* extortioners, adulterers, and the like. The truth is, as it appears to me, that the exact description of his own moral character is not concerned in the meaning and point of the contrast—and all that we should be authorized to infer from his manner of speaking of himself, in comparison of others, would be simply this, that whether like or unlike to them, in such and such moral respects—he had a redeeming virtue which they had not, and which he proceeds to specify—that made him unlike to others, that compensated for all deficiencies, and gave him a right to be considered perfect.

That the Pharisees and their disciples made a practice of frequent fastings, we learn from various passages in the Gospels¹; that they laid much stress upon the practice, and thought it an essential article of that system of observances which was intended to render them perfect, we may also infer, not only from the reason of the thing, and the strictness of the discipline which they prescribed to themselves and their followers in this respect, but also from the reproach which they endeavoured to fasten upon our Saviour, in return for the practical condemnation which he passed on the overweening importance at-

¹ Vide Mark ii. 18; Luke v. 33; Harm. ii. 28; Matt. ix. 14; Harm. iii. 21. Cf. Matt. vi. 5.

tached to this ceremony of outward or formal religion, by neither fasting at stated times himself, nor requiring it as matter of course from his own disciples; "the wine-bibber and glutton, the friend of "publicans and sinners^m." This is not the place to enter into the question, whether the Pharisees were right or wrong in this article of their system; whether fasting at stated times is a duty incumbent on moral and responsible agents; whether it can be so practised as to be an acceptable service to God, and within certain limits and restrictions, an useful means for growth in grace, for improvement in holiness, piety, and virtue. It appears from the avowal of the Pharisee, that he himself (and therefore we may presume, the rest of his sect) fasted twice a week—that is, twice on some day or other in the week; but whether on stated days, or fast-days of regular occurrence, does not appear. Some of the ancient Christian commentators tell us, these days were the second and the fifth, that is, the Monday and the Thursday; but there is reason to doubt the truth of that statementⁿ. It is the most probable supposition, that each of the Pharisees made a point of fasting so many times in the week; but that the times were left to themselves: and besides these, at this period of Jewish history the Sabbath was probably kept as a kind of fast; though the Jews of modern times have been taught by their rabbis to

^m Matt. xi. 19; Luke vii. 34; Harm. iii. 9.

ⁿ Ἐνήστευον δὲ δις τοῦ σαββάτου, δευτέραν καὶ πέμπτην: Epiphani. i. 34. B. Pharisei. i. So Theophylact. i. 434. E. in Lucam xviii. ἐνήστευον δ' ἄρα οἱ Φαρισαῖοι δευτέραν καὶ πέμπτην. See, however, my Dissertations, vol. ii. 142. note. Cf. Supplemental Diss. 481.

keep it as a feast^o. In the observance of a fast on that day, however, out of deference to the sanctity of the day itself, all the nation would be agreed; and not the Pharisees and their disciples in particular.

Again, it is well known to those who are familiar with the original language, that the verb rendered, “I possess,” in the last sentence of the Pharisee’s prayer, never denotes *to possess*, but only *to acquire* or *get*. A certain past tense of that verb may denote possession (κέκτημαι, or ἐκτησάμην, not κτῶμαι,) because to possess is the necessary consequence of having acquired or got. What the Pharisee means to predicate of himself in this instance, is the strictness with which he observed the law of tenths or tithes, down even to the slightest of his gains or acquisitions: “I fast twice in the week, I give a tenth “of all things soever that I get^p.” The reader must be aware that by the appointment of the Law, all who belonged to the tribe of Levi, and had no inheritance in common with the rest—and in some instances the temple itself, the poor, the fatherless, the widow, and the stranger within their gates—were entitled to a tenth of all the increase of the other tribes, whether from the ground, or from the flocks and herds, or from the labour of their hands, and the blessing of God on their industry, art, and

^o See my Dissertations, vol. iii. Diss. i. 13, 14. Cf. Supplem. Diss. 520, 521.

^p Gen. xxviii. 22. The Septuagint render Jacob’s vow, καὶ πάντων ὧν ἐάν μοι δῶς, δεκάτην ἀποδεκατώσω αὐτά σοι. These expressions are very like those in the parable, ἀποδεκατῶ πάντα ὅσα κτῶμαι.

skill. He must know too, that the Pharisees prided themselves so much on the scrupulous observance of this law, as to make it a point of conscience to pay tithes even of things which, generally speaking, both in the estimation of those to whom they were due, and of those who would otherwise have been bound to pay them, must have been deemed too trifling to be expected or exacted ; even the smallest of kitchen herbs, though little better than weeds, the mint, the anise, and the cummin, which grew in their gardens. Upon the punctilious observance of his duty in this respect, next after the strictness of his bodily discipline, the Pharisee makes his boast. He gave a tenth of all that he got, of every addition that was made to his income or his property, and in whatsoever way, every year. And indeed, to give tithes of all that he possessed, could his words have borne that meaning, would imply the doing of something of that kind once for all ; not, as he wishes it to be understood—of his observance of the duty, *per se*, of tithes set apart for payment as regularly as they became due, of something, in short, repeated as often as there was occasion for it ; in which circumstance he manifestly supposes the merit of his conduct to consist.

THE MORAL AND APPLICATION.

The moral of an history which turns on the representation of two opposite modes of prayer, must, no doubt, reside immediately in the declared effect of such prayers respectively to those who had used them ; which effect, as we have already seen, is plainly asserted by our Saviour, in the words subjoined to the account ; “I tell you, this man went

“ down to his house accounted righteous *rather* than “ the other :” that is, he who, under the circumstances of the case, to judge from the style of his prayers, and the nature of his professions concerning himself, had least appeared to deserve, or least seemed to expect it, was justified in consequence of them ; while he, who from the strain of his address, and the persuasion which he entertained concerning his own claims to acceptance, most confidently expected to be so, was not made or accounted righteous. It is manifest, however, that even this inversion of consequences is resolvable into the general proposition, which sums up the whole account, and states the rule or principle applicable to all such cases in common ; “ For every one that exalteth himself shall “ be made low, and he that maketh himself low shall “ be exalted :” a declaration, which as it occurs more than once from the mouth of our Saviour^o, and contains so important a truth, we may be permitted to consider and explain somewhat at large.

Among the topics, or sources of argument which the rhetoricians of antiquity enumerate for the benefit and assistance of the orator, there is one that directs his attention to the good or the evil consequences, to which almost every subject is liable—the former as a means of persuasion, the latter as a means of dissuasion, in reasoning upon practical questions : and there is another, a particular modification of this in general, to which they give the name of βλαίσωσις, the inversion of opposite consequences^p. To the application of this argument it is

^o Cf. Luke xiv. 11 ; Matt. xxiii. 12.

^p Arist. Rhetorica, ii. xxiii. 14.

necessary that two things should be opposed to each other as contraries, and consequently if the one as a good, the other as an evil; that each of these should be liable to two certain consequents, the one a good, and the other an evil, and so opposed to each other also, that the good shall be the contrary of the evil in question, and *vice versa*, in each case. Under these circumstances, if the good consequence of the thing in question is urged as an argument in its behalf, it may be met and contravened by the opposite evil consequence; and if the evil consequence is urged against it, it may be retorted by the good.

A specimen of this kind of inversion of opposite consequents we have, in the two distinct propositions which are comprehended in the complex of this one sentence, "Whosoever exalteth himself shall be made low, and whosoever maketh himself low shall be exalted." Exalting himself on the one hand, is opposed to making himself low on the other, and each of these antecedents is attended by a two-fold consequent; exalting himself by being made high in the man's own estimation, but being made low in the estimation of some one else—abasing himself, by being made low in his own eyes, but being exalted in the sight of some one else. And as, for a man to exalt himself would be opposed in practice to abasing himself, and consequently as the conduct implied by either of these things would be directly the reverse of the conduct involved in the other; so, were it ever a question which of these modes of conduct a man should adopt, in preference to the other, the proper good consequent of the one would serve as an argument of encouragement to it, and the proper evil con-

sequent of the same, as an argument of dissuasion from it; in choosing between which, the man would be bound to compare the good as such, on the one hand, with the evil as such, on the other: that is, whether the good consequent, such as it was, of exalting himself in his own estimation were greater or less, in proportion, than the evil one, of being abased in the estimation of another; or *vice versa*, the evil consequence of being humbled in his own sight, were more than compensated by the good effect of being exalted in the opinion of another.

After this explanation of the principle of the reasoning in this general proposition, it must be evident that as he to whom the act of exalting himself is attributed on the one hand, is the individual's own self; so he to whom the contrary act of abasing him is to be attributed on the other, cannot be the individual's own self, but must be some one else. And so, likewise, of the respective acts of abasing himself on the one hand, and being exalted, in opposition to it, on the other. But who can this be, to whom the contrary act so directly opposite, both in its tendency and its effects, is immediately to be attributed, as soon as a certain act of the individual's own doing has preceded? What is that opposite agency, which will infallibly make low, whensoever the individual himself shall have made high; or will assuredly make high, as soon as the individual shall have made low?

No answer can be returned to this question, but one; that as it cannot be the individual, who must thus contravene his own act in reference to himself, by a contrary one to the directly opposite effect; and

as it would be little less absurd to suppose it could be another individual, who could thus reverse the act of an individual like himself—it must be God. If it is not the contrary act of the individual which not only rescinds his own judgment upon himself, but supersedes it by a totally different judgment; nor yet the act of any mere man, which can reverse the judgment of another man on himself—it must be the act of God.

If such be the case, however, the following conclusions become immediately deducible; first, that these different acts of self-exaltation and self-abasement concern the conduct and demeanour of men, not under any circumstances, but as standing in the presence of God, and under such circumstances as nearly affect the question of their title to *his* approbation or acceptance, considered as their judge. Secondly, that whatever be the cause why all mankind should labour under this peculiar kind of estimation in the sight of God—whether they themselves are aware of the fact, and disposed to acknowledge it, or not—all mankind are amenable to the justice of God, all are accounted sinners, in some sense or other, before God; no one can stand in *his* presence, as before his judge, clear and innocent of offence, and so with an antecedent right to his acceptance—nor without too much reason beforehand to apprehend the effects of his displeasure. Thirdly, that the act of abasing, on the part of God, which under the circumstances of the case, reverses and supersedes the act of self-exaltation on the part of the man, must be just and right, and no more than beforehand was to be expected; but whether the act of exaltation on the part of God, which un-

does the act of self-abasement on the part of the man, may be equally necessary as a consequence of that, and equally to be expected beforehand from it, it is possible may admit of a question. The words of our Saviour declare only the act which *shall ensue* on the one side, as the certain consequence of the act which shall have preceded on the other—but they do not specify the reason why, in either case; yet some such reason there must doubtless be to account for both, though not necessarily the same for each. There may be an antecedent fitness and even necessity, to account for the consequence in the one case; but no such fitness and much less any necessity, to account for it, in the other. Whosoever exalts himself, after the manner supposed in the text, in his own estimation, may or ought to be conscious that he deserves to be made low, in the manner opposed to that, on the part of God; and whosoever makes himself low in his own estimation, in the manner opposed to this making himself high—may have reason to know, on that very account, that he least deserves to be exalted on the part of God ^q.

Now this being the case, when men appear be-

^q To exalt the low, to abase the high—even the pagan moralist considered the peculiar office and prerogative of God. Diogenes Laertius, Chilo i. 69: φασὶ δ' αὐτὸν καὶ Δισώπου πυνθέσθαι ὁ Ζεὺς τί εἴη ποιῶν; τὸν δὲ φάναι, τὰ μὲν ὑψηλὰ ταπεινοῦν, τὰ δὲ ταπεινὰ ὑψοῦν.

ῥέα μὲν γὰρ βριάει, ῥέα δὲ βριάοντα χαλέπτει·
ῥεία δ' ἀρίζηλον μινύθει, καὶ ἄδηλον ἀέξει·
ῥεία δὲ τ' ἰθύνει σκολιόν, καὶ ἀγήνορα κάρφει
Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης, ὃς ὑπέρτατα δώματα ναίει.

Hesiod. Opera et Dies 5.

fore God, in the express character and relation of moral, responsible, and dependent beings, who owe him an obedience which ought to be perfect, yet can render him none which is not necessarily imperfect—without the feelings becoming his creatures in their situation, without that fear of his justice, that reverence of his holiness, that awe of his majesty, that abhorrence of themselves, that humiliation and contrition which the conviction of their natural and acquired sinfulness ought to produce in them; what is this but to abase or to exalt themselves before him, accordingly; or rather to make themselves low, or to make themselves high, in his presence? for the verb, which expresses the latter, is properly to lift on high, and that which denotes the former, is properly to reduce from the height of a thing, to take it down, to make it low, if not to level it with the ground: changes and affections these, of which material structures only are literally capable, though by metaphor applicable to corresponding affections and changes of personal subjects. The upright posture, the unabashed countenance, the steady eye, in the presence of a judge, are the privilege of innocence; and betoken the conscious integrity of one who has given no offence, and apprehends no punishment. Prostration of the body, confusion of face, and turning away of the eyes, are the spontaneous acts of the self-convicted offender, who stands before a superior, to whose justice he knows himself responsible, whose observation he cannot elude, whose authority he cannot dispute, whose favour he believes himself to have forfeited, whose indignation he is aware he has incurred.

But if a man, who under such circumstances pre-

sumes to lift himself up, is not literally cast down again, he could not literally raise himself up; and if he did not literally lift himself up, he could not literally be cast down. Both these effects, opposed to each other as they are, must be metaphorically understood. It is an act of opinion which lifts up; it is an act of opinion, which contravenes it, and makes low again. The judgment of the sinner, pronounced upon himself, is the cause and instance of the one; the contrary judgment of God, pronounced upon the sinner, is the cause and instance of the other. The same is true of the judgment of the sinner on himself, as constituting his previous abasement; and of the contrary judgment of God upon him, as constituting his exaltation again. Whosoever, among men—among the complex of frail, dependent, and responsible beings, in this their state of probation, and as standing at all times in the presence of their Judge—when he has but too much reason constantly to feel, and ever to deplore his own sinfulness, presumes upon, and glories in the presumption, of his righteousness—by his own act lifts himself up, and stands face to face with his Judge; and he, who, under the same circumstances, instead of pluming himself on an imaginary good desert, confesses, proclaims, and bewails, his too real depravity—does as good as cast himself down, and humble his pride in the dust.

On each of these acts, as they shall first have proceeded from man, an opposite, corresponding act it is pledged, shall ensue on the part of God. For the absolute certainty then, of either, on the part of God, according as the other shall have preceded, on the part of man, we have equal reason to depend on

the truth of our Saviour's repeated assertion thereof; but whether with an equal fitness and consistency between the antecedent and the consequent, the cause and the effect, in either case, as we before observed, is another question. The principle of retributive justice may seem, at first sight, to be alike concerned in each of these results; but a little consideration will shew us, that it is properly applicable only to one of them; and that the producing cause of the other must be resolved into something very different from strict justice.

For that those, who under such circumstances as we have been supposing, venture to lift themselves up by their own act, in the presence of God, deserve on that very account to be cast down again by his act—must be too evident to require any proof. One who is presuming on his good desert, when he ought to be bemoaning his evil—one who is proclaiming his innocence, when he is bound to be confessing his guilt—one who stands erect and unashamed before the tribunal of Almighty justice, when he ought to be prostrate at its feet—such an one by his conduct and demeanour at the very time when he is answering, as it were, for his crime—makes himself more a criminal than before. His former guiltiness remains, and it is aggravated by recklessness and indifference. Such an one sins with an high hand, and almost braves his Judge. He adds presumptuousness to guilt, and glories in his shame.

But it does not follow, that because pride was not made for man, nor loftiness of look for them that are born of a woman—humility, though the fittest expression of his weakness, is the sufficient condition of his perfection; or that because man is bound to

proclaim himself a sinner, God is therefore obliged to pronounce him righteous. There is no necessary connection between the antecedent act of casting himself down, in the consciousness of his own sinfulness, and the subsequent one of rising up again, in the confidence of imputed innocence. The pre-existing penitence of an offender against the divine justice, may qualify him beforehand as so much the worthier of the divine favour, if it is restored to him; but it cannot entitle him to pardon, nor make it incumbent upon the divine favour to be again restored to him. Confession of the injustice committed, is not compensation for the injury done; nor is the repentance of the criminal, the satisfaction of the crime. The tears of shame will not blot out the stains of guilt; nor the contrition of the offender undo the effects of his offence. Human laws acknowledge no such meritorious ground of satisfaction for the transgressions committed against them; neither do the divine. Nothing can make this satisfaction, or do away with the consequences of his own act of offence to the offender himself, except a free pardon on the part of the injured, or an adequate and sufficient redress of his injury, on the part of the injurer. That restoration to favour with God, then, is promised to men, upon the simple acknowledgment that they have offended him—that they have justly incurred his displeasure, and justly deserved to be never restored to his favour—is a wonderful instance of the mercy of God, and infinitely more than so sinful a creature as man had any right to claim, or any reason to expect. But the justice of God is as essential an attribute of the divine nature as the mercy; and his intrinsic holiness

is as great and intense as his goodness. With all the disposition to pardon his disobedient and sinful creatures, then, even beyond and independent of themselves, which the Divine Being might have derived from his attributes of mercy and goodness ; some plenary satisfaction to do away with the guilt of sin in general, and some proper method of applying that satisfaction in doing away with the guilt of individual sins in particular, was due to his holiness, purity, and justice : and such a satisfaction for the sins of mankind, and such a method of applying and rendering it available to the sins of individuals, does the Christian scheme instruct us to have been provided by the vicarious death and passion of our Saviour on the one hand, and by a personal faith in the merits of that sacrifice on the other.

But to proceed. If the event proved, according to our Saviour's declaration, that the person of the Pharisee was not accepted, but that of the Publican was—each by virtue of the prayer which he had offered up—we may justly presume that there was something as radically defective in the prayer of the one, and as necessarily displeasing to God, as essentially right, and acceptable to the Being addressed by the prayer in the other. It is to be presumed also, that the traces of this characteristic distinction between them must appear on the face of their prayers themselves, or be by just implication deducible from them. Though, therefore, the explanation of the material circumstances of the parable must have thrown some light upon this question ; and though the preceding observations on the moral of the whole must have contributed still more

to clear it up; it is manifestly of sufficient importance that we should consider what was that property of one of these prayers, which made it so offensive to God, and what the most characteristic circumstance in the other, which rendered it acceptable to him; each from the evidence of the prayers themselves, or the nature of the language, as well as of the conduct and demeanour, attributed to the Pharisee and the Publican respectively.

In the first place, then, though the worship of the Pharisee is termed his prayer, and though it was certainly offered by him as a prayer, yet it possesses no one essential property of a prayer, it fulfils no one legitimate purpose of such an office of religion as prayer. For prayer, as a part of the service which mankind, as at present constituted, is bound to render to his Maker—must necessarily be conformable to the truth of his present relation to his Creator; and that is the relation not only of his creature, but of his sinful creature, who has offended and displeased his Maker. Prayer, therefore, as an act of the worship which is due by mankind to his Maker, both in the first conception and in the performance of the duty, is bound to regard him in each of these relations; and never can be acceptable to God, or becoming in man, if it is not accommodated accordingly. Prayer as the act of a created, and therefore a dependent being, might be the duty of the creature towards its own Creator, under any circumstances of the relation between them; but prayer, as the act of such a being, placed in the relation to its Maker in which mankind stand at present, is the act of his sinful as well as his dependent creature. As mankind, in his present state, is such an one of

the creatures of God, who by the depravity of his nature, and his original inclination to evil, has forfeited all claim to be considered pure and spotless—and besides, is conscious of innumerable actual offences, still more to alienate the favour of his Maker, and to provoke his wrath against him—it is manifestly his duty to approach to the performance of such an office of prayer, in the sense of his unworthiness as well as of his dependence; and not even to venture into the presence of his Maker without first proclaiming his sinfulness, and deprecating the displeasure of his Judge. As mankind is a dependent creature, who owes not only his well-being but his very being, to the power and goodness of his Maker; it is another palpable duty of his prayers, to make the confession of this his dependence, to declare himself sensible of it, and to intercede for the supply of his wants, whether spiritual or temporal, whether for the body or for the soul, in that quarter whence only they can ultimately be obtained, the benevolence, and bounty of his God. A multitude of other purposes there may be, to which prayer in particular instances may be, and will be, directed. But these two are among the first, the most prominent, and most indispensable of all. These two, generally stated, comprehend the substance of all. It is not easy to conceive for what men *can* pray, much more for what they *ought* to pray, under any circumstances, except the pardon of some sin, or the supply of some necessity; both which they must alike derive from God. The object and purpose of all prayer, may, therefore, be said to be comprised in these two things. The foundation of prayer for these two things, is the foundation of prayer for

every thing else ; the obligation to the duty, so far as these two objects are specially concerned, is the obligation to the duty with respect to every thing else. If these two purposes are not consulted by the performance of an act of religious homage on the part of man ; whatever the act may be, or profess to be, it can be no act of prayer : the name of a prayer can never with propriety be given it.

Nor yet, on the other hand, is the office ascribed to the Pharisee a thanksgiving, if not a prayer. For thanksgiving is properly the counterpart of prayer, and takes up the prosecution of a common duty towards his Creator, on the part of a sinful and dependent creature like man, where prayer leaves it. As prayer is bound, in his instance, to intercede first of all for the pardon of sin, and next for the supply of bodily or spiritual wants ; so should thanksgiving, as the proper response to prayer, where it is successful, acknowledge the forgiveness which has been extended, or the blessing which has been vouchsafed, in answer to the suit. Prayer must be preferred in the consciousness of some want—thanksgiving in the assurance of some satisfaction of it ; the former may be preferred, uncertain about the issue or success of its suit, the latter can never be performed except in the conviction that prayer has obtained its end, or may reasonably calculate on doing so. Thanksgiving then, as an office of the religious worship which man is bound to render to God, must regard him in the truth of his present relations to his Maker, as much as prayer ; and in what he acknowledges, as well as in what he prays for, man is bound to proclaim himself alike the same sinful and dependent creature, who has no hope of forgiveness except

from the mercy of his Creator, no means of providing for his being and well-being, neither in the present life, nor in that which is to come, without the continuance of his favour and blessing upon him.

It is true, that it is couched in the form of a thanksgiving, and ushered in by the words, “ God, I “ thank thee !” But the reason immediately subjoined to this ascription of praise shews the grounds of the thankfulness itself to be such, that the thanksgiving which acknowledges the gratitude of the worshipper on that account, can be no legitimate office of thanksgiving, nor justly entitled to the name. That reason, it appears, is, because the person who is returning thanks to God, was not like the rest of men : a distinction which so far implies that he believed himself to be better than them. Now though mankind may be bound to praise God for any good desert which they really possess—because both the origin and the effect of all human goodness, both the virtues of moral agents and their fruits, are ultimately derived from him, and to him the glory of all, and the merit of all, ought both in justice and humility to be referred—yet this very necessity of ascribing all their excellence, even when most truly such, to the grace of God, is the strongest reason why they should arrogate to themselves no praise, and lay claim to no superiority to others, in their own right. It is much to be questioned whether any truly wise and pious man, sensible alike both of what he was, and who had made him so, would ever presume to say of himself, as this Pharisee says—I am not like unto the rest of men : much more, to praise God on that account, as for some privilege, on which he might justly and triumphantly insist—some

mark of favour and distinction not less proud and enviable, than exclusive and confined to himself. It is one thing to return thanks to God in our own behalf, that he has made us what we are; and another to insinuate, at the same time, that he has made us better than others, or others not so good as ourselves. There may be the truest humility of self-esteem in the one, notwithstanding the apparent profession of personal goodness, included in it: there can be only pride or censoriousness, vainglory or the want of charity, in the other.

The worship of the Pharisee, then, does not deserve the name. It was neither prayer nor praise of the just and becoming kind—it was neither the confession of the penitent, nor the thanksgiving of the pardoned offender. It interceded for no forgiveness; it besought no grace nor assistance; it acknowledged no want of the worshipper, temporal or spiritual—no sense of his dependance on God for either. The Pharisee came to the temple in the confidence of his righteousness. He presented himself, therefore, before his Judge—not as an offender against his justice, who might possibly hope to be pardoned by his mercy—but as an innocent person, whom his very justice must absolve, and pronounce righteous accordingly. His language is, consequently, not that of a suitor who is soliciting a favour, but that of a claimant who is asserting a right. What further justification was he likely to desire, who possessed, as he thought, a sufficient ground of perfection already? that ground, too, one which, as acquired for himself, might be retained and perpetuated for himself. If the law of observances had made him perfect, the law of observances could

keep him so, and either independent of any cooperation but his own. What sense of obligation, then, could he feel, as if indebted to another for that which, on his own profession, he owed to himself? It was but the affectation of gratitude, and the pretence of dependence—only the more strikingly contrasted with the pride and self-complacency lurking within, that he began his address in the language of thanksgiving before he passed to that of boasting; that he congratulated himself, as if indebted to God for what he believed, and took a pride in believing, he had earned for himself.

This Pharisee, it appears, was not like the rest of the men of his own time; by which, as we have already observed, it was meant to be insinuated that he was much better than they. To allow, then, the most favourable supposition of this superiority—that it was really moral, not merely ceremonial righteousness, to which it pretended—and not to object that his own attestation to the fact of it in his own behalf, would prove nothing of its truth; we might argue that he must have laid claim to the superior moral excellence in question, because he believed himself truly possessed of it, or because he did not. If he did not believe himself possessed of it, his pretending to it was an act of hypocrisy, and God was called upon to bear witness to a lie. And if he did believe himself possessed of it, though that might acquit him of the charge of dissembling with God, yet it would not acquit him of the suspicion of self-delusion. It might exculpate the sincerity of his own belief that he was better than others; but it would endanger the truth of the fact itself—by the very avowal that was made of it. The most

truly good would be the least bold to affirm his goodness, and the least inclined to magnify himself in his own conceit—by running down the character of others. A confidence in the assumption with respect to itself—and an invidiousness in the contrast with respect to others—such as this, it would be difficult to reconcile with that sobriety of self-estimation, that diffidence in its judgment of itself, that distrust of its own applause, that charitableness and candour, as well as that reservedness and modesty, which accompany real worth and goodness, and distinguish it from spurious excellence, and hypocritical pretensions to merit.

The truth, however, appears to be this; that we cannot be certain from his own words, whether the Pharisee intended to contrast his moral character with that of others or not; whether to challenge to himself the praise of being just in his dealings, while others were dishonest; kind and liberal, while others were greedy and rapacious; chaste or temperate, while others were debauched and sensual. The point of the comparison which he draws between himself and the rest of his contemporaries, turns upon the circumstance, not that *he* was free from *their* vices, but that *they* were destitute of *his* virtue. Now this particular virtue, which, by being resident in himself, gave him an exclusive superiority—by being absent in the rest, reduced them to a state of comparative inferiority—it is distinctly intimated was the strictness with which he kept the whole law of observances. He enumerates, indeed, only two of the instances of this observance; but these are in two of its principal parts, the law of fastings and

the law of tithes ; which we are justified therefore in considering to be produced as examples of *all* the bodily austerities, and *all* the ritual formalities, which together constituted the complex of the ceremonial code ; and the minuteness with which this Pharisee kept these two, to be intended as a specimen of the strictness with which he observed all the rest.

Now, as the event shewed that the prayer of the Pharisee contained something offensive to God ; so this offensiveness, judged of by the language in which the prayer itself was couched, is seen to have consisted in the fact, that being all the while a sinner before God, he was proclaiming and professing himself righteous : the grounds of which offence so taken, become, even to our apprehensions, most just and reasonable, if we further suppose that he, who was professing to appear before his Judge faultless and impeccable, must have known himself to be a sinner, had he not shut his eyes to the conviction of that truth ; that in declaring himself to be perfect, when he was actually a sinner, he erred not ignorantly and excusably, but presumptuously and wilfully. Under such circumstances, the imputation of sinfulness to which he was liable, even then when professing himself perfect—must have implied something more than the natural tendency of humanity to sin—though that alone would be sufficient to render all men sinners in the sight of God ; and the consciousness of that liability to which he was bound, something more than the conviction which all men would be obliged to have of their own liability to be accounted sinful, from the tendency of their nature to sin. The actual moral

guiltiness, contracted by the commission of actual moral offences—and the consciousness of such guiltiness, which every one would be bound to have, who was conscious of such offences—are much more probably implied by each of these things respectively ; the former, as that to which the Pharisee was obnoxious, at the very time when he was professing himself righteous, the latter, as that on the conviction of which he had purposely shut his eyes. We may infer, then, with respect to the grounds of his persuasion concerning himself, that though he could not but be conscious of such guiltiness, yet he believed himself to be absolved from its effects by the possession of a remedy, which others, as guilty as himself, wanted ; and by means of which, while they were exposed to the penal consequences of the sinfulness so contracted, he himself was secured against them.

The experience of all religions has proved how easy it is for the essence of godliness to be merged in the form ; and for exactness in outward discipline, to take the place of uniform moral and practical obedience. The sect of the Pharisees, among the Jews, acted notoriously on the principle of a compensation by strictness in the performance of one class of duties, for laxity in the observance of another. It was the capital error of their sect, and from both the delusion in which it was founded, and the fatal consequences to which it led in practice, entitled them, more than any thing else, to the name and estimation of blind leaders or guides of the blind. Not content, however, to rest their claim to perfection, upon the ritual prescribed by the law of Moses, they had added indefinitely to the number and minuteness of its requi-

sitions, by a system of traditionary prescription, grounded ostensibly on the basis of a traditionary interpretation of the written law; the result of which was a complicated, and burdensome body of forms, enforced upon the consciences of the people by the conviction, that if the stipulations of this code were scrupulously observed, the obligations of any other, even the moral law itself, might be considered of secondary importance, or even set aside and disregarded.

For the origin of so dangerous, and yet so irrational a doctrine, it would not be easy to account, except by supposing that it was purposely contrived and invented for the sake of that delusion, which it was so well calculated to produce. The idea of compensating for deficiencies in one respect by performances in another, is sufficiently absurd in itself, where the question concerns the nature and extent of the obedience which man owes to his Creator, or the kind and degree of the perfection which the Creator expects from the creature; but the idea of compensating for deficiencies in a certain class of duties, by performances in a totally distinct one—and still more for notorious deficiencies in an higher and more important, by performances in a lower and comparatively an useless and insignificant class—is monstrous and extravagant in the extreme. If there is any proposition more obvious and intelligible than another, it is this; that no ritual or positive duty in point of intrinsic merit, can compete with a moral law: if there is any dictate of conscience more instinctive than another, it is this; that no rules of outward observance, no system of forms and ceremonies—can dispense with the due regula-

tion of the life and conduct, or supersede the moral and practical duties of religion—that no washing of the body will serve instead of the purification of the thoughts and affections—no rigour of sensible austerities will do the part of the government and restraint of the desires—no pain or privation inflicted on the corporeal nature of man, will compensate for the indulgence of his sensual or malicious passions.

The law of Moses by requiring the observance of ceremonies, and attaching a specific value to that observance, might seem to have given the Jew—uninstructed as yet in the true nature and intent of its carnal and typical ordinances, as shadows of spiritual duties, or substantial blessings to come—reason to conclude that even its ceremonies possessed an excellence and efficacy of their own. Nor can there be a doubt that for such purposes as they were properly designed to answer, when rightly performed, and in obedience to the divine command, they possessed the necessary efficacy. But as to a preference of either of the divisions of the law to the other, or as to the presumed efficacy of either independent of the other—the subsequent declarations of the prophets might long since have corrected the disposition to rely on the inferior part of the same code, at the expense of the superior—if any such there was ; and by denouncing the purely-ceremonial, without the accompaniment of moral righteousness, might have taught the Jews the utter insufficiency of the former instead of the latter, as a means of justifying sinners in the sight of God^r.

^r Vide Ps. xl. 6 ; l. 7—15, 23 ; li. 16, 17 ; lxix. 30, 31 : Prov. xv. 8 ; xxi. 27 : Isaiah i. 11—17 : Jeremiah vii. 21—23 : Hosea vi. 6. Cf. 1 Sam. xv. 22 : 2 Chron. xxx. 18, 19 : Ps. xix ;

If the law of Moses, too, prescribed a ritual of forms—it contained a scheme of moral duties also. The moral law rested on the same foundation, and was entitled to the same obedience as the ceremonial. Had the latter, then, even been placed originally on a par with the former in point of authority—had no observable distinction been made between them, either as to the mode of their promulgation, or to the importance attached to them respectively by the common author of both—still on no principle could the one have been subsequently advanced above the other by any human power or judgment, without a manifest injury to an equal, if not a superior in divinely imposed obligation; much less have been made to supersede it, and by its own observance to dispense with it.

It is, then, no improbable conjecture, that the Pharisee so far from intending to exalt his own moral character above that of the rest of his countrymen, rather designed to insinuate, and yet was not ashamed to insinuate, that in all moral respects his own character and theirs might be the same: because, even on the worst supposition, he had a redeeming excellence, sufficient to vindicate and justify himself, which they altogether wanted. He knew not, or cared not, for any principle of perfection, but this one. He kept the law of observances, and that was sufficient to absolve him from the law of conscience. Upon the integrity of his obedience in this one respect he was content to place his right and title to be accepted as perfect; and conscious that his claims would so far be found unexceptionable,

xxiv. 3—5; xxvi. 6; xxxiv. 11—22; ci: Isaiah xliii. 23, 24; lviii. 2—14; lxvi. 3: Jerem. vi. 20; xiv. 12.

he might boldly take even God to witness for the truth of his professions concerning himself^s.

^s It would take up too much time, and require too many details, to enter minutely upon the question of the probable origin of the sect of the Pharisees, the growth and formation of that body of traditionary observances, known in the Gospel under the name of the traditions of the elders, which must be ascribed to them; and to what extent it may be considered the same with that which exists at present, as the body of rabbinical law, under the name of the Mishna, the Gemara, or the Talmud. Great obscurity hangs over each of these points, as any one will soon find, who shall undertake to investigate them. One thing only is certain, that both the rise of the sect, and the gradual perfection of their peculiar system of discipline, which seems to have been brought to maturity, and to have been in the acme of its reputation, about the time of the gospel ministry, are to be comprehended within the return of the Jews from captivity, B. C. 536. and the birth of our Saviour, B. C. 4.

The first historical mention of the sect of the Pharisees, as well as of the other two, the Sadducees, and the Essenes, which occurs in Josephus, is Ant. Jud. xiii. v. 9: an occasion belonging to the reign of Jonathan, the second of the Maccabæan princes, and consequently coming between B. C. 153. and B. C. 143. See my Dissertations, vol. i. Diss. iv. App. iv. Nothing more is said of them there, than that they differed from the rest in their notions concerning fate and freewill.

They are next mentioned in the reign of John Hyrcanus, the fourth of the Maccabæan princes; sometime between B. C. 135. and B. C. 102: when, because of a personal insult offered to his family by one of their body, he is said to have renounced their sect, and espoused the opposite one of the Sadducees; carrying his hostility to those whom he had abandoned, so far as not only to withdraw his favour from them, but actually to persecute them; *τά τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν κατασταθέντα νόμιμα τῷ δήμῳ καταλύσαι, καὶ τοὺς φυλάττοντας αὐτὰ κολάσαι*. Yet this may mean no more than that he would not suffer the glosses, corrections, mutations, which, under the name of the tradition of the Fathers, the Pharisees, since their rise, had gradually been obtruding on the people as principles of duty or rules of conduct, over and above,

If we proceed, on the other hand, to consider the prayer of the publican, we shall find, that short as it

or even contrary to the written law—to have weight with them any longer, or to be acknowledged as binding. For Josephus proceeds to observe, on the same occasion, ὅτι νόμιμα πολλά τινα παρέδοσαν τῷ δήμῳ οἱ Φαρισαῖοι ἐκ πατέρων διαδοχῆς, ἅπερ οὐκ ἀναγέγραπται ἐν τοῖς Μωϋσέως νόμοις, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα τὸ Σαδδουκαίων γένος ἐκβάλλει, λέγον ἐκεῖνα δεῖν ἡγεῖσθαι νόμιμα τὰ γεγραμμένα, τὰ δ' ἐκ παραδόσεως τῶν πατέρων μὴ τηρεῖν: Ant. Jud. xiii. x. 6.

The hostility to the sect, imbibed by John Hyrcanus, was inherited by Alexander Jannæus his son; and a constant warfare was carried on between him and them from the time of his accession, B. C. 102, to the time of his death, B. C. 75. On his deathbed, however, he recommended to his queen Alexandra, from motives of policy, to make her peace with this powerful party, even by offering his own remains, if necessary, to be treated by them as they pleased—to admit them to her councils—and to be governed in all things by their advice. From this time forward, which is B. C. 75, we may consider their party to have become politically established; and to their influence with the people generally at this very time Josephus bears distinct testimony, Ant. Jud. xiii. xv. 5. In the War he observes, in reference to the same event, i. v. 2: παραφύονται δὲ αὐτῇ (that is, queen Alexandra) εἰς τὴν ἐξουσίαν Φαρισαῖοι, σύνταγμά τι Ἰουδαίων, δοκοῦν εὐσεβέστερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἀκριβέστερον ἀφῆγεσθαι. Here we have the first distinct mention of their profession of superior *piety*, that is, superior respect and deference to the will of God, a greater care and desire to please him by the mode of service most acceptable to him; (which is properly to be understood of *piety* as such;) the grounds thereof being placed in that more exact interpretation of the laws, implied by the supposed taking into account along with the law, of the various comments and traditions of the elders, which, in the opinion of the Pharisees, were as much declaratory of the will of God, and as needful to be observed, in order to please him in all respects, as the law itself.

During the arbitrary and vigorous reign of Herod, which began B. C. 37, we may presume the Pharisees were governed with as strict an hand, as the rest of his subjects. Yet Jose-

is, and no more than a simple ejaculation, which is the briefest kind of prayer, it contains in itself the

phus mentions an instance of their boldness, about the seventeenth year of his reign, B. C. 21 or 20. when two of their number, Sameas and Pollio, with their followers, refused to take the oath of allegiance to him: Ant. Jud. xv. x. 4. (Cf. xv. i. 1.) The whole body refused to do the same, at the very end of his reign, upon an occasion, which, in my opinion, was intimately connected with the census of Judæa, at the nativity: (see my Dissertations, vol. i. xii. 448—450:) and for that refusal a fine was levied upon them. We are told that their numbers then amounted to about 6000: which proves that the Pharisees as such, notwithstanding the extent of their influence with the people, and the general dissemination of their doctrines, were still a limited body; and if their amount was about 6000, just at the time of the birth of our Saviour, it is probable, it was not much more considerable during his ministry, nor even later than that, in the time of Josephus. It is very necessary to be aware of this fact, to understand a variety of allusions to the Pharisees which occur in the Gospels: and none more especially than what is recorded, Matt. xxii. 34. Harm. iv. 72: where they are spoken of as *gathered together*, on the last day of our Saviour's public ministry. The occasion of the Passover would no doubt bring them all up to Jerusalem, and the occasion of the attendance in the temple at the usual times of prayer, and at the daily service, would cause them all to be assembled on that spot: and their being so assembled together, at that particular time, and on that particular locality, (which was so manifestly possible, *a priori*, if their numbers were limited,) would be the means that all would be addressed at once by Matt. xxiii.: and all would hear at once, the discourse thus levelled against their whole body in general; with the solemn delivery of which our Saviour not only quitted the temple for that night, but made an end of his ministry itself. Nor ought it to surprise us that the Pharisees were a limited body, and their numbers no more than 6000, or even less. The Essenes were limited too, and in number only 3000 or 4000: see *supra*, vol. iii. 279. The Sadducees were limited also; and though probably more numerous than the Essenes, yet certainly

elements of a perfect prayer: the acknowledgment of sin—the desire of forgiveness, and, what is more,

less so than the Pharisees. At Acts xxiii. 6. when Paul was tried before the sanhedrim, A. D. 56, the members of that council for the time being, were partly Sadducees and partly Pharisees; in numbers and influence, upon that occasion, at least, both being nearly on a par.

The fine imposed on the Pharisees at the time above referred to, we are told, was paid by the wife of Herod's brother Pheroras. In explanation of this fact, Josephus says of them, *καὶ ἦν γὰρ μόνιον τι Ἰουδαϊκῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπ' ἀκριβώσει μετὰ φρονούν τοῦ πατρίου νόμου, οἷς χαίρειν τὸ θεῖον προσποιουμένων ὑπῆκτο ἡ γυναικωνίτις*: Ant. Jud. xvii. ii. 4. Here we have the same profession of their exclusive favour with the Deity; and on the same grounds, as before, the more exact perfection of the law of the country, or of the fathers. But with respect to this specific circumstance of the influence acquired by the sect, with the female sex in particular, upon such grounds as these, that is, upon the supposed title to superior piety and goodness—the reader will do well to compare Mark xii. 40. Luke xx. 47. which charge the Scribes with devouring the houses of widows, and on purpose making long prayers; that is, with insinuating themselves, under the pretence of godliness, piety, devoutness, into the good opinions and confidence of women—and Matt. xxiii. 13. which asserts it of the Pharisees as well as the Scribes: all which passages in the Gospels are illustrated by this testimony of Josephus. These allusions were probably distinct; there being no mention of Pharisees in the former along with the Scribes, and both being mentioned in conjunction in the latter. A Scribe was not necessarily a Pharisee; one of the terms being the name of a profession, the other of a sect—as it is proved most clearly by Luke xi. 43, 44. compared with 45, 46. and also by the passage of Acts xxiii. recently referred to.

It is extremely probable too, that the two sophists, as Josephus calls them, Judas and Matthias, the leaders in the attack upon the eagle, (sculptured by Herod over one of the gates of the temple,) not many months before his own death—which is related by Josephus, Ant. Jud. xvii. vi. 2: were two principal Pharisees; though they are not distinctly so termed by him.

the well-grounded hope of obtaining it from the ascertained goodness, and even the veracity, of God.

The most minute account of the three Jewish sects, is found B. ii. viii. Of the Pharisees in particular, before entering into a more minute statement of their opinions (which however relates chiefly to their sentiments concerning fate and free-will) it is there observed, section 14. *Φαρισαῖοι μὲν οἱ δοκοῦντες μετὰ ἀκριβείας ἐξηγέσθαι τὰ νόμιμα* κ', τ. λ. With this account we may compare, Vita Josephi 2: and Ant. xviii. i: the last of which passages says of them, that δι' αὐτὰ, that is, because of their peculiar doctrines concerning free-will—the immortality of the human soul—(which, yet, was no more than the immortality implied in a perpetual succession of changes from one body to another, that is, a metempsychosis, or transmigration—) and a state of rewards and punishments (resembling too, the Elysium and Tartarus of the Greeks, but nothing more) τοῖς τε δήμοις πιθανώτατοι τυγχάνουσι, καὶ ὅποσα θεία εὐχῶν τε καὶ ἱερῶν ποιήσεως ἐξηγήσει τῇ ἐκείνων τυγχάνουσι πρᾶσσόμενα. εἰς τοσόνδε ἀρετῆς αὐτοῖς αἱ πόλεις ἐμαρτύρησαν ἐπιτηδεύσει τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κρείσσονος, ἐν τε τῇ διαίτῃ τοῦ βίου καὶ λόγοις. Josephus' account of the Pharisees, so far as regards the real possession of that which he declares them to have aimed at, both in their words and actions, τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κρεῖσσον, and a well ordered gravity and decorum both in life and language—must be received with the necessary allowance for a man's partiality towards his own sect. Josephus was himself a Pharisee. In other respects, to judge from his account of their peculiar tenets, if we except only their law of traditional observances, and that ἀκρίβεια τῆς ἐξηγήσεως τοῦ πατρίου νόμου, on which he principally insists as their chief excellence; there does not seem to have been much to distinguish this sect of philosophy among the Jews, from one at least of the various sects among the Gentiles; and Josephus himself admits, that as the Essenes among his countrymen might be compared to the Pythagoreans, and the Sadducees to the Epicureans, so might the Pharisees, to the Stoics.

Besides the above particulars, there is not much to be met with in Josephus relating to the sect of the Pharisees, and calculated to throw light on their peculiar principles, except the account which he gives of the conversion of Izates, king of the

More than this we cannot conceive to be indispensably necessary to the best constituted form, or

Adiabenes, between about A. D. 37, and A. D. 60, which admirably illustrates that spirit of proselyte-making, so characteristic of the sect, asserted in Matt. xxiii. 15. See Ant. Jud. xx. ii.—iv. 3.

Such particulars as seem to have been known to the earliest Christian commentators, respecting the origin, the principles, the traditions or Mishnæ of the sect (which in Greek are expressed by *δευτερώσεις*—quasi, the renovation, repetition, or duplication of the written law, by an oral or traditionary one, both explanatory of it, and supplementary or perfective also,) may be found in Epiphanius Adv. Hær. i. 33. B. De Scribis, (whom he plainly supposes to have been the same with the Pharisees, i. 32. C. D. 33. A.) i. 224. B. C. Ptolemaïtæ ix: i. 332. B. C. Contra Marcionistas: all which, however, is very intricate and obscure, if not absolutely contradictory or confused—Hieronym. iii. 79. *ad med.* in Isaiam viii: ii. 740. *ad calc.* in Ecclesiasten iv.

St. Paul, in his defence before Agrippa, speaking of his former life, previous to his conversion, says, “ My manner of life... “ know all the Jews, if they would bear witness, that *κατὰ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αἵρεσιν .. ἔζησα Φαρισαῖος* ;” Acts xxvi. 45. Similar to this is his account of himself in his defence to the people, Acts xxii. 3: speaking of his being brought up at the feet of Gamaliel, the most celebrated of the sect in his time—and *πεπαιδευμένος κατὰ ἀκριβειαν τοῦ πατρῷου νόμου*. In calling the sect of the Pharisees, *τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αἵρεσιν*—his language agrees with that of Josephus, who uniformly speaks of it in the same terms, and makes this exactness or accuracy, in some sense or other, its distinguishing excellence, and most characteristic property in comparison of the other sects. In what this exactness and accuracy too consisted, he gives us sufficiently clearly to understand; and even without his explanation, it might have been inferred from the meaning of the words *ἀκριβής*, *ἀκριβεστάτη*, *ἀκρίβεια*, and *ἀκριβωσις*, as descriptive of a certain discipline—that it must have consisted in a conformity not only to what all sects among the Jews agreed to receive and to acknowledge in common, the written word of God, or Law of Moses, properly so called,

the most properly performed act of prayer, in general.

but to something that went beyond even that, and was reputed either more necessary, or at least more conducive to perfection, even than that. The exactness of which the Pharisee made his boast, could not be the precision with which he kept the written law more particularly; for we may take it for granted, that conformity, nominal or real, to the written law, was just as much acknowledged to be his duty by the Sadducee, as by the Pharisee, and professedly at least was as characteristic of the one, as of the other. It was an exactness then, which pretended to something over and above the observance of the written law; to something which might be observed, and was bound to be observed as well as that, and by being observed would contribute to carry the perfection of the observer to an higher degree than the simple observance of that. To the extent of the professed observance of the written law, the Pharisee went along with the Sadducee; beyond the profession of the observance of the written law, and in passing on to the observance of a system of unwritten law, the Pharisee parted company with the Sadducee, and went on, in his journey to perfection, by himself. The names of the two sects point to this difference between them; the name of Sadducee being probably derived from their founder—but that of the Pharisees from their principles and professions. It denotes broken, detached, or separate; and consequently implies that they who assumed it, and thereby conformed to the principles of such a sect, became distinguished at once from others, not simply by being formed into a body of their own, and called by a name peculiar to themselves, (for that was as true of the Sadducees and of the Essenes, as of them,) but by the principles which they professed, the higher degree of perfection at which they aimed. And hence, even those peculiarities which were notoriously distinctive of the sect of the Pharisees, were some of them only such things as were characteristic of the Jews in general—carried to a greater length—and stamped with an individuality peculiar to the Pharisees; for example, the widening the breadth of their phylacteries, and enlarging the hems of their outer vestures, which are specified among the badges of the sect

To illustrate each of these its properties in its order. The language of the petition in the original

at Matt. xxiii. 5. To wear phylacteries of a certain breadth—if these consisted of slips of parchment upon which certain sentences of the law were wont to be written, fastened about their persons in some conspicuous part—(see Epiphan. i. 33. A. Chrysostom in Matt. xxiii. &c.) might not be peculiar to the Pharisees; being in fact only the literal construction and observance of Deuteron. vi. 8. xi. 18—in which many might agree as well as they. Still less peculiar would it be to wear an hem or fringe of a certain size and certain colour, at the bottom of their outer vesture; which the law had commanded every Jew to wear, in order that he might be distinguished from a Gentile even by his dress; Numb. xv. 38, 39: Deut. xxii. 12. But to wear wider phylacteries, and fringes broader and more conspicuous, than the rest of the Jews, was peculiar to this sect, and no doubt meant to be as characteristic of them, in comparison of the rest, as the possession of a border at all was of Jews in comparison of Gentiles. These may be mentioned, then, by our Saviour, as particular instances of that general spirit of ostentation, and that habit of doing all their *ἔργα, πρὸς τὸ θεαθῆναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*, which he lays to their charge; but even this desire of publicity and admiration, in whatever way it might give itself effect in practice, is resolvable into the same presumption of their own superior sanctity, and the same affectation of differing from the rest of the Jews, as much as these might do from the rest of the world, of which the peculiarities in question were the natural symptoms.

A reader of the Gospels, who might not have access to extraneous sources of information, would be obliged to collect his opinions about this sect, from what he would find on record in the Gospel narrative concerning them, as often as their history came to be mixed with that of our Saviour and his ministry; and though under such circumstances, it would be evident that all such allusions to them must be purely incidental, yet he would find enough in them to come to a very just conclusion respecting the nature and character of the sect itself: more especially, upon the decision of this one question, in which, more

is perhaps in two respects imperfectly rendered by the English version—"God be merciful to me a

than any thing else, the essence of their character is concerned ; what is that kind or degree of moral estimation, in which, notwithstanding their pretensions to superior goodness and sanctity, this sect, according to the evidence of the Gospel narrative, is to be held ? In other words, was the superior strictness and exactness of one kind, in which they made their boast, only a cloke to disguise, or an excuse to palliate, proportionable laxity and licentiousness, in another ?

I have assumed in the above exposition that such was actually the case ; that the Pharisee, instead of meaning to exalt his own moral character at the expense of that of the rest of his countrymen, was to be understood to mean that whether better or worse than they, in all strictly moral respects, he possessed that which would make him righteous, whatever might be the case with them. Now if his character was really morally defective, and in such gross respects as would be implied by supposing him no exception from the rest of the world, described as *ἀρπαγες*, *ἀδικοι*, *μοιχοι*—this quality of righteousness, notwithstanding, could be entailed upon it only on the principle of a compensation by performances of one kind, for omissions of another ; by merit of one kind for demerit of another ; and under the circumstances of the case, such merit as resulted from the strict observance of the ceremonial, in opposition to such demerit as was the consequence of the lax observance of the moral law. It behoves us to demonstrate the truth of this assumption with all possible exactness, if we would not lay ourselves open to the charge of calumniating so seriously a certain individual, and much more a certain body ; and on one supposition, which may reasonably be taken for granted, viz. that this individual was no exception to the character or conduct of the rest of his sect—I think it admits of being demonstrated of him in particular, by the help of such facts and disclosures as are upon record in the Gospels, with respect to his body in general.

The points upon which the moral character of this Pharisee, according to his own representation, either agreed with that of the rest of the world, or differed from it for the better—were these three, of *ἀρπαγες*, *ἀδικοι*, and *μοιχοι*. If he agreed with the

“ sinner;” for, “ God be merciful,” in the Greek, is *ὁ θεὸς ἱλάσθητι*, and “ to me a sinner,” is *μοὶ τῷ ἁμαρ-*

rest in being *ἄρπαξ*, *ἄδικος*, and *μοιχὸς*, whatever else he might be, the question is at end ; he pleads guilty to the charge for which I have contended, and in his condemnation is involved that of his sect. But if he agreed with them not, then he was not *ἄρπαξ*, *ἄδικος*, nor *μοιχὸς*—whatever they might be ; and he differed from his contemporaries, as much in the want of moral vice, as in the possession of ceremonial virtue. On this question, then, we may join issue with him ; and unless he is a singular exception to the rest of his sect, he cannot be pronounced to stand clear of vices and crimes which, on the authority of our Saviour, we shall find must be laid to the charge of his order in general.

First, as to whether the Pharisees in general were or were not chargeable with being *ἄρπαγες* : what is the testimony of our Saviour? Luke xi. 39, 40 : *νῦν ὑμεῖς οἱ Φαρισαῖοι τὸ ἔξωθεν τοῦ ποτηρίου καὶ τοῦ πίνακος καθαρίζετε· τὸ δὲ ἔσωθεν ὑμῶν γέμει ἈΡΠΑΓΗΣ καὶ πονηρίας. ἄφρονες, οὐχ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔξωθεν καὶ τὸ ἔσωθεν ἐποίησε ;* a declaration made not many days before the time of the present parable. Again—a declaration made in like manner not many days after this time—Matt. xxiii. 25, 26 : *οὐαὶ ὑμῖν . . . ἔσωθεν δὲ γέμουσιν ἐξ ἈΡΠΑΓΗΣ καὶ ἀκρασίας. Φαρισαῖε τυφλὲ, κ', τ. λ.*

Secondly—as to whether the Pharisees in general were or were not chargeable with being *ἄδικοι*—to be *ἄρπαξ* in general, we might argue, implies being *ἄδικος* also ; since there can be no act of rapacity which does not involve an act of injustice. But as the rapacious are distinguished from the unjust, in the words of the Pharisee, and as fraud and dishonesty, which are properly injustice in the limited sense, are really different things from force and violence, which characterize injustice when the same with rapacity ; we will consider them as distinct, and allow it to be possible for a man to be *ἄρπαξ* without being unjust, in one sense, and *ἄδικος* in that sense, without being *ἄρπαξ* : what then is the verdict of our Saviour upon this point too ? On the former occasion we find him declaring, Luke xi. 42 : *ἀλλ' οὐαὶ ὑμῖν τοῖς Φαρισαίοις, ὅτι ἀποδεκατοῦτε τὸ ἡδύοσμον, καὶ τὸ πῆγανον, καὶ πᾶν λάχανον, καὶ παρέρχεσθε τὴν κρίσιν, καὶ τὴν ἀγάπην τοῦ Θεοῦ·*

τωλῶ: and neither of those versions comes up to the full meaning of the Greek. The prayer of the wor-

ταῦτα ἔδει ποιῆσαι, κακῆῖνα μὴ ἀφίεναι: and on the latter, Matt. xxiii. 23: οὐαὶ ὑμῖν γραμματεῖς καὶ Φαρισαῖοι, ὑποκριταί, ὅτι ἀποδεκατοῦτε τὸ ἡδύοσμον, καὶ τὸ ἄνηθον, καὶ τὸ κύμινον, καὶ ἀφήκατε τὰ βαρύτερα τοῦ νόμου, τὴν κρίσιν, καὶ τὸν ἔλεον, καὶ τὴν πίστιν· ταῦτα ἔδει ποιῆσαι, κακῆῖνα μὴ ἀφίεναι: in each of which, if the Pharisees, as a body, are not charged distinctly with being *ἄδικοι*—unjust, dishonest, and fraudulent in their dealings—they are virtually; for they are charged distinctly with passing over, and neglecting the graver and weightier parts of the law, τὴν κρίσιν καὶ τὴν πίστιν—while they scrupulously observed the lesser: and what is the neglect of judgment between man and man, and of faith or honesty, in their own dealings, but *ἄδικία*, in the literal sense of the word? Nor is it the neglect of these weightier matters, along with the scrupulous observance of the smaller, as permitted to others, but as permitted to themselves, which is laid to their charge: for, as this observance of the smaller matters, viz. the giving of tithes for such minute productions of the garden, as mint, or rue, or anise, or cummin—is in reference to what they did themselves, and not to what they required others to do; so is the neglect of the weightier duties, on the principle of contraries, to be understood here of what they neglected to do themselves, not of what they winked at, when neglected by others.

The specific charge of *ἄδικία* is necessarily included also in the general charge of *ἀνομία*, which is brought against them in the words of the 28th verse: since it were a contradiction in terms to suppose the Pharisees could be inwardly *full* of *ἀνομία*, as there asserted, and yet be free from *ἄδικία*, which is a main part of *ἀνομία*, and together with *ἀρπαγή*, the other bad quality before laid to their charge, in the popular sense of the word, and so far as regards the complex of one man's dealings with another, may be said to be equivalent to it; there being no overt act of iniquity, or rather of lawlessness, which one man can commit against another, that is not either an act of violence, or an act of fraud and dishonesty.

Thirdly—with respect to the question whether the Pharisees, as a body, were or were not chargeable with being *μοιχοὶ*, like

shipper would even thus have contained the confession of his sinfulness; but it would not have ex-

the rest of the men of their age and nation—adultery, as such, lasciviousness, and impurity in the special or limited sense of the word, are synonymous; and a tendency to any one of these things is a tendency to the rest, the presence of any of them may justly be considered to imply that of the rest. Now on the first of the occasions, which we have referred to, Luke xi. 44, we find our Saviour comparing the Pharisees to tombs or graves, which were not manifest, and men walking on the tops of which were not aware of them: and upon the second, Matt. xxiii. 27, 28, to whited or whitewashed sepulchres, made beautiful externally by such an embellishment—but inwardly full of the bones of dead men, and of all kinds of impurity. The point upon which these two comparisons turn respectively, is different in each instance, but the conclusion to which they lead concerning the characters of the persons so compared, is the same in both. A grave not seen, nor known to be a grave, is a different thing from a grave which is seen, and known to be what it is, by being whitewashed and rendered conspicuous; yet the impurity of both internally must be the same, though in the one case, the impurity is not even suspected, because the source of it even is not known—in the other, the beauty of the exterior, the effect of the wash, is only the more forcibly contrasted with the filth and uncleanness known to be within. So was it with the Pharisees. Men, who could judge of them only from what they appeared, could not know that they were even the reverse of what they seemed to be; God, who could look into their hearts, saw them to be full of *ὑπόκρισις* and *ἀνομία*, like graves externally decorated, but abounding internally in impurity.

Now to contrast the interior of the Pharisee, with his exterior, as the inside of a whited sepulchre must be contrasted with the outside—is to compare what is filth and uncleanness, in the strictest sense of the word, with what is clean, and neat, and charming to the eye in the strictest sense also; and as *ὑπόκρισις* is that which answers to the latter in their case—*ὑπόκρισις* which as so used is equivalent to sanctimony—what can it be that will answer to the former, in the same case, but lasciviousness—incontinence—the moral filth and impurity pro-

pressed the peculiarity of his feelings under that sense of his sinfulness, nor the individuality of duced by sensual desires and sensual indulgences? I know of nothing which is so properly uncleanness, in a moral sense, answerable to the rottenness of a grave or charnel house, as that. And were there any doubt, whether our Saviour meant to charge them here with this particular kind of impurity or not, it would be removed by the testimony of Matt. xxiii. 25—produced before: οὐαὶ ὑμῖν . . . καὶ ἁκρασίᾳς. ἁκρασία in Greek is what we mean by incontinence in English; and very little different from what must be understood by ἀκολασία itself.

But further to establish the same charge against the whole body of the sect, I would remind the reader of a designation which our Lord twice addresses to the Pharisees, under such circumstances as shew it to have been specifically applicable to them, Matt. xii. 39. and xvi. 4: γενεὰ πονηρὰ καὶ μοιχαλὶς. If μοιχαλὶς here cannot be understood figuratively, it must be understood literally; and if it is to be understood literally, then it will follow that among the vices to which the men of this generation, more especially the Scribes and Pharisees, were notoriously addicted, this of being adulterers—of a proneness to adultery—was among the most infamous and characteristic. Now no one will contend that this epithet is here figuratively to be understood; for if so, it would describe a nation or generation spiritually adulterous, that is to say, guilty or liable to be guilty of spiritual fornication, or adultery; which in the language of scripture is simply idolatry, or forsaking the service of the true God for the service of idols. Of this kind of adultery the Jews of our Saviour's time were not guilty, nor liable to be guilty; whatever their forefathers might have been. The epithet of *adulterous* therefore, twice applied to them by our Lord, must be literally understood.

The remarkable story, related in John viii. 1, seq. of the woman taken in adultery, and brought to our Saviour, in the temple, about six months before the present time, will be found to illustrate this assertion; and to shew to what an extent at this juncture the vice in question was prevalent among all orders and descriptions of persons, the Scribes and Pharisees not excepted. They who brought the woman are said to have been the Scribes and the Pharisees; and, considering that they

that character as a sinner, which under those feelings he wished to fix upon himself. The latter part

brought her, after having detected her, as they represented it, in the very act, the first circumstance which strikes us as extraordinary is, why they should have brought the woman, and not also the man. But if we reflect further, that the place was the temple, the time early in the morning, just with the commencement of the morning service there, we shall consider it, perhaps, probable, that the male offender was one of their own number, some one at least connected with the temple; and that that was the reason, why they let him go and brought only the woman. Be this however as it may, our Lord's answer to them, when they continued urging him to decide somewhat concerning the disposal of the woman, was, *ὁ ἀναμάρτητος ὑμῶν πρῶτος βαλέτω τὸν λίθον*. By the appointment of the Law, the hand of the witnesses, whose evidence had been instrumental in convicting a criminal, was to be the first in carrying into execution the punishment enacted against his offence: and to this appointment our Lord evidently referred in these words. But what did he mean, by *ὁ ἀναμάρτητος ὑμῶν*? him, that was guiltless among them, of *any* sin, or him that was guiltless among them, of *this* sin? Surely him that was guiltless among them, of *this* sin. For, can it be supposed that our Lord would put the propriety of a particular witness's being the first to execute the proper punishment of the law, against a proper offence in that law, on such a condition as that of the party's being himself conscious of no sin? Could the proper punishment of any crime committed against any one of the laws of God, be ever executed on such a condition as that? for who is there, who, however capable he may be of denouncing such and such a crime in another, has not some sin to answer for himself?

But if we suppose him to have meant, him that was guiltless of this particular offence, we shall perceive from the event that there was a remarkable significancy in his words. No witness against a particular crime, by whose evidence a particular criminal has been convicted of it, and made liable to the punishment denounced against it, if he is himself guilty of the same, is fit even to bear evidence against it, much less to begin the execution of the punishment denounced against it. The parties

of his prayer should have been rendered, “ God be
“ merciful to me THE sinner.”

addressed by these words, whether guilty of other sins in general or not, seem certainly to have applied the words in this sense ; for being convicted by their own conscience, as the evangelist tells us, they went out one after another, from the eldest down to the youngest, until our Saviour and the woman were left alone. Supposing all to have been alike habitually guilty of the crime of adultery, it is manifest that those who had lived longest would have most to answer for on that account ; and therefore that the eldest, being convicted by their own conscience most of all, would begin to steal away first of all. If so, there was not one of this number, Scribes and Pharisees as they were, that had not been guilty of the crime of adultery ; and the older they were, the more acts of sin of that kind were they conscious to themselves they had committed. What shall we say, then, to the boast of a particular Pharisee, that he was not an adulterer, like the rest of the men of his time ?

I have thus shewn, I think, unequivocally upon the testimony of our Lord himself, that the Pharisees, taken as a body, were notoriously guilty of each of these vices in respect to which the Pharisee in the parable seems to oppose his own moral character to that of the rest of his countrymen ; ἀρπαγή—ἀδικία—μοιχεία. In addition to this, let it be remembered, that on the testimony of St. Luke also, xvi. 14, as recorded in the account of the last parable but two, they are charged with being notoriously φιλάργυροι—a propensity which St. Paul denounces as the root of all evil—wherein he does but sanction the observation of the heathen poet,

Effodiuntur opes, irritamenta malorum.

and,

Quid non mortalia pectora cogis

Auri sacra fames ?

St. Luke makes this observation upon them, to account for the offence which they took at our Saviour's declaration, “ Ye cannot “ serve God and mammon :” on which it has been well remarked, that it is the only instance in the gospel narrative, of what may be called the *philosophy of history*—or the explanation of effects by

The intensity of his contrition, under the conviction of his sinfulness, and the earnestness of his resolving them into their causes, and accounting for the conduct of individuals in particular instances, by referring to the principles which actuate them. The charge already considered, of devouring the houses of widows, is another proof of the same love of money in their case—and of the mean and unjustifiable arts, to which, for its gratification, it was wont to lead them.

But without specifying any longer, particular vices or bad qualities, which, on the unexceptionable testimony of our Lord himself, might be laid to the charge of the Pharisees; would we obtain a just conception of their true moral character, can we go to a more expressive indication, than this of *γεννήματα ἐχιδνῶν*? the designation applied to them, Matt. iii. 7. Luke v. 7. first by John the Baptist; and twice after, in still stronger language, by our Saviour, Matt. xii. 34; xxiii. 34. *ὄφεις, γεννήματα ἐχιδνῶν*. For what can be understood by this designation, except the offspring or children of devils? the children of hell? as indeed they are called in so many words, Matt. xxiii. 15. *οὐαὶ . . ὑμῖν γραμματεῖς καὶ Φαρισαῖοι, ὑποκριταί, ὅτι περιμάγετε τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ τὴν ξηρὰν ποιῆσαι ἓνα προσήλυτον· καὶ ὅταν γένηται ποιεῖτε αὐτὸν υἱὸν γεέννης διπλότερον ὑμῶν*: or how is it possible for abhorrence and reprobation, founded in the essential antipathy of absolute purity and goodness, to absolute malice and depravity, to be expressed in stronger terms than these, *ὄφεις, γεννήματα ἐχιδνῶν, πῶς δύνασθε ἀγαθὰ λαλεῖν, πονηροὶ ὄντες*; or, *ὄφεις, γεννήματα ἐχιδνῶν, πῶς φύγητε ἀπὸ τῆς κρίσεως τῆς γεέννης*;

I have considered elsewhere, the first of the occasions which led to this severe rebuke; and have shewn that, when rightly explained and understood, nothing can more strongly illustrate the wickedness of the Pharisees of the present day; for it seems that in order to injure our Saviour, and to prevent the success of his miracles with the people, as far as lay in their power, they did not hesitate knowingly to blaspheme the Holy Ghost himself, and to say that the Holy Ghost was Beelzebub. See my Dissertations, vol. ii. xviii. 504—533.

Not to insist on the pride or vanity of the Pharisees, Luke xi. 43; xiv. 1. 3. 7: Mark iii. 38—40: Luke xx. 45—47: Matt. xxiii. 6, 7: their love of the praise of men more than the praise of God, John v. 44; xii. 42, 43: and many other

desire to be forgiven his sins, appear in the form and order of his words, as they stand ; than which,

characteristic qualities—we might instance the laxity of the moral principle in particular which governed this sect, and determined their estimate of right and wrong, in a variety of facts ; as in the readiness with which they could join the Herodians, to conspire against the life of Jesus, (Matt. xii. 14 : Mark iii. 6 : Harm. iii. 3 :) as soon as it served their purpose so to do ; their refusing to listen to the remonstrance of Nicodemus, against condemning Jesus unheard ; John vii. 50—52 : Harm. iv. 19 : the facility with which they assented to the doctrine of Caiaphas, that it was expedient one man should die, even though innocent ; John xi. 47—53 : Harm. iv. 24 : their conspiring to take away the life of Lazarus, who had given them no offence, merely because many of the Jews believed in Jesus through him : John xii. 10 : Harm. iv. 63 : their concerting measures with the Herodians, in suborning persons who should feign themselves righteous, to entangle our Lord in his words—and to get him to commit himself with the Roman governor—Matt. xxii. 15—22 : Mark xii. 13—17 : Luke xx. 20—26 : Harm. iv. 70. (Cf. Luke xi. 53, 54 : Harm. iv. 31. for another instance of the same kind of treacherous intention :) the various subterfuges which they had invented to elude the sanctity of oaths ; Matt. xxiii. 16—22 : (Cf. my Dissertations, vol. ii. Diss. xiii. 407 :) their accepting the overture of Judas, to betray his Master, and hiring his services for that purpose—Matt. xxvi. 14—16 : Mark xiv. 10, 11 ; Luke xxii. 3—6 : Harm. iv. 80 ; and upon his repenting and bringing back the money, the indifference which they shew to their own part in the transaction : Matt. xxvii. 3, 4 : Harm. iv. 97. For this was in the very spirit of Pharisaical morality ; according to which, though it might not be lawful for men to commit a crime themselves, yet it was perfectly so to take advantage of its commission. A man might not make away with his enemy by foul means himself, but he might get another to do it for him, and while the latter would be guilty, the former would be blameless : which explains the nature of their reply to Judas, when he complained, I have sinned, in that I have betrayed *αἴμα ἀθῆτον* : What is that to us ? see thou to that. To the same principle must we refer their subornation of false

no arrangement could better have responded to the state of the speaker's mind, and better have ex-

witnesses against our Lord, Matt. xxvi. 59—62 : Mark xiv. 55—60 : Harm. iv. 95 : that they might nominally keep the law, while virtually breaking it, in putting him to death : their bribing the Roman soldiers to spread the report that his disciples had stolen away his body while they slept : Matt. xxviii. 11—15 : Harm. v. 2 : their repeated attempts to assassinate St. Paul, as at Acts xxiii. 12—15 : xxv. 2, 3 : and the like.

And with respect to the other part of the charge against the Pharisees of this day, that they acted on the principle of a compensation by the strict performance of ceremonial duties, for the neglect of moral—we may observe, that the gospel narrative had no occasion to notice expressly more of the ceremonial particulars, on the strictness of which the Pharisees prided themselves, than these three ; the observance of stated fasts—the observance of the sabbath, so much so as to hold it sinful even to do a good action on that day (and yet the sanctity of the sabbath was considered no impediment to their own conspiring to take away the life of our Lord upon that day ; see my Diss. vol. ii. Diss. viii. part iii. 295.) and the observance of sundry kinds of washings. For instances of the former, we may refer to Mark ii. 15—22 : Luke v. 29—39 : Matt. xi. 19 : Luke vii. 34 : Matt. ix. 10—17 :—for those of the second : John v. 1—19 : Matt. xii. 1—8 : Mark ii. 23—28 : Luke vi. 1—5 : Matt. xii. 9—14 : Mark iii. 1—6 : Luke vi. 6—11 : John vii. 23 ; ix. 1—41 : Luke xiii. 10—17 ; xiv. 1—6 : for those of the third, to Matt. xv. 1—20 : Mark vii. 1—23 : Luke xi. 37, 38.

Their characteristic disposition to trust in a mere carnal righteousness—in the accident of their birth, or the like—appears from the rebuke addressed to them by the Baptist, Matt. iii. 9 : Luke iii. 8 ; with which we may compare John viii. 33, 39. The same disposition appears in the words of Trypho the Jew to Justin, in their dialogue together ; 153. 19 : where Trypho is speaking : *εἰ οὖν καὶ ἐμοῦ θέλεις ἀκοῦσαι (φίλον γάρ σε ἤδη νενόμικα) πρῶτον μὲν περιτεμοῦ, εἶτα φύλαξον ὡς νενόμισται, τὸ σάββατον, καὶ τὰς ἑορτὰς, καὶ τὰς νουμηνίας τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ ἀπλῶς τὰ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ γεγραμμένα πάντα ποιεῖ, καὶ τότε σοι ἴσως ἔλεος ἔσται παρὰ Θεοῦ.*

pressed the nature of his feelings, at the time. In giving vent to the sense of his wants, or relieving

But as to the question of a compensation by one class of duties for another—that they acted deliberately on such a principle, is intimated, I think, by our Lord's declaration to his disciples, in the first sermon on the mount, Matt. v. 20. "Except your righteousness abound more than the Scribes and Pharisees," &c. The context of that declaration shews that our Lord was speaking of the impossibility of attaining to such perfection as must gain admission into the kingdom of God, without the observance of the least of the commandments necessary to perfection, as well as of the greatest. But the rule of perfection laid down by the Pharisees was the reverse of this; the neglect of the greatest, for the sake of observing the least. What is here generally implied of the principle on which they acted, is still more particularly declared, Luke xi. 42. and Matt. xxiii. 23, 24. where the little things, which it is supposed they observed, are such minute duties of the ritual code, as paying the tithe of mint, rue, anise, and cummin; the greater things which it is affirmed that they neglected, are such weighty matters as the love of God, judgment, mercy, and fidelity. No doubt, the one on the principle of compensating for the other; as indeed is presumptively to be collected from Matt. xxiii. 24, for this straining off of the gnat is manifestly supposed to compensate for that swallowing down of the camel.

The evidence of the parable, by which the observance of a stated fast twice in the week, and giving tithes of all the Pharisee got, were represented as the sum total of his positive merit, has been already considered. The incident too, relating to the vow of corban, Matt. xv. 1—20: Mark vii. 1—23: Harm. iv. 1, contributes strongly to the proof of the same conclusion; since it appears from it, that the observance of the traditionary law with respect to that particular case, was enough to excuse, nay even peremptorily to require, the breach of the fifth commandment. See the explanation of this doctrine, in my *Dissertations*, vol. ii. Diss. xiii. 403—409.

We find our Lord asserting of the Scribes, or lawyers, Luke xi. 46: *οτι φορρίζετε . . . φορτίοις*: and of them and the Pharisees, Matt. xxiii. 4: to the same effect: *δεσμεύονσι γὰρ . . . κινῆσαι αὐτά*.

the urgency of his desires in prayer, natural it is that what the petitioner is conscious he stands most Of the burdens here alluded to, there can be but one opinion; viz. that they were such things as the Scribes and Pharisees required the people to observe; but with regard to what is next asserted, that having put such burdens on men's shoulders, they themselves would not move them, or touch them, with *one* of their fingers—though it might bear the construction that they would not allow the least indulgence to those whom they required to observe such things—they would force them to carry their burdens, supportable as they might be, or not—yet I think it is much more correct to consider it to mean, that they themselves would observe none of those things, hard and burdensome as they were, which they imposed upon others. This construction is more agreeable to the context, in the second instance; for after telling the people that whatsoever the Pharisees taught them, as sitting in the chair of Moses, they were to observe and to do; when our Lord proceeds to tell them, that after the works of their teachers themselves, they were not to do, for they said and did not—it seems necessarily to be implied, that the Pharisees dispensed in their own behalf with the obligation of the very things, made binding on the people at large. And indeed we know that the rabbis claimed the power of loosing as well as of binding; and could as easily take off an obligation, if they thought proper, as lay one on: and this power the Pharisees, it seems, freely exercised in their own behalf; but not in that of others.

What, then, were these burdens, which they laid inexorably on others, but would not move or sustain with one finger themselves? The burdens of the moral, or those of the ceremonial law? Not those of the ceremonial; for it would be contrary to the matter of fact to suppose they exonerated themselves from the observance of the ceremonial law, in the strictness of which they made their boast. It must, therefore, have been the burdens of the moral law. If so, the Pharisees acted on the principle of compensation, for which we are contending; and because of their strictness in one respect, notoriously allowed themselves more liberty in another; presuming on the persuasion, that they only knew what was right and pleasing to God, but *this people*, the rest of the nation but themselves and their disciples, being

in need of—he should be most eager to obtain; and what he is most eager to obtain—he should ask for first. The place which is assigned in the Publican's prayer, to the profession of the Publican's sinfulness, shews that though last in the order of expression, it was uppermost in the order of thought. The deeper the conviction of sin—the more heart-felt the penitence of the offender—the more fervent will be his desire to be forgiven; and in his eagerness to satisfy himself of the success of this, the principal object of his suit—his prayer for forgiveness may leave to implication the sense of its necessity, and take for granted the previous acknowledgment of the sin. Such is the order and such is the effect of the expression in the prayer of the Publican. The urgency of deprecation precedes the admissions of confession. The Publican is praying for mercy, even before he has pleaded to his guilt. His conscience had denounced him to himself as an offender: his own tongue does not repeat the denunciation, except as an argument why he should sup-

ignorant of the law, were not simply accursed (see Deuteron. xxvii. 27.) but *intensely accursed*, ἐπικατάρατοι, John vii. 49.—and could not be too strictly kept to their duty, or too exclusively rendered obnoxious to the penal consequences of neglecting it.

In addition to the above considerations, much might still be said on the same subject in general—on the liberty of divorce allowed themselves by the Pharisees: on the hypocrisy of doctrine laid to their charge by our Saviour; on their hatred or contempt of publicans and sinners—instances of which last disposition we see, besides the parable, in Mark ii. 15: Luke v. 29: Matt. xi. 19: Luke vii. 34; vii. 36—50: Matt. ix. 10—13: Luke xv. 1—10; xix. 2—10. Cf. on these points, *supra*, vol. iii. 76. sqq. and 552. sqq. and my Dissertations, vol. ii. Diss. xxii.

plicate, if not as a reason why he should expect, forgiveness.

And with respect to the first part of his address, which contains the entreaty of forgiveness from God, and the grounds of assurance on which the hope of obtaining it was placed: "God be merciful to me the sinner," would have required in the original, ὁ Θεὸς ἐλεῆσόν με τὸν ἁμαρτωλόν: between which, and ὁ Θεὸς ἰλάσθητί μοι τῷ ἁμαρτωλῷ—there is so much difference as may justify us in concluding that something was intended by the latter, which would not have been fully represented by the former.

In order to explain this distinction we must observe, that there were stated times for the resort of worshippers to the temple, desirous to offer up their prayers to God; and that these times were twice at least^t in the day, once in the morning, at the usual period of the daily morning sacrifice, and again in the evening, at the time of offering the daily evening sacrifice^u. The reason of this coincidence between the offices of private devotion, and the times of the public services of religion, in the temple, was doubtless this, among others; that the time of the morn-

^t I say twice at least, for Psalm lv. 18, will shew that the more devout among the Jews might prefer their prayers thrice in the day—morning, noon, and evening; and Psalm cxix. 164, that they might do it seven times, as matter of stated observance. Daniel vi. 10. 13, illustrates the former practice by a case in point to it. Jerome observes in his commentary on the place, Tria autem sunt tempora quibus Deo flectenda sunt genua: tertiam horam, sextam et nonam ecclesiastica traditio intelligit: Operr. iii. 1096.

^u Vide Acts iii. 1. Cf. ii. 15. Also my Diss. vol. iii. Diss. iv. 96. vol. ii. Diss. xv. 439.

ing and evening sacrifices respectively, was also the stated time for the officiating priest to enter the sanctuary or holy place, to burn incense within, upon the altar of incense there^x; and it is well known that the scriptural meaning of the rite of burning incense makes it a type of the spiritual incense of prayer, or praise to God. Thus it is that the Psalmist expresses his wish, that his prayer may be set forth, may be as duly and regularly offered, in the sight of God, as the incense, and the lifting up of his hands towards heaven, in the attitude of supplication, be accounted as an evening sacrifice^y; and thus also, the incense which the four and twenty elders are supposed to offer in the book of Revelation, is called the prayers of the saints^z. The sweetness of incense was a lively adumbration of the acceptable quality of prayer, when just and becoming of its kind, and fitly offered up. But prayer is never just and becoming of its kind, nor fitly offered up, so as to be acceptable to God, except it be such as is proper for man to offer, and for God to receive; and except it be offered after the manner of God's appointment, which is the manner of an implicit reliance on his goodness for obtaining the object of its suit, whatever it be. And where the object of prayer is the remission of sin, it cannot be duly preferred, or acceptable to God, unless it be accompanied by a faith and trust in that mode of expiation, which the goodness of God has appointed to do away with sin, and to cleanse from its guilt. Now under the law, the institution of animal sacrifice at stated times, was a standing provision for

^x Vide Luke i. 9, 10. ^y Ps. cxli. 2. ^z Rev. v. 8. Cf. viii. 3, 4.

this purpose. With reason, then, did the periods of resort to the temple for daily private prayer, coincide with those of the daily morning and evening sacrifice; and the times of burning incense in the sanctuary, coincide with both. The sacrifices offered, on each of these occasions, supplied the material object of the faith or trust, which must give value and efficacy to repentance, and vouch for the success of prayer for forgiveness, under the consciousness of sin; and the fragrance of the accompanying incense was an apt symbolical representation how pleasing and acceptable to God was the prayer so offered up: on which account, more particularly, the same times of morning and evening sacrifice, and of the daily resort of worshippers to the temple, though at the conclusion of the whole service, and before the dismissal of the people to their homes—were appointed also for the pronunciation of the blessing by the priest, which virtually declared that the prayers of the worshippers had been accepted, that their sins had been remitted and forgiven, and that they might depart to their homes in peace ^a.

At the very time, then, when the prayer of the Publican must be supposed to have been uttered, the necessity of the case requires us to suppose also, that the usual daily ceremony of the temple service had just taken place—that the blood of the atoning victim was in the act of being sprinkled on the altar—the sweet cloud of the incense was rising up in the sanctuary, and filling the court of the priests with its perfume, when this penitent sinner was humbling his soul before God. Indications of this

^a Vide Luke i. 31, 32. Cf. Numbers vi. 23—26.

coincidence we may observe in his language itself, that part at least, which concerns his use of so peculiar a term as *ἱλάσθητι*; for this term is properly a ritual one, and confined to transactions which pass, or are supposed to pass, between the object of worship, on the one hand, and the worshipper himself, on the other, the final end of which is to procure a change of disposition in the former towards the latter—a change not brought about, or supposed to be brought about, in *any* way, but by the way of atonement and propitiation. In the use of this term, then, it is implied that the object of the worship, and the worshipper, previous to the change in question, stand to each other in the relation of one who is offended, and one who has given offence—and after the change, in that of one who is no longer offended, and one who is no longer considered to have given offence; that is, of parties, who after being strictly at enmity, have been strictly reconciled and made friends—the instrumental means of the change in the meantime, being some satisfaction, atonement, or compensation, which he who had given the offence, has rendered, or is supposed to have rendered, to him whom he had offended.

The exact version of the words of the whole prayer in the original is consequently this, “God be “propitiated to me the sinner:” and if so, it must be an obvious inference from its very language, that not only does it declare the Publican’s own sense of his sinfulness, not only does it intercede for forgiveness, but it expresses his confidence and assurance of obtaining it, because sought for in that way, which God himself had appointed, and trusted for to the efficacy of that provision, upon

the strength of which God himself had authorized the penitent to expect it. It declares, therefore, not only the depth of his contrition, and the sincerity of his repentance, but the liveliness of his faith, and the vigour of his hope. It shews him to have had a right apprehension of the nature and intent of sacrifice, as the appointed means of reconciling the sinner to God; and a firm reliance on its imputed efficacy as available to its proper end, when applied to the justification of the sinner, through the mercy of God, as the sole efficient cause of the result—but through an act of his own appointment as the instrumental means to it also—requiring consequently from the justified sinner, both gratitude on account of the one, and faith in the merits of the other.

It is needless to observe that no trace of this kind of conviction is discoverable in the prayer of the Pharisee, as contrasted with that of the Publican. Nor in fact is the difference between two instances of the same religious act, performed at one time, more remarkable in any respect than this; a difference which may possibly account, in the most satisfactory manner, for the distinction in the personal consequences of the act respectively, to its performers in common—that the one was rejected, and the other was accepted. The prayer of the Publican, like the sacrifice of Abel, being offered in the humility of self-distrust, in the merit of an imputed righteousness, in the sense of dependence, and in the strength of reliance, upon God—might be acceptable to its Object—for the same reason that Abel's was: while the worship of the Pharisee, in the spirit of pride and unbelief—in the confidence of its own

strength, in the self-sufficiency of its own merits—with no consciousness of any thing to be required, no acknowledgment of any thing received, as matter of grace and favour from God—resembling the sacrifice of Cain, might be as offensive to God as that was, and on the same accounts.

We may conclude our reflections on the parable, with one more remark. Our Saviour declared to the Pharisees not long after this time, that the Publicans were nearer to the kingdom of heaven than they; that is, in point of moral fitness and predisposition, were better qualified for becoming converts to the Gospel than they. Considering each of the present characters as the representative of the class to which he belongs—we may perceive in the opposite conduct and demeanour of the two men, a lively illustration of the truth of this assertion. For let it be supposed, that at the moment when they thus appeared in the presence of God, to perform a common act of worship, and while they were still in the same frame of mind in which they preferred their respective prayers; the same tender of salvation through the blood of Christ, had been made to them both in common. It is easy to see, which of the two would have embraced it with joy, and clung to it with hope and confidence; and which would have rejected it with scorn, or treated it with indifference. And perhaps, it might be one design of the parable, not merely by the example of the Pharisee, to instruct the disciples what fault they were especially bound to avoid in prayer; but also by the exposure thus made of the pride and self-sufficiency, yet self-ignorance of this one of the body, to account for the

rejection of Christianity by the rest : and by the opposite example of the Publican to teach the hearers not only in what spirit, and with what language, they were to approach God for the performance of such an office as prayer; but also what spiritual proficiency in the school of Moses—what degree of insight into the nature, and final end of the existing Levitical dispensation—was necessary to make a Christian.

PARABLE TWENTY-SECOND. ALLEGORICAL.

THE LABOURERS IN THE VINEYARD.

MATTHEW XX. 1—16. HARMONY, IV. 54.

MATTHEW XX. 1—16.

¹ For the kingdom of heaven is like a man, a master of an house, who went out with morning (*sunrise*) to hire himself labourers for his vineyard. ² And having bargained with the labourers for a denarius *for* the day, he sent them into his vineyard. ³ And having gone out about the third hour, he saw others standing in the market-place idle. ⁴ And to them he said, Go ye also into the vineyard, and whatsoever may be just will I give you. And they went their way. ⁵ Again, having gone out about the sixth and the ninth hour, he did in like manner. ⁶ And having gone out about the eleventh hour, he found others standing idle : and he saith unto them, Why have ye stood here all the day idle ? ⁷ They say unto him, Because no man hath hired us. He saith unto them, Go ye also into the vineyard, and whatsoever may be just, ye shall receive. ⁸ And when evening was come, the lord of the vineyard saith to his overseer, Call the labourers, and pay them their wages, having begun with them that were last, unto them that were first. ⁹ And they of the eleventh hour, came and received a denarius apiece. ¹⁰ And when the first came, they supposed that they shall receive more ; and they received themselves also a denarius apiece. ¹¹ And when they had received it, they began to murmur at the master of the house, ¹² saying, These last ones have passed one hour (*in the vineyard*) and thou hast made them equal unto us, those that have borne the weight of the day, and

the heat. ¹³ And he answered and said to one of them, Comrade, I am doing thee no wrong: didst thou not bargain with me for a denarius? ¹⁴ Take up that is thine, and go thy way. But I choose to give to this last one as unto thee also. ¹⁵ Whether is it unlawful for me to do as I choose in my own concerns? or is thine eye evil, because I am good? ¹⁶ Thus shall the last be first, and the first *be* last; for many are called but few *are* chosen.

MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

THE parable of the labourers in the vineyard, illustrates in a remarkable manner a characteristic property of many of our Saviour's discourses—their obvious reference to some actual circumstance in the state of things around him, to which, if they did not owe their conception, they are accommodated in their structure, allusions, and images. There is every reason to suppose that when he delivered this parable, he was not far from Jericho, one of the most considerable cities in Judæa; and the action of the parable is manifestly laid in the neighbourhood of some city. It is still more certain, that the time of the year was the spring; one of the seasons at which the labours of husbandry, whether in the fields or the vineyards, were likely to be most actively going on. Peræa, the district in which he probably was at the time—is described by Josephus as a region abounding in vineyards; the transaction in the parable is supposed to begin with the morning of some day; and when our Lord delivered the account of it, there is the utmost probability that he had just set out in the morning, upon that day's journey which, after crossing into Judæa, from Peræa, over the Jordan, and passing through Jericho,

on the way to Jerusalem, was concluded by stopping at the house of Zaccheus for the night ^a.

But to proceed to the particulars of the narrative. The personages concerned in the history, are divisible in this instance, as in every other of the same kind, into principal and subordinate; the former, one and the same, the latter, as it appears from the sequel, of two kinds. The principal personage is represented in a twofold capacity—one in relation to each of these subordinate personages respectively—to the one as the owner of a vineyard, and to the other as the master of a family; but the latter of these relations, so far as concerns the representation contained in the parable, is subordinate to the former. The parabolic character, then, of the principal personage is such as might be consistent with the actual character of any master of a family among the Jews, who was but a man of some property and consequence; for property among the Jews, as we have had repeated occasion to observe, consisted principally in fields and vineyards, and the several productions of each. The character of the inferior personages subordinate to this, is that of the workmen, by whose means instead of their own, the owners of property in land bestow upon it the kind and degree of culture which is necessary to render it productive; a description of persons who, as maintaining themselves by the labour of their hands, and by the labour of their hands in the culture of the ground, both in the parable, and in classical writers, are called by the name of ἐργάται, labourers in gene-

^a Vide my Harmony, part IV. sections 50—59.

ral, but with the sense of peasants and husbandmen in particular.

The purpose for which the principal personage is supposed to want the inferior, and the services which these are expected to render the superior, are consequently, such as concern the necessities of a vineyard, or some species of property in the ground; but of a vineyard already in existence, of property in the ground already in possession of the owner. It is not, therefore, the business of forming a vineyard, for a certain use or purpose, but of preparing one, already planted with a view to its proper use and purpose, for best answering the end of its being: in other words, supposing the vineyard to have been already planted by the proper owner, and for the proper purpose for which all vineyards are planted; the business for which the labourers are wanted is the business of dressing, manuring, repairing it at the due season—the business of performing every needful work in and upon it, preparatory to rendering it as prolific and profitable as possible, against the time of bearing its fruits. Two such seasons there are in the natural year, the autumn and the spring—either of which would be as well adapted for the end in view, as the other; and either of which is recommended by the writers upon husbandry anciently, for the culture and preparation of vineyards, as much as the other^b.

^b Vide the testimonies produced in the explanation of the parable of the barren fig-tree, *supra* vol. iii. 361. Add to these the following also, which recommend the season of spring more particularly:

Τὸν δὲ μετ' ὀρθρογῇ Πανδιονὶς ὦρτο χελιδὼν
 εἰς φάος ἀνθρώποις, ἔαρος νέον ἱσταμένοιο.

The master of the vineyard is supposed to engage the labourers, whose services his vineyard requires, for money—whence it appears, that though they stand to him in the relation of his workmen after that engagement, they do not stand to him in the relation of his servants previous to it^d. The transaction which passes between him and them, consists therefore in hiring them first on certain terms for the sake of these services, and paying them afterwards, according to those terms, when these services have been rendered ; the discharge of the stipulated service taking place between. The scene of these different parts of the transaction is different also ; the labourers are hired in one locality, and they render the services for which they are hired, in another ; they receive the wages of their services in one locality, which may be the same with either of the former, but they perform the conditions of their engagement, within the vineyard. It is manifest, that the place, where the labourers were found

τὴν φθάμενος, οὔνας περιταμνέμεν· ὥς γὰρ ἄμεινον.

ἀλλ' ὅπότε ἂν φερέοικος ἀπὸ χθονὸς ἂν φυτὰ βαίῃη

Πληϊάδας φεύγων, τότε δὴ σκάφος οὐκέτι οἰνέων.

Hesiodi Opera et Dies, 566.

Geoponica, iii. cap. 3. De Mense Martio ; τούτῳ τῷ μηνὶ περισκάπτειν δεῖ τὰς ἀμπέλους, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δένδρα· τὰ γὰρ τότε περι-
σκαπτόμενα καὶ πολυκαρπεῖ καὶ καλλικαρπεῖ.

^d The owners of estates among the Greeks and Romans, who possessed slaves of their own, had several classes of them, appropriated to the various labours of husbandry—by whose means they discharged them all, in their own behalf. Those who had not, of course employed the services of hired labourers, called *αὐτουργοί*, as depending on their own labour for support, *ἐργάται*, as employed on the culture of the ground more especially, and *θήτες* as engaged for hire. The same was more or less the case with the Jews also.

before they were hired, is not the same with the place to which they were sent on being hired; though it is not so evident that the place where they received their wages, is not the same where they had previously rendered their services.

The master of the vineyard is supposed to go forth to engage the labourers, wanted for its use, as one who desired to engage workmen, for such a purpose, naturally would—with the morning, or beginning of the day; because the services of the workmen engaged would be wanted for the whole of the day. The civil computation of diurnal and nocturnal time was the same among the Jews, at this period of their history, as among the Romans; and in conformity to either mode of reckoning, the day, at all periods of the year, contained twelve hours, of variable length, according to the season of the year—and at all periods began with the appearance of the sun in the horizon, (a point of time called in Greek $\pi\rho\omega\acute{\iota}$), and ended with its disappearance beneath it, (a point called properly $\delta\psi\acute{\epsilon}\epsilon$.) The first hour then began with sunrise, and the twelfth expired with sunset; and a full day's labour would do the same. It is necessary only to observe that at the two equinoctial points, (with one of which the time of the action in the parable, as we have seen, coincides,) the hours of the day, according to the reckoning of the Jews, would be equal in length to our own; and the first hour would begin with six in the morning, the twelfth would expire with six in the evening.

^e Cf. my Supplemental Diss. Diss. xiv.

The place, where the labourers were met with, is spoken of as the ἀγορὰ or market-place—no doubt of the city, where the master, who wanted them, must be supposed to have dwelt. Here, consequently, they must have been previously assembled, in the hope of meeting with some such engagement; and hither must he himself have repaired, in expectation of finding them there. The agora, forum, or market-place, of antiquity was a well-known part of an ancient city; and, as the denomination given to it in the Greek is sufficient of itself to imply, it was a quarter of general resort, not simply for buyers and sellers, and consequently a market-place, strictly so called—but for all descriptions of persons, and for every kind of purpose, besides that of trade or commerce. In the agora, not only the business of the market, but transactions of every sort, of a public nature, were wont to be carried on: here the assemblies of the people, on matters of general interest, were wont to be held; the courts of justice were established, and lawsuits were heard and determined. The agora was the chief resort of strangers, and a general meeting place of the inhabitants of the city, for the sake of pastime, amusement, or conversation, as well as for objects of a graver kind^f. To the agora, consequently, at stated times, were those who desired to let out their services for hire, to any who wanted them, accustomed to repair; and hither also were those, who stood in need of the services of others, accustomed to go, at such times, in search of them^g.

^f Vide Acts xvii. 17. 21.

^g The market-places are still the usual places of resort in the

The wages agreed upon with the labourers, found in the market-place at the beginning of the day, and consequently the wages agreed upon for the labour of a day, are specified as a denarius, or scripture penny; the value of which, in money of our denomination, according to the most accurate calculation, is sevenpence and three farthings^b. Small as this sum may appear, and low as the rate of a day's wages, on that scale, may be considered, there is no question, that according to the custom of these times it is more than was usually paid for the labour of a full day. The value of money is perpetually changing; and in the experience of all countries, at different periods of their history, a small sum at one time has been known to be equivalent to a much larger, at another. In our own country, there once was a time when a penny, according to our computation of the value of such a coin, was considered a just remuneration for the labour of a day. Upon this question, however, it is not necessary to enlarge at present. I have collected in the note below a variety of testimonies, calculated to throw light on the value of a Greek drachma, or a Roman denarius; the effect of which is to place it beyond a doubt, that an agreement with labourers in a given instance, for a penny or denarius the day, would be not only a just and adequate compensation for the service of a day, but, regard being had to the usage of the times, and to the value of a denarius in comparison with the price of the necessaries of life, more ample and indulgent

East, both for business, amusement, and conversation; see Harmer's Obs. ii. 524. chap. x. Obs. lxxi.

^b Vide Arbuthnot's Tables of Ancient Coins, &c.

than might have been expectedⁱ. Nor is this circumstance without its use in the sequel of the narra-

ⁱ Judges xvii. 10: Micah is represented as saying to the Levite, whom he was desirous to retain in his house, "I will give thee ten *shekels* of silver by the year, and a suit of apparel, and thy victuals." Ten shekels would amount to about five crown pieces, or twenty-five shillings, of our money.

Tobit says to the angel, when about to engage him as the companion of his son into Media, "*Wilt thou* a drachma a day?" v. 14: and this was evidently meant to be a liberal offer.

Xenoph. Hellen. ii. iii. 18: a senator's salary at Athens was a drachma a day. Hence Hesychius, *βουλῆς λαχεῖν, τὸ λαχεῖν βουλευτὴν, καὶ δραχμὴν τῆς ἡμέρας λαχεῖν*. Lucian, i. iii. 121. Timon. 6, 12: a day-labourer's wages are supposed to be four oboli, that is, two thirds of a drachma. Operum i. 697: De Mercede Conductis 38: he speaks of a philosopher's or tutor's salary, as doled out to him in such minute portions at a time, as *δύο ὀβόλους ἢ τέτταρας*. Plutarch, Aristides, 27: three oboli a day was the pension which Demetrius Phalereus obtained from the people of Athens, in his time, for two granddaughters of Aristides: that is, half a drachma. He himself doubled it, and made it a drachma. The pension allowed at the expense of the state, to the poor citizens of Athens, who had been deprived of any of their limbs in its service, is variously represented at an obolus a day (which would be five drachmæ a month) at nine drachmæ a month, which is one obolus and an half a day, and at two oboli a day, which is ten drachmæ a month; according to Lysias and Aristotle, to Philochorus, and to Harpocration, respectively. Vide Hesychius, *Ἀδύνατοι*, and Lysias, *ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου*, Oratio xxiv. The payment of an hundred drachmæ, at once, would procure a scholar the privilege of attending the school of the sophist Proclus, at all times, free of expense: Philostratus, Vitæ Soph. ii. Proclus. 600. A. Aristides, ii. 123. Oratio xlv: the hire of a pilot, in Plato's time, from Ægina to Athens, was two oboli; from Egypt to the Pontus, two drachmæ, at most. Cf. p. 228. Oratio xli.

Thucydides, vii. 27: the pay of the Thracian mercenaries engaged by the Athenians for the Sicilian expedition, B. C. 413, was a drachma a day; which is reckoned a great sum. Ibid. viii.

tive. To understand and do justice to the conduct of the master of the vineyard, who is also the hirer

29: Tissaphernes engaged to pay the Peloponnesian fleet, when they were first brought into the Ionian sea, B. C. 412, a drachma a day. The Athenians paid their common sailors only three oboli, and Tissaphernes soon reduced the pay of the Peloponnesians to this sum. Xenophon, *Anabasis*, vii. iii. 36, the soldiers of Cyrus, hired by Seuthes, were hired at the rate of a Cyzicene stater a month; about a drachma a day. Demosthenes, *Oratio* iv. *Contra Philipp.* i. sect. 32, reckons a common soldier's pay ten drachmæ a month, or two oboli a day; a knight's three times as much. In Polybius's time, a Roman foot-soldier's pay was two oboli a day; a centurion's four; a knight's a drachma, that is six: *Lib.* vi. 39. In the reign of Tiberius, a common Roman soldier's pay was a denarius a day, that of one of the prætorian guard, was two denarii; *Tac. Ann.* i. 17.

Diodorus Siculus, tells us, i. 80. that it did not cost parents in Egypt, to bring up their children, more than twenty drachmæ. Lysias, *Contra Diogitonem*, *Oratio* xxxii. 44. reckons it quite an unheard-of thing to charge nearly three drachmæ a day, for the maintenance of five persons; and, section 30, he specifies it as an instance of extraordinary impudence in Diogito, that he should have charged three persons, in his accounts, for ὄψον or fish only, five oboli a day. Demosthenes, *Contra Phormionem*, *Oratio* xxxiv. 44. reckons the regular price of corn at five drachmæ the medimnus; that is, about one drachma to an English peck. Plutarch, *De Animi Tranquillitate*, *Operum* vii. 841. relates an anecdote of Socrates; ὁ Σωκράτης ἀκούσας τινὸς τῶν φίλων λέγοντος, ὡς πολυτελὴς ἡ πόλις· μὴ δὲ ὁ Χῖος οἶνος· ἡ πορφύρα τριῶν μνῶν· τοῦ μέλιτος ἡ κοτύλη, πέντε δραχμῶν· λαβὼν αὐτὸν προσήγαγε τοῖς ἀλφίτοις· ὁβολοῦ τὸ ἡμίεκτον· εὐτελὴς ἡ πόλις· εἶτα ταῖς ἐλαίαις· δυοῖν χαλκοῖν ἢ χοῖνιξ· εὐτελὴς ἡ πόλις· εἶτα ταῖς ἐξωμίσι (*ita leg.*) δέκα δραχμῶν· εὐτελὴς ἡ πόλις. The hemiectum was one twelfth of the medimnus, that is, four chænixes: *vide Harpocration. in voce.* The price of the medimnus in the same proportion was two drachmæ. Thus though luxuries might be dear at Athens, at this time, necessities were abundantly cheap. In like manner, Diogenes Laertius, *Diogenes*, vi. 35: ἀνδριάντα γοῦν τρισχιλίων πιπράσκεισθαι, χοίνικα δὲ ἀλφίτων δύο χαλκῶν, or one

of the workmen engaged for its use, it is necessary we should know his stipulation with the labourers

fourth of an obolus. This too is in the proportion of an obolus to the hemiectum, or four chænixes : and four chænixes, it is to be observed, would be adequate to a man's support nearly three days. At Rome the regulated price of corn was about two sesterces to the modius, which is in the proportion of half a drachma or denarius. Vide Cicero, *Divinat.* in Q. Cæcilium, 10 : *De Officiis*, ii. 17, &c. Cf. Tac. *Ann.* xv. 39. The Roman modius was something more than the English peck.

Plutarch, *Solon.* 23, mentions that the price of an ox, at Athens, in the time of Demetrius Phalereus, was but five drachmæ, and that of a sheep, one. Lucullus, 14. he tells us, that at one time, in the course of the war with Mithridates, an ox might be had for one drachma, and a slave for four. In the time of Polybius, the prices of the necessities of life in Cisalpine Gaul, were usually as follows : the medimnus Siculus of wheat, four oboli (two thirds of the drachma) ; that of barley, two : the metretes of wine, two oboli ; the usual charge for a day's entertainment, in the inns, being half a Roman as, about one quarter of the obolus, one twentieth of a denarius : lib. ii. 15. Athenæus also quotes his thirty-fourth book, for the following prices current in Lusitania, the modern Portugal, *Deipnosophistæ*, viii. 1 : The medimnus of barley, one drachma ; the medimnus of wheat, nine Alexandrine oboli, rather more than a drachma and one half ; the metretes of wine (ten gallons two pints, of our measure, and upwards) a drachma ; a moderate sized kid, one obolus ; an hare, the same ; a lamb, three or four oboli ; a fat hog, five score weight, five drachmæ ; a sheep, two drachmæ ; a talent of figs, fifty-seven pounds, three oboli ; a calf, five drachmæ ; a working ox, ten drachmæ ; and the like. These instances are sufficient to prove that a Greek drachma, or Roman denarius, was worth a great deal more, and would go much further, than the same sum in our money, seven-pence three farthings. As small sums were valuable, under such circumstances as these, they might often be the subject of disputes which would require to be brought into a court of justice. Hence it is that Aristotle, *Politica*, iv. xiii. 2. provides for such suits accordingly : *ἔτι δὲ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα, περὶ τῶν*

at first, to have been liberal and generous, and much more, fair and just.

If the supply of labourers, at first provided, turned out to be insufficient for the necessities of the vineyard; or if the number of persons, desirous to hire out their services, discovered in the agora at the early hour of morning, was inadequate to the demand for them; it would be necessary to supply more, or to visit the agora again, in the hope of finding others there, at later, and possibly different periods, in the course of the day. The first time when an employer in search of workmen might be supposed to go forth again on the same errand, and be most likely to find the market-place full of persons of every description, is that which is known in classical writers, by the name of *πλήθιυσα ἀγορά*, or *ἀγορᾶς πληθώρα*; a time, answering to the third hour of the day with the ancients, and to nine in the morning with us. The reason of which is, that the ancients in general, and especially the people of the East, being accustomed to rise with the sun, that is, with the first hour of the day, all through the year, and to take their morning's repast as soon as they were risen; no general resort to the market-place, strictly speaking, could take place, until sometime after the first hour; but having then begun, it would continue, and be most likely to have arrived at its height, from the second to the third hour of the day.

The same reasons which required a second visit

μικρῶν συναλλαγμάτων, ὅσα δραχμαῖα, καὶ πεντάδραχμα, καὶ μικρὴ πλείονος· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτων γίνεσθαι κρίσιν. Cf. 2 Kings vii. 1.

to the market-place, about the third hour of the day, might require a third, or even a fourth, at other periods of the day. Two more such visits are accordingly supposed to be made, apparently for the same object as before, or expressly in search of labourers; one at the sixth hour, which was the hour of noon in an ancient day, answering to twelve of the clock, with us; and another at the ninth hour, a time which the Jews designated by the name of the early evening, because the sun, though still visible in the heaven, yet having sensibly begun to decline, the heat of the day was proportionably diminished also; in which sense it was opposed to the later evening, which began properly with the point of sunset, from which moment the sun being no longer to be actually seen, the day was considered to be actually at an end. This hour answered at the equinoxes, to three in the afternoon. Besides these, a fifth visit is mentioned, about the eleventh hour of the day, which would be one hour only before sunset, and at the equinoxes, as before, would answer to five in the afternoon with us.

On each of the three intermediate occasions, the object of the owner of the vineyard in going to the agora might be expressly to engage more labourers; and at each of these times, persons were likely to be found there, who had either not yet come thither by the hour of *proï*, or had not yet been able to meet with an employer—and would still have an opportunity of letting their services for an integral part of a day: in the first instance for three fourths, in the second, for one half, and in the third, for one quarter, at least, of the day. But we can hardly suppose that his object in visiting the market-place, so late as the eleventh

hour of the day, was expressly in search of labourers ; that the visit itself at that time was not accidental, and what ensued on the visit, accidentally the consequence of it. He might not expect to find labourers, still unengaged, an hour before the close of the day, nor visit the market with a view to engage them, so late as the eleventh hour of the day : but, it is possible that if he went there and found any there, whom no one had yet engaged, though able and willing to work if they had but the opportunity—he might take advantage of this coincidence, to send them too into his vineyard, to bear a part in the labour of the day, as long as the time would permit.

A stipulation was made with the labourers, engaged at the beginning of the day, what wages they were to receive for the services which they were to render : but none with the labourers, subsequently engaged, for the different parts of the day. Yet such a stipulation was as possible in their case, as in that of the first ; and for a part of the day in proportion, as for the whole. This omission, which would so far be something unexpected even in the case of the labourers engaged at the sixth, or at the ninth hours respectively, is perceived to hold good notwithstanding, in the case of those who were engaged at the third hour ; not only the next to the first in the order of engagement, but next to the first in the length of the service for which they were engaged.

If there was any special reason for the omission of this circumstance in the engagement with these labourers, much more would the same reason require

its omission in the engagement with the labourers of the eleventh hour. And such a special reason, in each of these cases, and more particularly in the last, we may perceive in this consideration; that without it, the result and effect of the history, which consists in placing the labourers of every hour on a footing of equality, in respect of remuneration, notwithstanding the inequality in the duration of their respective services, could not be supposed to have ensued. No explanation, then, can be given of this œconomy, remarkable as it may be, so probable as that of its subserviency to the ultimate design of the representation; with respect to which, we shall find it truly critical and important.

Yet, without any ulterior reference, it must be admitted that this circumstance is nothing improbable, and much less impossible. A master might make such terms with his workmen—and workmen might engage their services to a master, with such an understanding as this—that whatever was just and reasonable, when the term of their labour was over, that they might reckon upon receiving. It is manifest too, that as illustrating the willingness of the labourers, to embrace the first offer of being honestly and industriously employed, and their confidence in the honour and good faith of their master, no supposition was so well adapted as that of an understanding between them, which left the reward of stipulated services to the unstipulated frankness and liberality of the employer. And if such is the moral effect of this understanding with respect to all the labourers, who engaged themselves at broken periods of the day, from a voluntary mo-

tive of industry, and an implicit reliance on the promise of their employer; it must be especially true of the last engaged of all, who went into the vineyard, upon the first summons, though with the hope of obtaining, by their labour and diligence, no more than the wages of a single hour.

The allusion, which occurs in the sequel, to “the weight of the day, and the heat,” τὸ βάρος τῆς ἡμέρας, καὶ τὸν καύσωνα, without regarding it simply as a topic of complaint, which, under the circumstances of the case, was very likely to suggest itself, and to be made the ground of an invidious contrast between the apparent hardship of the case of one class of the labourers, and the indulgence shewn to another; as referred to the climate of Judæa, and to the time of the year, is exceedingly pertinent and just. The ideas conveyed by these terms, are distinct, and the words should be so rendered as to preserve this distinction. The burden of the day is one thing, and the burning of the day is another. The former is the greatest proportion of the common toil and labour of the day, the latter of its common heat or sultriness; the one of which is most considerable to those who labour for the whole of the day, and the other to those who labour before and at the noon of the day, when the heat of the sun is greatest. In hot climates, and under a cloudless sky, the personal toil of labourers in the open air, is much aggravated by the heat of the weather, and the scorching power of the sun: and this inconvenience, which is felt to be considerable in Judæa, about the noon of day, at every season of the year, begins to be almost insupportable about the time of the vernal

equinox, and throughout the summer^k. Each of these evils had fallen to the share of the labourers first engaged—both the accumulated toil and the accumulated heat of the day; compared with whom, the labourers of the eleventh hour in particular, had endured but one twelfth of the bodily exertion, and almost nothing of the bodily scorching of the day. And considering the fatigue which they had all undergone, in the light of a personal burden, the language in which they speak of their share of it is just and beautiful. The whole labour of the day being represented as a weight or load, they who had sustained the greatest proportion of it, might fitly be said to have carried it, *βαστάσαι*.

The punctual discharge of the wages of the labourers, at the close of the day, that is, as soon as they became due, might appear too natural a circumstance to require to be particularly noticed; except to observe that it was critically in unison with the requisition of the Law of Moses. Consulting for the right of the poorest and humblest, as well as of the greatest and wealthiest, it was the mandate of that law, that so often as a poor man had been any way engaged in the service of a rich, the earnings of his labour were not to be withheld from him a single night, but to be paid as soon as his day's work was ended, and ere the sun was yet gone down^l.

^k Cf. Gen. xxxi. 40: *Thus I was: in the day the drought consumed me, and the frost by night.*

^l Leviticus xix. 13: *The wages of him that is hired shall not abide with thee all night until the morning.*

Deuteron. xxiv. 15: *At his day thou shalt give him his hire, neither shall the sun go down upon it.*

The command to pay the labourers their hire proceeds from the master; but the payment is actually made through the hands of another, who as standing in a certain relation to the master, and in a corresponding one to the vineyard, is with great propriety supposed to act in his stead. The mention of this person introduces a new class of subordinate personages; the name which he bears being that of the ἐπίτροπος of the owner of the vineyard. That this new personage stands to the principal one in the relation of his servant, may be taken for granted; but whether as the master of an household, or as the owner of a vineyard, may be doubtful. It is more consistent, however, with the analogy of the parable, to suppose that he stands to him in the relation of his servant in the latter respect, as much as the workmen in the relation of his labourers, in the same: and yet it is not impossible that his relation of servant to the owner of the vineyard, may be founded ultimately on his relation of servant to the master of the household.

The version of steward for the name of this servant in the original, would seem to imply that he was the same description of domestic servant, the nature of whose office we considered at large, under the various denominations of οἰκονόμος, *dispensator*, or steward. But the proper meaning of the word is simply a procurator; one to whose care and superintendence something has been delegated by another. It would answer consequently to “over-seer” or “inspector;” and though it cannot be

Tobit iv. 14: Let not the wages of any man, which hath wrought for thee, tarry with thee, but give it him out of hand.

denied that it might denote such a servant as the steward in former parables—a general governor of the family, and a general manager of the concerns, of an opulent householder of antiquity—yet, since the material transaction which gives occasion to his agency, concerns the culture or care of a vineyard, as one among other species of property, each of which might require its peculiar manager—it may justly be presumed that the same kind of servant is meant in this instance, as was spoken of in the parable of the barren fig-tree, by the name of the ἀμπελουργός, the keeper or dresser of the vineyard. Such a keeper would every vineyard possess, in behalf of the owner; and it would belong to his office to superintend the services of all persons engaged in its cultivation, at the owner's expense; and whenever it was necessary, to pay them their wages in his behalf.

The resolution of the master to pay all the workmen in the same proportion, at the end of the day, however unexpected, is not an improbable circumstance. Instances of such resolutions, from no better a motive than the whim or caprice of those who form them, would not be unexampled in real life. But let us not suppose that the motive to the act in the present instance, is of this description. The act is attributed, as it was naturally to be attributed, to the resolution of the master; but the moving cause to that resolution was his own good-nature—as no less essential, and no less distinctive a part of his character, than his justice and equity. It has been observed, that a penny a day was not only good wages for a workman, but even ample and munificent. Those,

then, who had bargained for a penny a day, had reason not merely to be content with the fairness, but grateful to the liberality of their employer. And as to the proper objects of such dispositions as the master's generosity or good-nature—it is clear that these could not be found in that class of his labourers, with whom a stipulation or covenant of a definite kind had been made ; but if in any of the number, only among those who had consented to go into his vineyard, upon no other terms than a general confidence in his word and assurance, that they should receive whatever was right.

Now this was a difference between their case and that of the labourers engaged at first, which might lead to the distinction made in their treatment respectively, at last. Generosity had been consulted, in behalf of the latter, in fixing their stipulated reward at first ; and justice only remained to be considered in awarding it to them at last. But justice had not been considered in fixing the reward of the latter at first ; and generosity might fitly become the rule and law of proceeding, in reference to them at last : the more liberal in a case like theirs, the measure of their actual reward, the more worthy of their employer—and so far the more just. For the alacrity with which they had accepted his invitation—the confidence they had displayed in himself—the trust they had reposed in his word—might be construed, if he pleased, as a personal obligation, which he was personally bound to acknowledge—and might be the moving cause in making up his mind to treat them with more indulgence, than in strictness, or even in equity, he was obliged to do.

And if such was the nature of his feelings, and the principle of his conduct towards the rest, it was but natural that the labourers of the eleventh hour, who had established their claim to this favourable construction of their behaviour beyond the rest—should be distinguished as the objects of his generosity, even above the rest. Under any circumstances, indeed, it is evident, that by no kindness gratuitously conferred on some of the number, was an injury done to the rights of the rest, if these received their stipulated due; in which respect, the œconomy of the parable is worthy of all admiration; exhibiting the strict justice and yet the unconstrained generosity of the master of the vineyard, so entirely in harmony together, that while it cannot be denied a great and unexpected indulgence is shewn to some of his workmen, it is just as certain that no wrong is done to the rest.

Josephus mentions a circumstance, respecting a custom in his time, which, if I mistake not, illustrates the apparent anomaly in the parable, by shewing that, under peculiar circumstances, the payment of equal wages, notwithstanding the inequality of services rendered, might be the actual rule of proceeding in awarding to workmen their due. The rebuilding or restoration of the second temple was begun in the eighteenth of Herod's reign, U. C. 734. B. C. 20; but in consequence of various subsequent extensions of the plan, and the addition of new buildings, or the further embellishment of old, we have the testimony of the Jewish historian that it was not completed before the year when the Jewish war broke out, U. C. 819. A. D.

66; and we have St. John's, at the outset of his Gospel, that it was still going on U.C. 780. A.D. 27^m. The workmen, many thousands in number, who were employed upon the sacred edifice, were paid at the expense of the corban, or sacred treasury; and the rule of payment was this, that whosoever had wrought but one hour of the day, received on the spot the wages of a dayⁿ. No contemporary of our Lord's could be ignorant of so remarkable a rule for the remuneration of services upon so remarkable a work, as the rebuilding, decoration, or enlargement of the temple.

This part of the œconomy of the parable, indeed, is not only the most singular, but the most important of all—and is best to be explained by a reference to the concealed moral import of the whole. For the sake of its subserviency to that import, there is equal art and judgment in directing the payment of the labourers to begin with the last, and to proceed upwards to the first; not as might have been the case, and, considering the order in which they were engaged, was more likely to be the case—to begin with the first and to end with the last. For had the order of the payment been reversed, no such effect, as is represented to have been

^m Vide John ii. 20. Harm. ii. 11.

ⁿ Ant. Jud. xx. ix. 7: *προνοούμενος δὲ τῶν τεχνιτῶν* (Ananus scilicet), *καὶ εἰς τούτους ἀναλοῦν τοὺς θησαυροὺς βουλόμενος· καὶ γὰρ εἰ μίαν τις ὥραν τῆς ἡμέρας εἰργάσατο, τὸν μισθὸν ὑπὲρ ταύτης εὐθέως ἐλάμβανεν.* The use of *ὁ μισθός* absolutely, requires it to be understood of the wages of a day; and the sense of the passage in general is, that if a workman was engaged at the eleventh hour of the day, so as to be but one hour employed on the sacred edifice, he received pay as if he had been employed all the day.

the consequence of the rule of payment, could have been supposed to ensue. The labourers of the first hour, having received all they had stipulated for, and consequently all that beforehand they had reason to expect, would have gone away contented, before it came to the turn of the labourers of the eleventh hour to be paid their wages. The cupidity which led them to expect that they should receive more themselves, than what had been stipulated in their behalf, could not have been raised, except by seeing others before them paid more liberally than in proportion to their apparent deserts; nor consequently that envy of the good-fortune of these, and that discontent at their own treatment, which the disappointment of this cupidity excited.

The envy and discontent so produced, however unreasonable in themselves, yet, under the circumstances of the case, must be pronounced a natural and probable effect. The slightest experience of human nature, and especially of the feelings and dispositions of persons belonging to the rank in life, which these labourers must be supposed to have occupied, would be sufficient to vouch for its truth. Nor can it be denied that, *prima facie*, the liberal remuneration extended to services, indisputably inferior to their own, would be a ground of encouragement to them to expect so much the more themselves; nor consequently that the disappointment of so natural an anticipation, would be proportionably vexatious and mortifying. It was their duty, indeed, to have reflected that no wrong was done to them, whatever favour was shewn to others; and instead of drawing invidious comparisons between themselves and their

companions, to the prejudice of the fairness and impartiality of their common employer, they should have concluded that he had good reasons for what he was doing, as well as an unquestionable right to make what distinctions he pleased. Yet that they do not stop to reason thus, but give way at once to the feeling of anger and irritation, which the disappointment of their hopes had occasioned—was natural enough to persons in their situation.

The propriety of the language in which this feeling gives itself vent, has been already pointed out in one instance: and besides this, another circumstance is incidentally disclosed in the narrative, which places the impulse of which it is the natural expression, in a striking point of view. The master, reasoning with one of the loudest in his complaints, is supposed to say to him, ἄρον τὸ σὸν, καὶ ὑπάγε—words, which should not be rendered, “Take that thine is, “and go thy way,” but “Take up that is thine, and “go thy way.” So rendered, they lead to the inference, that the penny, which had been tendered to this man in payment, had been received, indeed, but in the expectation that more would be offered along with it: and when he found his expectation disappointed, had been thrown by him on the ground in disgust.

Lastly, the reply of the master to the murmurs of his workmen, which might have been as sharp as their complaints were unreasonable, is yet remarkable only for firmness of manner, mixed with moderation and calmness of tone. It is in unison with that attention to decorum, which appears in all our Saviour’s parabolic conceptions, that the sternness of rebuke, which might have been consistently assumed,

is softened down to a mild, but dignified expostulation, which defends the conduct of the master, and exposes the unreasonableness of the workman at the same time; reminding him gently of his own engagement, with the letter of which he had strictly complied; and, provided no injury was done by his own liberality, to the rights of another, asserting the liberty of a master to act as he pleased in his own concerns, and to give what he would, and to whom he would, of his own money; and insinuating rather than alledging, the true cause of his complaint, in the *evil* eye which could not look without envy on the receiver of a benefit, nor without dissatisfaction on the author of it, because it was excluded from partaking in a share of it, itself—though with no reasonable claim to expect it. For that this is a just description of the nature and operation of the passion of envy—to begrudge the good-fortune which has fallen to another, though with no right to partake in it itself—and that jealousy of the kindness extended to his companions, as well as the disappointment of cupidity in his own behalf, lay at the bottom of the complaints of the discontented labourer, may equally be taken for granted.

The above explanation of the material circumstances of the parable will prepare the way for the consideration of its moral, and subsequently of its interpretation; but before we proceed to this, the peculiarity of a narrative which turns almost entirely on the engagement of one succession after another, of a common description of persons, for a common end and purpose, at different periods of the

same interval of time, renders it manifestly proper to premise certain observations on this part of the œconomy of the parable; which will be found only necessary to its ulterior explanation.

The labourers engaged at so many different times, and constituting by each engagement, a separate body of men, it may be advisable to call the labourers of so many orders, according to the times of their engagements respectively. The labourers of these several orders agree in some things, and differ in others; both which require to be pointed out. They agree in the character of labourers in general—in the circumstance of being hired by the same master, out of the same place, and for the same purpose. They agree in being all sent into the same vineyard, and all rendering there the same kind of services, and all in bearing there some portion or other of the burden and heat of the same day. They agree, lastly, in being treated alike at the close of the day, and being placed on a par in the receipt of the wages respectively due to them, for the services respectively rendered by them.

They differ from each other first, the labourers of the first order from those of every other, in being engaged at the morning of the day, and consequently for the labour of the entire day; secondly, the labourers of the second order, in being engaged at the earliest period of the day, and consequently for the greatest share of the toil and fatigue of the day, next to the labourers of the first order; and thirdly, the labourers of the third order, from those of the fourth, and those of the fourth, from those of the fifth, in being engaged at earlier periods, and consequently for more of the duration, and more of the

labour and fatigue of the same day, than any who came after them, though for less than all who had preceded them.

They differ further, the labourers of the first order, from those of every other, in being engaged with an express stipulation beforehand what they should receive at the end of the day, in return for what they should do through the day ; and the labourers of every other order from those of the first, in being engaged with a stipulation what they should do, but with no stipulation what they should receive ; and in being engaged upon such terms, for part only of a day, and yet receiving at the end of the day, though for part of the day, as much as the labourers of the first order, by virtue of a special contract, for the whole of the day.

They differ again, the labourers of the second and the fifth orders from those of the third and fourth, in being specified as separately engaged, while those of the other two, though doubtless engaged distinctly, and at different periods of the same day, are yet summarily mentioned as engaged together ; whence it is not unreasonable to infer that these two orders agreed in some circumstance, which so far identified them with each other while it discriminated them from the rest. They differ again, the labourers of the second and the fifth order, from those of the third and the fourth, that the proper stipulation which must be supposed to have been made with the labourers of every order, next after the first—the stipulation of receiving whatever was just and right—is actually specified of those of the second, and those of the fifth order respectively, but not of those of the third and those of the fourth.

They differ lastly; the labourers of all the orders next after the first, as well as those of the first, from the labourers of the fifth, that the engagement of the former, in each instance, was the result of design, or the effect of a visit to the market-place expressly to find them; that of the latter appears to have been accidental, or the consequence of discovering persons in the market-place, at the close of the day, whom one in search of workmen could not have expected to find there still unengaged, so late in the day.

THE MORAL.

If it is reasonable to suppose that our Saviour's parables are well-connected histories, the parts and circumstances of which have all a proper meaning, and conspire to some common result—it must be evident that the first part of the preceding narrative is preliminary and subordinate to the second. The final end proposed by the account of the engagement of labourers for hire, on the service of a vineyard, during a certain day, would not have been answered without the account of the payment of their wages, as the due for that service, at the end of the day. The narrative itself too, which touches summarily on the fact of the engagement, and leaves to implication the fact of the stipulated services, begins to be circumstantial with the account of the payment of the wages.

Admitting however, that the first part of the parabolic narrative, relating to every thing which passes *during* the day—is preliminary to the account of what passes at the end of the day—still when the history comes to this account, it dwells

upon two facts only, one in respect to each order of the labourers in common, and the other in respect to those of the first in particular: the former of these, that the labourers of every order, are all paid for their services alike, as if their services in each instance were the same—the latter, that the labourers of the first order are displeased and dissatisfied at receiving no more than the rest, after having done as they thought, so much more to deserve it, than the rest. These two facts likewise are connected as cause and effect. The latter of them is the consequence of the preceding. The discontent of the labourers of the first order is the result of the treatment of all the labourers alike. This treatment might be the effect of the justice of their common employer in one respect, and of his liberality in another; of his justice in acting up to the letter of a covenant, where a covenanted right was due—of his liberality in extending an indulgence, where a favour was free to be bestowed; but that discontent was the effect of disappointed cupidity in their own behalf, previously raised by the appearance of liberality in the master, when justice only was expected from him—and of envy at the good fortune of others which had profited so much more from his liberality, than they themselves in proportion, from his justice.

Now this resolution of the common employer, to place all his labourers, whether they had wrought for a longer or a shorter time, upon a footing of perfect equality in point of remuneration, would necessarily be most unexpected in the instance of those who had been last engaged, and had borne but a twelfth part of the labour of the day. The

munificence, then, towards all in common, which had determined to reward their services in common, beyond what they strictly deserved—would be attested by the conduct of the master towards none of the number, so strikingly as towards these. The cupidity of the labourers of the first order would be excited by the favour conferred upon none, so strongly as by the indulgence shewn to these; their envy or their indignation would be so pointedly stimulated by the comparison of their own case with the treatment of none of the number, as of these. Accordingly, whether they were disposed to complain at being placed upon a par with the rest, or not, does not appear; they give vent to their dissatisfaction only at seeing themselves placed on a par with these. They contrast the hardship of their own case, solely with the indulgence extended to these; and they compel the master of the vineyard to vindicate his treatment of his workmen from the charge of an unjust and partial distinction generally, with a special application only to themselves and to these.

Besides which, though it must of necessity be supposed that all the labourers, beginning from the last, received every man his penny, up to the first; yet the actual tender, and actual receipt of that sum, are specified merely of the last and the first. It is reasonable, therefore, to presume that the proper consequences of such a dispensation, whatever they might be, were designed chiefly to affect these two; were meant to be specially illustrated by the evidence of the result, only as concerned these two. The personal offence which any, among the preceding orders of labourers, were liable to take, or actually did take, at being placed on a par with the rest, was

to be exemplified, in the feelings and behaviour of the labourers of the first order, upon finding themselves in no wise distinguished from the labourers of the last. Accordingly, though some there were among the labourers of the intermediate orders, who had almost as good a pretence to take themselves offended, at being placed on a level with those of the last order, as the labourers of the first; yet it is not implied, much less affirmed, that any concurred in the same feeling of dissatisfaction, or gave vent to their discontent at this apparent inequality of treatment, in the same kind of complaints, as the labourers of the first.

Laying these circumstances together, we may justly infer that the moral of a representation and course of things like the preceding, must be to the following effect: Out of a common number of labourers, engaged by the same master, and for a similar purpose—a day's labour in the culture of his vineyard—some at the very beginning of this day, and with a stipulation beforehand for the wages of the day—others at various periods of its duration, and some almost at its close, but each with no previous stipulation, like that made with the first engaged, respecting the wages to be received for the services to be rendered; it is the object of the narrative to evince the resolution of the common employer, on coming to reckon with his workmen at the close of the day, to treat them all alike, and to pay the same wages to all, whether they had wrought for the same time or not, and especially to the last engaged as compared with the first; allowing to these in particular, as the unstipulated remuneration for the labour of one hour, the same sum which was

the adequate stipulated return to the others, for the services of an entire day; and as the natural result of this resolution on the part of the master, to illustrate its consequences to the workmen in nothing so much as the discontent and dissatisfaction of the labourers at first engaged, on being treated as equals in point of reward, as if equals in point of desert, to the labourers last engaged.

THE INTERPRETATION.

When treating of the parable of the barren fig-tree, we observed that the visible church, regarded as a material, not as a personal subject—that is, as the local habitation of the congregation of believers, professing the faith and practice of true religion, which, in the nature of things, must be confined to a certain locality, and comprehended within certain limits, upon the face of the earth; is denoted by the metaphor of the vineyard or garden of God^o: and every vineyard, as a garden appropriated to the culture of the vine, supposing the inhabitation and ingrowing of that species of tree, the community comprehended by the palé of the church, the congregation of professing believers, are described and characterized, under the same metaphorical relation, as the vine of God. But in addition to what was then said, it requires to be further observed, that the use of such metaphors is not indiscriminate; and in order to a just conception of the grounds and reasons of the modes of speaking themselves, the metaphor of the vineyard of God, as applied to the visible church, is to be restricted to the land of Judæa, as an integral part of the whole earth; and the idea of

^o Vol. iii. p. 365.

the vine, as planted in that vineyard, to the people of the Jews, as an integral part of mankind; and to each, as a small and limited, but a select and peculiar portion of a certain whole, in comparison with the remainder.

The necessity of this restriction seems to be justly deducible, first, from the nature of the case; because until the establishment of the Christian church, there was no visible church of God any where in being except in Judæa; until the incorporation of the Gentiles into the body of the congregation of that church, there was no community which could be said to be the people of God, and the members of his church, but the children of Israel. Secondly, from the analogy and propriety of the simple idea, which is at the bottom of the metaphor, in each of these instances; an idea, which metaphorically applied to the Jews, and to the church among the Jews, but also restricted to them, is exquisitely just and beautiful—but, if extended to the Gentiles, and to the Christian church in contradistinction to the Jewish, manifestly becomes incongruous. For every vineyard, though appropriated to the culture of the vine, is a species of garden; and must agree with a garden in the possession of a certain common nature, and corresponding properties. Now every garden is necessarily only a part of a greater estate; but a part selected from the rest, and appropriated by its owner to some special purpose, whether of embellishment or recreation, of pleasure or utility, distinct from the rest. The complex of a man's lands could not be called his garden, or his pleasure grounds; though his garden and his pleasure grounds must be included in the complex of his lands. Nor

would any portion set apart from a larger estate, be converted thereby into a garden or a pleasure ground, were it not also to be distinguished by some ornamental qualities above the rest, or dedicated to some use and purpose for the benefit of the owner, different from the rest.

For example, at the creation of the present world, speaking after the manner of men, the holy Scripture represents the Maker of the universe as planting himself a garden in Eden; that is, as selecting Eden from all the earth besides—from the rest of his own creation—to bestow upon it peculiar beauty or peculiar sanctity; and to apply it to corresponding purposes, as the proper habitation of the first human pair in their original state of innocence and goodness, and of corresponding free and unreserved communion with their Creator. But had the whole earth been the counterpart of Paradise, however perfect of its kind, there would have been no room for peculiar and exclusive embellishment to be bestowed upon God's garden in Eden; and had not Eden, when set apart as the seat of Paradise, been distinguishable for greater beauty and perfection than the rest of the earth, it could not have been rendered, nor could it have been called or considered in any sense, the garden of God.

A garden, then, and by parity of reason a vineyard, necessarily implies the idea of *μικρόν τι*, and *ἀγαπητόν τι*—of something small and limited, but choice and cherished of its kind; of a part selected from a certain whole, and in the estimation of its owner, in the embellishments and decorations bestowed upon it, in the affection with which it is regarded, and in the uses to which it is devoted—

perceptibly distinguished from the rest. Hence, though the whole earth was always the Lord's, and the fulness thereof—and though all the families of mankind were equally his creatures—yet when he had set apart the Jews, a single community, and compared with the whole of mankind, or even of any one nation of their own time, the fewest of all people—to be his own, his peculiar and exclusive people; and when he had settled them within the locality of Judæa, an isolated region of the earth, and compared with the extent of the circumjacent countries, possessed by the families of the Gentiles, the least of all lands; though the property and lordship of the whole earth might still be his as before, his garden, his vineyard, was planted in Judæa, his right or title to a property in the earth of that description, was confined to Judæa; and from that time forward, the figure of his vineyard, as applied to that land in particular, and the image of his vine, as meant of the people who inhabited it, the former in the sense of the locality of his church as visibly established upon earth, the latter in that of its members or congregation—are obviously just and beautiful.

But when the limits of the visible church had been extended over the rest of the earth, as well as Judæa—and the children of the Gentile had been incorporated among the congregation of that church, as well as the Jew; it is manifest there was no longer any room for the same real distinction as before, between Judæa and the rest of the world, or the people of the Jews and the Gentiles; nor consequently, for the same metaphorical mode of describing and characterizing it as before. Either the

whole earth, from that time forward, had become, and must have been denominated, the vineyard of God, and the whole of mankind, the vine of God—or no part of the world more than another, no nation or community of professing believers above the rest. Accordingly, after the period of this enlargement of the pale of the visible church, the use of such metaphors, to describe either the locality of the church itself, or the congregation of professing believers living within it—each in their peculiar relation to God, as the Head of the church in particular, as well as the Lord of the whole earth in general—is observed to cease. Later than these instances of its use in the parables of our Saviour, at a time when the church in question, however near to the point of this enlargement, was still actually confined to Judæa, there is no example of its recurrence in the Christian Scriptures, not even in those parts which, in other respects, are the most figurative in their language of all—as the Book of Revelation itself.

But with respect to the usage of the Old Testament—that construction, which restricts the meaning of these metaphors *specially* to the Jewish church, and the Jewish people, is strictly in unison with its established modes of speech. These figures present themselves repeatedly in the writings of the prophets; but always in this limited sense. Thus Ezekiel xv. 2, where God is introduced expostulating with the prophet, and saying, “Son of man, “What is the vine-tree more than any tree, *or than* “a branch which is among the trees of the forest?” and again, ver. 6: “Therefore thus saith the Lord “GOD, As the vine-tree among the trees of the forest,

“ which I have given to the fire for fuel, so will I “ give the inhabitants of Jerusalem :” while the nations of the world are denoted by the trees of the forest in general, the people of the Jews, or the inhabitants of Jerusalem, are designated by the vine-tree in particular ; the former, by trees growing wild and in a state of nature, the latter, by a tree reclaimed and domesticated ; the former, by trees still unproductive and unserviceable to any one, the latter, by a tree the most useful to man, and valuable to its possessor ; the former, as at all times left to themselves, and as the subjects of no particular care or attention, from any quarter, the latter, as for a time cherished by its owner in proportion to its value, and treated with uniform delicacy and tenderness—until, in consequence of its own ungrateful returns for such favours, it deserved to be abandoned by him, and left to perish, like one of the trees of the forest.

The author of the eightieth Psalm, the internal evidence of which, though it is entitled a Song of Asaph, or a Song for Asaph—strongly implies that he must have lived later than the first of the two captivities at least, describes the effect of that visitation on his country, under the image of breaking up, and laying waste and bare, a vineyard, and all its productions, beforetime flourishing in peace and security. The whole of this allegorical description, from verse 8—15, is so much to the point, so beautiful and pathetic, and with one exception, in the allusion to the casting out of the heathen, preparatory to the planting of the vine in this vineyard, a picture of such perfect keeping and consistency, that it would well deserve to be transcribed, were it not

that it must be familiar to the reader. It is superfluous to observe upon it, that by the image of the vine nothing can be intended but the people of Israel, nor by the vineyard, any thing but the land of Judæa, within which they were settled, and until this sad reverse of fortune, had lived and flourished, favoured and protected by God.

The prophet Isaiah, too, has an equally circumstantial, and well sustained allegory, in his fifth chapter, from verse 1—7: which under the disguise of the same metaphorical imagery, contains a retrospect of God's dealings with the Jews, and of the ingratitude, impenitence, and immorality, with which his manifold dispensations of mercy in their favour, had been requited; as well as a prediction of the signal national visitations which the national stubbornness and wickedness should at length compel him to bring upon them. To place the import of the whole beyond a question, it concludes with a declaration from the prophet himself; "For the vineyard of the LORD of hosts *is* the house of Israel, and the men of Judah his pleasant plant."

These examples of the usage of speech in question, are sufficient to illustrate the idiom of prophecy in the employment of terms and images like these—though more might be added to the number^p;

^p Isaiah xxvii. 2, 3: "In that day sing ye unto her, a vineyard of red wine.

"I the Lord do keep it; I will water it every moment: lest *any* hurt it, I will keep it night and day."

Jeremiah ii. 21: "Yet I had planted thee a noble vine, wholly a right seed: how then art thou turned into the degenerate plant of a strange vine unto me?"

The vine stands for the Jewish people, Isaiah xvi. 8—11: Ezekiel xvii. 6—8: xix. 10—14: Hosea x. 1: Nahum ii. 2:

whence it is a natural inference, that the material image of a vineyard, which enters, in an allegorical sense, into three of the parables of the gospel, was either derived from the usage of the ancient scriptures, or is to be understood in conformity to it. The practice of the inspired writers of the Old Testament may well be supposed to have consecrated this particular symbol to this particular sense; and it is highly improbable that our Saviour, speaking as he was of the Jews, in this very capacity of the people of God, and familiar as he was with the standing image of the prophets to describe their relation in the same capacity, would use the same symbol to express the same thing, except in the same sense.

If, then, the conclusion thus obtained, respecting the original derivation, and the formal application of the metaphor or symbol of the vineyard of God, as denoting the local habitation of the visible church, not every where or any where established, but as first planted, so still continuing to subsist, exclusively in Judæa—be admitted to be just and reasonable; the determination of the sense of this principal image will furnish a clue to the interpretation of the rest of the parable. The owner of the vine-

The land of Judæa is represented by a vineyard, Jeremiah xii. 10. The people of God is represented as an olive, Jeremiah xi. 16. The kings of Judah are described as cedars, Ezek. xvii. 3. The Messiah himself is so represented, Ezek. xvii. 22—24. The kings and princes of the nations, at different times subjugated by the kings of Babylon, are described by the fir-trees and cedars of Lebanon, Isaiah xiv. 8. The Assyrian king, or the Assyrian empire is represented as a cedar of Lebanon; other kings and nations by inferior trees, Ezek. xxxi. 3—9. The Amorite destroyed before the Israelites, at the Eisodus, is compared to the cedars and the oaks, Amos ii. 9.

yard, the orders of the labourers, the nature and duration of their services, the wages or stipulated reward of these services, the overseer or steward who pays them, the inequality of personal labour, the equality of personal remuneration for it—each will find its counterpart in the persons or facts of a real history, answering to the allegorical. But before I proceed to state what these are, I consider it necessary to premise certain cautions, respecting the construction of the history in general, the degree of coincidence between such an history and its required interpretation, which we ought to expect in some things, and the points of distinction which we ought to be prepared for in others.

For example, though the parable should be found to contain a reference to something in the history of the Jewish church, still future, it ought not to surprise us, if it is seen to contain a reference to something in its past history also; nor that both should be so connected together, that the former, in point of time, may appear almost identical with the latter. Thus, it ought not to surprise us, if, to shew what was still the design of Providence in respect to the disposal of the Jewish church, the œconomy of its proceedings from the commencement down to the close of the proper dispensation connected with that church, should be found exhibited in one view: nor should it be considered a difficulty that the entire duration of the same dispensation, and the successive steps in the progress and development of the same Divine œconomy, may be described under the metaphor of a single day, and adumbrated by what is supposed to take place, at integral periods of that day.

Again, if the different orders of labourers are to be considered so many distinct classes of such persons—they may denote so many different national divisions of mankind. If they denote distinct classes of such labourers, admitted from time to time into the same vineyard, they may denote similar comprehensive divisions of mankind admitted from time to time into the Jewish church. If these classes continue no less distinct, after their reception into the vineyard, than before, they may denote corresponding divisions of mankind, received into the bosom of the Jewish church, yet remaining as distinct from the Jews, and from each other, after their union to it, as before. If these different classes of labourers, once admitted into the vineyard, preserving their original distinction from each other, retain it, and continue therein as distinct as at first, to the close of the day; the national divisions of mankind, represented by them, must be such as existed in the bosom of the Jewish church, yet still preserved their distinction from each other, at the time of its transition into the Christian: so that the same class of labourers, as distinct from the rest, may stand for the same general division of mankind not only when first incorporated into the Jewish church, but as continuing to belong to it, down to the time of our Saviour and his apostles. It will therefore be considered no difficulty, that the same body of labourers are described in each instance not only as originally engaged either at the beginning, or at some definite period of the day, but as receiving their wages at the close of the day; and consequently as having been all employed for the whole or for part of the same day—though this day should be found to

denote the entire duration of the Legal œconomy itself.

Again, with respect to the terms on which the several classes of labourers are supposed to be admitted into the vineyard ; we are bound to consider not merely the different intervals of the same day, at which their admission successively takes place, but more especially the circumstance, that though all are admitted in the course of one day, and all to a part of the labour and service of that day, some are admitted with an express stipulation beforehand, both what they are to do, and what they are to receive, and others are not.

Again, with respect to this previous stipulation—more especially that part of it which concerns the return which the labourers were to receive for the services which they were to render ; we are bound to consider not what it is *in specie*, a denarius, or scripture penny, but what it is *in genere*, a covenanted remuneration for covenanted services : which being the case, it ought not to surprise us, that even this image of a denarius may stand for any specific instance of covenanted remuneration, and the services, for which it is the supposed equivalent, for any species of covenanted performances, either promised or required from the Jews, as the reward of their obedience, or as the condition to which that reward was attached.

Again, though the labourers of every order were described to have been engaged by the personal agency of the master of the vineyard, and all for the same kind of service in his vineyard, yet the labourers of each order after the first, were not supposed to be so engaged, with any express stipulation what they were to receive for these ser-

vices ; like the labourers of the first. The covenant, then, of these labourers with their common master, if it could be called a covenant, partook more of the nature of a voluntary engagement, than the contract of the labourers of the first order. For it left something, essential to such a covenant, to be understood on one side, though what corresponded to it on the other, was explicit and well defined. It was clear, that by going into the vineyard, upon the invitation so received, they might calculate on rendering its owner a certain kind of personal service therein ; but it was not clear what they were to expect, in return for that service, from him.

This representation may suit to the case of those, who, whether nationally or individually, might voluntarily embrace the Jewish religion, and take upon themselves the observance of the proper Jewish law, yet without any such positive and express understanding of the nature and certainty of the privileges to which they might become entitled by so doing, as the Jews ; who had both the assurance of God to know what they might expect from their obedience to his Law, and the warrant of God to depend on the fulfilment of the promise by him, if they themselves performed the conditions to which it was appended.

Again, though the labourers of the eleventh hour must be supposed to have wrought for at least *one* hour, after their admission into the vineyard ; yet the hardship or duration of the services, which they were competent to render, or liable to endure, after their admission at so late a period, in comparison of those before them, and especially of the emphatic burden and heat of the day, which had fallen to the

lot of the labourers engaged at the first hour—is manifestly so small, that the labourers of the one hour, in being admitted to the full enjoyment of the same day's-wages as the labourers of the twelve hours, may be supposed admitted to the plenary enjoyment of the proper stipulated reward of certain stipulated services, without having done absolutely any thing to earn it; and consequently on no principle to account for this admission, but the gratuitous kindness and good-will of the common employer of both, who was free, if he pleased, to give the one as a favour, the very same thing which he was bound to render to the other as a right.

Lastly, though all the labourers of the four last orders are supposed to have been put on a par with each other, and with those of the first; yet we are bound to remember that the moral effect of this representation and its consequences, was meant to be specially evidenced in the results to which it leads with respect to the labourers of the last order, and those of the first, exclusive of the rest; upon the former, in the gratuitous kindness and liberality of their treatment, at the hands of a common master, which, though proportionably evinced towards the labourers of each of these subsequent orders, also, was most singularly displayed towards those of the last; upon the latter, in the envy produced in them towards the labourers of the last order, as the subjects of this liberality, and in the discontent and dissatisfaction with their common employer, as the author of it, also generated, in their own behalf.

Now, the vineyard denoting the visible church, as at first established, and as still existing solely among

the Jews ; the transaction in the parable, between the master and the labourers, relating to the culture of this vineyard, must be something which concerns the œconomy of that church, as still confined to the Jews, and not yet passed into the Christian ; which, as before observed, may go as far back as the very beginning of this œconomy, and as far downwards as the very period of its expiration, but cannot ascend higher than the one, nor descend lower than the other.

The principal personage in this transaction, described in his relative character to the vineyard, as its owner, and in his relation to the labourers, as their master or employer, must be the author and founder, and consequently the Lord and Master of the visible church, established among the Jews ; who being uniformly represented in the Christian scriptures, as the second Person in the most Holy Trinity, the Angel of the Covenant, and in all things appertaining to human salvation, the only Mediator between God the Father, and mankind, is God the Son, who in the fulness of time, took flesh upon him, and dwelt among us, and suffered for us, in the person of Jesus Christ.

The several orders of labourers, engaged in the service of this master, and sent into his vineyard successively—are those portions of mankind, who from time to time were in possession of the visible church, or made up the complex of its existing parts and members, while it was still confined to Judæa ; and these being received into the vineyard at different periods of the day, on different terms and stipulations, and with a difference in the degree or extent of the services to be rendered by them there—may

be understood, as we have shewn, of comprehensive orders, classes, or divisions of mankind, admitted at divers times and in divers manners, into the body of the Jewish church. Five such orders of labourers does the narrative suppose to have been thus admitted into the vineyard; and five such classes or divisions of mankind will the testimony of the fact shew to have been originally put into possession, or subsequently received within the pale of the church established in Judæa.

The period of the day, beginning with the hour of sunrise, and ending with that of sunset—for the length of which the engagement of the labourers is supposed to last, and during which all the accessions to the numbers of workmen admitted into the vineyard, are represented to be made, and for all or for part of which the kind of services rendered by each of them within the vineyard, is implied to be in general the same; is the entire period of the Legal æconomy, from the first institution of the visible Jewish church, to its final transition into the Christian: a period, measured by the interval between the delivery of the Law upon mount Sinai, and the supersession of the Law by the Gospel, and coextensive with the intermediate duration of the rule and observance of that Law, as the only declared revelation of the word and will of God.

The service of the labourers, which as discharged in and upon one and the same vineyard, was necessarily one and the same unto all, though with regard to the specific duration of their engagement, the specific hardship of the service, and the specific return stipulated to be received for it, not one and the same to all; is the observance of the Mosaic law, as im-

posed at first on the Jews, and as subsequently, in some proportion or other, made incumbent on all, who were received into their communion within the pale of the same visible church. The stipulated service is the observance of this whole Law; the unstipulated is the observance not of this whole Law, but only of some of its parts.

The burden of the day, and the heat of the sun, which taken together, were the characteristic distinction of their share of the common labour within the vineyard, who were engaged in the morning, and employed in the vineyard throughout the day—are the difficulty, pain, and labour, which, from whatsoever cause, attached preeminently to the observance of the whole Law, and by the terms of their original covenant, constituted the peculiar obligation of those who had bound themselves to the observance of that whole Law. So much of the same burden, and such a proportion of the same heat, as fell to the lot of the workmen subsequently engaged, is such a degree of the same difficulty, pain, and labour, as would attach to the observance even of parts of a Law, so difficult to be observed as a whole—and would be specially incumbent on those who bound themselves to the observance of any portion of it, less than the whole.

The wages of the labourers at the end of the day, for the services rendered in the vineyard during the day, are the peculiar privilege, whatever that was, attached to the observance of the Mosaic law, and constituting the proper reward of the obedience paid it. The particular image, under which this privilege and this reward are adumbrated in the parable, is indifferent to its proper specific nature, provided it agrees to its actual generic description: and how

many soever and various might be the privileges attached to the right of communion with the Jewish church—whatever promises in general, might be held out as the reward of the observance of the Legal covenant; yet if there was any one prerogative among the former, or any one expectation, among the latter, more singular than another, this may be denoted by the image in the parable; and the stipulated reward or wages, will be this one privilege or this one promise, considered to be due to some among the members of the same visible church, as matter of right, the unstipulated, will be the same thing, not considered to be due as matter of right, but if imparted to others besides the former, at all, only so as matter of grace and favour.

The labourers of the first order, who were engaged for the service of the vineyard at the beginning of the day, and were bound by their engagement to the burden and heat of the day; are consequently they who were first put into possession of the visible church, while it still retained its proper relation of the vineyard of God, and who continued in possession of it ever after; who received the Law at its first promulgation, and pledged themselves to its entire observance, so long as they were subject to it: that is, they are the people of the Jews, who first came out of Egypt, and were first settled in possession of the land of Canaan; and standing both at that time, and at all subsequent periods of their history, for the same national division of mankind, were now represented by their descendants, in continued succession, down to the time of our Saviour—the contemporaries of the Gos-

pel, the men of *that* generation, who saw the close of the Mosaic, and the beginning of the Christian dispensation.

The labourers of the second order, who were sent into the vineyard at the earliest period of the day, and consequently were bound thereby to the principal share of the burden and heat of the day, next after the labourers of the first order—will denote the next integral division of mankind, who, though as distinct from the Jews as the rest of the world, were incorporated into the body of the Jewish church, or by embracing a part of the Law of Moses, in respect both to what they were bound to observe, and to what they might have reason to hope from the observance, were so far placed upon a par with the Jews. The matter of fact demonstrates that these were originally the successors of the ten tribes, planted by the conqueror Shalmaneser at the time of their captivity and absporation, in the same locality of the kingdom of Israel, and consisting at first of a mixture of Gentile tribes and nations^q. They are that people, therefore, who continuing ever after in possession of this country, and being neither the same with the Jews, nor yet with the rest of the nations of the Gentiles, are known thenceforwards in contemporary history by the name of Samaritans; and standing at all times for the same national division of mankind, were now represented by the descendants of the original settlers—the Samaritans of our Saviour's time, the men of *that* generation, who witnessed the termina-

^q 2 Kings xvii. 21—41. Cf. Ezra iv. 2. 9, 10; iv. 6; vi. 6: Nehemiah ii. 10, 19; iv. 1. 2. 7; vi. 1.

tion of the Mosaic, and the commencement of the Christian dispensation.

The labourers of the third and the fourth order, who are mentioned summarily together as engaged at the sixth and the ninth hours of the day, and stand distinguished from the labourers of the two former orders, not only in that respect, but by the comparative lightness of that part of the labour within the vineyard, which would fall to their share—are those accessions to the congregation of the visible church, while it was still confined to Judæa, which were made both after its original institution for and among the Jews, and after the incorporation even of the Samaritans ; and consequently, neither from among the Jews, nor yet, as from an order or division of Gentiles, already admitted within the pale of the visible church, from among the Samaritans. These, too, the matter of fact demonstrates to be the strangers converted to the Jewish religion, after the two captivities (both that of Israel, first, and that of Judah, next), out of the Gentile communities into the midst of which both Israelites and Jews were cast by those events. Such converts we may call the Proselytes of the dispersion ; an order of men who, though agreeing with each other in the possession of a common character, as Proselytes to Judaism from among the Gentiles, and contradistinguished thereby, both to the Jews of the mother country, and to the Hellenists, or lineal descendants of those Jews among the Gentiles, and to the Samaritans, as an integral part of the Gentiles professing the Jewish religion within the precincts of Judæa itself ; were yet Proselytes from no one Gentile community more than another, but from every commu-

nity of Gentiles in the ancient world, among which Jews of the dispersion were cast. The denomination for such Proselytes in the Christian scriptures is that of οἱ εὐσεβεῖς, καὶ Θεὸν σεβιζόμενοι, ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι, the pious, devout, and godly men, converted to Judaism from the errors of pagan idolatry—believers in the divine legation of Moses, if not adopted by the reception of the rite of circumcision into the family of Abraham—and bound to the observance of the law of Moses, in all its moral, and many, if not of all, its ritual or positive parts; yet probably not living in Judæa, among the Jews of the mother country, but in their own countries, among the Jews of the dispersion. Numbers of converts of this description were to be found, at the time of the gospel era, in every nation under heaven; and of converts of this description, many were actually assembled at Jerusalem, celebrating the feast of Pentecost in common with the Jews—who witnessed at that time the first formal publication of the Christian religion, and heard from the mouth of St. Peter the first sermon of a Christian preacher. The Proselytes of this description answer to the labourers of the third and fourth orders in conjunction; and beginning to have a being from the time of the Dispersions in particular, they might be represented by the same order of persons, members incorporate in the common body of the Jewish church, down to the contemporaries of our Saviour himself, the converts or devout men from among the Gentiles, who witnessed the cessation of the Legal, and the commencement of the Christian dispensation.

The labourers of the fifth order, who stand distinguished from all others, admitted into the same

vineyard in the course of the same day, by being received into the vineyard when the day was on the eve of expiring, and, consequently, when little of the burden, and none of the heat, which had characterized the labour of the entire day, remained to be endured by them; will denote some description of persons, who must have been admitted into the communion of the visible church, as at present confined to Judæa, not only *after* all others already admitted into it, whether Jews, Samaritans, or Proselytes, but *distinct* from them; and at a time in the duration of the Mosaic œconomy, previously subsisting and still in force, when it was on the point of expiring, and the rigour of its enactments was already sensibly mitigated, and shortly to be totally removed. This description of persons, then, can be none but the first-fruits of the Gentiles, properly so called; who were incorporated in the bosom of the Jewish church in the last and latest period of its existence in a separate state—or rather in that stage of its separate existence, before its entire transition into the name and form of the Christian, at which it had already begun to be identified with the latter; and who were subjected, upon their reception into it, to a few of the most simple and necessary of the ritual ordinances of the ancient Law, but with respect to the body of its requisitions in the complex, were excused from every thing but the observance of its moral duties.

The moral of the parable, therefore, which has been shewn to reside in the part of the history, transacted at the close of the day, the admission of each of the orders of labourers—whether engaged for the whole, or for part of the day—whether with,

or without a previous stipulation for the whole, or for part of the wages of the day—to the indiscriminate enjoyment of the full wages of a day, can find its counterpart in no future fact, hereafter to be exemplified in the œconomy of the Divine proceedings with respect to the disposal of the visible church, but this; the equal admission of Samaritans, Proselytes, Gentiles, and Jews, at the close of the appointed duration of the Mosaic dispensation, whether with or without the stipulated observance of the Mosaic law, and whether for the whole or for part of the duration of the Mosaic dispensation, to the common enjoyment of the same privilege, promise, or blessing, whatever it was, which constituted the stipulated reward of the observance of the whole Mosaic law, and for the whole of the Mosaic dispensation.

It becomes necessary, therefore, at this stage of our inquiries, to consider the nature of this privilege, promise, or blessing, more particularly: which is represented indeed, by a denarius, or scripture penny, but as we observed, only in the *general* character of the proper stipulated wages for the proper personal labour of a day; in which point of view, the image of a denarius is capable of standing for the proper covenanted recompence of any corresponding covenanted services. Regarded in this most general capacity, the parabolic image of the denarius is discriminated by the following characteristics; a due attention to which is necessary, that we may obtain a just idea of its counterpart in the matter of fact.

First, the denarius itself is something which was

originally the master's own, and whether to be given, or to be received, depended mainly upon him; that is, it might be expected by the labourers, if it was promised by him, and it might be received by them, if it was bestowed by him, but not otherwise.

It is something which might be stipulated for, between the employer and his labourers, as the wages of a day—and if so stipulated for, must be, at the beginning of the day; but could not be paid nor received, according to the stipulation, until the close of the day.

It is something which as stipulated for, at the beginning of the day, and as received at last, at the end of the day, was a just, and more than a just equivalent for the toil and labour of the day.

It is something which was stipulated for, on the one hand, and promised, on the other, only in behalf of the labourers engaged at the beginning of the day, and for the service of the whole day; and, therefore, which was due of right to them, at the close of the day, in payment of the service of the day; but to them only.

It is something, which if the master tendered to this one class of labourers, as matter of debt, he was still free to offer to the rest, without doing any injury to them, as matter of grace. It is something consequently which as offered to the labourers of the first order, must be offered by virtue of a covenant, and so far from a sense of obligation; but if offered to any of the rest, must be offered of the master's own accord, and unsolicited.

It is something which, until the close of the day, the labourers engaged for the whole of the day, con-

sidered to be exclusively due to themselves, as no more than equivalent to the labour and service of a day. It is something, therefore, which they could not see tendered to others, without expecting more to be offered to themselves; nor see given to others, without being increased to themselves, and not be envious of their good fortune, or disposed to accuse their employer of partiality. It is something lastly, which they prefer to reject, although their due, rather than receive it in common with others, to whom they considered it not to be due.

Now in order to discover what there is in the matter of fact relating to the Jews, as answering to the labourers of the first order, which will correspond to these several criteria, we must reason as follows.

The people of Israel on being delivered from Egypt, were not taken at once to the land of Canaan, by the nearest and readiest route—but instead of that were conducted into the wilderness, in a direction far from the borders of the promised land. On the forty-seventh day after the Exodus they arrived at Horeb, but not until the middle of the second year, did they first approach the confines of Canaan, at Kadesh Barnea^r: at which time, but for their own rebellion, and the sentence to which it subjected them, of wandering thirty-eight years in the wilderness, until the men of that generation were all consumed—there is no doubt an opportunity was given them, of taking possession of the inheritance pro-

^r Vide Exod. xix. 1. 10, 11. 15, 16; xl. 1. 17; Numb. i. 1; ix. 1—5; x. 11. 13; xii. 16; xiii. Deuteron. i. 6—46. Joshua xiv. 6—10.

vided for them ; of which they might have availed themselves, if they would.

It was then the intention of Providence that the people should have an opportunity of being conducted into their inheritance, at the end of one year and six months from the Exodus, instead of forty years ; but not at an earlier period. If we ask for the reasons of this dispensation, the answer must doubtless be returned in the fact and design of the proceedings, which began, and continued to go on, in the wilderness of Sinai, from the day of their arrival there after the Exodus, to the day of their quitting it again to journey to Kadesh Barnea. And what were these, but the promulgation, reception, and reduction to system, of that Law and Discipline, under which the Jews were to live in the land of promise ; the Law which was to be the standard of their faith, and the rule of their practice, the formulary of their civil, as well as their religious obedience, and the guide of their public and their private life ? The event therefore proves that the people of Israel, though adopted as the people of God, and asserted to be so by their miraculous deliverance from Egypt, were not considered fit to be put in possession of their promised inheritance, within the region appointed for the locality of the visible church of God, and as the proper community, constituting its congregation—until they had been provided with the Law, in which was comprehended the revealed will and word of God ; without the possession of which, and without the obedience of which, real or professed, there can be no such thing as the visible church itself.

Now it is impossible to peruse the scripture ac-

count of the transactions which attended the formal delivery and publication of this Law, and not to perceive that this delivery and publication has all the characteristics of a solemn covenant, made and agreed upon between two principal contracting parties, through the intervention of a third party, who acts as mediator in behalf of both. The contracting parties are Jehovah, on the one hand, and the people of Israel, on the other; and the mediator between them is Moses. The terms of the covenant, as affecting either of the parties in behalf of the other, may be summed up in this comprehensive statement; that the people of Israel should avouch or acknowledge Jehovah to be exclusively their God, and Jehovah should avouch or acknowledge the people of Israel to be exclusively his people.

It belongs to the essence of such a covenant, to include the mutual rights and obligations, which would immediately become due to one of the parties in a federal relation like that, and binding on the other, and *vice versa*; obedience to the word and will of him, whom they had acknowledged to be their God, as incumbent on the people, protection, and blessing, in behalf of those whom he had avouched to be his people, as incumbent upon Jehovah. These rights and obligations, however, are not left undefined in the Law itself, the great bond and charter of the mutual covenant; for it is the business of all its requisitions, whether positive or moral, to specify the particulars of that entire and perfect obedience, which was due to Jehovah by his proper people; and it is the design of all its promises, to certify with the utmost minuteness, what

his people might expect from Jehovah, whether in a temporal or a spiritual sense, in return for that complete obedience.

By the covenant of Horeb, then, before their settlement in the land of promise, the Jews became the people of God ; and by virtue of that covenant, after their settlement in Palestine, and at every subsequent period of their possession of it, they were still the people of God^s. By virtue of the same covenant, even at the present time, when the Mosaic dispensation was on the point of merging in the Evangelical, they continued to be the people of God : and after the publication of the Gospel, and the cessation of the Mosaic œconomy, the privilege of continuing what they had been, and as much the people of God as before, is that privilege, attached to the Mosaic œconomy at every period of its duration, previously—which answers to the conditions of the denarius in the parable, considered as the proper stipulated remuneration for proper stipulated services, through the course of a certain day.

For, first, the privilege of continuing the people of God, even after the expiration of the Mosaic œconomy, would have been as much the effect of the good-will and pleasure of God, in behalf of whomsoever it might have been vouchsafed, as the privilege of becoming his people had been, before the commencement, or by virtue of the institution and during the continuance, of that dispensation.

Again, the dispensation of the Law being always intended to prepare the way, in due time, for the Gospel; the Jews, who had formally received the Law,

^s Cf. Amos, iii. 2: “ You only have I known of all the families of the earth.”

were virtually bound by that act to the reception of the Gospel ; and the privilege of continuing the people of God, was as much dependent on the condition of receiving the Gospel in due time, as the privilege of becoming the people of God, had been on the reception of the Law at first.

Again, the privilege of continuing the people of God, under the dispensation of the Gospel, was one, which from the nature of the case could not take effect until the expiration of the dispensation of the Law.

Again, the privilege of continuing the people of God, under the Gospel, as much as under the Law, when the bondage of the latter should have been succeeded by the liberty of the former, and promises purely temporal and carnal, commuted for blessings spiritual and eternal, would have been, even to the Jews themselves, a more than sufficient compensation for the harsh and severe discipline of their ancient dispensation. Besides this, we know not what degree of honour and preeminence might have been the peculiar distinction of the Hebrew church, in its new character of the Christian, had the reception of the Messiah by his own, been as general as his rejection ; or had the Jewish church truly passed, as in the due course of things it was intended to pass, into the Christian : nor what eminence and dignity may yet be in reserve for the ancient people of God, when their conversion shall take place.

Again, the privilege of continuing the people of God, under the Gospel, was one which, among all the nations of the world, could be claimed, beforehand, by none but the Jews. The Jews alone, of all the nations of the world, had enjoyed the cha-

racter of being the people of God, under the Law; and could advance any pretension, antecedently, to the maintenance of that character, under the Gospel.

Again, the privilege of continuing the people of God, even under the Gospel, might have been retained by the Jews, though the privilege of becoming the people of God might have been extended to the Gentiles; and God, who alone could continue the one to its existing possessors, was free to confer the other upon whom he would. Nor would the communication of this privilege to the Gentile have interfered with the integrity of its possession in the Jew. The original inheritors of the privilege would not have lost their former character, because they were thenceforward associated with the Gentiles in the possession of it—though the Gentiles would have acquired a new character by being associated with the Jews in their old; for neither of them had been, or was to become, the people of God, in any such sense as necessarily to exclude all but themselves from partaking in the same relation; as the Jew might have learned from the provision already made in his own Law, for the incorporation of the children of the stranger in the commonwealth of Israel, on condition that they too should become subject to the same observances with themselves. But the continuance of the privilege in behalf of the Jew, as what was previously possessed, and virtually had been stipulated to be always retained from the first, would have appeared in the case of the Jew, to be matter of right; its extension to the Gentile also, who had never before enjoyed it, to be matter of grace and favour.

Again, the privilege of continuing, as they had always been, the people of God, was one which the Jews considered exclusively their own, and never to be divided with any others : and lastly, when offered to their acceptance, as the consequence of embracing Christianity, coupled with the extension of the same privilege to the Gentiles, it was one, which, rather than retain to themselves on such terms, they preferred to reject with disdain.

It was therefore the secret design of the parabolic representation, to illustrate first, the future œconomy of the Divine proceedings, at the expiration of the appointed duration of the Legal dispensation, in the extension of the privilege, which had hitherto been the peculiar distinction of that dispensation, and the exclusive right of those who were placed originally beneath it—whether with or without the previous observance of the covenant of works, and on the ground of mere grace and favour—to the rest of mankind, as distinct from the Jews, Samaritans, Proselytes, and Gentiles—yet not so as necessarily to take it away from the Jews—the privilege of becoming the people of God, as well as the Jews, and of enjoying the benefits of that relation in common with them, subject to the acceptance and profession of Christianity : and secondly, the offence which should be taken by the Jews, on seeing a privilege which they considered to be of right exclusively their own, and were not prepared to share with any others, gratuitously communicated even to the Gentiles, and the effect which that offence should produce upon their own conduct, in leading to the rejection of the Gospel.

It is a corollary from this conclusion, that the character and office of the ἐπίτροπος, who stands to the master in the relation of his domestic servant, and to his vineyard in that of its curator or superintendent; who seems to have been aware of his master's intentions respecting the payment of his labourers, before they were executed; and through whom, acting under his directions this payment is made to them all at last—must suit to the character and office of the apostles of Jesus Christ, as standing to the head of the church in the proper relation of his servants—as the instruments, appointed, commissioned, and directed by Christ himself, in the gradual fulfilment of the Christian scheme, by whose means the intentions of its Author were carried into effect unto all whom he designed to benefit thereby—the distinction of spiritual privileges between one order of men and another was abolished—and beginning with the reception of the Jews, the pale of the church was successively enlarged to comprehend the whole of mankind.

Nor is it an objection to the truth of this interpretation, that if the office of the servant is supposed to be that of the curator of the master's vineyard, and the vineyard to be the visible religious polity confined to the precincts of Judæa—the office of the apostles is thereby implied to be that of the stewards of the Jewish, not of the Christian church. The Christian church was the counterpart of the Jewish, in every respect but that one, of standing in the proper relation of the vineyard of God; and perhaps, even in that, so long as it was yet in its infancy, and still confined to Judæa—still existing among the Hebrews only—and not yet expanded

into the form and magnitude of a religious society, adapted to the comprehension of all mankind. The Jewish church, as well as the Jewish people, at every period of its existence as a church or as a nation, was subject to the same Lord and Master, Christ; yet at every period also was governed by deputies and vicegerents, who derived their appointment from him, and stood to his church or to his people in his stead. The judge and the king were the representatives of the God of Israel, as the King of the people of the Jews; and the priest and the prophet were his vicegerents, as the head of the Jewish church. The ministers of religion, among Christians, stand in a similar relation to Jesus Christ as the head of the Christian church; considered in which point of view, it is of no importance by what name the nature of their relation be expressed, if it be only the name of a relation subordinate to him. The appellation of his curators or stewards, in a general sense, as that of those who stand in the relation of his servants, and to whose care something is committed which belongs to him, would apply to them all, from the apostles downwards; though the name of such a steward, as the curator of his *vineyard*, under him, applies with more propriety to the relation of those who presided over his church, while it was still Jewish as much as Christian; that is, to those who presided over his church at its first transition from the state of the Jewish into that of the Christian; and who were manifestly the apostles, at the outset of their Christian ministry^t.

^t The above account of the import of the parable seems to be most in unison with the meaning of that declaration, which both

Besides the above coincidences between the general outline of the parabolic history, and that of the

precedes the parable, and is subjoined upon it: πολλοὶ δὲ ἔσονται πρῶτοι ἔσχατοι, καὶ οἱ ἔσχατοι πρῶτοι, and οὕτως ἔσονται οἱ ἔσχατοι πρῶτοι, καὶ οἱ πρῶτοι ἔσχατοι· πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσι κλητοὶ, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἐκλεκτοί. From this connection between them, it may justly, perhaps, be inferred that the parable was designed to illustrate and apply the declaration, in the first instance, and the declaration to sum up and epitomize the parable, at last. Yet that the general declaration is not necessarily connected with the parable, but must have a meaning and signification of its own, appears from the fact, that St. Mark records the declaration, but omits the parable. See Mark x. 31: Harmony, iv. 53.

The received translation by rendering these words, in the first instance, “ But many *that are* first shall be last, and the last “ first,” tends to raise the impression that something is meant to be conveyed by this particular declaration, opposed to and different from what precedes it, in the same paragraph; whereas it is perhaps a juster construction of it, to understand it as simply carrying on the same train of ideas, and conspiring to the same general effect. They should rather have been rendered, “ And “ many shall be *the* first last, and the last first;” especially if, as I apprehend to be the truth, all that is intended by them is, the absolute future equalization of those who are the subjects of the assertion, in all such respects as entailed the distinction of first and last, or last and first, understood according to the circumstances of the case.

I take it for granted that we have, upon this occasion, Matt. xix. 30. and Mark x. 31. as precise an account of the manner in which our Lord expressed himself, as we had before, Luke xiii. 30. in what was then said. The probable import of this last declaration was fully considered, in the explanation of the parable of the great supper, vol. iii. p. 455—458. But there is so much difference in the phraseology of the proposition on this second occasion, compared with the terms in which it was expressed before; that with a perfect agreement in general, there may still be some actual difference in particular, between them. And without stopping to point out in what circumstances the coincidence in question may consist, I shall specify this only, as one

real one, adumbrated by it, there are many more, relating to details, which require to be particularly pointed out.

mark of distinction between them ; that, whereas it was implied by the context of the declaration before, not only that whatsoever the Jews possessed, in a certain respect, entailing the possession of the character and relation of *first*, the Gentiles should gain, but that what was acquired by the latter, should be taken away from the former ; it is implied by the context at present, that nothing should be gained by the one, or lost by the other, exclusively : simply that a certain existing distinction, which made the one *first*, and the other *last*, should be abolished, and the parties, between whom it held good at present, should consequently be put upon a level. For considering the parable intended to illustrate the declaration, and to shew in what way this inversion of the existing distinctions of first and last, between the proper persons, was to take place ; it is manifest that the peculiar method, by which it is carried into effect, is by advancing the last, and not by degrading the first ; by placing the labourers of the last order on a level with the labourers of the first ; by giving to the former more than they were strictly entitled to, not by withholding from the latter what was justly their due.

It is no unusual thing to find our Lord's discourses, though originating in some passing and casual circumstance, expand themselves by degrees, after the manner of a climax, and beginning with particulars, ascend up to generals, of a more comprehensive, yet still of a kindred nature. In the account of his discourse with the apostles, beginning with the answer to the question of Peter, Matt. xix. 27 : Mark x. 28 : Luke xviii. 28. (the circumstances and import of which were fully considered by me in the General Introduction, vol. i. 221—229.) out of which the present parable arose, we have an instance of this mode of speaking. The general subject of that discourse, as it appears from the explanation given of it, *loc. cit.* is the kind and degree of the reward which may be expected for such and such kinds and degrees of the exercise of the virtue of Christian self-denial. Three degrees of the reward in question, appropriated to so many modes of the exercise of the corresponding

As, first, the principal personage, it appears, was possessed of a vineyard, before he engaged labourers

virtue, and to so many classes of persons, as the subjects of the one and the recipients of the other, are specified by it ; and the first of these classes being the apostles, the second the Hebrew Christians, what can the third be so properly as the Gentile converts to Christianity, opposed to both ? The promised reward to the self-denial of the apostles, we have seen to be peculiar to them ; that of the same meritorious virtue in the Hebrew Christians, to be peculiar to them also, in the promise of the life that now is, as well as of that which is to come (see vol. iii. 160—279) ; and, if the explanation which has been given of the parable is correct, the specified reward of the faith and obedience of the Gentile, is the promise of eternal life, and the privilege of becoming the people of God and of sharing in the blessings attached to that relation, as much as the Jews. The first effect of this dispensation would be, not to make the Jew change places with the Gentile, but to put them both on a par ; to advance the latter, but not to degrade the former. But it might be a secondary effect of it, to make the Gentile step into the place of the Jew, and so to invert the actual preexisting relation between them. For if the Jew should not be content to acquiesce in this dispensation in behalf of the Gentile, nothing less than his own degradation from his existing station above the Gentile, could be the consequence of it to himself. He could not refuse to allow the Gentile to be placed on a par with himself, and yet continue to rank as his superior. The effect of his obstinacy must be to degrade himself, while the Gentile would be left standing in his newly-acquired eminence. And, therefore, it might be added, at the end of the parabolic narrative, when the effect of the dispensation in favour of the labourers of the last order had been shewn by the event to be of this nature to the labourers of the first order, that rather than receive the same wages as the former, they preferred to lose their due itself—“ Thus shall the last be first, and the first be last ; for many are called but few *are* chosen ”—words which we shall have occasion to consider in treating of the parable of the wedding garment. At present it is sufficient to remark upon them, that without restricting them to the acceptance or

for any purpose connected therewith ; and God, who was always the Lord of the whole earth, had already set apart Judæa to be the local habitation of his visible church, before he made choice of a particular community to dwell therein. The formation and planting of the vineyard were over, before the action in the parable began ; and the designation of the limits of the future church, as comprehended within the local boundaries of Judæa, had been long before made, according to the testimony of the inspired writer, “ when the Most High divided to “ the nations their inheritance, when he separated “ the sons of Adam.” The labourers were hired to till the vineyard, and to prepare it for the production of its fruits ; and a particular people was chosen to be the congregation of the church on earth, and to dwell in the country appropriated to it, that they might bring forth the fruits of righteousness, and glorify their God and their Maker by a perfect obedience to his will. The labourers first engaged were hired in one locality, and sent to perform the work

rejection of such an offer as that which is supposed in the parable—whatever may be its nature—their general sense is, that in all the dispensations of Divine grace for the good of mankind, the offer of such and such privileges, subject to such and such conditions, is indiscriminate, and made to all ; but the acceptance of the offer, subject to the conditions in question, as the event invariably proves, is not indiscriminate, nor equally characteristic of all. Consequently, neither is the actual enjoyment of the promised blessing or privilege, alike characteristic of all, nor are the benefits of the offer as general as the intention thereof. In this sense, it is true of *all* the dispensations of Divine grace for the good of its moral creatures, whatever may be their particular object, that “ Many are called but few *are* chosen.”

^u Deuteron. xxxii. 8.

for which they were hired in another ; and the Jews were taken to be the people of God, out of the land of Egypt, and then settled, in that capacity, in a land of their own. The several additions to the numbers of the workmen, subsequently made, were all made from the same *agora*, or place of general resort ; and the several augmentations of the numbers of the Jewish church, by the admission of one new class of persons after another, were all derived from the same body of mankind—from the rest of the world in general, as distinct from the Jews in particular.

The engagements of the different orders of the labourers, respectively, were made at the most remarkable points of time, in the duration of one and the same day ; and the various accessions of numbers to the complex of the congregation of the visible church, took place at equally remarkable periods in the history of the œconomy of that church ; the first, at the Exodus from Egypt, the second at the dissolution of the kingdom of Israel, the third and the fourth, at the dissolution of the kingdom of Judah, in the united effect of the second captivity along with the first ; and the fifth, at the close of the duration of the Mosaic œconomy, or when the era was arrived of the transition of the Jewish into the Christian church.

If the labourers at first engaged had been sufficient for the wants of the vineyard, it would not have been necessary to engage more after them. Whatever accessions, then, to the numbers of the workmen engaged in the vineyard, might have been made at different periods of the day before ; it does not appear to have been adequately supplied with

all that it was calculated to contain, or all that it was competent to employ, before the close of the day. The Mosaic dispensation was of an expansive nature; and though intended originally for one community, yet it was adapted for the comprehension of all mankind. Provision was made in it, from the first, for the adoption of proselytes from among other nations, into its communion; and for the incorporation of the children of the stranger in the same family of faith, with the children of Abraham; and the event proved, that though the visible bounds of the church might still be confined to Judæa, yet, after the dispersion of the Jews in all parts of the world, and the conversion of numbers of Gentiles every where to the religion of Moses, the pale of its congregation was virtually extended to the ends of the earth. Besides which, if Judaism was, from the first, related to Christianity, as the bud to the flower, or the seed to the plant, as the shadow to the substance, and the image to the very truth of the same things; the design and constitution of the Jewish church were necessarily incomplete, until the Jewish had ripened into the Christian: the final end of the dispensation of Providence in setting apart a peculiar people, was not fully accomplished, until the Mosaic œconomy was ready to expire, and the privileges of that œconomy, as enlarged and confirmed in the Gospel, were thrown open to the Gentiles.

The engagement of the labourers of the first four orders was naturally to be ascribed to design; but that of the labourers of the fifth order comparatively seemed to be the effect of accident. The choice of the Jews at first, and the subsequent admission of

integral parts or divisions of mankind into the body of the Jewish church, at the earlier periods of its history, may well be supposed to have been in prosecution of the purpose, properly contemplated by the foundation of that church ; but the admission of the Gentiles into its communion, so late in its history as the period immediately before the transition of the Jewish into the Christian church, must have been in prosecution of purposes connected with the Christian dispensation, as much as with the Jewish ; and so far accidental to the latter.

Something like a stipulation appeared to be entered into with the labourers of the second, and also with the labourers of the fifth order, respectively ; but not with those of the orders between the two. The Samaritans were settled in the land of Israel, as the successors of the ten tribes not only in the possession of the country, but, apparently, in that of the covenanted rights which had formerly belonged to them. From the account of their settlement, as given in scripture, it appears that for a time they continued to worship the gods which they brought with them from their own country ; and not the God of Israel, in whose land they were. A scourge of wild beasts, inflicted upon them, and known to be *his* dispensation, first set them upon inquiring after the God of the land ; and having received from the king of Assyria, an Israelitish priest, to instruct them in the proper mode of serving him, they thenceforward adopted his worship in common with the rest of their religious usages. In process of time, the law of Moses became the sole standard of their faith and practice ; and the Samaritans, so far from being idola-

ters, like their ancestors, were as remarkable as the Jews themselves, for zeal and devotion in behalf of the worship of the one true God ; and in attachment to their adopted Law and all its observances, came nothing behind its own countrymen^y. The order of the event, in the dispensation of the gospel, which was offered to them next after the Jews, shews that in point of religious privileges and distinctions, they were held to be inferior only to the Jews ; and stood in a middle relation between them and the Gentiles. And in our Saviour's prophecy on the mount, as it will appear hereafter, the Samaritans of that day are considered and spoken of as not less properly the successors of the former possessors of the kingdom of Israel, than the Jews of the same day, as those of the ancient kingdom of Judah.

And with respect to the labourers of the last order, and the stipulation seemingly made with them ; as Christianity arose in the bosom of Judaism, so it superseded it—not, however, by the abrogation of any part of the ancient Law, as something distinct from, and originally independent of itself, but by the spiritualization of such things in it as were of a carnal and typical nature ; the fulfilment of others, which were designed from the first to be temporary ; and the adoption, reinforcement, and enlargement of every thing else, which was always intended to be lasting.

The exact moment of the transition of the earlier dispensation into the later, it would be manifestly impossible to define, further than that we have the assurance of our Saviour that the proper commence-

^y Vide supra, vol. iii. 59, 60.

ment of the new was the proper termination of the old. The Law and the Prophets, he repeatedly declared, were until John; but from that time forward the kingdom of heaven had begun, and was continuing to be preached^z. The earliest overt annunciation of the new dispensation, then, as beginning and bearing date from the appearance of the Baptist in the proper discharge of his commission, was so far the first intimation that the teaching of Moses and the Prophets, that is, the authority of the ancient dispensation, in some sense or other was at an end, and might be considered to have ceased.

It is certain, however, that the proper Law of the Jews continued to be still observed even by the Jews converted to Christianity; it is certain also that it was never formally rescinded, by any act or declaration of the apostles, so as no longer to be binding even upon its original professors. The *virtual* suspension of this Law, then, must be dated from the time of the appearance of John, and still more from the time of the commencement of the publication of the Gospel; but its *actual* abrogation from that point of time, when by the destruction of the civil and religious polity of the nation, it became impossible even for the unbelieving Jews to observe its injunctions, more especially its ritual ones, any longer.

Between the time of this event, and the first formal publication of the Gospel, consequently while the law of Moses was still in being, and still capable of being observed by those who were properly subject to it—the offer of Christianity was made to

^z Vide my Diss. vol. ii. Diss. v. 160—162. 164.

the Gentiles, and Christian churches were established in all parts of the civilized world. But the first fruits of the Gentiles were converted in Judæa—that is, the labourers of the eleventh hour were called into the vineyard, while the vineyard was yet in existence; and if by that conversion, they were incorporated in any Christian society, they were incorporated in the Christian society of Judæa—of whom the observance of the law of Moses was still a characteristic distinction; that is, the labourers of the eleventh hour were called into the vineyard, when the proper service of the vineyard was still more or less going on, and still capable of being more or less shared.

The Hebrew converts to the gospel, more especially such as had belonged to the sect of the Pharisees, would early have imposed on the Gentiles, converted to Christianity, the same obligation to the observance of the law of Moses, which continued to distinguish themselves; and the Judaizing teachers of the gospel, at every period of the interval between the conversion of the Gentiles and the destruction of Jerusalem, were indefatigable in inculcating the persuasion of this obligation upon the consciences of the Gentile Christians, wherever they were to be found: but by the authority of the apostolic Synod at Jerusalem, in the first instance, and by the strenuous exertions of St. Paul ever after, the intention and effect of their doctrines were overruled and defeated. Yet the same apostolic council which absolved the Gentiles who had never yet been subject to the law of Moses, from any necessity of submission to it in consequence of their conversion to the Gospel, left the Jewish converts, who had been accustomed to

observe it before their conversion, equally free to its observance still; and what is more, from an equitable spirit of indulgence to the prejudices of their Hebrew brethren, if not from the reason of the thing and the necessity of the case itself, imposed on the Gentiles the duty of abstaining “from things sacrificed to idols, and from things strangled, and from blood;” that is, the obligation of observing a few of the ordinances of the Mosaic ritual itself—the most simple as well as most natural, and the nearest to the idea not of purely positive, but of moral duties, of all. And there is proof from the testimony of ecclesiastical history, that the Gentile Christians not only of the apostolical, but of much later times, considered it a point of conscience to abstain from such things, and to observe so much of the ritual of the ancient Law, long after the rest of it had ceased.

The labourers of the third and the fourth class, in point of the shorter duration of the term of their engagement, and in the mitigated severity of their share of the common labour, came nearer to the labourers of the fifth order, than to those of the second. The Proselytes of the Dispersion were not only later in being converted to Judaism than the Samaritans, but by the principle of their obligation were bound to the observance of less of the Mosaic covenant than they. The Samaritans received the whole Law, and bound themselves to the observance of the whole. The Proselytes of righteousness, as they were called, received the whole of the moral, if not the whole of the ritual, in the complex of the ancient Law; but the Proselytes of the gate, only the former, and not the latter.

The resolution of the owner of the vineyard to place all his labourers on a par, did not appear to be dependent on the concurrence or the non-concurrence of any part of their number, in the resolution itself, but rather to be the more confirmed in its purpose and effect with respect to *all*, by the dislike evinced to it on the part of *some*: nor was the intended dispensation of Providence in behalf of the Gentiles, dependent upon the concurrence of the Jews; nor can there be any doubt that the same offer of the gospel would still have been made, in due time, to the Gentiles, whether the previous offer of it to the Jews was accepted or not.

The resolution of the master to treat all his workmen alike, in point of payment, might have been conceived from the first, but it could not be executed until the end of the day: and it is certain that no intimation of it was given until the close of the day. Nor in the nature of things could the proper effect, contemplated by the Mosaic dispensation from the first, whatever it was, be fully attained and realized, until the appointed duration of that dispensation was at an end; and with respect to the Gentiles, the designs of Providence in their favour, before the time when they were declared by the event, are every where spoken of in the scriptures of the New Testament, as a mystery or secret, a profound secret, a secret kept hid from the foundation of the world, and revealed or made known in their days only, upon whom the ends of the world, or rather of the period of ages, (denoting the respective duration both of the Patriarchal and Levitical dispensations, anterior to the Christian,) were come.

The resolution of their common employer to pay

the last engaged among his workmen, for the labour of one hour, as much as the first for the labour of twelve, was vindicated on the score of pure liberality and his right to dispose of his own; and the gratuitous extension of the covenanted privileges of the Mosaic dispensation, whatever they were, to those who had never been placed under the bond of that covenant, strictly so called—that is, to the Gentiles in opposition to the Jews—if those privileges, though attached to the Law, were still to be fulfilled and confirmed by the gospel; is justified in the scriptures of the New Testament, upon the same principle. The same resolution admitted of being defended against the complaints of the labourers of the first order, on the score of strict justice; because if they actually received at last, the utmost which they had stipulated for at first, they could have no right to consider themselves aggrieved, whatever might be done for the rest. And in like manner, after the covenant of Horeb had been solemnly entered into and concluded on both sides, if what was to be exacted in the way of observance, was defined on the one side, so what was to be expected, in the way of reward, was stipulated on the other; and it would have been as much a violation of an existing contract, to expect more than had been already promised, as to require more than had been already prescribed. The complaint of the labourers would have been reasonable only on one of two suppositions, either that their master had obliged them to more than their stipulated labour, or offered them less than their covenanted wages. That he had required others to labour less than themselves, or that he paid others more than in proportion to them-

selves, was nothing to those, whom he had held to no more than their stipulated service, and was defrauding of no part of their stipulated remuneration. In a word, with respect to the proper benefit and advantage, attached to the supposed observance of the Mosaic covenant, whatsoever it was, the case of the Jew was one thing, and the case of the Gentile was another. If the Jew had a claim to that benefit and advantage, it was as matter of right; and if his claim was to be allowed him, it must be allowed as a right. But the same benefit which might be regarded as a stipulated return in one point of view, might be considered as the result of no covenant, and the return for no service, in another: and while it might be due to some, and must be tendered to some, as matter of right, it might be given to others, and received by them, as matter of grace and favour.

The willingness with which the labourers of the eleventh hour obeyed the summons into the vineyard, as soon as they received it, represents the readiness with which the Gentiles accepted the offer of the gospel, as soon as made to them. That very willingness, and the confidence displayed in his own honour and liberality, might be the moving causes which induced the master to treat them in particular with so much more favour at the end of the day; and the readiness with which it was foreseen that the offer of gospel privileges would be accepted by the Gentiles, might be one inducement, humanly speaking, in the counsels of the Divine providence, for making that offer to them; as proving that they were so much the more worthy of it. No offence at being treated on a footing of equality to the

labourers of the eleventh hour in particular, appeared to have been taken by any body of labourers, engaged before them, but the first; nor do we know that the same jealousy of the Gentile was entertained by any order of persons previously admitted into the bosom of the visible church, but the Jews themselves; or the same opposition to the extension of their peculiar privileges to others as well as their present possessors, was made by any order but them. The secret motive to the complaints of the labourers of this class was resolvable into disappointed cupidity in their own behalf, and envy of the superior good-fortune, as it seemed, of their companions in labour: and similar motives to each of these may be considered to have actuated the Jews, in determining them to the rejection of Christianity, rather than be associated in the enjoyment of its privileges, with the Gentile; both in the overweening expectation which they entertained of the benefits to redound to themselves, from their peculiar relation as the people of God, and as previously in covenant with him, and in their jealousy of the communication of the same character to any others, without their being subjected to the same covenant. The dissatisfaction and discontent of the labourers of this class are not seen to have been removed by the expostulations of the master with them; and the unwillingness of the Jew to associate with the Gentile in the common enjoyment of Gospel privileges, has not yet been overcome, but continues as obstinate as ever.

The burden, the toil, and the heat, which were specially insisted on, as the characteristic circumstance of their share of the labour of the day, who

were engaged in the morning, and kept in the vineyard until the evening—adumbrate, as we have observed, the difficulty, pain, and labour, which, from whatever cause, peculiarly attached to the observance of the Law of Moses, and was specially incumbent on those who by their original covenant were bound to keep and obey it. The propriety and significance of this mode of describing that difficulty, will appear from the least reflection upon the nature of that Law. The covenant of Horeb was a covenant of works on the one hand, and of promises on the other. The fulfilment of its promises depended upon the observance of its conditions; and the observance of its conditions was left to the strength and ability of the agent. The language of that covenant is conformed accordingly. It supposes performances, before promises; it requires every thing from the agent, before it authorizes him to expect any thing from itself. A perfect obedience to its injunctions would entail a perfect right to its promises; but the least failure in the observance of the conditions would forfeit all claim to its promises; and not only deprive of any right to its blessing, but justly expose to the danger of its curse. The tenor of its sanctions is consequently this; Do this, and thou shalt live: Fail to do this, and thou shalt die ^a.

^a Leviticus xviii. 5: "Ye shall therefore keep my statutes
"and my judgments; which if a man do, he shall live in
"them."

Deuteronomy xxvii. 26: "Cursed *be* he that confirmeth not
"all the words of this law to do them. And all the people shall
"say, Amen." Cf. Gal. iii. 10, v. 2—4.

Justin Martyr, *Dialogus*, 348. 19: καὶ γὰρ πᾶν γένος ἀνθρώπων

Moreover, the works which it required were two-fold—partly positive or ritual, and partly moral; the entire performance of both which was equally to be exacted, the breach of any part of either of which was equally to be resented. The ceremonial prescriptions of the Law were so minute and complicated; they went so much into detail; they mixed themselves up so completely with the ordinary business and occurrences of life; that the utmost punctuality could scarce observe them all—the utmost vigilance could hardly be secure against the danger of sometimes violating or disregarding them. And hence, besides presumptuous offences, or transgressions wilfully committed against them—innumerable sins of ignorance or of omission^b; for the expiation of which, as affecting the nation at large—there was one, among the ritual institutions of the Law, as solemn as any, in the annual ceremonial of the great day of atonement; besides a constant provision in the ordinary trespass-offering, for the production of the same effect in particular instances, whensoever there was occasion.

The moral law, on the other hand, was nothing less than the whole duty of man towards his Maker, towards his neighbour, and towards himself; in each of these points, alike necessary to be observed, to establish a claim to perfection; but the due observance of which, no allowance being made for the

εὐρεθήσεται ὑπὸ κατάραν ὃν κατὰ τὸν νόμον Μωσέως. ἐπικατάρατος γὰρ, εἴρηται, πᾶς ὃς οὐκ ἐμμένει ἐν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ τοῦ νόμου τοῦ ποιῆσαι αὐτά. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἀκριβῶς πάντα ἐποίησεν, οὐδ' ὑμεῖς τολμήσετε ἀντειπεῖν, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν οἱ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐντεταλμένα ἐφύλαξαν.

^b Cf. Numbers xv. 27—30.

possible deficiencies of human infirmity, exceeds the unassisted strength and capacities of human nature. For the breach of the ceremonial requisitions of the Law, and consequently for the possible defect of ceremonial righteousness, provision seemed to have been made in the Legal sacrifices, the Legal oblations, and the other modes and forms of Legal justification. But for the breach of its moral injunctions, for those infractions of the natural and eternal rules of duty, which infect the conscience with the guilt, and load it with the burden of sin—with very few exceptions, no provision was made under the Law. Legal justification in none of its prescribed forms, nor in any part of its imputed efficacy, extended to these, which properly deserve the name of sins; or we should not meet with such declarations in the ancient scriptures as the following: “Thou desirest not sacrifice, else would I give *it*;” “thou delightest not in burnt offering:” Psalm li. 16: “Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire . . . burnt offering and sin offering hast thou not required,” Psalm xl. 6: nor, lastly, with this assertion of St. Paul’s in Hebrews x. 4: “It is not possible “that the blood of bulls and goats should take away “sins ^c.” In this department of the mode of the reconciliation of God to sinners, the most necessary and important of all, there seems to have been left, under

^c Chrysostom, i. 282. C. Hom. xxiv. De Baptismo Christi : ὑπόθου τοίνυν διακόσια δηνάρια τοῦ νόμου τὰς ἐντολὰς εἶναι· τοῦτο τὸ χρέος ἔδει τὸ γένος τὸ ἡμέτερον καταβαλεῖν. οὐ κατεβάλλομεν· κατεῖχεν ἡμᾶς ὁ θάνατος ὑπευθύνους ὄντας τοῖς ἐγκλήμασι τούτοις· ἐλθὼν δὲ ὁ Χριστὸς καὶ εὐρὼν ἡμᾶς κατεχομένους, κατέβαλε τὸ χρέος· ἐπλήρωσε τὸ ὄφλημα· ἐξήρπασε τοὺς οὐκ ἔχοντας δοῦναι. Cf. Gal. iii. 11—13; Rom. viii. 3; Hebrews x. 1, 2; Acts xiii. 39.

the law of Moses, a studied and significant blank. Nor indeed had it been otherwise, could the punishment of temporal death have been appointed for the infraction of these requisitions; as it was in a variety of instances. In the absence of the necessary provision to that effect, no alternative would seem to be left, except the indefinite assurance of God's possible mercy to penitent offenders, (a doctrine, purposely kept out of sight in the Law, and reserved for the teaching of the Prophets,) or if that should be found insufficient, a fearful expectation of judgment to come.

What then was a Law, which in both its branches clearly defined what was to be done, in order to perfect obedience, and rigorously insisted on the performance of every thing—if it was to impute the merit of performing any thing—but communicated no aids to assist the performance, while it shewed no mercy to the deficiencies of non-performance; what was it but such as it is represented in the Christian scriptures—the ministration of death^d, the ministration of condemnation^e, through whose means all had been rendered obnoxious to death, all had been virtually condemned to death? It was added, declares the apostle^f, added to the covenant of promise and free grace previously made with Abraham, for the sake of transgressions. Its final end, or at least its effect, was to produce transgressions, in order that the Jew, being thus taught by daily experience and daily conviction, his own weakness and infirmity, might deduce from it the salutary lesson of the necessity of trusting in some other

^d 2 Cor. iii. 7.^e 2 Cor. iii. 9.^f Gal. iii. 19.

means of justification, than his own strength and his own righteousness. It was given, that sin might abound ^g, and that sin, before sinful, might become exceeding sinful^h. It was a taskmaster, who exacted from his servants works and services far beyond their ability to render. It was the pædagogues of children, the inexorable, censorious tutor of non-age—the trainer, corrector, and discipliner of morals, in the early period of lifeⁱ. It was a jailor, who held

^g Rom. v. 20. ^h Rom. vii. 13. Cf. Rom. v. 21 ; vii. 7—12.

ⁱ Ὡστε ὁ νόμος παιδαγωγὸς ἡμῶν γέγονεν εἰς Χριστὸν ἵνα ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοθῶμεν: Gal. iii. 24. The version of these words in the English Bible is, “Wherefore the Law was our schoolmaster “to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by faith.” But the more correct version would have been, “So that the “Law hath been our pædagogue with respect unto Christ, that “we should be justified by means of faith.” The word παιδαγωγὸς in Greek is one to which no term corresponds in our language. “Schoolmaster” is not a correct representation of it; for the idea of a schoolmaster, in English, is that of one who has much to do indeed with the mental instruction—the intellectual improvement of children; but nothing exclusively with the formation of their manners, the training of their moral habits, and the discipline of their character and conduct. The duty of a pædagogue was just the reverse. It had every thing to do with the moral discipline of children, nothing whatever with their teaching, their learning, or schooling, properly so called. A παιδαγωγὸς of antiquity, and a διδάσκαλος were perfectly distinct characters.

The use of παιδαγωγοὶ in the education of children was alike characteristic of the domestic habits of the Greeks and of the Romans. Among the former, the antiquity of the custom goes as far back as the heroic age; for Phœnix, according to Homer, was the pædagogue of Achilles: Charon, and his wife or daughters, according to Pindar, of Jason: see the iv Pythian Ode of Pindar, lines 180—185—which describe in brief, but very effectually, the kind of education which he had received under the discipline of such tutoresses, in the formation of his

habits and character according to the rules of the strictest morality.

Innumerable passages might be cited from the classics, or other writers, both Greek and Roman, illustrative of the nature and duties of the office of a παιδαγωγός. I shall produce a few of them, and refer the reader to others.

Thus Aristotle, *Ethic. Nichom.* iii. xii. 8 : ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν παῖδα δει κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον.

Athenæus. vi. 9. ex Antiphane, in the *Μισοπονηρός*.

Εἴτ' οὐ σοφοὶ δῆτ' εἰσὶν οἱ Σκύθαι σφόδρα ;
οἷ γενομένοισιν εὐθέως τοῖς παιδίοις
διδόασιν ἵππων καὶ βοῶν πίνειν γάλα
οὐχὶ, μὰ Δία, τιτθᾶς εἰσάγουσι βασκάνους,
καὶ παιδαγωγούς αὖθις, ὧν μείζον κακὸν
οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν, μετὰ γε μαίας, νῆ Δία ;

Plutarch, de *Liberis Educandis* : vi. 11 : ἐπειδὴν τοίνυν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν ὑπὸ παιδαγωγοῖς τετάχθαι, ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐκτέον ἐστὶ τῆς τούτων καταστάσεως, ὥς μὴ λάθωσιν ἀνδραπόδοις, ἢ βαρβάροις, ἢ παλιμβόλοις, τὰ τέκνα παραδόντες. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε τὸ γινόμενον πολλοῖς, ὑπερκαταγέλαστόν ἐστιν. τῶν γὰρ δούλων τῶν σπουδαίων τοὺς μὲν γεωργοὺς ἀποδεικνύουσι, τοὺς δὲ ναυκλήρους, τοὺς δὲ ἐμπόρους, τοὺς δὲ οἰκονόμους, τοὺς δὲ δανειστάς· ὃ τι δ' ἂν εὖρωσιν ἀνδραποδὸν οἰνόληπτον καὶ λίχνον, πρὸς πᾶσαν πραγματείαν ἄχρηστον, τοῦτ' φέροντες ὑποβάλλουσι τοὺς υἱούς. δεῖ δὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον παιδαγωγὸν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, οἷόςπερ ἦν ὁ Φοῖνιξ, ὁ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως παιδαγωγός.

Dio Chrysost. ii. 385. Oratio lxxii : ὥσπερ οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες ἡδέως ὀρᾶν δύνανται οὐς ἂν ἴδωσι παιδαγωγῶν σχῆμα ἔχοντας, καὶ παρεσκευασμένους οὕτως, ὥς ἐπιπλήξοντας αὐτοῖς, καὶ οὐκ ἐπιτρέψοντας ἀμαρτάνειν, οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν· κ', τ. λ.

Aristides, ii. 126. Oratio xlv : τί δαί ; οὐχὶ καὶ αἱ τιτθαὶ τοῖς παιδαρίοις ταῦτα λέγουσιν, καὶ οἱ γραμματισταί, καὶ οἱ παιδαγωγοί ; ὑπερ-εμπίπλασθαι σε οὐ χρή, καὶ βαδίζειν ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ὅτι χρή κοσμίως, καὶ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ὑπανίστασθαι καὶ τοὺς γονέας φιλεῖν, καὶ μὴ θορυβεῖν, μηδὲ κυβεῖν, μηδ' ἰσχεῖν, εἰ βούλει, τὸν πόδ' ἐναλλάξ ;

Clemens Alexandrinus, i. 130. l. 3. *Pædagog.* i. vii : ὥσπερ οὖν κατευθύνει τὴν φάλαγγα ὁ στρατηγός, τῆς σωτηρίας τῶν μισθοφόρων προμηθεύμενος· καὶ ὡς ὁ κυβερνήτης οἰακίζει τὸ σκάφος, σώζειν προαιρούμενος τοὺς ἐμπλέοντας· οὕτω καὶ ὁ παιδαγωγός ἄγει τοὺς παῖδας ἐπὶ

τὴν σωτήριον διαίταν, τῆς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἔνεκεν κηδεμονίας . . . ὅνπερ οὖν τρόπον ὁ κυβερνήτης οὐκ αἰεὶ τοῖς ἀνέμοις ὑπέκει, ἀντίπρως δὲ ἔσθ' ὅτε ὅλαις ἀνθίσταται καταγίγιν' οὕτως ὁ παιδαγωγὸς οὐχὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τῷδε καταπνέουσι νόμοις (leg. forsan ἀνέμοις) ὑπέκει ποτέ, οὐδὲ ἐπιτρέπει αὐτοῖς τὸ παιδίον, ὥσπερ σκάφος, εἰς θηριώδη καὶ ἀσελγῇ προσρῆξαι δίαταν . . . Ἀχιλλεύς μὲν οὖν παιδαγωγὸν τὸν Φοῖνικα φασὶ γεγονέναι, καὶ τῶν Κροίσου παίδων, Ἀδραστον· Ἀλεξάνδρου δὲ, Λεωνίδην· καὶ Φιλίππου, Ναυσίθοον. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν γυναικομανῆς, ὁ Φοῖνιξ ἦν· ὁ δὲ φνγὰς, ὁ Ἀδραστος ἦν· Λεωνίδης δὲ οὐ περιεῖλεν τὸν τύφον τοῦ Μακεδόνος· οὐδὲ Ναυσίθοος μεθύοντα τὸν ἐκ Πέλλης ἰάσατο· Ἀλκιβιάδου δὲ τὴν πορνείαν ὁ Θραῆς ἐπισχεῖν οὐκ ἴσχυσε Ζώπυρος· ἀλλ' ὠνητὸν ἀνδράποδον ὁ Ζώπυρος ἦν· καὶ τῶν Θεμιστοκλέους παίδων ὁ παιδαγωγὸς Σίκινις, οἰκέτης ῥάθυμος ἦν· ὀρχεῖσθαι φασιν αὐτὸν καὶ σικιννίζειν εὐρήκεναι. οὐκ ἔλαβον ἡμᾶς οἱ παρὰ Πέρσαις βασιλῆιοι καλούμενοι παιδαγωγοί· οὐς τέτταρας τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀριστίνδην ἐκλέγοντες ἐκ πάντων Περσῶν, οἱ βασιλεῖς Περσῶν τοῖς σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐφίστων παισίν. ἀλλὰ τοξεύει μόνον οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῖς μανθάνουσιν· ἡβήσαντες δὲ, ἀδελφαῖς, καὶ μητράσι, καὶ γυναιξί, γαμεταῖς τε ἅμα καὶ παλλακίσιν, ἀναρίθμοις ἐπιμίσγονται, καθάπερ οἱ κάπροι εἰς συνουσίαν ἡσκημένοι.

Julianus Imper. Operr. 351. B. Misopogon : συγγνωστόον οὖν ἐμοί· δίδωμι γάρ, ὃν ἀντ' ἐμαυτοῦ δικαιοτέρον μισήσετε, τὸν φιλαπεχθήμονα παιδαγωγόν, ὃς με καὶ τότε ἐλύπει, μίαν ὁδὸν εἶναι διδάσκων, καὶ νῦν αἰτίας ἐστὶ μοί τῆς πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπεχθείας, ἐνεργασάμενος τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐντυπώσας, ὅπερ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἐβουλόμην τότε, ὁ δὲ ὡς δὴ τι χαρίεν ποιῶν, μάλα προθύμως ἐνετίθει, καλῶν, οἶμαι, σεμνότητα, τὴν ἀγροικίαν, καὶ σωφροσύνην, καὶ ἀναισθησίαν· ἀνδρίαν δὲ, τὸ μὴ εἶκειν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις, μὴδ' εὐδαίμονα ταύτη γενέσθαι, κ', τ. λ.

Chrysostomus, Operum i. 673. A. De Babyła : καθάπερ τις νέος ἐν συμποσίῳ παιδαγωγὸν θεασάμενος ἐφεστῶτα, καὶ παρακελευόμενον διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἐν τάξει τῇ προσηκούσῃ πίνειν τε καὶ ἐσθίειν, καὶ φθέγγεσθαι καὶ γελᾶν, φυλαττόμενος μὴ πον τὸ μέτριον ὑπερβᾶς, τὴν δόξαν αἰσχύνῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ, κ', τ. λ.

Seneca, iii. 192. Ep. xciv. 8 : Monitorem non desiderabit ad singula ; Sic incede, sic cœna : hoc viro, hoc feminæ, hoc marito, hoc cœlibi convenit . . . hæc pædagogus puero, hæc avia nepotî præcipit.

Tacitus, De Causis Corruptæ Eloquentiæ, 28, 29 : Ergo de urbe et his propriis ac vernaculis vitiis loquar, quæ natos statim excipiunt, et per singulos ætatis gradus cumulantur : si prius de severitate ac disciplina majorum, circa educandos formandosque

liberos, pauca prædixero. jam primum, suus cuique filius, ex casta parente natus, non in cella emptæ nutricis, sed gremio ac sinu matris educabatur : cujus præcipua laus erat, tueri domum et inservire liberis. eligebatur autem aliqua major natu propinqua, cujus probatis spectatisque moribus omnis cujuspiam familiæ suboles committeretur, coram qua neque dicere fas erat, quod turpe dictu, neque facere, quod inhonestum factu videretur. ac non studia modo curasque, sed remissiones etiam lususque puerorum, sanctitate quadam ac verecundia temperabat. sic Corneliam Gracchorum, sic Aureliam Cæsaris, sic Atiam Augusti matrem præfuisse educationibus ac produxisse principes liberos accepimus. quæ disciplina ac severitas eo pertinebat, ut sincera et integra, et nullis pravitatibus detorta, uniuscujusque natura toto statim pectore adriperet artes honestas, et, sive ad rem militarem, sive ad juris scientiam, sive ad eloquentiæ studium inclinasset, id solum ageret, id universum hauriret.

At nunc natus infans delegatur Græculæ alicui ancillæ, cui adjungitur unus aut alter ex omnibus servis, plerumque vilissimus, nec cuiquam serio ministerio adcommodatus. horum fabulis et erroribus teneri statim et rudes animi inbuuntur : nec quisquam in tota domo pensi habet, quid coram infante domino aut dicat, aut faciat ; quando etiam ipsi parentes nec prohibiti, neque modestiæ, parvulos adsuefaciunt, sed lasciviæ et dicitati ; per quæ paullatim inpudentia inrepat, et sui alienique contemptus.

Quintilian, Institt. Orat. i. ii. 4 : Corrupti mores in scholis putant : nam et corrumpuntur interim : sed domi quoque assunt multa ejus rei exempla, tam læsæ hercle, quam conservatæ sanctissime utrobique opinionis. natura cujusque totum cura-que distat. da mentem ad pejora facilem, da negligentiam formandi custodiendique in ætate prima pudoris : non minorem flagitiis occasionem secreta præbuerint. nam et esse potest turpis domesticus ille præceptor : nec tutior inter servos malos, quam ingenuos parum modestos conversatio est.

Ibid. i. iii. 15 : Nunc fere negligentia pædagogorum sic emendari videtur, ut pueri non facere, quæ recta sunt, cogantur, sed, cum non fecerint, puniantur. denique cum parvulum verberibus coegeris, quid juveni facias, cui nec adhiberi potest hic metus, et majora discenda sunt ?

Of the way in which a strict and faithful παιδαγωγός may be

supposed to have discharged his duty, there is a good illustration in Philo, *Operum* ii. 552. 4.—553. 28. De *Virtutibus*, where he is giving an account of the behaviour of Macro to the emperor Caius. The passage is too long to be extracted; the following ironical sentiments, attributed to Caius himself, in reference to it, will sufficiently shew the kind of lessons which he would have impressed upon him, and the disagreeableness of his discipline to the subject of it: *Adv. Flaccum*, *Operum* ii. 519. 31: καὶ γὰρ ὁπότε πόρρωθεν αὐτὸν ἀφικνούμενον ἴδοι, τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς συνόντας διεξήκει· μὴ μειδιῶμεν, ὁ νουθετητῆς παραγίνεται, ὁ αὐθέκαστος, ὁ ἀνδρὸς τελείου καὶ αὐτοκράτορος ἀρξάμενος νῦν εἶναι παιδαγωγός, ὅτε καὶ τοὺς ἐκ πρώτης ἡλικίας ὁ καιρὸς ἀπήλασεν καὶ διέξευξεν.

In the Latin poets the παιδαγωγός is called *custos*; the time when his attendance on the person of the youth, committed to his charge, began to be dispensed with, being the time when the youth had passed into the man, and laid aside the *toga prætexta*, or *puerilis*, for the *toga pura*, or *virilis*, called also, from the circumstance that it was assumed when the bearer was released from all restraints, except such as were imposed by his own confirmed moral habits, the *toga libera*.

Mi satis est, si

Traditum ab antiquis morem servare, tuamque,
Dum custodis eges, vitam famamque tueri
Incolumem possum:

Horace, *Serm.* i. *Sat.* iv. 116.

Ipse mihi custos incorruptissimus omnes
Circum doctores aderat:

Ibid. *Sat.* vi. 81.

Imberbis juvenis, tandem custode remoto,
Gaudet equis canibusque et aprici gramine campi:

De *Arte Poetica*, 161.

Cum primum pavido custos mihi purpura cessit,
Bullaque succinctis laribus donata pependit,
Cum blandi comites, totaque impune Saburra
Permisit sparsisse oculos jam candidus umbo:
Me tibi supposui: teneros tu suscipis annos
Socratico, Cornute, sinu:

Persius, *Sat.* v. 30.

Quid

Quid enim puero conferre potest plus
Custode, et cura natura potentior omni?

Juvenal, Sat. x. 302.

Ceu pueri, quibus alta pater trans æquora merces
Devehit, intenti ludo, studiisque soluti
Lætius amoto passim custode vagantur:

Claudian. In Eutropium, Lib. ii. 509.

The distinction of the Custos or Pædagogus from the school-master, or teacher of children, appears plainly in the above passages. Cf. also Plin. Epp. v. xvi. 3. In fact from Philostratus' life of the sophist Proclus, (Vitæ Soph. ii. 600. B—C.) it seems the pædagogue accompanied the pupil to and from school, and sate with him, while there. Cf. likewise, Sueton. De illustribus Gramm. xxiii. 1: and Chrysostom, i. 188. A—B. Ad populum Antiochenum Homilia xvi. in proof of the same facts. Oppian borrows a simile from this custom:

ὥς δ' ὅτε μουσποδίων ἔργων ἄπο παῖδες ἴωσιν
ἄθροοι, οἱ δ' ἄρ' ὅπισθεν ἐπίσκοποι ἐγγὺς ἔπονται,
αἰδοῦς τε, παραπιδὼν τε, νοοῦ τ' ἐπιτιμητῆρες
πρεσβύτατοι· γῆρας γὰρ ἐναίσιμον ἄνδρα τίθησιν·
ὥς ἄρα καὶ δελφίνες ἐοῖς παιδεσσι τοκῆες
ἔσπονται, μή τί σφιν ἀνάρσιον ἀντιβολήσῃ.

Halieutica, i. 681.

Vide, the Reliquiæ Sacræ, iv. 235. 237. Archelai et Manetis Disputatio, xli.

For further allusions to the same subject, I refer the reader to Æschines, Oratio i. 187. Contra Timarchum—Ælian. Variæ Historiæ, iii. 21: xiv. 20—Plutarch, Lycurgus, 30: Alexander, 22: Marcellus, 9: (Cf. De Audiendis Poëtis, Operum vi. 99:) Cato Minor, 1: Apophthegmata, Operum, vi. 683. 737: Virtutem doceri posse, vii. 728. 730—Suetonius, August. 44, 5: Claud. 2, 4: Nero, 6, 5: 37, 2: Galba, 14, 2—Valerius Maximus, vi. 1. 3—Seneca, i. 66. De Ira, ii. xxi. 4: xxii. 1: ii. 48. Epp. xi. 6—Juvenal, xiv. 10—14—Quintilian, i. i. 8: Dio Chrysost. i. 678. Oratio xxxii. 10—Josephus, B. Jud. ii. viii. 4—M. Antoninus, De Rebus suis, x. 36—Clemens Alex. i. 98. Pæd. lib. i. 1. 1. 38: 102. lib. ii. 3. 1. 26: 107. lib. ii. 5. 1. 13, &c.—Julianus Imp. Opera, 274. D. ad S. P. Q. Atheniensem: 351.

A. C. D. Misopogon: 352 A—C. *ibid*—Chrysostom, i. 193. A. Ad populum Antiochenum Homilia xvii—Hieronymus, Opera, iv. 263 *ad calcem*, in Epistolam ad Galatas cap. 3.

It thus appears that no two things could be more different in themselves than the office of the pædagogus of antiquity, and that of a schoolmaster. With the exception, indeed, of the rudiments of education, strictly so called, the office of the pædagogue may be said to have ceased when that of the schoolmaster began: and even supposing them to have accompanied each other, what the schoolmaster was doing for the improvement of the child in learning and knowledge, the pædagogue was doing for his improvement in virtue and good manners. The child it seems was put under the care of the pædagogue, as soon as he became capable of moral discipline, or even before, in point of age, he was a fit subject for it; and from that moment the pædagogue never quitted him, until he was old enough to be considered and treated as a man: attending him both at home and abroad, in company and out of company, encouraging him both by precept and by example, correcting him, where correction was necessary, teaching him to behave himself under all circumstances, and towards all persons, with becoming propriety, checking every indecorum of language or deportment, and training him by degrees to habits of modesty, gravity, temperance, and self-command. It was consequently a strict, severe, censorious office, and from the very nature of its duties necessarily unpleasant to the subject of its discipline, because perpetually thwarting its natural inclinations, denying it all indulgences except of the proper kind and in due degree, and holding it constantly to tasks and labours exceedingly irksome to children.

With what propriety therefore, St. Paul, might apply a metaphor, borrowed from the nature of such an office as this, to the moral discipline of the Law, strict and inexorable as that was, yet not more rigorous than necessary to perfection, and indispensable to those whose salvation must be of works, through themselves, and not of grace, through faith—after this explanation, must be self-evident. With respect indeed to the necessary discipline of its subjects in the habits of virtue requisite for perfection, the Law might truly be said to have fulfilled towards men, an office and duty analogous to those of the pædagogue in the bringing up of the child, and in the forming of the

the whole nation in custody, for numerous offences against the highest power in the state, with a view to some day of assize^k, when, if they were not to be freely pardoned and delivered by an act of grace, they stood amenable, without the chance of escape, to the utmost severity of punishment. It was a yoke, in short, to describe it in the language of the apostolic council, which neither they, nor their forefathers had been able to bear^l.

It appears from the preceding review of the parable, that it is partly historical and partly prophetic; historical down to the eleventh hour in the supposed duration of the day, prophetic from that time to the end of the transaction. The historical part extends as far back as the beginning of the civil and religious polity of the Jews; the prophetic received a speedy fulfilment, in the overt extension of gospel privileges to the Gentiles, only fourteen years after the time of the delivery of the parable^m.

perfect manly character by the preliminary training of the puerile. But when St. Paul adds, that it discharged this office, in behalf of its proper subjects, with respect unto Christ—that we should be justified by means of faith—he clearly intimates that all its disciplining of them beforehand, with a view to their perfection, had been unavailing. The Law had done its duty, as the pædagogus; but the subjects of its discipline had not done theirs; nor was the perfect manly character yet formed out of all this care and pains bestowed on the puerile. The result then of this experiment conspired with every other use of the Law previously insisted on, to produce the same conviction. Either we could never be rendered perfect, or it must be by some other means than the effect of the moral training and discipline of the Law. Those means are derived from faith.

^k Gal. iii. 22, 23.

^l Acts xv. 10.

^m Vide my Diss. vol. i. Diss. xiii. 562. sqq.

There seems to be at first sight, a great similitude between the moral of the present parable, and that of the parable of the Prodigal Son; but the distinction as well as the resemblance between them, may be briefly pointed out, as follows:

The resemblance consists in this—that the elder brother in the one, and the first order of labourers in the other, both stand for the people of the Jews; the younger brother, and the fifth order of labourers, both for the Gentiles. The younger brother is freely restored to the family of his father, and the last order of labourers is freely put upon a par with the first, in the enjoyment of the reward of their labour. The elder brother is jealous of the favour shewn to his younger brother, and the first order of labourers is discontented at being put upon a par with the last. The father expostulates with his son in vain, and the master expostulates with his labourers in vain.

The distinction between them might be specified in other respects, but it resides principally in this circumstance; that the Gentile is freely admitted to the covenant of grace, in the one, and to the covenant of works, in the other; or, what amounts to the same thing, to that which was always intended to be the peculiar privilege of the covenant of works, without any mention of the covenant to which it was attached, in the one—and to the same privilege and advantage as the stipulated consequence of a stipulated covenant, in the other.

Among the arguments which might appear the most likely to be urged in favour of the efficacy of a late, or as it is commonly called, a death-bed re-

pentance, the analogy of the call of the labourers into the vineyard, at the eleventh hour, would seem to supply a case in point. To suppose, indeed, that the parable was designed to inculcate this particular moral, would reduce it from the class of the allegorical, to that of the purely didactic or doctrinal, and would be liable to various objections and difficulties. Not to mention the inconsistency of such a supposition with the historical occasion of the parable—with the harmony of parts, the unity of design and purpose, which ought to pervade every well-connected and regular narrative; not to mention too, the unusual meaning which must be given, on the same principle, to the images of the vineyard, of the day, and to others of the material circumstances, (if they are to be capable of any meaning at all)—the character and agency of every description of persons concerned in the parabolic transaction, except only the master of the vineyard, and the labourers of the eleventh hour, would become superfluous, or inexplicable and absurd. For what has the part ascribed to the other orders of labourers, and more especially the envy and discontent displayed by the labourers of the first hour, to do with the favour extended to the labourers of the eleventh hour—if all that is intended by the fact of that favour, is the efficacy of a death-bed repentance, or of any repentance whatever?

The truth is, as a little reflection will shew, the case of the labourers engaged at the eleventh hour, furnishes no kind of analogy to the case of a death-bed penitent; and it is improper to insist upon it, as the ground of any argument upon this question at all. A death-bed penitent is one, who has lived

through the whole of life, up to the period of its close, in the constant disregard of religious and moral restraints ; in the habitual neglect of religious and moral duties ; and is first awakened to the sense of his dangerous situation, and to desires or resolutions of amendment, by the approach of death, and the prospect of the terrors of futurity ; by the goadings and compunctions of conscience—always the sharpest and strongest on a death-bed—disturbed by the retrospect of the past, and by the apprehension of what is to come.

Were the case of such an one, then, to be described in the language of the parable, he could not be said to be one who had received no call into the vineyard until the eleventh hour of the day, but who had received daily calls, and hourly invitations, through the whole course of his past life ; to all which he had turned a deaf ear : he had not been excusably ignorant, but wilfully negligent of his duty, until this last moment in the term of his probation. But the labourers engaged at the eleventh hour, being demanded of the master, “ Why they “ had stood there, in the market-place, all the day “ idle ? ” replied, and replied truly, “ Because no “ man had hired them.” It was not their own fault therefore, that they had stood there all the day idle : they had patiently waited eleven hours, in the hope of finding an employer, and were still willing to work, when they were sent into the vineyard at last.

Besides, a sinner on his death-bed, may repent, and resolve indeed, but he cannot give effect to his penitence, and execute his resolutions of amendment, by leading a new life, unless his existence is pro-

longed to him; which, in the case of the death-bed penitent, is precluded by the supposition. Repentance, under such circumstances, and resolutions of amendment, may possibly be effectual, and may deserve the name of good works; but whether they are effectual or not, can be known only to God, and even if good works, they are not such good works as were created for men to walk in, and to exemplify in the general tenor of their life and conversation, during their appointed period of trial. But the labourers last engaged were employed in the same vineyard, and on the same kind of service there, as the rest engaged before them—for a twelfth part of the day; obeying the summons into the vineyard, as soon as received, with every alacrity, and exerting themselves so diligently while there, as to deserve a special mark of the approbation of their common employer, above the rest. The efficacy of a death-bed repentance, then, can have nothing to do with the analogy of a case such as theirs. It is neither affirmed, nor denied by the example of *their* treatment in particular, at the hands of the master of the vineyard; while, by the example of their own conduct, or the analogy of any thing as done by themselves to deserve that treatment, it is much more strongly denied and disproved, than affirmed or established.

PARABLE TWENTY-THIRD. ALLEGORICAL.

THE TEN PIECES OF MONEY, OR THE POUNDS.

LUKE XIX. 11—27. HARMONY, IV. 60.

LUKE xix. 11—27.

¹¹ And as they were hearing these things, he proceeded to speak a parable, because he was near to Jerusalem, and they were supposing that the kingdom of God is about to shew itself immediately. ¹² He said therefore, “A certain nobleman went into a distant country, to receive unto himself a kingdom, and to return. ¹³ And having called ten servants of his, he gave them ten minæ, and said to them, Employ yourselves in trading, until I come. ¹⁴ Now his fellow-citizens hated (were hating) him; and they sent an embassy after him, saying, We will not that this man be king over us. ¹⁵ And it came to pass, that when he was come back, having received the kingdom, he bade these servants, unto whom he gave the money, to be called for him, that he might know what each had gained by employing himself in trading. ¹⁶ And the first came forward, saying, Sir, thy mina hath wrought itself in addition ten minæ. ¹⁷ And he said to him, Well done, good servant! because thou hast become trusty in a very little thing, know thou art possessing authority over ten cities. ¹⁸ And the second came, saying, Sir, thy mina hath made five minæ. ¹⁹ And he said to this *servant* likewise, Thou too become over five cities. ²⁰ And another came, saying, Sir, here is thy mina; which I was keeping lying by in a napkin. ²¹ For I was afraid of thee, because thou art an harsh man: thou takest up that thou

“ hast not put down, and reapest that thou hast not sown.
 “ 22 And he saith to him, Out of thy mouth will I judge thee, O
 “ wicked servant. Thou knewest that I am an harsh man, tak-
 “ ing up that I have not put down, and reaping that I have not
 “ sown : 23 and why hast not thou committed my money to the
 “ bank ; and so, when I came, I should have exacted it with in-
 “ terest ? 24 And he said to them that stood by, Take the mina
 “ away from him, and give it to him who hath the ten minæ.
 “ 25 (And they said to him, Sir, he hath ten minæ.) 26 For I
 “ say to you, To every one who hath it shall be given ; but from
 “ him who hath not, even that he hath shall be taken away from
 “ him. 27 Those enemies, however, of mine, those that would
 “ not that I should be king over them, bring *ye* hither and utterly
 “ slay before me.”



MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

THE material groundwork of the parabolic trans-
 action, in the present instance, is the supposed acqui-
 sition of a kingdom ; and all the circumstances of
 the narrative are closely connected with that acqui-
 sition, either as preliminary to it, or as arising out
 of it. Hence, as the acquisition of a kingdom ne-
 cessarily implies some one to acquire and possess it
 —of the parties concerned in such a transaction, it is
 manifest that one must be the party who acquires
 the kingdom, and therefore, so far as the result of
 the whole transaction is that acquisition, who must
 be the principal person concerned in it.

The acquisition of a kingdom, however, at one
 time, presupposes the want of it at another ; and the
 absence of the personal attribute of royalty may en-
 tail as definite a personal character on its proper
 subject, as its presence. The character of the prin-
 cipal personage, then, before his elevation, is neces-

sarily not the same with his character afterwards ; and if by his elevation it becomes that of a king, before that event, it was something else—which might indeed be superseded by the character of a king, but could not exist along with it. Now one such character is evidently that of a *private* citizen ; who may be taken from the body of his fellow-citizens, and raised to the rank of their king, but before his elevation, however distinguished in other respects, from the rest of the same community, is not yet discriminated by that which distinguishes a king from his subjects—the possession of power and supremacy over the complex of a certain community.

The character of a private citizen, as contradistinguished to that of a king, is consistent with every personal attribute, which may discriminate one member of a certain community from the rest, except that of political eminence, and exclusive authority, as the head and governor of the whole. Superior wealth might be one of these, and superior nobility of birth may be another. The character of the principal personage in the parable, while still in the state of a simple citizen, is described accordingly, as one of a certain community distinguished indeed from the rest by superior birth, and therefore properly a nobleman—but not by superior political authority, and therefore, not properly a king.

It is manifest, then, that one class of persons, likely to be concerned in such a transaction as the elevation of one member of a certain community from the rank of a simple citizen to the dignity of a king, would be the remainder of that community, over which this one of its members is promoted as

king ; whose relation to the individual in question, before his elevation, would be that of his fellow-citizens, and therefore his equals in political rights and privileges ; but after his exaltation, would be that of his subjects, and consequently his inferiors in all those respects which discriminate a fellow-citizen from a king.

But the public character and relation of a simple citizen, are not incompatible with the private character and relation of a master ; nor the absence of political supremacy over the body of a certain community, with the possession of the power and jurisdiction of the head of a family over his own household. The principal personage, therefore, might be described, before his elevation, as standing in the relation of master to certain persons—as well as in that of fellow-citizen to others ; in which case, another class of persons, likely to take a part in such a transaction as the promotion of a single individual from the rank of simple citizen to the dignity of king, besides the rest of his fellow-citizens in general, might be the members of his own household in particular.

While, then, the principal person in such a transaction would necessarily be one and the same—the subordinate personages concerned in it also, might be twofold and distinct ; the fellow-citizens of the principal personage on the one hand, and his servants, or the members of his household, on the other. Between these, the essential difference to be kept in view through the sequel of the narrative, would be not merely the distinction of their individual relation to the principal party, and of the principal party to them—but with regard to the œconomy

of such a transaction as the promotion of one member of a certain community over the heads of the rest, and antecedently to the beginning of this œconomy, or the fact of the elevation itself—what would necessarily be the consequence of that distinctness ; viz. that one division of the subordinate members, concerned in the transaction, would be beforehand the equals, and the other, beforehand the inferiors, in such and such respects, of the same principal party, whose elevation in a new capacity over both, was the subject of the transaction.

Again, the relation of king necessarily supposing the relation of subjects, and the relation of subjects being necessarily incompatible with that of equals in political rank and privileges ; it follows, that from the time of the advancement of one among a body of citizens, (which in the present instance would be the advancement of the nobleman,) to the dignity of king over the rest, the character of those, who before his elevation might have stood to him in the relation of equals in certain respects, must now be converted into the character of inferiors in the same respects. The relation of the principal person, then, towards one class of the subordinate, is changed by the fact of his elevation ; and whereas it was of one kind before that event, it becomes of a totally opposite kind after it. But the relation of master and servant being independent of political relations, and yet compatible with them, is not inconsistent with the relation of a king and his subjects ; and as it was capable of existing in a given instance, prior to that, so it will not be changed, nor superseded in a given instance, by the acqui-

sition of it. The preexisting relation, therefore, of the nobleman, as the head, and of his servants, as the members of one and the same household, is not disturbed by his political elevation above the rest of his fellow-citizens, and by the acquisition of a new personal character with respect to them. He was always the master of his own household, though not always the king of his fellow-citizens; and he does not cease to be the master of his own household, by becoming the king of his countrymen. The only difference which the change in his personal character produces in the nature of his personal relations to each class of subordinate personages, is this; that before his elevation, the name or relation of his inferiors applied to one of those classes only, and after his elevation it applies to both.

Again, this elevation of one member of a certain community above the rest, is not implied to be his own doing, but the act of some superior power, to which both he, and the rest of his community, are previously subject in common. The disposal of his kingdom is in the hands of that power; and the choice of the person, on whom to bestow it, rests with the will of that power; whose decision, in favour of the nobleman, as one member of the community in question, might be deprecated, or protested against, by the rest of its members, before it was made, but must be submitted to, when once it had been made. The local residence of this power is supposed to be at a distance from the kingdom which he has to bestow; and his decision in favour of the person on whom he should bestow it, to require a personal visit from that party to himself; which entails upon

the future possessor of the kingdom, the necessity of a personal departure from his own home, to the court or habitation of this other power. In other words, the kingdom supposed to be conferred on the nobleman, is part of a more extensive empire, which also is subject to some proper head ; and the government bestowed upon him, over his own community, is bestowed in trust, subordinate to this more general and comprehensive government, the seat of which lies elsewhere, while its jurisdiction embraces the dominions of the nobleman himself.

In disposing of this kingdom to some proper person, the intention of the supreme authority to decide in favour of the nobleman, or to confer the kingdom upon him in particular, is supposed to be already known, or on good grounds, presumptively to be collected, before the departure of the nobleman himself. Reasons of state, or the deference naturally due to his political superior, requires him to visit the court of the head of the empire, and to obtain his appointment to a particular province, within his dominions, directly from him ; but it is clearly implied that the kingdom is ready to be conferred upon him, as soon as he appears to receive it. He goes from home, to acquire it, and he returns home, to take possession of it, equally as matter of course in each instance. The elevation of the nobleman, then, and the consequent change of his proper character, and of his personal relations to his fellow-citizens, from being their equal to becoming their king, may be regarded as virtually effected from the moment of his departure from home, and as actually completed and realized from the moment of his re-

turn again. After the one, he was king *de jure*, but not yet *de facto* ; and after the other, he is king *de jure* and *de facto* both.

The cause of the promotion of this one member of a certain community, to be the head of the rest, is not specified, further than may be considered implied in his superior nobility of birth, as one criterion of distinction personally between himself and them. That this circumstance might contribute to determine the choice of their common superior, in his favour, rather than in that of any of his fellow-citizens besides, may well be admitted ; but there is no reason why considerations of superior personal fitness, and personal worthiness, may not cooperate in a given instance, with regard to superior dignity of origin, to produce the elevation of some one in a certain community, by the act of a competent authority, over the rest. The delegation of power and trust from a king to a subject, or personal preferment to places of honour and dignity by those who have them in their gift, are the reward usually bestowed upon superior deserving, or the testimony usually rendered to superior talents ; and where there is no sinister motive to produce a contrary disposal of such things, nor any reason in a given instance, to suspect the existence of such a motive, it is to be presumed, that the fact of the advancement of one person, by the choice of another, to superior rank and power, in comparison of those who before were his equals, is an evidence of his superior merit.

Again, the acquisition of the rank and character of king including the acquisition of all the necessary

rights and privileges of a king, of which, submission on the part of subjects, is one of the chief; it follows, that from the time of the elevation of the nobleman to be the head of his fellow-citizens in the former capacity, he became personally entitled to the obedience of the rest of his community, as thenceforward his subjects. Nor would it make any difference to the acquisition of this right on the one hand, and to the obligation to acknowledge it on the other—whether the elevation of the nobleman to the rank of king was yet virtual or actual, was still only prospective, or finally carried into effect. If he was already designated king, by the act of a lawful superior, and already known to be so, when he set out from home, to receive the kingdom; he was as much entitled to the submission of his fellow-citizens, as his subjects, before his installation in the kingdom, as afterwards. Now resistance to a lawful authority—insubordination of any kind under a just and constitutional government—is always criminal, and obnoxious to punishment; but resistance to the authority and government of a king as such, amounts to rebellion; to the fact of which, and to the aggravated character of which, it makes no difference whether the king himself, whose personal authority is disclaimed and resisted, be king *de jure*, or *de facto*. If he is but lawfully the king, and justly entitled to the rights and privileges of the kingly office, resistance to his claims, and the refusal to acknowledge and respect his rights, on the part of his subjects, render them traitors and rebels, at one time as much as at another.

Again, the members of the nobleman's household

who, by their proper relation to him as his servants, were already bound, before his elevation, to acknowledge his authority as their master, would be much more bound, after his elevation, to acknowledge and obey him as their king; and having been accustomed to regard him as their superior, while still in his capacity of simple-citizen, would be predisposed to acknowledge him as their superior still, in his new capacity of the head of his fellow-citizens. But his fellow-citizens who had heretofore known him only as their equal, could not be predisposed to recognise him as their superior; and never having been accustomed to owe or to pay him any submission before his change of character, they might not be inclined to defer all at once to his authority, in his new capacity. Considering then the fellow-citizens of the nobleman, and the servants of his household, as constituting together the complex of his subjects in general—we must draw this distinction between them; that his own servants are that portion of his subjects, who were as much predisposed before his elevation, as they were bound after it, to receive and acknowledge him for their king; his fellow-citizens are that portion, who though they might be just as much bound in consequence of his elevation, as his own servants, to acknowledge and obey him as their king, might not be equally predisposed to do so.

Though; therefore, it is implied in the history that some exception is taken by the subordinate personages, from the first, to the choice of the principal one for their king; and though the fact of an actual opposition on their part, to the assumption of the regal character and functions on his, is placed upon

record ; yet both the exception and the opposition in question are with great propriety attributed to that class of the subordinate personages, who only were capable of them beforehand—the fellow-citizens of the nobleman himself. From the time then, of his own elevation to a new rank and character ; and consequently from the time when the question must be decided, whether those who had known the nobleman in such and such a character and relation before, should receive and acknowledge him in a character the reverse of the former, or not ; the servants of his household are they, among the complex of his subjects, who are willing or profess their willingness beforehand, to respect his new rights as much as his old, and to pay him allegiance as a king, as well as to reverence him still as a master ; his fellow-citizens are they who are beforehand unwilling to recognise him in his new capacity, or to pay him that obedience as their king, which they had never owed him as their fellow-citizen.

Again, this opposition to the elevation of one member of their own community above the heads of the rest, which is thus supposed to be made by the rest of the same body, is represented to be unanimous, or such as *all* the fellow-citizens of the nobleman concurred to join in. They are all spoken of as hating him in common, before his appointment ; and all as actuated by that hatred in common, to send an embassy after him, designed to protest against his appointment, and if they could not prevent its taking place, yet declaring their own unwillingness to acquiesce patiently in it, and their determination not to receive such an one for their king. The only por-

tion then, among the complex of subordinate personages in general, which the new king, from the time of his appointment, could look forward to, as the subjects of his future reign, would seem to be the members of his own household : the other portion of the same complex, or such as are meant by his fellow-citizens, before his appointment stand in the relation of his personal ill-wishers, and after his appointment, in that of open rebels against his authority.

It is a circumstance, however, distinctly specified in the narrative, and deserving to be attended to accordingly, that the nobleman himself is supposed to be already gone from home, to receive his appointment, before the embassy, declaring the repugnance of his fellow-citizens to it, is described to be sent. We may infer from this, that though their enmity to his person might have been entertained before his departure, yet their hostility to his appointment was either not conceived, or not declared, before the time when he went from home to receive it. Consequently, there must have been a time, anterior to this, when they were willing to submit to his government, or professed to be so ; nor until the period was arrived for his actual confirmation in the possession of the kingdom—already supposed to be his by the designation of their common superior—had they reason as yet to disapprove of the choice, or had they formed as yet the intention of opposing by all the means in their power the appointment, of their future king.

The hostility which thus openly pursued the nobleman, after his departure, cannot be supposed to

terminate, before his return ; nor the dissatisfaction which had been manifested at the mere idea of this appointment, to be removed or allayed by its actually taking place. If his fellow-citizens were averse to his nomination, and did their utmost to prevent it, while there was any chance of succeeding in their object, it is not likely that they would cheerfully acquiesce in it, after it was ratified ; and not cherish the same dislike and aversion to the individual made choice of as their king, which had prompted their opposition to his appointment. The failure of their opposition, indeed, would shew that the appointment of the nobleman was something which no remonstrances, or influence, of theirs could possibly prevent ; and consequently that it was due to causes, alike independent of their approbation or their disapprobation of the effect, their good-will or their enmity towards the same individual ; but it would make no difference in the feeling which led to the opposition, and of which that was but the overt act ; or even would aggravate and embitter the preexisting spirit of ill-will to their future king, rather than mitigate or soften it. Their opposition itself, too, under the circumstances of the case, was an act of rebellion against a lawfully constituted authority ; and deserved to expose the agents to all the personal consequences of such an act. The only difference in their liability to such consequences from their proper relation to the nobleman, before and after his confirmation in the kingdom, was this ; that whereas from their declared disposition towards him before his confirmation, they were already to be considered his enemies, and rebels against his authority, yet, until his confirmation, they could not be treated, nor

punished as such : and whereas, from the time of his designation to the kingdom, he acquired a right to resent any ill-will to his person, or opposition to his government, whensoever and by whomsoever entertained or attempted, as an act of rebellion, yet until his confirmation in it, he did not acquire the power to display his resentment in effect. The power of the sword, like the right to the kingdom, might be entailed upon the designation to it, *de jure*, but it was conferred, like the kingdom, *de facto*, only by the appointment.

Again, the personal acquisition of the kingdom taking place abroad, but the personal exercise of the functions of royalty beginning at home ; the departure and the return of the nobleman are events of his individual history necessarily connected together, and conspiring to one and the same effect. The former is preliminary to the acquisition, the latter to the assertion or usufruct of the kingdom ; but both to its actual, absolute, and plenary enjoyment, as the possession and administration of kingly power and jurisdiction, within a particular region, and over a particular community of some kind or another. Between the departure and the return, an interval is consequently necessarily to be supposed ; nor can that interval be a short one. For the nobleman goes into a far country, and therefore returns from a far country : and a business must be supposed to be going on in his absence, relating to his domestic affairs, which would require an adequate length of time for its transaction. Nor could any length of time, to be adequate, be of small duration ; for it must be such as, in the ordinary course of things, would suf-

fice to convert one mina or pound of money, into ten times as much.

Again, the personal exaltation of the nobleman, from the previous condition of a simple citizen to the new character of king over the rest of his community, being the act of that common superior power to whose favour he is supposed to owe, and from whose hands he is supposed to receive, the gift and confirmation of the kingdom; to the effect of this exaltation, and the consequent change of personal character in the nobleman, between the time of his departure and that of his return, the part contributed beforehand by the will and concurrence of that common superior, in any manner soever expressed, and entailing the designation to the kingdom, may be said to be of paramount importance; and next to that, the ceremony of the installation, which ratifies the designation, and confirms the nobleman in the possession of the kingdom at last. But neither of these things is particularly specified. The narrative of the course of events dwells upon nothing but the ultimate effect of both, in the change produced on the character and relations of the principal person, before and after a certain point of time. He is seen to go from home in the capacity of a simple citizen, and he is seen to return in the dignified character of a king: but whither he went, meanwhile, or from whom he received the investiture of his kingdom, or with what forms and ceremonies it was conferred upon him — though something of the kind there must have been, to account for the effect—we are not told. Nor is this silence, in all probability, without a meaning.

Again, the return of the nobleman, which exhibits him as a king *de facto*, armed with all the powers, and endowed with all the privileges essential to the regal character, describes him also as asserting the possession of them all, by entering without delay upon the proper jurisdiction of his office. But it supposes him to proceed no further, in this first assumption of the regal functions, than the most preliminary and indispensable measures, under the circumstances of the case; that is, to make provision only, partly for the future good order and good administration of the government, of which he was now taking possession—and partly for its immediate peace and security; for the former, by disposing of offices of trust and confidence subordinate to himself as supreme, among the persons best fitted to sustain them, and for the latter, by the punishment and coercion of those enemies whose evil will to himself and disaffectedness to his government, had already been openly displayed. With the results of this œconomy, so far as regards the main design of the whole, the acquisition and enjoyment of a particular kingdom by the proper person, the history terminates; leaving the newly-established king in the unmolested possession of his regal supremacy, which has nothing now to fear from the treachery, machinations, or violence, of its former adversaries; and in the due administration of his government, as divided in certain proportions, with those on whose fidelity and attachment to himself, as well as on their several qualifications for their respective trusts, he might rely with confidence.

From this review of the circumstances of the

parabolic narrative, it must be evident that so far as we have yet considered it, the œconomy of the material transaction is to be regarded exclusively as an œconomy relating to the acquisition, enjoyment, and administration of a certain kingdom, supposed to be the personal right of one person called a nobleman, involving in its privileges a right of jurisdiction, and including in its functions an exercise of jurisdiction over others, described before his elevation as his fellow citizens; but given and confirmed to him by a third party, supposed to be the common superior of both.

This kingdom, it is further implied, may be conferred on the party who is ultimately left in possession of it, by him in whose disposal the gift of it is originally placed, out of regard to his own personal claims and personal deservings, whether entailed by superior nobility of birth, or acquired by superior merit of private character; but it is clearly intimated that, conferred on what account it may be, it is conferred against the will and consent of those, over whom its jurisdiction extends. The first characteristic circumstance, then, in the œconomy of such a kingdom would be, that with respect to the mode of its acquisition, it becomes the property of its rightful owner and possessor at last, against the wish and inclination of those, over whom it was rightfully and lawfully possessed.

This kingdom, it is further implied, was to be obtained in one place, but being obtained, was to be held and administered in another; that is, it was to be bestowed and acquired abroad, and at a distance from the home of its possessor and of its subjects both, but was to be entered upon, and administered

among them, in his and their native country. The next principal circumstance, then, in the œconomy of such a kingdom, would be this, that with respect to the mode of its enjoyment, or the effect of its acquisition, a departure of the nobleman in person, from home, must precede, in order to become possessed of it, and a return of the nobleman in person home again, must follow, in order to administer and enjoy it.

The exercise of the functions of the kingdom, when obtained and entered upon, was observed to go no further than the most preliminary acts necessary to its consolidation in the hands of its present possessor, by the immediate destruction of its avowed enemies, or disaffected subjects—and for its subsequent well-being and continuity, so long as it should be in his possession, by the admission of persons of confidence to offices of trust under the head of the kingdom itself. The principal circumstance of the œconomy of such a kingdom, so far as regards the mode of its administration, and the actual exercise of the powers of sovereignty entailed by its possession, for the purposes of government, is therefore no more than was to be expected as the first and most direct effect of the return of the sovereign himself, under such circumstances as are supposed in the parable, possessed of a kingdom, acquired against the inclination of some of his subjects, but destined to be enjoyed and administered for the benefit of the rest ; viz. measures of penal retribution for the coercion of the one, and measures of precautionary provision for the good government and welfare of the other.

But this is not the whole of the account which requires to be given of the material circumstances of the parable. Besides the œconomy of the kingdom, another œconomy is interwoven in the parabolic history, distinct from the former, yet beginning, and proceeding along with it; and though really subordinate to it, yet to judge from the more prominent part assigned to it in the narrative, apparently more important and more entitled to consideration. To this second œconomy we must direct our attention, that we may perceive its connection with the former, and the use it serves, in reference to it.

First then, it has been already remarked that the character and relation of a fellow-citizen, and consequently an equal in political rank and civil privileges, as compared with the rest of the members of a certain community, were perfectly compatible, in a given instance, with those of the master of a family, or a superior in reference to the members of a certain household: and therefore, that the relation and character of a master and superior, with respect to the members of such an household, as dependent upon the circumstance neither of political equality nor of political inequality to the members of a certain community in the complex, would not be affected by the change in the character and relation of a private citizen, and of an equal of the rest of the members of his own community, into those of their king, and their superior in political eminence and power—but would continue the same after that change, as much as before.

Upon the probability that a nobleman, of ancient

times, who must also have been a rich man—would possess an household of his own, as large and considerable in the number and variety of its component parts as the households of the rich and affluent of this period generally were—it is unnecessary to say any thing, after what has been so repeatedly observed, in illustration of this particular fact. It is more to the point, in the present instance, to remark, that though the possession of sovereign power in every kingdom, to be secure and unmolested, is necessarily to be confined to one, in the person of the monarch; yet the administration of his government, in all its details and subordinate functions, requires it to be divided and shared in certain proportions with others. The presence of one man, however absolute his power, and unlimited his jurisdiction, cannot reach to all parts of an extensive empire, which may need his personal inspection at once; nor can the labours of one man, however diligent and indefatigable, suffice for many and various cares, all demanding his attention at once. A kingdom, then, even though subject to one as supreme, must have many ministers and instruments, intrusted with certain degrees of the rank and the authority of the sovereign himself—for the administration of it. A supreme governor over an extensive empire, without a proportionable number of deputy governors, each with a proper office and jurisdiction of his own, would be an unexampled phenomenon in the history of human affairs.

The nobleman, therefore, having before his eyes the acquisition and enjoyment of such a kingdom, and the consequent necessity of making provision for the exigencies of its administration; it was na-

tural that he should begin to think even before his departure, of the selection of persons, best qualified to serve him in the future offices of government, upon his return. It was natural too, that being desirous to take measures of precaution in time, with a view to this future result, he should turn his eyes upon the members of his own household, as the most likely to supply him with such ministers and officers as he might want. It is usual with kings to select for situations of trust, in their service, and to promote to offices of state, beneath themselves, only those whose capacities are best known to them, or whose personal fidelity and attachment they can most rely upon ; that is, their own domestics, or such as are at all times the nearest to their persons, and the most constantly under their observation. More especially is this the case in the administration of eastern governments : in which the important offices, under the sovereign, are commonly filled by his slaves, not in the general sense in which his subjects universally might be considered to be such, but in their private capacity, and as understood of the members of his household. Besides which, it is to be remembered that in the present instance, according to the state of the case in the parable, the only body of persons from among whom the nobleman could think of selecting, before his departure, a certain number to be invested with offices of power and trust, after his return, were the members of his private household—all else, as the event proved, instead of being well-affected to their future king, being either secretly or openly his enemies ; and with a view to such a trial, as he proposed to lay, during his absence, even upon these, before he advanced

them to offices of trust and confidence, upon his return, no body of persons, among the complex of his future subjects, could have furnished the proper objects of selection, but the members of his own household in particular.

The commission of power to a subject, by a monarch, or the promotion of a subject to a situation of rank and dignity, subordinate only to his own, though ultimately designed for the good of the monarch, and the benefit of his service, is necessarily productive of honour and advantage to the subject. Such promotions therefore, either are, or profess to be, the rewards of superior merit, or the evidence of superior ability; and merit or competency, if not before ascertained, requires some proof or experiment to make it known. The nobleman, therefore, even before his departure to receive his confirmation in the kingdom, designing to promote the most deserving of his servants to offices of trust and authority therein, upon his return to its enjoyment and administration—might resolve to try them previously in some manner purposely contrived to put to the test their individual capacity and fitness for such offices, and their personal zeal, fidelity, and attachment, in his own behalf. The necessity of his departure, and the length of time which must intervene before his return, afforded the requisite opportunity for making this trial under the most favourable circumstances; and for the due transaction of the œconomy which was to be carried on meanwhile, with a view to the end proposed.

The imposition of such a trial, with a view to such

a result, necessarily requires it to be supposed that the personal disposition or genius of his servants was not yet known to their master^a; or should that be thought incredible, that it was not yet known as the result of any such experimental test, as he proposed to lay them under; more especially, of any which was altogether independent of his personal presence, and personal cognizance, during the time that they were to be subjected to it—or rather, in order to the attainment of the end designed by it, absolutely required that he himself should be personally absent, and personally incapable of observing them. Nor would it follow, that whatever final end their master might propose from the discovery thus made with respect to his servants, he would declare it beforehand, or make them aware of the personal consequences which might be expected to themselves from the due discharge of their trust. The natural result of an œconomy of probation, begun and completed under such circumstances, would be, that each servant, while it lasted, would know he was labouring, or expected to labour, in the service of a master, whom he was bound to obey—and for the good of a master, which he was bound to consult—in his absence as much as in his presence; whether with or without the hope of reward to himself. Each servant, therefore, would be left to the impulse of his personal motives, to justify or to abuse the confi-

^a That masters anciently would purposely make trial of their servants in some appropriate way, we may collect from Tertulian, *Operum* iii. 66. *De Cultu Feminarum*, 10: *Nonne sapientes patresfamilie de industria quædam servis suis offerunt atque permittunt, ut experiantur, an æqualiter permissis utantur, si probe, si modeste?*

dence reposed in him, and to apply or to misapply the subject matter of his trust, according or contrary to the intentions of its author. If he failed of his duty, he would fail deliberately, and be amenable to the punishment of a servant wilfully disobedient to the commands of a master ; but though he performed his duty ever so well, and realized the expectations of his master to the utmost, it must be from the influence of principle, and not from regard to his personal interest.

As soon, then, as the nobleman is seen to be preparing for his own departure, we observe him calling together his servants, appointing to each their charge, and fixing the time for which it was to be retained, or when it might be expected to cease ; but nothing more. The utmost therefore which could be distinctly collected from the nature and circumstances of such a commission, would amount to thus much—that a certain portion of their master's property had been committed to each of his servants, and committed as the subject-matter of a responsible trust ; which they were to administer as such, during his absence, and were to account for to him, according as it should be administered, upon his return : but how long he was likely to be absent, and therefore how long they were to continue in the exercise of their trust, they were not given to understand. It would follow, consequently, that though the fact of his personal departure from home, would speedily take place, and the fact of his continued absence from home, at any moment after his departure, until his return, would be matter of sensible experience, yet the precise period of his return would be indefinite ;

and though the fact of their being placed in a responsible situation at all moments during his absence, and of necessarily having an account to render him upon his return, might also be certain—yet the time when they must calculate on being called to this account, would be unknown.

The number of servants whom the nobleman is supposed to leave behind him, in the administration of such a trust, is stated in the narrative at ten: though, why they should be represented at neither more nor less than ten, it is superfluous to inquire, further than merely to observe, that if ten were adequate for the purpose in view, yet not more than sufficient, the decorum of the parable is shewn in limiting their number accordingly. These ten themselves, however, must be considered a part of a larger body—that is, of the household of the nobleman in general; both from the reason of the thing, because the family of a nobleman of antiquity would necessarily consist of many more servants than ten—and also from the language of the parable in speaking of their appointment—καλέσας δέκα δούλους ἑαυτοῦ—which it is not correct to render by, “having called his ten “servants” (whence it would naturally have been inferred that he had but ten servants—that these ten were the whole of his servants;) but rather, by “having called ten servants of his own,” or, as we might express it more agreeably to our own idiom, yet equally faithfully to the original, “having called ten “of his servants;” either of which versions would imply that he had other servants, besides these ten, though he called and set apart these ten, for a particular purpose, but none of the rest.

It follows, therefore, from the selection thus made of these ten, and the peculiarity of the commission imposed upon them, that while all the members of the nobleman's household besides, must be considered his servants, as much as these, and all besides might have their proper duties to discharge during their master's absence, as well as these; none could be considered servants of his, whom their master had specially left in trust during his absence, but these; none could be bound to such a duty in his behalf, as necessarily presupposed his absence, but these. With the specific addition to a common relation, entailed by this imposition of an extra trust and an extra duty, upon ten of the nobleman's household, but not upon the rest—these ten, it is manifest, during the absence of their master, (which is, in fact, during the continuance of their trust,) would stand personally distinguished from the rest of their fellow-servants, and the rest of their fellow-servants from them. The rest of their fellow-servants would no doubt have their proper duty, during the absence of their master, as well as these ten; but it could be no such duty, as properly began with the departure of their master, and would properly terminate with his return, like that of these ten; it could be no duty which their master himself had expressly imposed, over and above what would have been their ordinary duty during his continuance at home, in the contemplation of his absence thence for a considerable time; it could be no duty, in short, to which they would not have been just as much bound, during the presence of their master, as in consequence of his absence—like that of these ten. The same circum-

stance of distinction too, which discriminates these ten from the rest of their fellow-servants, identifies them with each other. As servants of a common master, whom he has invested with a new character, and charged with a peculiar duty, they are all opposed to the rest of his household; and as servants of such a master, whom he has not invested with any new character, nor charged with any extraordinary duty, the rest of his household are all opposed to these ten.

It is evident, likewise, that considering all these ten as trustees of a certain trust, the nature of this trust is the same in one as in the rest. Ten minæ of ancient money were committed to the ten in common, and a mina to each in particular; so that all were placed upon a par, both in the character and relation of trustees of their master's property in general, and in the amount or quantum of that property committed to each in particular. The value of an ancient mina in money of our denomination, is three pounds, and about four shillings. It is manifest, however, that for the purpose of the representation in the parable, we have nothing to do with these minæ, either as sums of money in general, or as sums of money of such and such a value, in particular; further than as they stand, under the circumstances of the case, for the subject-matter of a delegated trust, which is originally the property of a certain master, and by his own act is committed to the care and disposal of others—to be applied and managed meanwhile for the benefit and advantage of its owner, and ultimately to be rendered up to him again. In this point of view, a sum of money of any denomination, might be an appro-

priate image for the subject-matter of any trust, which was derived from one person, and held by another, under the necessary circumstances.

The propriety of supposing the same sum of money, that is the very same trust, to be committed to each of the servants, appears first from the final end of the trust itself; since, if the design of the master, in subjecting these ten of his servants to such an experiment, was to discover the genius, fidelity, or capacity of each of the number, in comparison of the rest, the end proposed by this test required the parties subjected to it, to be placed in circumstances exactly the same for the success of the experiment. Supposing, too, the subject-matter of the trust committed to each of the servants, to have been the same, but the use and improvement made of his trust by each eventually to be found to differ; it is manifest that the cause of this difference would not be that one had enjoyed advantages and opportunities denied to another, but that one must have made a better use of advantages and opportunities common to all, than another. There would be no means, then, of accounting for the disparate results of the same trial, in each of its instances, should any such appear in the event—but by the difference of zeal, or diligence, or principle—as well as of ability or of success—with which each of the persons tried must have applied himself to the execution of his share of a common task.

The nobleman, when committing these sums of money to his servants, is represented as directing them what use they were to make of them; but the

word which he employs to convey his directions, *πραγματεύσασθε*, literally understood, implies no more than a general command to be diligent, busy, or industrious, in some manner or other, without specifying in what. It follows, therefore, that provided some proper and legitimate application were made of the sums in question—the nature of the application was indifferent to the master, and might be left to the discretion of the servants. Some application it must be to which money could properly be put, and the more profitable of its kind, the better ; but the particular species of adventure or speculation, which each of the parties might prefer, in turning his individual deposit to account, appears to have been purposely left to his own choice and determination. Nor is this supposition without its use, in explaining the difference of gains and improvement, in one of these instances, compared with another, to which the use and application of the same sum of money, though for the same length of time, and under circumstances apparently the same previously, is seen to have led in the end.

Of the uses which might be made of a sum of money committed by one person to the discretion of another, to be applied in some manner which shall prevent it from becoming totally unprofitable ; the simplest and readiest, and that which is still capable of being resorted to when every other is likely to fail, or every other is beyond the power and capability of the depository of the trust, is that which makes it productive by means of usury, or by putting it out at interest with the bankers. That such means for the improvement of money, existed in

ancient times, will appear from the note below ^b. But that this was not the particular expedient for

^b The fact of the existence of bankers anciently, and some idea of the mode in which their business was carried on, may be collected by a reader of the Gospels, from the incident relating to the cleansing of the outer court of the temple by our Saviour; an incident twice repeated in the course of his ministry, once at the beginning of it, John ii. 13—22: Harm. ii. 11, and again at the end, Matt. xxi. 12, 13: Mark xi. 15—17: Harm. iv. 65. On the second of these occasions, the Evangelists tell us that he overturned the tables of the money-changers, in the Greek *κολλυβισται*, and on the first, St. John mentions that he poured out the money, τὸ κέρμα, which was upon them.

It seems then that upon each of these occasions persons were sitting in the outer court of the temple, with tables, *τράπεζαι*, before them, and money upon them, which St. John calls κέρμα, and the owners of them in reference to it, *κερματιστάς*. Κέρμα is properly money of a small, minute description, like a farthing, or a halfpenny among us; and a *κερματιστής* is a dealer in money of that description, a dealer in small coin properly so called. The reason why dealers in money of this description should be found in the outer court of the temple, and the kind of trade which they carried on there, may be thus explained.

By the appointment of the Law, various money-dues were required to be paid into the treasury of the temple, both of other sorts, and more especially the tax imposed on every male Israelite, above the age of twenty, in the shape of the half shekel, or didrachmum, annually. Various dues in kind too, in the form of tithes, and other things, were also required under such and such circumstances; which, when the parties liable to them lived at too great a distance from the temple, were to be commuted into their value in money, and brought up in that shape. Now the Jews of the Dispersion, and Proselytes who embraced the law of Moses in all its parts, were liable to these requisitions, as much as the Jews of Judæa. Jews of the Dispersion too, and Proselytes, were living at this period, in every city, and certainly in every country of the ancient world; and almost every city and much more every country, of the ancient world, had its own coinage. But the Law required all money-dues to

the use and improvement of their respective deposits, which was adopted by such of the servants as

be paid in the current coin of the sanctuary, which was the shekel, the half shekel, and their subdivisions, the *gerah*, &c. Hence the necessity of dealers in money in or about the temple, to break the current coin of other countries, into the current coin of the sanctuary. Such dealers were money-brokers or money-changers, who might properly be called *κερματισταὶ*, or *κολλυβισταὶ*, that is, dealers in small coin, as their stock in trade consisted of a collection of the coin of the sanctuary, the highest of which in value, the shekel, was but about half-a-crown of our money, and the *gerah*, a twentieth part of it, (Exod. xxx. 13.) was consequently but equal to three-halfpence.

Now the bankers of ancient times generally, *mutatis mutandis*, did not differ much from these *collybistæ* and *kermatistæ* of the outer court of the temple. The name of *τραπεζίτης*, in Greek, or *mensarius*, in Latin—in English, literally the *owner of a table*—would have expressed them all, and sufficiently indicated the way in which their business was carried on, viz. in the open streets, with a table before them. Hence *mensa*, absolutely for a bank: as Tacitus, Ann. vi. 17: on an occasion, when the emperor Tiberius, to relieve an urgent present need, advanced money on credit from the imperial exchequer: *Tulit opem Cæsar, disposito per mensas millies sestertio*; on tables, in different parts of Rome—a sum amounting to what Dio calls 2500 myriads (that is, 25,000,000 of drachmæ) lviii. 21. *Argentarius* is another, and a more general name for them in Latin; and *numularius*, as answering properly in Latin to *κολλυβιστής*, or *κερματιστής* in Greek. In other respects, as being open to the reception of deposits of money, as being accountable for their safe custody, while in their keeping, and as bound to render them up to their owners, when called for again, and as paying a certain interest upon them, while in their possession, bankers by trade in former times did not differ much from persons of the same profession in modern times.

But with regard to the respectability of such a trade, and the estimation in which its professors were held anciently, though there might be particular exceptions, the case was widely different. The extant remains of the Greek orators supply nu-

the event proved to have made the best and most successful application of their trust, may be pre-

merous instances of the dealings of these *trapezitæ* of antiquity, which shew them to have been consummate knaves; and that it was almost impossible to have any thing to do with them, without being defrauded in some manner, and having good occasion for a lawsuit. The usurious rate too, at which they disposed in loan to others, of the money which they had received into their own custody, made them generally odious, and brought their occupation into disrepute, as proverbially mean and griping. In fact the *trapezitæ* of antiquity were like the Jews of modern times; and seldom were free men by birth, but commonly libertines or manumitted slaves.

Cebes observes in his *Tabula*, cap. 31: διὰ τοῦτο οὖν τὸ δαιμόνιον κελεύει μὴ θανμάζειν ὃ τι ἂν πράττοι αὐτῇ, μηδὲ γίγνεσθαι ὁμοίους τοῖς κακοῖς τραπεζίταις· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι, ὅταν μὲν λάβωσι τὸ ἀργύριον παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, χαίρουσι, καὶ ἴδιον νομίζουσιν εἶναι. ὅταν δὲ ἀπαίτῶνται, ἀγανακτοῦσι, καὶ δεινὰ οἶονται πεπονθέναι· οὐ μνημονεύοντες, ὅτι ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἔλαβον τὰ θέματα, ἐφ' ᾧ οὐδὲν κωλύειν τὸν θέμενον πάλιν κομίσασθαι.

Augustus Cæsar was reproached by his enemies with being the grandson of an *argentarius*; see Suet. Aug. 2: and even the son of one, see Ibid. 3. Again, Cassius quidem *Parmensis*, says Suetonius, *quadam epistola non tantum ut pistoris, sed etiam ut nummularii nepotem, sic taxat Augustum: Materna tibi farina: siquidem ex crudissimo Ariciæ pistrino hanc finxit manibus collybo decoloratis Nerulonensis mensarius*; Augustus 4: which implies that he was the grandson of a money-changer by the daughter of a baker; the *collybum*, also alluded to, expressing the per-centage paid to the money-broker in discount, ex *argenti permutatione*; the profits, that is, of his trade. Again, *Nam et proscriptionis tempore ad statuam ejus adscriptum est: Pater argentarius, ego Corinthiarius*: Ibid. 70: My father was a dealer in silver, I am one in Corinthian brass; meaning probably that he was one of the triumvirate, or three, by whom men's lives and fortunes were thus arbitrarily proscribed, as Corinthian brass was composed of three materials, silver, and brass, and gold. Of Galba, Suetonius tells us, *Nam et nummula-*

sumptively inferred for two reasons. First, from the disproportion between the amount of their respective gains, and the time in which they must each be supposed to have been acquired; viz. the interval between the departure and the return of their master. This disproportion is too great to allow us to consider it the natural effect of the increase of a sum of money by the method of simple usury, for any such interval as that; a method which renders money productive of money, it is true, but by a slow and gradual process, small, and almost insensible in its operation, at any particular time, considerable, and visible only in the sum total or result through an indefinite period of time^c.

rio non ex fide versanti pecunias, manus amputavit, mensæque ejus affixit: Vita 9.

All this implies that the trade of a banker in ancient times was considered low and illiberal. Yet it was an actual trade, which notwithstanding the estimation in which it was held, society at large could not dispense with; and it was very productive of profit to those who practised it.

^c There are undoubtedly instances to be met with, in ancient times, which prove that it was very possible for money lent upon interest to multiply itself in a short space of time. Thus Plutarch, Lucullus, 20. informs us, that a debt of 20,000 talents, imposed upon Asia, by Sylla, about U. C. 670. had accumulated in consequence of the interest due upon it, to one of 120,000 talents, by the time when Lucullus was dispatched into the province, to take the command, in the war against Mithridates; viz. about U. C. 686: which was an increase of six times its amount, in sixteen years.

Suidas has a proverb, to express the rapidity of the increase of money by usury, *θάπτον ὁ τόκος Ἡρακλείτου Περινώ τρέχει*. Compound interest too was well known to the usurers of old. Lucian, *Operum* i. 564. *Vitarum Auctio* 23: *ἡ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι τῶν τόκων οἱ μὲν εἰσι πρῶτοί τινες, οἱ δὲ δεύτεροι, καθάπερ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων*

Secondly, from the difference in the degree of the improvement of the same sum of money, and for the

ἀπόγονοι ; Plutarch, Operum ix. 296. De Vitando Ære Alieno :
λέγεται μὲν παρὰ Μεσσηνίοις*

ἔστι Πύλος πρὸ Πύλοιο, Πύλος γε μὲν ἔστι καὶ ἄλλος*

λεχθήσεται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς δανειστάς*

ἔστι τόκος πρὸ τόκοιο, τόκος γε μὲν ἔστι καὶ ἄλλος.

Notwithstanding this, however, it would be in the highest degree contrary to probability, to suppose the increase effected upon the deposit in the parable, during the term of the nobleman's absence, (which is only the interval necessary between his departing to acquire, and his returning to enter upon one and the same kingdom,) could be the consequence of putting it to interest, or suffering it to lie at interest, for that length of time. The highest rate of interest which money, under ordinary circumstances, can be supposed to have borne, in these times, as we shall see by and by, was twelve per cent. : and at this rate of interest, without taking into account the addition that might be made to the principal by the interest of interest, or compound interest, it would have required eight years, and upwards to convert one mina into two ; four years and upwards to convert two minæ into four ; two years and upwards to convert four into eight, and so on. On this principle, it would have required more than fourteen years, to convert one mina into ten. And who will suppose it probable, that the nobleman in the parable, during the period of whose absence the effect in question is considered to take place, when going from home on such an errand as to receive unto himself a kingdom, and to return, could be absent fourteen years, or any such length of time ? It makes no difference that all this is allegorically, and not literally to be understood ; that the nobleman is our Lord Jesus Christ, that his departure to receive his kingdom, is his going to heaven at his ascension, for a certain purpose, and his return to take possession of it, is his coming again for a certain purpose, also ; and that between the times of these two events, the interval may be of indefinite length. We are concerned with the material circumstances of the representation, in their literal sense, before we can proceed to consider them in

same length of time, in one of these instances, compared with the other ; a difference which is seen to

their figurative : and we are as much concerned with their probability in themselves, and their consistency with each other, in the first of these senses, as in the second. Now in the case of a literal departure of a certain person to receive a literal kingdom, under such circumstances as those which are supposed in the parable, and a literal return to its enjoyment, it would not be probable, but in the highest degree improbable, that between his departure for the first purpose, and his return for the second, an interval of fourteen years, or any thing like it, should be considered to elapse. What would be thought of such a supposition, in the case of a nobleman who might have had occasion to go from home on such an errand as that in the parable, from any part of the Roman empire, to be confirmed in his possession of a kingdom by the Roman emperor ? Such cases were not of rare occurrence, since the subjection of the greatest part of the civilized world to the empire of Rome. The history of Judæa supplied more than one instance to that effect. And from what quarter of the Roman empire, even the most remote, could it require much more than a year's interval, to make a journey to Rome, and back ? For example, Tiridates the brother of Vologeses, the king of Parthia, contemporary with Nero, setting out from Armenia, the most distant province of the empire in the East, to be confirmed by the emperor personally in possession of that kingdom, at Rome, began his journey about the spring quarter of U. C. 818, and was already returned in possession of his kingdom, by the autumnal quarter of U. C. 819. Whatever then, may be meant by the nobleman himself, or by his kingdom, and his departure to receive it, or his return to enter upon it ; the interval between these two events, to be consistent with probability, must be supposed no more than might reasonably be imagined to have intervened, between such an event as the actual departure of a given person, from a given part or quarter of the Roman empire, to be confirmed in his right to a kingdom over that part, at Rome itself, and his actual return to the same quarter, from Rome again, after receiving the confirmation of his right ; an interval, which in an actual case

be in the proportion of ten minæ to five ; that is, of two to one. It is evident, then, that though each of

of that kind, might be one or two years, but could not possibly be more.

For the remainder of this note, then, I shall confine myself to the illustration of the usages of the Greeks or Romans, with respect to money lent upon usury, so far as they are calculated to throw light upon the allusions in the parable, which recognises that as one of the modes of rendering money productive to its owner, and considers it as obvious and as familiar as any.

The interest of money lent upon usury among both the Greeks and the Romans was paid monthly ; among the former on the *τριακὰς*, or *ἔνη καὶ νέα*, that is the last day of the month ; among the latter, on the kalends or first day of the month. Thus, Aristophanes,

Πέμπτη, τετρὰς, τρίτη, μετὰ ταύτην δευτέρα
εἶθ', ἣν ἐγὼ μάλιστα πασῶν ἡμερῶν
δέδοικα, καὶ πέφρικα, καὶ βδελύττομαι,
εὐθὺς μετὰ ταύτην ἔστ' ἔνη τε καὶ νέα.

Nubes, 1134.

Cf. the Scholiast, *in loc.* and Suidas, *ἔνη καὶ νέα*. Plutarch, *Operum* ix. 291. De Vitando *Ære Alieno* : οὐδ' ἀναμνήσκει τῶν καλανδῶν καὶ τῆς νομηνίας, ἣν ἱερωτάτην ἡμερῶν οὖσαν, ἀποφράδα ποιῶσιν οἱ δανεισταὶ καὶ στύγιον.

Horace, *Epod.* ii. 67.

Hæc ubi locutus fœnerator Alfius,
Jam jam futurus rusticus,
Omnem relegit Idibus pecuniam ;
Quærit Kalendis ponere.

This was probably to call it in, before its time ; though, as the *Vetus Schol.* observes, etiam Idibus exigebantur usuræ ; for which he quotes Cicero, *Cat.* i. 6.

Horace, *Sermon.* i. iii. 87.

Qui, nisi, cum tristes misero venere Kalendæ,
Mercedem aut nummos unde unde extricat, amaras
Porrecto jugulo historias, captivus ut, audit.

the holders of the trust in question, to produce even the least of these degrees of improvement, must have

Ovid, *De Remedio Amoris*, 561.

Qui Puteal Janumque timet, celeresque Kalendas,
Torqueat hunc æris mutua summa sui.

Tacitus, *Ann.* vi. 16, having occasion to give an account of the various laws and regulations made at Rome, at different times, with respect to money lent, and the rate of interest, tells us, that by the XII Tables it was ordered, *Ne quis unciario fœnore amplius exerceret*. About the meaning of this passage great difference of opinion is likely to be entertained. Understood according to one sense, the *fœnus unciarium* would be no more than an *uncia*, that is, one twelfth of an *as*, per month; and, consequently, only one per cent. per annum. Understood according to another, the *fœnus unciarium* would denote an *uncial* payment, that is, a twelfth part of a certain sum, considered collectively as an *as*, in the shape of interest on money lent; which payment, if farther supposed to be made monthly, would amount to twelve such uncial payments, or one entire sum denoted by an *as* in a year. Now *usuræ asses*, as we shall see by and by, is one of the modes of expressing a rate of payment of interest monthly, amounting to twelve per cent. in the year. It is probable, therefore, that the *fœnus unciarium* in the law of the XII Tables, was a rate of interest of this description—a twelfth part of such an interest, paid monthly, as would amount to twelve per cent. in the year. The *usuræ asses* at Rome, like the *ἐπὶ δραχμῇ* at Athens, twelve per cent. in either case, seems to have been the legally acknowledged rate of interest, or at least the rate acted upon as legal, from the earliest down to the latest times.

Dein rogatione Tribunicia, continues Tacitus, *ad semuncias reducta*; that is, to one half the preceding rate, whatever that was—either six per cent. or $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Livy, vii. 27, shews this reduction to have been made, U. C. 407. *Postremo vetita versura*; that is, all lending of money on interest of any kind was declared illegal. This became the law, U. C. 412. See Livy vii. 42: and cf. App. de B. Civilibus, i. 54. Yet as nobody

employed his money in some useful and lucrative way, they could not both have employed it in the

would lend money on such terms, there is every reason to suppose the law was never observed, or never enforced.

The same passage of Tacitus speaks of a law passed by the Dictator Cæsar, to regulate the rate of interest. This it appears from Dio, xli. 37, was U. C. 705. Ernesti, in his note on Tacitus, *loc. cit.* calls this law, the *Lex Trebonia*. Dio, lviii. 21, in his reference to the same occasion in the reign of Tiberius, as Tacitus, U. C. 786, describes it as a law *περὶ συμβολαίων*. The present measure of Tiberius had it in view to reinforce this law of Cæsar's, which, it is evident from the context, did not forbid all lending of money on usury, but regulated the rate of the interest to be received upon it. It is probable, the rate so fixed by it, was about three per cent. per annum; half the last rate fixed by the law of the XII Tables. For Dio, lix. 2, mentions that Caius Cæsar, upon his accession to the throne, U. C. 790, at the age of twenty-five, distributed among the people a largess of sixty drachmæ a-piece, which had been promised them, U. C. 782, when he was seventeen, with an addition of fifteen drachmæ, as interest for the intermediate time. This was about two drachmæ upon every sixty, as the rate of interest upon it per annum; and that is in the proportion of twenty oboli, or three drachmæ and one third, per cent. per annum.

Whatever laws, however, might be made for the regulation of the rate of interest in all money transactions, it is very certain that both at Rome, and in the provinces, people acted as if it was subject to no definite rule, and made what bargains they pleased.

Non erat hac facie miserabilior Crepereius
Pollio, qui triplicem usuram præstare paratus
Circuit, et fatuos non invenit.

Juvenal. ix. 6.

This triplex usura was thrice as much as the legal rate.

Quinas hic capiti mercedes exsecat :

observes Horace, *Serm. i. ii. 14*; that is, says the *Vetus Scholiasta*, *quinis centesimis fœnerat*, 5×12 , or 60 per cent.

The common rate of interest, indeed, was this of the cente-

same ; at least, they could not both have applied it in the same method of simple usury : for the use

sima (usura) or centesimæ (usuræ): one *as* upon every hundred per month, twelve in the year, or the hundredth part of the principal per month, twelve per cent. per annum. Plutarch, Lucullus, 20, tells us that Lucullus fixed the legal rate of interest to this amount, upon the occasion before alluded to, U. C. 686 or 7, and thereby speedily relieved the province of an immense debt. Dio, li. 21, observes that money was paying twelve per cent. (ἐπὶ δραχμῇ, which is the Greek mode of expressing the centesima in Latin,) at Rome, U. C. 725, before the triumph of Augustus, and dropt all at once (τὸ τριτημόριον αὐτῆς) four per cent. in consequence of the influx of specie, by reason of that event. Pliny, Epp. ix. xxviii. 5, writes to one of his friends, Proinde prima quaque occasione mitte (another letter) appositis quidem usuris, quas ego (num parcius possum ?) centesimas computabo ; that is, at twelve per cent. Lib. x. 62, he writes to Trajan to propose to his consideration the propriety of diminishing the rate of interest on sums borrowed by individuals from the imperial treasury ; Nec inveniuntur, says he, qui velint debere, reipublicæ præsertim (duodenis) assibus, quanti a privatis mutantur. It makes no difference to the sense of this passage, whether we read assibus, or duodenis assibus, both implying twelve per cent. ; and the writer's meaning in general being, that people would not borrow money from the exchequer on the same terms as from private creditors, at twelve per cent. The rate in question, it would thus appear, was recognised at this period as legal, in some sense or other. And so it continued at Antioch, even in Chrysostom's time, who speaks of the ἑκατοστή, or centesima, as the common rate of interest there, Operum i. 609. C. Hom. iv. De Penitentia v. Cf. ii. 23. B. C. D. E. Hom. iii. in Gen. i.

That even this rate of interest could not account for the increase effected upon the deposit in the parable, consistently with probability, in proportion to the time within which it must be supposed to have been effected—has been already shewn. In addition to which, we may observe, that the parable in no case could have contemplated any such rate of interest as this, because, however common, it was excessive and usurious, and is generally spoken of as such. The lending of money upon in-

of that method of improving the same sum of money, for the same length of time, previously, would

terest at all, was forbidden by the Law itself, in all pecuniary transactions between one Jew and another, though not between a Jew and one of another nation; which is sufficient to prove that though lending money on interest was nothing criminal, or repugnant to morality in the abstract, and therefore was a supposition which might enter, under the proper circumstances, even into one of our Saviour's parables, yet lending it upon exorbitant interest was morally wrong, and no supposition to that effect could with propriety have made a part of a parabolic history, conceived and detailed by him.

Seneca, iii. 384. Epp. cxviii. 2: *Quam durus sit fœnerator Cæcilius, a quo minoris centesimis propinqui nummum movere non possunt*—iv. 326. *De Beneficiis*, vii. 10, 3: *Quid enim ista sunt? quid fœnus, et Kalendarium, et usura, nisi humanæ cupiditatis extra naturam quæsita nomina? . . . quid sunt istæ tabulæ, quid computationes, et vœnale tempus, et sanguinolentæ centesimæ?* Pliny, H. N. xiv. 6, calls *usuram semissem* (six per cent. per ann.) *civilem ac modicam*; which implies that *usuræ centesimæ* or *asses* were not so, but *inciviles et immodicæ*.

Persius, v. 149.

Quid petis? ut nummi, quos hic quincunce modesto

Nutrieras, peragant avidos sudare deunces?

The quincunx usura would be five per cent. per annum; the deunx twice as much or more. The one is called a moderate, the other a greedy, rate of interest.

Capitolinus tells us of Antoninus Pius, 2: *Idem fœnus trientiarium, hoc est minimis usuris, exercuit, ut patrimonio suo plurimos adjuvaret*. Lampridius, of Alexander Severus, 21: *Fœnus publicum trientiarium exercuit*: and again, 26: *Usuras fœneratorum contraxit ad trientes pensiones, etiam pauperibus consulens*. The *fœnus trientiarium*, or the *trientes pensiones* in question, are four uncîæ per month, four per cent. per annum.

Diodorus Siculus, i. 79, records a law of Bocchoris, king of Egypt, which forbade *τοὺς . . . μετὰ συγγραφῆς δανείσαντας . . . διὰ*

have led to the same degree of improvement at last.

τοῦ τόκου τὸ κεφάλαιον πλεῖον ποιεῖν ἢ διπλάσιον. Jerome, *Operum* iii. 823. *ad med.* in Ezech. xviii: argues against all usury, and of any kind, as contrary to Scripture: Putant quidam usuram tantum esse in pecunia; quod prævidens Scriptura divina, omnis rei aufert superabundantiam, ut plus non recipias, quam dedisti. solent in agris frumenti et milii, vini et olei, cæterarumque specierum usuræ exigi; . . verbi gratia, ut hyemis tempore demus decem modios; et in messe recipiamus quindecim, hoc est amplius partem mediam. qui justissimum se putaverit, quartam plus accipiet portionem, et solent argumentari ac dicere: Dedi unum modium, qui satus, fecit decem modios. nonne justum est ut medium modium de meo plus accipiam, quam ille mea liberalitate, novem et semis de meo habeat? &c.

So far as the explanation of the parable is concerned, the rate of interest among the Romans, and at this present time, is of more importance than that among the Greeks, and at any former time. This last was probably more indefinite and more usurious than the former. The laws of Athens in particular opposed no obstacle to the exaction of any degree of interest for money lent, that people might be persuaded to pay. Theophrastus, *Ethici Characteres*, cap. vi. *περὶ ἀπονοίας: καὶ τῆς δραχμῆς τόκον τρία ἡμιοβέλια τῆς ἡμέρας πρᾶττεσθαι*: which would be a fourth of the principal daily. Lucian, iii. 440. *Convivium sive Lapithæ: οὐδ' ἐπὶ τέτταρσι δραχμαῖς δανείζω*: that is at the rate of 4×12 or 48 per cent. per annum.

A very common rate of interest at Athens was nine oboli, or a drachma and an half per month, upon every hundred drachmæ, or one mina; that is, eighteen per cent. per annum. Cf. Lysias contra Æschinem, apud Athenæum, xiii. 94: *Oratores Attici*, Isæus, xi. 59: Æschines, i. 107. Interest on money due as dowry was restricted by law to an amount not exceeding this: Demosthenes, xxvii. 22. But it might be as low as *ἐπὶ πέντ' ὀβόλοις*, or ten per cent. per ann.: Demosthenes, xxx. 7.

We read also of thirty-six per cent. per ann.: or what is called *ἐπὶ τρισὶ δραχμαῖς*: Lysias apud Athenæ. loc. cit.: Cf. Lysurgus, sect. 23: Cf. Aristot. *Rhetorica*, iii. 10. 7. But the most common rate of interest, at Athens, and what Pliny would have called the

Now the possible modes of adventuring a certain sum of money with a view to its improvement, dis-

maxime civilis, in that community, was that which went by the name of ἐπὶ δραχμῇ, one drachma to the mina per month, twelve per cent. per ann.: answering to the centesima among the Romans. Demosthenes had money left him at his father's death, so placed at interest. See *Contra Aphobum*, xxvii. 12. 29: and cf. xxxvii. 6, 7. *Contra Pantænetum*.

We must except from the ordinary rate of interest that which goes by the name of the τόκος ναυτικός: the most usurious and exorbitant description of all; concerning which we find Plutarch, observing, Cato Major, 21: ἐχρήσατο δὲ καὶ τῷ διαβεβλημένῳ μάλιστα τῶν δανεισμῶν, ἐπὶ ναυτικοῖς, τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, proceeding to describe the policy which he adopted to insure himself great profits in such speculations, with little risk: and Maximus Tyrius, Diss. viii. 7: ὥσπερ τῶν ἐπὶ χρηματισμῷ παραβαλλομένων ἐν θαλάττῃ οἱ τόκοι μεγάλοι τῶν δανεισμάτων, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐπεξιόντων τοῖς θυμοῖς οἱ τόκοι μεγάλοι τῶν συμφορῶν.

It was nothing unusual for an eighth (ἐπόγδοον), a sixth (ἔφεκτον), a fifth (ἐπιπέμπτον), a fourth, a third, or the like, of the principal to be stipulated for in such cases as these, by way of interest for a few months' credit. See Harpocration, in ἐπιτριταῖς, ἐπόγδοον, ἔφεκτος τόκος: also in ἐπωβελίαν. Nor can any excuse for such usurious bargains be advanced, except perhaps the consideration of the greater risk to the security of the principal, in the case of money lent upon adventures at sea; the shortness of the time for which it was borrowed; and especially, the magnitude of the returns, which if the adventure succeeded, the money so obtained brought in to the borrower; for these were often extremely great: see *Lysias contra Diogitonem*, xxxii. 38.

Instances of these loans, and the συγγραφαὶ between the parties, concerned in them, are frequently to be met with in the *Oratores Græci*, as they were fertile subjects of litigation: see, for example, Demosthenes, *contra Phormionem*, xxxiv. 26, 27: *Contra Lacritum*, xxxv. 10: *Contra Polyclem*, l. 23.

There is a passage in the *De Vectigalibus* of Xenophon, chapter iii. section 9, which is illustrated by the use of the terms in question, relating to the τόκος ναυτικός: κτήσιν δὲ ἀπ' οὐδενὸς ἂν οὕτω καλὴν κτήσαιντο, ὥσπερ ἀφ' οὗ ἂν προτελέσωσιν εἰς τὴν

tinct from this one means of increasing it gradually by usury, being many and various ; each of the parties in the parable, to whom the same sum of money had been intrusted, would be left to determine for himself in what manner he might choose to employ it ; and in the exercise of his own discretion, would be responsible for nothing but the choice of some mode that was both innocent and allowable in itself, and likely to answer his purpose. Hence, supposing the abilities of the servants the same, but their inclinations to this kind of business in preference to that, to be different—any two might fix upon different employments, one of them more lucrative than another ; or supposing their abilities to be different, but the mode of employment which they made choice of, to be the same, the success of one, even in the same pursuit, and for the same length of time previously, though with the advantage of common means and facilities from the first, might be greater than that of the other. The success of one, too, as dependant in each instance on causes beyond his own controul, might differ materially from that of the other. On all these accounts, there is nothing improbable in either of the two things which are supposed to result ; either that the gains of both the servants in the time in question, should so much exceed the sums committed to their care—or that the gains of one of them, though made in the same ἀφορμήν· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἂν, δέκα μναὶ εἰσφορὰ γένηται, ὥσπερ ναυτικὸν σχεδὸν ἐπίπεμπτον αὐτῷ γίγνεται, τριώβολον τῆς ἡμέρας λαμβάνοντι· ὃ δέ γε ἂν πέντε μναί, πλεῖον ἢ ἐπίτριτον.

Three oboli or half a drachma a day would equal about 182 drachmæ a year ; that is, not quite one fifth of ten minæ, or 1000 drachmæ, but more than a third of five minæ, or 500 drachmæ.

length of time, and by the use of the same sum of money, should so much exceed those of the other.

It was scarcely however to be expected, that the gains of the servants by the use of the sums committed to them, should be found in every instance as much greater in proportion to what they had received, as in these two cases. The rate of the increase which the event shewed to have taken place in these two instances, we may justly presume to be the greatest which was capable of taking place; and the use and management of the trust, which led to such results, in these two instances, to be that kind of use and application which would necessarily make it the most productive possible; and the method of administering their common trust, exemplified in the conduct of the trustees in these two instances, to be characteristic of the most diligent and industrious, the most competent and successful among them. But with respect to the possible degrees of improvement in any other way, distinct from these, or the use and application of their particular trust which was likely to be made by the majority among the ten; as that method of providing for the improvement of their master's property, which consisted in depositing it with the bankers, in whose keeping it would be safe, and while it continued to lie with them, not entirely unproductive—whatever might be the ability of each for employing it otherwise, was equally in the power of all; whatever might be his chance of success from any other mode of turning the matter of the trust to account, was a means of increasing it which might safely be depended on by all; what-

ever might be the zeal or devotion of the servant personally in behalf of the master, was the least that could be expected from his duty as a servant at all; and, as appears from the sequel, whatever more might have been done in other instances, for the performance of the same duty, and under the same circumstances—would have satisfied the master, and acquitted the servant of blame; we may justly, perhaps, conclude, that the method adopted by the servants in general, for the discharge of their commission, and answering the expectations of their master, was the method of simple usury, by placing out his money, for the duration of his absence, in the care and custody of the bankers.

If this be the case, there will be three species or kinds of material use, and three degrees or kinds of personal merit, the consequence of that use, which are either actually or virtually exemplified in the administration of the same kind of trust, and either actually or virtually characterise the holders of the trust themselves. The first is the instance of its use by those, who with as much ability, diligence, and good success, as fidelity to their employer, multiply their deposit tenfold, or improve one mina into ten; a rate of increase, deservedly to be placed at the head of all—which others might aspire to rival, indeed, but, as it appears from the evidence of the result, none could hope to surpass. The second is the instance of those who with as much personal fidelity to their master, and the same degree of personal industry, as the former, but not with equal ability or equal good success, multiply their deposit fivefold, and convert their one mina into

five ; a rate of augmentation considerable in itself, and though lower than the degree of improvement in the first instance, yet much above that in any other. The third is the instance of those, who with as honest a desire to do their own duty, and to improve their master's property, as either of the former servants, yet wanting their capacities, or despairing of their success, deposit their trust with the bankers ; in whose responsibility for it, it would be safe, and the longer their master was absent, and the longer it should lie unclaimed in their hands, so much the more augmented by the gradual accumulation of interest, it would be restored to him on his return.

Now it is needless to observe, that these several instances of the administration of the same kind of trust, different as they may be in themselves, and different as are the results to which they lead—are still instances of the right use and due improvement of the trust in question ; the two first, by other means than those of simple usury, and to a degree, which could not have been effected, within the given time, by the method of simple usury—the third, that kind and degree of improvement which might be effected by putting out a sum of money to interest for the time in question ; the two former, therefore, each extraordinary instances of the improvement, and by means different from the most usual and simple and obvious mode of adding to the amount of a given sum of money, intrusted to any one for improvement, in proportion to the duration of the trust—the latter this ordinary and familiar method itself, and such as would be adopted in the majority of cases, with a view to the desired effect. Any instances of its use and application, different from

these, would so far be instances of the abuse and deterioration, instead of the use and improvement of the trust in question. But in the nature of things, though there might be many kinds of the right use, and many degrees of the possible improvements even of the same trust—there could be only one species of its abuse, considered as alike opposed to any of the kinds of its right use; and only one direct effect of that abuse, considered as rendering the trust totally unserviceable with a view to the purpose for which it was given.

Now, though the parable speaks of ten servants of the nobleman, as intrusted, by their master before his departure, with a certain commission, to be executed in some manner or other, during his absence; and of all these ten, as called to an account upon his return, for their respective administration of the trust in question; yet so far as the particulars of the account itself, are actually specified, three only are supposed to be called before their master, upon his return, to answer for the use of their trusts respectively, during his absence—and three only do actually render an account of the use and administration in question. It follows then, that unless we suppose many more to have been originally intrusted with the same commission, than were afterwards called to an account for it; these three who are actually summoned to this account, and who actually render this account, must be considered to represent the rest; and each of them to stand for a class. The mode in which these three had severally discharged their commission, is so far a specimen of the way in which others of the same number,

had done the same thing ; the account which these three had to render in one way or another, for the use of their trust, is a specimen of the account which the rest, in the same way also, had to render likewise. Now two of these instances of the use in question, are positive instances of its right and legitimate application—in the strictest sense of the terms ; and the third, though properly an instance of its absolute neglect, and its application to no legitimate purpose whatever, yet being on that account the more opposed to that one method of applying it—the simplest and readiest of all, and the least that was to be expected from the servant, though still enough to have satisfied the master, viz. the method of simple usury—instructs us, on the principle of contraries, in another instance of the same right and legitimate application, which in defect of any other, still might and still ought to have been resorted to. We shall have therefore, upon the whole, three instances of the right use and application of the trust in question, in one way or other ; and three classes of the servants, originally invested with it, in whose administration of it this mode of using and applying it is exemplified. The fourth instance is one of its maladministration and abuse ; and the fourth class of servants, in whose case it is exemplified, consists of those, who whether they could hope to emulate the diligence and success of the two first classes, or not, yet having it always in their power to do as much as the third—neglect even that, and so render themselves obnoxious to the charge of an unqualified abuse of their trust, and a total disregard of their duty.

The return of the nobleman was followed, as we saw in the consideration of the former œconomy, by one dispensation of events, with respect to his enemies ; and it is followed by another, as we perceive in this, with respect to his servants, whom he had left in trust behind him : and in the order of succession, the latter takes precedence of the former ; that is, the account with his servants is supposed to be held and concluded, before the animadversion in question begins to take place on his enemies ; for which various reasons may be assigned : partly because the final end of one of these dispensations is to reward, and that of the other is to punish, and rewarding is naturally a more pleasing business than punishing ; partly because the one of these dispensations would always have been necessary, though the other might not have been so ; measures of provision for the government and administration of a kingdom, with a view to its own internal welfare, being still requisite, though measures of coercion, with a view to its security against enmity or aggression from without, under the circumstances of the case should not be wanted.

But the true reason seems to be, that the nobleman's calling his servants to an account, as soon as he returned, was no more than the due execution of the design which he had formed before his departure. And hence, his object in summoning them before him, is expressly specified to be ἵνα γνῶ τίς τί διεπραγματεύσατο—how each had employed himself during the whole period of his absence—and what he had gained in addition to the original sum committed to his care. The same conclusion is still

more strongly implied by the manner in which he acts, according to the results of the inquiry in each instance—apportioning without delay, the corresponding reward to the corresponding desert, acquired, or supposed to be acquired, by the right use of the trust in question. In this point of view his language to the first of the number examined is significant; and contains a clear intimation, that on making the discovery that *his* pound had gained ten pounds, when he immediately awarded to him the government of a corresponding number of cities, he was only acting at last in conformity to a plan which he had conceived from the first: ἴσθι ἐξουσίαν ἔχων, “know that thou hast authority;” for so should the words be rendered, rather than, “have thou authority,” over such and such a number of cities.

The business of this audit, or account, appears from the parable to have been a solemn proceeding, and conducted in a public manner; at least, besides the principal parties in it, the king and his servants, to have been transacted in the presence of others, called οἱ παρεστώτες—or “they that stood by;” who act as his ministers, in bringing his servants before him, in executing the sentence awarded in part, if not altogether, in each instance, and in inflicting the necessary vengeance upon his personal enemies and adversaries.

The order in which the servants were called individually before their master, is so far remarkable, that they who had most to account for to him, or at least to render up to him, as a consequence and effect of the use of their trust, were called upon to

give their account first ; wherein there is a manifest propriety, independent of the more secret reasons which there may also be, why such must necessarily have been the course of proceeding. With respect too to the rule which regulates the measure of the reward, in each of those cases where some reward might seem to have been due even from a master to his servants, if not in justice, at least in equity, and on the score of bounty and liberality ; it is not less observable that it is a perfect specimen of the ἀντι-πεπονθὸς ἄλλῳ—or the return of like for like—that is to say, exactly in the ratio of the use and improvement effected in the subject-matter of the trust, is the advancement and promotion of the servant ; with this difference, that the good of the master was exclusively consulted in the former, but the good of the servant as much as that of the master is consulted in the latter. Every addition of a mina to the mina received, is rewarded by the government of a city ; and an increase of ten in all, by a government over ten cities. The servants are told at the same time that they had been faithful—they had proved themselves trustworthy and entitled to confidence—in what was a very little thing, and their master acknowledged and rewarded their fidelity, by fresh confidence in what was much : a reason illustrated and confirmed by the effect : for the trust of a mina bears no comparison to the gift of a city ; yet fidelity or competence for the one is rewarded by the gift of the other.

With respect to the account of the servant, who had failed in the discharge of his trust, the first circumstance which is remarkable in it is this ; that in

tendering to his master the mina which he had received from him, exactly as he had received it, and telling him at the same time that he was tendering him back his own; he was guilty of a manifest falsehood, or a misrepresentation of the real state of the case: for if that which has been committed by one person who was empowered to commit it, to another who was bound to receive it, for a proper end and purpose, (as by a master, his own property may be to a servant,) is returned to its owner again only as it was received, and without having been put to the use and purpose for which it was intended, he cannot be said to receive back his own, as he had a right to receive it and as he expected to receive it. He may receive what he originally gave in charge, nominally indeed as he gave it; but really minus that degree of augmentation of which it was capable, and which it would have experienced, if it had been put to the use for which it was given^d. The accessions which should have been made to the trust, under such circumstances, would be as liable to be claimed by the original owner, as the trust itself; and the mere non-use of his trust, according to his intentions, would be as much a violation of his rights, and as contrary to his wish, as its positive abuse in any conceivable way.

In the next place, when he attempts to excuse his own indolence, by laying the blame on the inordinate cupidity of his master—though nothing is

^d Plutarch, ^εCaton. Maj. 21: ἐκείνο δ' ἤδη σφοδρότερον τοῦ Κάτωνος, ὅτι θαυμαστὸν ἄνδρα καὶ θεῖον εἰπεῖν ἐτόλμησε πρὸς δόξαν, ὃς ἀπολείπει πλέον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ὃ προσέθηκεν, οὐ παρέλαβεν: and on the same principle, who should render back a deposit received in trust, much greater^ε than what was committed to him.

clearer, from the evidence of the context, and the nature of his master's conduct in the two instances just before—than that this insinuation is a calumny against the master, whose character and disposition do not deserve such an imputation; still we may observe that even had it been true, and his master had been the person he described him to be, his excuse would have stood him in no stead. By virtue of the peculiarity of the ancient relation of master and slave—to nothing transacted between them in their relative capacity, could the ordinary principles of justice or equity apply, which regulated the claims of one man upon another in other instances. The right to command was absolutely on one side, the right to obey absolutely on the other. The will of the master was the measure of justice to the slave. Nothing which he chose to expect, could the slave consider unreasonable; nothing which he chose to prescribe, could the slave excuse himself from complying with.

The answer of his master reminds him of this truth, and is an exquisite specimen of irony and refutation at the same time. It meets and exposes his plea on the proper principle of the *argumentum ad absurdum*, and the *argumentum ad hominem*, both; admitting apparently the truth of his premises, yet shewing that even on his own assumptions, they led to a conclusion condemnatory of himself.

Upon the last words of this address to the servant, and the concluding dispensation of the whole œconomy, something is still to be remarked. It is commanded that the mina be taken from this one unprofitable servant, and transferred to him who

had made the ten ; for which this reason is assigned, “ To every one who hath it shall be given ; but “ from him who hath not, even that he hath shall “ be taken away from him.” If this observation was intended with a special reference to the preceding command, we may gather from it, not only that the good use of a trust of one kind may be expected to lead to the enjoyment of a trust, and probably a greater, of another kind ; but that where many have been invested with a certain trust in common beforehand, with a view to a certain use thereof, to be requited in a certain manner to themselves—the failure of some in the use and administration of that trust, and the consequent loss of their claims to a reward on account of it, in their own person, will lead to this result in behalf of others who have made a better use of the same—that the reward which might have been earned by the former, will be given, over and above their proper remuneration, to the latter. The nobleman originally designed to promote ten of his servants, for the good use of the trust which he meant to impose on them ; and no doubt, if the merits of the case in each instance had deserved it, he would have promoted all these ten, on that account. But the result of the trial imposed upon them was, that out of the number originally selected for promotion, some were found worthy of it, and others not ; some were found more worthy, and others less so. The result of this discovery was a *residuum*, if we may so call it, of the rewards intended for desert, over and above the positive degrees of desert. By a secondary dispensation of bounty, this is distributed among those who had already been rewarded in proportion to

their deserts ; and the rule of the distribution is the same as before, that he who had most of desert originally, and most of its proper reward already, receives the greatest share of this extra reward also.

This truth seems to be intimated by that observation attributed to the bystanders, on receiving the commands of the king to transfer the mina from the unprofitable servant to him who had the ten minæ : “ Sir, he hath ten minæ.” This observation surely could not be intended as a remonstrance with the king on account of this command ; nor be expected to have the effect of changing his resolution in favour of the servant in question. If so, it was designed, we may presume, merely to fix the attention on the object of this extra distinction, and on the peculiarity of the reasons for which it was awarded to him : that the most meritorious and successful in the use of a common trust, though rewarded in proportion to his merit already, was the fittest to become the recipient of any share of the common reward of that trust, to which others, invested with the trust, might have been admitted, had they been entitled to admission—in their own right—as the consequence of its use.

THE MORAL.

It appears from the above review of the material circumstances of the parable, that besides the œconomy, considered at large in the first instance, and exclusively concerning the acquisition and enjoyment of a certain kingdom ; another is combined with it, subordinate to it, yet independent of it, which concerns the inferior parties in the complex

of the parabolic transaction, as directly as the other does the principal one in the same.

This peculiarity of structure is characteristic of the present parable. There is in almost every parable, and certainly in almost all of the allegorical or prophetic class, the same distinction of agents into principal and subordinate, as in this: but there is no parable, besides this, which is made up of two integral and independent parts, and combines together in the tissue of the same narrative, two distinct œconomies—one relating exclusively to the principal, and the other to the subordinate agents in the same transaction.

It is a consequence of the association of two such different œconomies in one and the same account, that though, under the circumstances of the case, they cannot be detached asunder—they must conspire individually to one and the same result; yet either was capable, *a priori*, of standing apart from the other—either would have had a proper use and moral of its own, independent of connection with the other. The peculiar œconomy for the personal acquisition of a kingdom by the proper party, has necessarily nothing to do with the peculiar œconomy for the trial of persons invested with a certain responsible trust; nor conversely, this latter œconomy with the former.

The connection of these two œconomies in the present instance, and yet their independence one of the other *a priori*, could not be better elucidated than by comparing the present, with another parable which will follow and require to be considered hereafter; I mean the parable of the talents, which

forms a part of St. Matthew's account of the prophecy upon the mount^e. The coincidence between these two, if specified and illustrated in every point of the resemblance which one of them bears to the other, would shew that while they certainly differ in some things, they agree in others to an extent which approaches almost to identity. There is no more difference observable between them, than would seem at first sight to be due to the incorporation of a separate and an integral history in the one, over and above what they possess in common—and to its absence in the other; and consequently to an excess and a defect, respectively, measured by the very same criterion in either case. Add to the parable of the talents, an œconomy like that of the kingdom—the result would be the parable of the pounds; take away from the parable of the pounds, the particular history in relation to the kingdom—the residuum would be the parable of the talents.

The principal points of distinction which would require to be attended to, in ascertaining the moral of this œconomy relating to the kingdom, have been already alluded to; viz. that the kingdom, before it is acquired, is in the gift of one person, and after it is acquired, becomes the property of another; that the possessor of the kingdom goes abroad to acquire it, and returns home to enter upon it; that the kingdom is acquired by the proper person against the will and inclination of his proper subjects; that the first acts and exertions of the power and authority of a king, within their proper sphere and over their proper subjects, go no further than what was to be

^e Matt. xxv. 14—30. Harm. iv. 79.

expected as the most direct and preliminary effect of the overt assertion of kingly power, under such circumstances—the punishment of the personal enemies of the king, and the disaffected subjects of his government, on the one hand, and the distribution of offices of trust and dignity, subordinate to his own, among those whose attachment and fidelity were to be relied upon, on the other; the former essential to the peace and security, and the latter to the order, good government, and well-being of any kingdom.

To these considerations we may now add, that the necessity which the future possessor of this kingdom is placed under, of departing from home, in order to its acquisition, and the interval which must ensue before he could expect to return for its administration, suggests the idea, and affords scope and opportunity for the execution of that scheme and course of things, subordinate to the acquisition and enjoyment of the kingdom in the person of the principal party, which begin with his departure, and continue to proceed during his absence, for the trial of the inferior parties—with a view to certain results affecting both them and his kingdom, upon his return.

At this point of time, then, the œconomy relating to the subordinate persons, described as the members of the household of the future king, and therefore as standing in a peculiar relation to him, begins to be interwoven with that which relates to the principal one, and the final end of the one to be subservient to that of the other. And with respect to this particular œconomy itself—that so far as it consists in the delegation of a certain trust by one person, in his proper capacity of master, to others, in their proper relation as servants, to be discharged and ad-

ministered, while held, after a specified manner, for the good of the principal party, but disclosing by the mode of the administration, the personal talents and disposition of the inferior ones, and serving consequently as a test of character, and a criterion of merit; it would answer in all respects to an œconomy of probation, such as we defined and described elsewhere^f, is too evident to require any proof: and that so far as it consists in the process of an account or inquiry at last, passing between the author of the trust on the one hand, and the receivers of it on the other, which turns on the use and administration of the trust itself previously, and leads to consequences which have the nature of reward or punishment, at the hands of the author of the trust, to the holders of it, according to the merits of the case in each instance—it would answer to the idea of an œconomy of retribution, arising out of, and critically adapted to give effect to a preceding œconomy of probation—such also as we described elsewhere^g, seems as little to be doubted.

With regard, then, to the further consideration of the parabolic history, (including its Interpretation, to which we must now proceed,) and what still remains to be said for the determination of its proper moral—the method which I propose to follow is this; As two œconomies are combined in the same account, each of which might have stood by itself, and would have had an use and meaning of its own, I shall consider them first separately, and afterwards in conjunction: beginning with that to which the other is found to be ultimately subservient, the œconomy of the kingdom.

^f Vol. i. chap. ix. 105—119.

^g Ibid.

THE INTERPRETATION.

We are told by the Evangelist, who records the parable, that the immediate or proximate cause which produced it, was because Jesus was near to Jerusalem, and the kingdom of God was expected forthwith to appear. The cause which produced the parable then, was the expectation of a certain kingdom; whence we may reasonably infer that a parable delivered specially in reference to this expectation, and turning specifically on the œconomy of the acquisition of a certain kingdom, turns upon the œconomy of the acquisition of *that* kingdom, *whose* coming at this time was expected. Now this kingdom is further described as the kingdom of God. The kingdom in the parable then, is the kingdom of God. But the kingdom of God in the popular acceptance of the terms, (in which sense we must necessarily suppose them to be used here,) was but another denomination for the kingdom of the Messiah. The kingdom in the parable, then, is the kingdom of the Messiah, and the œconomy relating to the acquisition of that kingdom is an œconomy relating in some manner or other to the kingdom expected to be acquired and possessed by the Messiah.

If this conclusion is correct, it becomes of cardinal importance to the elucidation and interpretation of the parable. For on that principle, the nobleman who acquires the kingdom, must denote the Messiah of the Jews, and if so, must answer to Jesus Christ; and the kingdom, which belongs to him *de jure*, at one time, and *de facto*, at another—which he goes abroad to obtain, and returns home to administer,

taking himself a personal and prominent part both in the assumption of the dignity, and in the discharge of the functions of a king—must be some kingdom of Jesus Christ, the right to which he has already acquired, and the duties of which he already exercises, or which he will sometime acquire, and will sometime exercise, in his proper capacity of the Messiah of the Jews.

The discovery of this correspondence between the person of the nobleman, and the person of Jesus Christ, and the kingdom of the nobleman, and some kingdom of Jesus Christ, is the discovery of a clue to the texture of the whole parable. But before we proceed to apply it, something more deserves to be said, in reference to the immediate cause and occasion which produced it; the further consideration of which will still more effectually confirm the conclusion already deduced.

The expectation relating to a certain kingdom, prevailing at this time, it may justly be contended, would not have given occasion to a parable, expressly conceived and framed in reference to it, were the parable designed to serve no purpose and to convey no assurance with respect to this expectation, which might not have been equally well served by being conveyed in any plainer way. But if the purpose intended to be served by the parable, and the assurance designed to be conveyed by it, in reference to a certain expectation, was not otherwise to be served, nor otherwise conveyed, under the circumstances of the case, than in the disguise of a parabolic allegory; we may take it for granted that there was something wrong in the expectation,

and something in the disclosures of the parable designed to correct that error, by the statement of the truth, which, under the circumstances of the case, would not have borne to be plainly revealed ; but if disclosed at all, must be so under the disguise of a parable.

Now that the error involved in the expectation in question, and therefore the error designed to be corrected by the parable, did not consist in this, that a kingdom was expected to appear, whether the kingdom of God or the kingdom of the Messiah, which was never to have an existence, which had no being either then, or in futurity, but was a perfect non-entity, and a creature of their imaginations who entertained the expectation of it—must of necessity be inferred from the analogy of the parable ; if that was framed with a special reference to such an expectation, and had to do with a kingdom, which was in any manner identified with such a kingdom. For the parable itself is founded upon the reality of some kingdom, the actual right and property of a certain possessor, *de jure* at one time, and *de facto* at another ; and the circumstances of the parabolic history, proceeding upon this supposition as their basis, consist exclusively of details relating to the mode of its acquisition, and to the mode of its administration ; each of them implying its real existence.

Admitting, too, the reality of this kingdom in general—that the error involved in the expectation of it, and the error designed to be corrected by the parable, might perhaps consist in some mistaken idea of its nature in particular, which the parabolic disclosures in reference to it might be adapted to

set right—can never be proved from the testimony of the parable itself. Whatever might be the popular persuasion, now prevailing, with respect either to the kingdom of God or the kingdom of the Messiah, the disclosures of the parable are just as favourable to the supposition of its truth, as to that of its falsehood. The popular expectation respecting the kingdom of God at this time, might be in favour of a temporal kingdom, and the popular belief respecting the person and character of the Messiah, might be in favour of a temporal monarch; but the nature of the kingdom in the parable, from any thing disclosed in reference to it, would be adapted to answer to the one, and the personal character of the nobleman, in the parable, from any thing that appears to the contrary, would be adapted to correspond to the other.

But if the error which the parable was intended to correct, in reference to this kingdom—was neither an error in the expectation of a kingdom in general, nor an error in the expectation of a certain kingdom in particular, now prevailing; in what could this error consist, except in some mistaken apprehension relating to the non-essentials of the kingdom, and not to the kingdom? some mistake, the existence of which, at this present time, and therefore the necessity of correcting and amending it at this present time, might be very possible in reference to something connected with the kingdom, without calling in question the fact of the kingdom itself? The circumstances of time and place are two of these nonessentials; about which, without calling in question the truth of the expectation of a certain kingdom in general, or even the truth of the ex-

pectation of such and such a kingdom in particular, a mistake might exist, and require to be rectified by a disclosure of the real state of the case.

That the error involved in the expectation of a certain kingdom, which produced the parable in the present instance, was actually an error of this description—a mistaken idea not affecting the truth of the kingdom in general, nor the nature of the kingdom in particular, but the fact of the time when, and of the place where, even such a kingdom was to have a being, and might justly be expected to be established; appears from the historical notice premised to the parable, and declaring the occasion out of which it arose; “And as they were hearing these things, he proceeded to speak a parable, because he was near to Jerusalem, and they were supposing that the kingdom of God is about to shew itself immediately.”

The ostensible ground of the parable, then, was the expectation, at this time prevailing, that the kingdom of God was immediately about to appear; but the ostensible ground of this expectation was the fact that Jesus was near to Jerusalem. From this fact the people derived the inference that the kingdom of God would immediately appear; and from the fact of the inference, so drawn by them, the parable was added and spoken by our Saviour; no doubt to disprove or correct the inference itself.

Now the matter of fact, on which the inference was founded, was certain. Jesus was actually on the road to Jerusalem, and might not be far from it, at the time when he delivered the parable. The error involved in the inference then, was not owing

to the possible falsehood of the premises, but to the very possible inconsequentiality of the conclusion, deduced from them. It was true that Jesus was, at this time, nigh to Jerusalem; but it might not follow, even from that, that the kingdom of God was forthwith about to appear. The parable subjoined in reference to the inference, might be designed to draw this necessary distinction between facts like these, not inseparably connected with each other; and without calling in question the truth of a kingdom of God, (even such as was expected,) as sometime or other, and somewhere or other to be revealed—much less the fact that Jesus himself was nigh to Jerusalem, and would shortly arrive there; to shew by its own disclosures, that it did not follow from the former that the kingdom in question was to be expected at *this* time, *when* he was journeying to Jerusalem, or from the latter, that it was to be expected in Jerusalem, as soon as he arrived at his journey's end.

The very inference, however, from such an assumption, false as it was, must prove one of two things concerning the antecedent persuasion of those who were capable of falling into the mistake in question; either that the kingdom of God, whensoever expected to be established, was always expected to be established at Jerusalem; or being expected at this present time to be soon established, under the circumstances of the case was expected to be established at Jerusalem. To account for the former expectation, it might be said, that if the kingdom in question was the kingdom of the Messiah, the Messiah was the Son of David, and Jerusalem was the city of

David—and with reason might the kingdom of his father David be expected to establish itself in Jerusalem, the city of David. And if the kingdom in question was the kingdom of God, Jerusalem was still the city of God, the place purposely chosen and set apart, to put his name there; to be the locality of his temple, and the seat of his public worship.

To account for the latter, it is necessary merely to remind the reader of the time when, and the circumstances under which, the parable was delivered. The time was the occasion of our Saviour's visit to Jerusalem, to keep the solemnity of the Passover at which he suffered; the circumstances, when having stopped for the night with Zaccheus, on the road between Jericho and Jerusalem, in all probability before the arrival of the sabbath, he was preparing, in all probability likewise, to continue his journey on the expiration of the sabbatic rest^g.

But this part of his progress to Jerusalem before the last Passover, was but the conclusion of a much more general and extensive circuit; which having been begun, some weeks before, as there is every reason to believe, from Capernaum in Galilee, had travelled in order through Galilee, Peræa, and probably Decapolis, until it passed into Judæa, and was finally closed at Jerusalem^h. The circumstances under which he had been travelling ever since he set out, had been such as to draw the attention of his enemies towards him, and to keep their eyes fixed upon him from the first; and to afford a pretext for the accusation brought against him before Pilate, of going about and stirring up the

^g Vide my Dissertations, vol. iii. Diss. i.

^h Vide my Dissertations, vol. ii. Diss. xvi—xxii. 457—573.

people, having begun with Galilee, until he was come to Jerusalemⁱ; while to the apprehensions of the people at large they seemed decisive intimations that some great event was shortly to be fulfilled, nothing less than the disclosure of the long expected kingdom, and the assumption by Jesus of Nazareth, of that regal character and authority, which they all expected to be assumed by their Messiah, and which they would gladly have fixed upon him. It pleased our Lord for a variety of reasons, to make his last progress to Jerusalem in a manner very different from usual, both as to the publicity with which it was conducted, and the pomp and splendour by which it was characterised; and his train of followers which had been gathering accessions to its numbers, in each of the crowded districts of Palestine, which it had previously visited, was naturally become most considerable when he had passed through Jericho, and was now on the high way to Jerusalem. The circumstances under which he entered the city from Bethany at last, are proofs that the same pomp and celebrity distinguished his final procession to the temple, which had marked his journey in all parts of its progress, until then; and the reception which was given him by the people, both on the way to the city, and in the streets of Jerusalem, and within the temple, demonstrates in like manner that the ardour and enthusiasm of his followers, however long before excited, so far from being impaired and abated by time, had never been raised to such a pitch, nor ever so openly and warmly declared, as at last.

With respect then to the œconomy of the parable

ⁱ Vide Diss. vol. ii. Diss. xvi. 469, 470.

which is first and properly connected with the acquisition and enjoyment of a certain kingdom, we may lay it down as sufficiently clear even from the historical notice premised to it, and as the first step towards the discovery of a clue to its interpretation; that the kingdom in question is the same which the popular expectation ascribed to the Messiah, as his personal right and property; and the final end of the parabolic narrative, as produced by the expectation prevailing concerning that kingdom, is not to disprove or rectify the existing persuasion about the fact of such a kingdom, as never to appear, or the nature of such a kingdom, whensoever it should appear; but the *time* of the kingdom, or *when* it should appear. And whatsoever else may be implied in the disclosures made by it respecting the kingdom in general, thus much may be implicitly collected from the information which it conveys upon this one point; that though the time of acquiring the kingdom *de jure*, might even then be come, or not far remote, when the parable was spoken, the time of acquiring it *de facto*, or of entering upon the discharge of its functions, whether of reward or of punishment, whether of coercion or of conservation, which must be the time of its open assumption, and of its revelation in its true nature and character, whatever those were destined to be, was still distant. The future possessor of the kingdom must depart to a distant country, and must return from a distant country, before he could appear in his true character of king, and in the exercise of his proper jurisdiction, even at home; and in the meantime, something must begin and proceed, with a view to the administration of his kingdom, when he should enter upon it, which would re-

quire time and space, duly to answer the purpose designed.

The next thing which we have to consider is the œconomy of probation, affecting the subordinate parties in the parable, combined with, and subservient to, the œconomy of the acquisition and enjoyment of the kingdom, affecting the principal personage.

If, then, this kingdom finds its proper counterpart in some personal kingdom of the Messiah, it follows that the owner and possessor of it, to whom it belongs *de jure* at one time, and *de facto* at another, must represent the Messiah himself, and therefore Jesus Christ. But the subordinate parties, to each of whom the principal personage stood in a proper relation, were observed to be twofold; the members of his own household in particular, and the rest of his own community in general; each of whom, from the moment of his elevation to the kingdom, became his subjects in common, and began to owe him the same allegiance and submission in common—but the former only, both before and after that time, both stood, and continued to stand, in the relation of his servants, and he in that of their master.

Now it was shewn at large in the General Introduction^k, that when our Lord Jesus Christ is represented in the personal relation of the head or master of a family, he is represented as the head or master of the visible church; and the corresponding parties in that relation, the members of such an household, subordinate to such an head, whatever distinctions

^k Vide vol. i. ch. viii. p. 99.

there may be among them in other respects, are all to be understood as the members of the visible church, and consequently as Christians in general. This being the case, that class of the subordinate personages in the parable, which consists of the rest of the nobleman's community in general, and to whom, before his elevation to the rank of their king, he stands in the relation of fellow-citizen—though, in consequence of his elevation to the rank of their king, they may become the subjects of Christ in his capacity of king, cannot be the members of his church in his capacity of the head of an household; that is, though bound in consequence of his elevation, as much as the members of his own household, to acknowledge or profess to acknowledge his authority as king, his fellow-citizens cannot, like the members of his household, acknowledge, or profess to acknowledge, his authority as the head of the church. If the members of his household, then, are such as profess an obedience or submission to Christ in his capacity of the head of the church; his fellow citizens are such as disclaim and renounce all subjection to him, and respect for him, in the same; that is, if the former are nominal or professing believers, the latter are avowed and determined infidels.

Now the denomination of professing believers in Jesus Christ, and consequently the relation of the servants and members of a proper household to its proper head, suit alike to the ministers of religion and to the people or laity, as composing together the congregation of the visible church. But it has been shewn, that considering the ministers of religion and the people, as forming the complex of profess-

ing believers, and each in their proper relation to Christ, as the members of one household are related to one head, to be subjected in common to an œconomy of probation, preparatory to a corresponding œconomy of retribution ; the peculiar representation of the situation or case of the people, that is of Christians in general, is that of servants, during the absence of their master, left in the exercise of the ordinary duties of their respective stations, whose personal description, under such circumstances, is that of servants left in waiting for the return of their master, and whose virtue, in conformity to such a description, is supposed to be that of servants who are bound to be ever on the watch, against the period of that return ; but the peculiar designation for the situation of the ministers of religion, as distinct from the people, is that of servants, in the absence of their master, left in the discharge of a special and extraordinary duty—which invests them for the time of his absence with the character of servants left by their master instead of himself, and bound by the nature of their office to the performance of duties which would otherwise be incumbent on himself ; or with the character of servants left by their master in trust with something which belongs to, and is derived from him ; and bound by the tenure of their trust to an use and administration of it, designed for his good¹.

Now it is evident that the relation of the servants in the parable, during the absence of their master, is one of this latter kind ; the relation of servants left in trust—of servants whom their master selected

¹ Vide vol. i. ch. ix. p. 105.

from the body of his household before his departure, to invest with a new and extraordinary duty, incumbent upon them, for the term of his absence, but upon none of the rest—and with a view to the purposes designed by it, specially requiring the interposition of such an extraordinary œconomy as that of his absence itself. The rest of the servants of the nobleman, it may well be presumed, would have their proper duties to discharge during his absence, in their master's behalf, as well as these ten; and would be as accountable to their master upon his return, for the neglect or observance of these proper duties during his absence, as they; but it does not appear that they became bound, in consequence of his absence, to any duties which they would not have been bound to, had he never departed from home; nor were liable to be called to an account by him, on his return, for the neglect or performance of any but the ordinary duties of their station, during his absence. It is evident also that the subject-matter of the trust, specially committed to these ten, and investing them with a new personal character, and a new personal relation to their master, accordingly, though described in the parable as a sum of money and a portion of their master's property, is capable of standing for any thing which properly belongs to Christ as the head of the church, and may be properly committed by him, to any of its members, so that it be originally derived from him, and be bound to be exercised while retained, in his behalf, and bound to be rendered back to him when the period of its tenure is expired, and capable of constituting while possessed, the subject-matter of a responsible trust.

Now, when we come hereafter to the considera-

tion of the parable of the talents, which we have had occasion to mention as resembling in many respects the parable under discussion ; I hope to make it appear from what it possesses in common with the present parable, that the servants, supposed to be left in trust with the property of the nobleman during his absence from home, divisible, as they were, into certain classes, according to the use which they made of their trust respectively, denote certain orders or classes of the ministers of religion, beginning with the apostles, downwards ; and that the sum of money, or material subject of the trust, committed to each, stands for a certain portion of that power and authority over the church, which belongs of right to none but Jesus Christ, but in his own personal absence from his church, and from the direct or immediate cognizance of the course of things therein, at all periods of its existence between the time of his personal departure and the time of his personal return, being of necessity to be committed to some order and description of persons, for the good and benefit, as well as the government of the rest, has been from the first intrusted to the ministers of religion, in his stead.

Thus much may suffice, in brief, for the explanation of the œconomy of probation connected with the œconomy of the kingdom in the parable, but considered as independent of it. Let us now proceed to consider them in conjunction, or as conspiring together to one and the same result, in the acquisition and administration of the kingdom.

The personal kingdom of Jesus Christ, in its largest and most comprehensive sense, is the kingdom acquired by him, and administered by him, as

his personal right in his human capacity. It is the kingdom, the title unto which was earned by him, and the possession of which was bestowed upon him, in reward of all that he did and suffered in his human capacity, or in his divine nature only as united to and combined with the human—as the Messiah of Israel, and the Saviour of human kind. It is the kingdom therefore, which being so earned and acquired, he enjoys and administers, strictly speaking, as the Son of man; and which, consequently, though perfectly compatible with any other that he may possess and administer as the Son of God, requires to be carefully distinguished from it.

The name which is given to the personal kingdom of Christ, in his human capacity, is that of the *mediatorial* kingdom of Jesus Christ; but the name which must be given to his personal kingdom, as the Son of God, is that of his *natural* or *hereditary* kingdom, the kingdom which he inherits by nature, from the Father: and there is this difference between the kingdom which belongs to, and is enjoyed by him as the Son of man, and that which belongs to, and is enjoyed by him as the Son of God—that the acquisition, and much more the possession and administration of the former took place and began in time; the right to the other, and its possession and administration are from everlasting; the duration of the former is of finite extent, and will have an end; the duration of the other is eternal *a parte ante*, and *a parte post*—it never had a beginning, and never will have an end. The mediatorial kingdom began at the time of the reception of Christ into heaven, and his session at the right hand of God; the natural and hereditary kingdom never

had a beginning, because the generation of the Son, by virtue of which he inherits it from the Father, is from all eternity : and for the same reason that the mediatorial kingdom had a proper beginning, it may have a proper end ; but the natural and hereditary one, as never having had a beginning, never can have an end.

These observations it was necessary to premise with respect to the distinction between the mediatorial and the hereditary kingdoms of Christ, respectively ; for each of these kingdoms is alike the personal right of Jesus Christ, and each of them may be called in one sense the personal kingdom of Jesus Christ ; and therefore each of them might be considered at first sight, capable of answering to the kingdom in the parable, concerning which thus much has been discovered, that it is in some sense or other a personal kingdom of Jesus Christ. And as it is impossible to regard our Saviour Jesus Christ himself, except in one of two capacities, or both, either as the Son of God, or the Son of man, or as both God and man ; so is it, to conceive of any kingdom of his, which he enjoys and administers in his personal right, except as his personal kingdom in quality of the Son of God, or his personal kingdom in quality of the Son of man, or his personal kingdom in quality of both. And, indeed, in one sense, as by virtue of the conjunction of the divine and the human nature in the unity of one and the same person, after that had once taken place, it became impossible to draw a personal distinction between Jesus Christ as the Son of God, and Jesus Christ as the Son of man ; it became equally impossible to

draw a distinction from the same time forward, between his personal kingdom as the Son of God, and his personal kingdom as the Son of man. The personal kingdom of Jesus Christ, whether as the Son of God or as the Son of man, always was the same, and for the same reason always will be the same: because Jesus Christ himself always was, and always must be the same^m. Still, as the personal relation of Jesus Christ as the Son of man was acquired in time, but his personal relation as the Son of God existed from all eternity; there is no reason why the mediatorial kingdom which is his personal right as the Son of man, should not be considered distinct from the natural kingdom, his right as the Son of God; nor, consequently, as the natural kingdom preexisted from all eternity, but the mediatorial was acquired in time, why the mediatorial kingdom itself should not be considered included in the natural—for a part of its duration coincident with it—and in the transaction of its peculiar purpose and œconomy, subordinate to it. And as the mediatorial may thus be comprehended in the natural kingdom of Jesus Christ—both being considered his personal right, though in two distinct personal capacities; so may some other kingdom be included in the mediatorial, as a part of that—and yet be the personal kingdom of Jesus Christ in the same capacity as the mediatorial kingdom itself: and this kingdom may be the kingdom in the parable, which it has been ascertained is the personal kingdom of Jesus Christ in some proper sense or other.

^m Hebrews xiii. 8: Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς χθὲς καὶ σήμερον ὁ αὐτὸς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας.

There is a multitude of texts in scripture, which either directly or indirectly bear testimony to the fact of the commission of all power and authority, both in heaven and in earth, to our Lord Jesus Christ, in his proper capacity as the Son of man ⁿ; and from a point of time which cannot bear date earlier than his resurrection, or later than his ascension; at the former of which his exaltation to be the head of all things, might be said virtually to have taken place, and at the latter was actually seen to begin, by his visible reception into heaven, before the eyes of the apostles, and his subsequent session at the right hand of God, which ensued, as we are told, upon it. While, then, the uniform language of the scriptures of the New Testament attributes to Jesus Christ, in his proper capacity of the Son of man as much as of the Son of God, the proper enjoyment of an universal kingdom; still it is a kingdom, which is invariably represented to have had a beginning in time, and the date of which may be distinctly pointed out. And as it is expressly declared that this kingdom had a beginning, so is it expressly attested that it will have an end; and as the proper date of its commencement has been so clearly revealed that we can distinctly point it out, so is the proper

ⁿ Vide, John iii. 35, (Harm. ii. 14.): Cf. John v. 17. 19—23. 25—27: Matt. xi. 27. (Harm. iii. 9.): Luke x. 22. (Harm. iv. 26:) John vii. 39; viii. 28: (Cf. x. 29, 30: Mark xiii. 32:) John xiii. 3; xiv. 12—14. 16. 18. 20. 26; xv. 7. 16. 26; xvi. 7. 13—15. 23, 24. 26; xvii. 2. 10: Matt. xxvi. 69: Mark xiv. 62: Luke xxii. 69: Matt. xxviii. 18. 20: Luke xxiv. 49: Acts i. 5. 8; ii. 33—36; v. 31; vii. 55, 56; x. 36. 42; xvii. 31: Rom. i. 4: Philipp. ii. 9—11: Ephes. i. 10. 20—23: Coloss. i. 16—20; ii. 3. 9, 10. 15; iii. 1: Hebrews i. 3, 4. 13; ii. 5—9; viii. 1.

date of its termination so clearly defined likewise, that we can have no difficulty in specifying that also.

In proof of this assertion, we need refer to no more than that remarkable passage of St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians, chap. xv. 24—28 : in which, while it is taken for granted that Christ, in his proper capacity as the Son of man, does even now enjoy a sovereign empire over all things, (the Father only excepted,) the kingdom in question is plainly described as delegated to him by the Father—as received and held for the Father—with a view to a certain purpose, and for the production of a certain effect ; and when that purpose has been answered, and that effect has been produced, the kingdom committed in trust to him by the Father, for such purposes as those, will be resigned by him who held it, and restored to him who gave it.

“ Then *cometh*” (or rather, “ After that the end”—as the last thing specified in a certain order and train of events—first, the resurrection of Christ himself, in the capacity of the firstfruit ; then the resurrection of them that are his, at his appearing and presence ; then, finally, the end or consummation of all things) “ when he giveth up the kingdom to “ God and the Father ; when he hath subdued and “ rendered of none effect all rule, and all authority “ and power. For he must reign himself until “ he hath put all enemies under his own feet. “ Death is the enemy who is subdued and made of “ none effect last. For (*the Father*) hath put all “ things in subjection under his feet. But when “ he saith all things are put in subjection *to him*, “ it is evidently with the exception of him who “ hath put all things in subjection *to him*. And

“ when all things have been put in subjection to him, then shall even the Son himself become subject to him that put all things in subjection to him, that God may be all things in all things.”

It appears then that while St. Paul affirms that Jesus Christ, by virtue of a commission derived from the Father, does actually reign even now in his human capacity, in the enjoyment of sovereign power over all but the Father himself; he affirms also that he must continue to reign, until by the exercise of this sovereign power, in the discharge of his commission, he has brought about a certain effect—but no longer. This effect is said to be the subjection of all things opposed to himself, the putting of all enemies under his own feet; the putting down, or rendering of none effect, the evacuating, enfeebling, and annihilating, every rule, authority, and power, at present distinct from, or independent of, and any way opposed to his own. Every antagonist power of this description will be subdued, one after another; and the last enemy whose opposition is to be overcome, and whose empire is to be destroyed, it is said, is death.

When then, by means of that sovereign exercise of the power of Christ, which will be followed by the annihilation and destruction of death, even death shall be no more; this will be the last period of the reign of Christ, and the ultimate effect of his power and sovereignty. With the conquest of the grave, and the redemption of its captives; with the restoration of the dead to life, and the immunity of the living from death; with the gift and assurance of an immortal existence to all who believe in Christ, as the one great and final effect of the infinite power,

and universal sovereignty of Christ; the kingdom which he enjoyed and administered until then, will be resigned to him who gave it; the Son also, in his human capacity, who presided over that kingdom until then, as supreme, will become subject to the Father, and the mediatorial kingdom will be consummated and merged in the Divine.

The mediatorial kingdom of Jesus Christ, therefore, which properly began at the time of his ascension into heaven, and his session at the right hand of God, will properly terminate at the time of his return to judgment, and the general resurrection of the dead. The mediatorial kingdom, then, cannot be the same with the kingdom in the parable; though that may be a personal kingdom of Jesus Christ, in some sense, as much as the mediatorial kingdom itself, and in the same capacity of the Son of man, as that. The kingdom in the parable is acquired in one locality, and is administered in another. The mediatorial kingdom was acquired, and is administered in the same. The possessor of the kingdom in the parable goes abroad to be confirmed in his right to it, but returns home to enter upon his possession of it. The possessor of the mediatorial kingdom ascended into heaven to be installed in it, but he has remained there in the possession of it. The possession of the kingdom in the parable is not supposed to cease with the return of the possessor home; but we have the assurance of St. Paul, that the mediatorial kingdom, as the property of Christ, will terminate with his return to judgment, and the general resurrection of the dead. The possession of the kingdom in the parable is asserted, upon the re-

turn of the possessor home, in two acts, both of them the acts of sovereign power, indeed, and both characteristic of a king—the punishment of enemies on the one hand, and the promotion of deserving subjects on the other ; but both of them under the circumstances of the case, no more than preliminary to the usufruct of the kingdom itself, and preparatory of its future well-being and continuity : the mediatorial kingdom may be asserted, in like manner, upon the return of Christ to the general resurrection and the general judgment, both in its functions of reward, and in its functions of punishment, such as may be expected then to take place ; but it will be asserted once for all, and in acts, whether of reward or of coercion, however decisive of absolute power and sovereignty, yet not preparatory to its continuance and perpetuity, but to its consummation and termination. The administration of the kingdom in the parable begins and proceeds with the assertion of those merely preliminary instances of kingly power and jurisdiction ; the mediatorial kingdom is brought to an end with its most overt declaration of its prerogatives of sovereignty, by the coming of Christ to judgment and the resurrection of the dead.

It follows, then, that the kingdom in the parable is not the mediatorial kingdom, the personal right and possession of Jesus Christ, as the Son of man, upon the enjoyment and administration of which he must be supposed to have entered, at the time of his reception into heaven, and sitting down at the right hand of God ; in the enjoyment and administration of which he has continued in heaven ever since ; and from the enjoyment and administration of which in

heaven, he will return to exercise its functions on earth, only in order to make an end of it, and to consummate the whole by the solemnity of the proceedings at the last day. The kingdom in the parable, though some personal kingdom of Jesus Christ, as much as this, cannot be the same with this kingdom at least—considered as coextensive and coincident with it, and as beginning, proceeding, and ending alike. But it may still be some kingdom, the personal right and possession of Jesus Christ in his human capacity, which is a part of that, and subordinate to it, and for a certain period in its entire duration, coincides, and proceeds in conjunction, with it; yet still is distinct from it, and independent of it, considered as a whole. To this kingdom, if any such there be, the analogy of the parable would justify us in giving the name of the kingdom which is the personal right and property of Jesus Christ, considered as the Messiah of Israel—in opposition to the mediatorial kingdom, which is his right and property as the Son of man.

The course of the argument, then, at this point in the progress of the present discussion, would have required me to enter upon the proof of the following propositions, as necessary to evince both the existence in futurity of such a kingdom as this of the Messiah of Israel, in general, and its distinction from the kingdom of the Son of man, or the mediatorial kingdom, in particular :

First, that there is reason to believe, from the disclosures of scripture with respect to the events which are yet to happen before the end of the world, that the final advent of Jesus Christ to judgment,

and the consummation of all things, will be preceded by an advent of a different kind, and preliminary to the transaction of an œconomy which will require the continuance of the present state of things, or of something analogous to it, for a certain time longer.

Secondly, that the advent of Jesus Christ on this occasion, will be followed by the establishment of a kingdom on earth, of which Jesus Christ, in his personal capacity of the Messiah of Israel, and the promised Redeemer of mankind, will be the head, and faithful believers—the members, from time to time, of his visible church, wheresoever and whensoever it has existed, upon earth, whether among the Jews before the birth of Christ, or among the Gentiles, since—will be the subjects.

Thirdly, that the seat of this empire will properly be Judæa; that honours and dignities, proportional to the respective merits and good deserts of the subjects thereof, will be awarded to all, or to part, among those who are admitted to partake of its blessings and privileges in common; and that a state of things will be the result of all, and continue to proceed for a certain length of time, which though adapted to the nature of a society transacted upon earth, and among such beings as mankind, will leave nothing to be desired for its perfection and happiness.

But the reader will at once perceive that if there be such a kingdom in futurity as this, and the kingdom in the parable is that which must be supposed to be intended by it; the kingdom in the parable is nothing more nor less than the millenary reign of Christ on earth; the consideration of which, and

the arguments in support of the doctrine of it, whether from the testimony of scripture, or from the belief and tradition of the primitive Christians, or from reasons of a more general kind, occupied so large a portion of the General Introduction to the present work ^o. The propositions, which have just been stated, and others of a kindred nature, were there also proposed for discussion; nor is it necessary to repeat the proofs, by which it was endeavoured to substantiate and confirm their truth ^p.

In addition, therefore, to the several propositions, on the proof of which, as proposed above, the truth of the doctrine of the millenary dispensation would naturally follow; all that would be necessary to the further elucidation of the connection between the parable and the doctrine in question, would be to shew that, among the complex of Christians, who may be expected to share in some degree or other,

^o Vide chapter xii. 140—485.

^p The connection, indeed, between the right interpretation of the present parable, and the doctrine of the millenary reign of Christ, is such, that the author of this exposition feels it but due to the truth of the case, to state, that the consideration of the parable, and the difficulty, or rather the impossibility of explaining it satisfactorily and consistently upon any other principle than that of a reference to the millenary dispensation, contributed as much as any thing else, to confirm his own belief in the futurity of that dispensation; and in fact first to draw his attention seriously to this subject. The difficulty which was felt by himself, he is persuaded will be felt by any other person, who shall attempt to explain the parable without doing violence to it, and to find a counterpart for it, in any æconomy, or in reference to any kingdom of Christ, whether past, or to come, but that.

in the privileges and blessings of Messiah's kingdom on earth, there is reason to believe a certain peculiar eminence and distinction to be in reserve for the ministers of religion, beginning with the apostles downwards; and that the futurity of such a kingdom, and of such a distribution of rewards and privileges in it, to this particular class of its subjects, is most in unison with the parabolic representation throughout, and the best adapted to explain its circumstances in both its œconomies.

With respect to the first of these points, the final end of the trial of the servants, which we saw to have been imposed upon them before the departure of their master, and to have proceeded and been transacted during his absence, was proved by the event to be a prospective provision for the future administration of the kingdom, upon his return; and the œconomy of retribution, which succeeded to this œconomy of probation, represents none of the servants of the same master as ultimately promoted to an office of trust in his master's kingdom, who had not been previously subjected to a corresponding trial of his talents and capacity, his zeal and fidelity, in his master's service. The result of this œconomy also, when the history in the parable is brought to an end, is to leave the course of things for the administration of the kingdom, in a corresponding train of proceeding; that, whatever be the extent of the nobleman's empire, and how many soever the amount of his subjects, the government of his kingdom must be supposed to go on from the time where the history in the parable breaks off, under himself as supreme, but divided with these of his servants,

whom he is seen to have promoted previously according to their deserts, as next in authority, though subordinate to himself.

Now the nobleman had other servants, besides these ten, before his departure, and he must have had other servants, besides these ten, after his return; all of whom would be members of his household in common, before his elevation, and all subjects of his empire, after his elevation, as well as the ten, but none of whom were such of his servants, as he left in trust behind him, at the time of his departure, or promoted to an office of state under himself, at his return, except these ten. Though the nobleman himself, then, may be Jesus Christ, and his household in general may be the complex of professing Christians, yet these ten, as a distinct body of his servants, must stand for a class of Christians distinct from the rest; and the trial and reward of these ten must stand for the trial and reward of that class of Christians, distinct from those of any of the rest. This class of Christians it has partly been shewn already, and it will be made further apparent hereafter, is that of the ministers of religion, in contradistinction to the people. The proper trial of these ten of the nobleman's servants, is symbolical of the proper trial of the ministers of religion, as one division of the servants of Christ; and the proper trial of the ministers of religion being something different from that of the complex of Christians in general, it is but consistent with this fact, that the proper reward of the one should be something different from that of the other also, and that any representation of the œconomy of probation, and any corresponding representation of

the œconomy of retribution, even as adapted to the reality of the present state of things, and to what may assuredly be expected at the end of the world, as the result of it—in order to apply to the truth of *their* case, should describe them as differently situated in point of responsibility, and as differently to be dealt with in consequence of their proper responsibility, from the rest of the Christian world. But the necessary distinctions upon this head cannot be conveniently stated and pointed out, until we come to the consideration of the parable of the talents.

With respect to the second position—the kingdom which is supposed to be acquired in the parable, being some personal kingdom of Jesus Christ, the necessity of the case requires that it must be the same with one or other of those three kingdoms, all of which are either spoken of in Scripture, or may implicitly be collected from it, as the personal right and property of our Saviour Jesus Christ; the natural, which he inherits as the Son of God, the mediatorial, which he acquired as the Son of man, or the millenary, which is his as the Messiah of Israel, and the Redeemer of his church. But the kingdom in the parable cannot be the natural or hereditary kingdom of Christ; for the kingdom in the parable was acquired, the natural or hereditary kingdom of Christ was never acquired; there was a time before which the nobleman was not yet king, and a time after which he was; there never was a time when the Son of God, by virtue of his eternal generation, was not king, nor ever will be a time when he shall cease to be so. Nor is the kingdom

in the parable the mediatorial kingdom of Christ, for the reasons which have been stated above. The mediatorial kingdom might be acquired, like the kingdom in the parable, and Christ might go away into heaven to receive the one, as the nobleman went abroad to obtain the other. But Christ went into heaven to *enter* upon his mediatorial kingdom ; the nobleman went abroad to be *confirmed* in his kingdom. Christ did not return to exercise the functions of his mediatorial kingdom on earth, as soon as he had been confirmed in its possession in heaven ; but the nobleman returned home to enter upon the enjoyment of his kingdom, as soon as he had been confirmed in its possession abroad. And it is no less certain that the nobleman, having entered upon the enjoyment of his kingdom at home, must have continued in the enjoyment of it there ever after, than that he went abroad to obtain it, and returned to enjoy it. And it is not less certain, that if Jesus Christ entered upon the possession of his mediatorial kingdom in heaven, at the ascension, he has continued in possession of it there ever since ; and if he returns again, in the possession of it, to the exercise of any of its functions upon earth, it will be to continue in possession of it no longer, but to resign it immediately after. The kingdom in the parable, therefore, is the millenary kingdom.

It remains to point out in brief such further coincidences between the matter of fact, and the representation of things in the parable, as have not yet been mentioned.

First, the principal personage was described as a nobleman ; that is, as superior in birth to the rest of

his countrymen ; and Jesus Christ, who answers to this personage, considered as the Messiah of Israel, in his human capacity was the Son of David, the greatest and noblest of the kings of Israel, and in his Divine was the Son of God. The fellow-citizens of this nobleman, as their name implies, were either the inhabitants of the same city, or the natives of the same country, with him ; and the fellow-citizens of the Messiah, considered as the Son of David, would answer to the Jews, in particular—his fellow-citizens, considered as the Son of man, would be the rest, or part of the rest, of mankind in general.

The kingdom in the parable was part of a more extensive empire ; and even the millenary reign of Christ on earth is part of the universal empire of God over heaven and earth. The gift of this kingdom was in the disposal of the head of that more extensive empire ; and the gift of the mediatorial, much more of the millenary kingdom of Jesus Christ, was in the disposal of God. The nobleman and his fellow-citizens were both alike subject to the will of this power ; and both Jesus Christ, in his human capacity, as the head of a kingdom upon earth, and all mankind, as the subjects of his reign, are so far subordinate in common to the sovereign will of the Father.

The bestowal of the kingdom on the nobleman, by this superior power, was the effect of his good-will towards him in particular ; and the delegation of the millenary kingdom to Jesus Christ, by God the Father, is the effect of his good-will and favour towards him, above all mankind. The choice of the nobleman by this common superior, to be king over the community in question, did not depend on the

concurrence or approbation of his subjects themselves ; and the appointment of Jesus Christ to be the head of a kingdom on earth, was equally independent of the concurrence or approbation of all or any part of mankind, as the future subjects of his reign. The personal merit of the nobleman cooperated with his personal dignity of birth, in procuring his elevation above the rest of his fellow-citizens ; and the personal exaltation of Jesus Christ, in his human capacity, to be the head of a kingdom over all mankind, was the reward of his personal obedience, and his personal desert in all that he did and suffered, for the salvation of mankind. The designation of the nobleman to the kingdom preceded his departure to receive his confirmation in it ; and Jesus Christ, from the time of his resurrection, was already the future head of the millenary kingdom, before he was yet gone away into heaven.

The fellow-citizens of the nobleman might once have been willing to acquiesce in his appointment to be their king ; but if there was ever a time when they were inclined to do so, it was before his departure to receive it : and the Jews, in like manner, might once have been disposed to acknowledge Jesus Christ, in the declared capacity of their Messiah and king, but it was before his crucifixion and death, and his resurrection and ascension into heaven. His fellow-citizens were unanimous, after his departure, in deprecating the appointment of the nobleman to be their king ; and the Jews have been unanimous, since the departure of our Lord into heaven, in rejecting Jesus Christ as their Messiah.

The nobleman departed to receive the kingdom, in the capacity of a simple citizen ; and Jesus Christ

went away into heaven to enter upon his reward, and upon every distinction consequent thereon, no wise distinguishable from the rest of his brethren, according to the flesh. The nobleman reappeared in the dignified character of a king; and Jesus Christ will return in the open display of sovereign power and majesty. The nobleman went abroad into a distant country to receive his confirmation to his kingdom; and Jesus Christ ascended into the highest heavens, to enter upon the immediate enjoyment of his mediatorial kingdom, entailing the right, and vouching for the possession of the millenary kingdom in futurity. The nobleman returned to exercise the functions of king in his own country; and Jesus Christ must return, as the head of the millenary kingdom, to reign upon earth. Between the departure of the nobleman in his capacity of simple citizen, and his return in the character of king, there was a blank in his personal history; and between the ascension of Christ into heaven, when the millenary kingdom became his *de jure*, and his personal advent again, when it will become his *de facto*, there is a similar silence in Scripture upon the mode in which this interval is transacted, as concerning Jesus Christ himself. Between the departure of the nobleman, to be confirmed in the kingdom, and his return to the administration of it, his personal enemies first declared their opposition to his appointment, and first incurred the guilt of rebelling against their king; and all the attempts of the adversaries of the Christian religion, and all the declarations of hostility to the person of its founder, from whatsoever quarter they may have proceeded, and in whatsoever manner they may have been made, have begun since the

time of his personal departure into heaven, and must be comprehended by the time of his personal return. The return of the nobleman was followed by the destruction of his adversaries, before the commencement of his reign; and the return of Christ to his reign on earth, will be accompanied by the overthrow of the antichristian power, preliminary to that dispensation.

The household of the nobleman in particular, in opposition to his fellow-citizens in general, were that portion of his future subjects alone, who before his departure were predisposed to acknowledge him as their king, and upon his return were prepared to receive him as such; and the members of the church of Christ must alone be that part of mankind, who are beforehand prepared to receive and acknowledge him as their Lord and Master, when returning to reign upon earth, in his specific capacity of the head of that church. The household of the nobleman contained various orders of servants; and the church of Christ has always contained various classes of Christians. The characters of the servants of the nobleman, in their proper relation to him, were some better, and others worse; and among the same complex of professing believers, all nominally alike the servants of Christ and the members of his church—there have always been some whose lives have agreed to their profession, and others whose lives have not. The household of the nobleman were placed by his departure in a new situation, in which they could not have been placed without it; and in consequence of the personal removal of Christ from the government and superintendence of his church, it has been placed in circumstances, which could not otherwise have held good. Some of the servants of the same

master were invested with a new duty, in consequence of his departure, and the rest were not; and a certain description of Christians in consequence of the personal absence of the head of the church from the care and superintendence of it himself, have been invested with a duty and character, directly arising out of the fact of that absence. From the time of the departure of the nobleman, to the period of his return, the complex of his household became divisible into that part of it which he had left behind him in trust, and that which he had not; and from the time of the departure of the head of the church in person, the complex of its members became divisible into that part of them, whom he had appointed to fulfil a special duty, in his absence, and that part which he had not; and it must continue to be so divisible unto the period of his return. The several orders of servants left in trust by him, at his departure, denoting certain orders of succession in the ministers of religion, as appointed by Christ at different times to preside over his church—the same mina committed to each of the former, is the same ministerial trust committed to each of the latter: the several degrees of the increase or improvement of the mina, as made by one order in comparison with another, are corresponding degrees of the exercise and administration of the ministerial trust, as characteristic of one of these orders of its possessors, in comparison of another: but what these orders of its possessors are, and what that exercise and administration of the same ministerial trust, the effects of which in one instance are so perceptibly different in degree from those in others, are circumstances which I purposely reserve for future explanation.

The return of the master was followed by the institution of an inquiry into the conduct of his servants in the administration of their trust; the return of Jesus Christ to the millenary reign, will be followed by the judgment of Christians in general, which must include the account of the ministers of religion in particular. All the servants, left in trust by the master, were called to this account at once; and each order among them, though individually distinct from another, were examined on the same occasion; and the millenary dispensation being preceded by a resurrection of the dead, every order of the ministers of religion, who may have existed in the church, from the time of its foundation to the period of its consummation, may be subjected to their trial at once, and undergo the inquiry into the exercise of their peculiar trust, on one and the same occasion. The account with the servants is conducted in the presence of others besides the master and the servants themselves; and the return of Jesus Christ to the millenary reign, will be accompanied by the host of heaven, and whatsoever may be expected as preparatory or preliminary to it, will be transacted in the presence of the angels. These bystanders acted as the servants of the king, both in punishing his enemies, and in rewarding his deserving subjects; and the angels will act as the ministers of Christ, in the process of judgment which precedes the establishment of the millenary dispensation; and will be his instruments in carrying into effect the several awards of retributive justice, the results of that process to each of their respective subjects. After the immediate settlement of the kingdom in the hands of its possessor, and the first pro-

vision made for its government and administration, it was left to implication that the kingdom would continue to proceed, and be enjoyed—but the history of it was closed with that point of time; nor has more been revealed with respect to the millenary reign of Christ, than what relates to its first establishment, and the nature of that constitution under which it will begin and proceed, from the time of its establishment, to the close of the period for which it is destined to continue.


It appears then from the above review and exposition of the parable of the pounds, that beginning with the fact of the departure of a certain person to receive a kingdom, and ending with that of his constitution or settlement in possession of it, and giving an account of an intermediate œconomy which is subsequent to the former of these events, and preparatory to the other; the final result which is proposed to adumbrate, is the establishment of the kingdom of Christ upon earth, as the common effect of one œconomy, which must precede, and of another which must follow, and of a third which must go on between the two; the former in the departure of Christ himself, to acquire the right to it *de jure*, the latter in his return, to assert his right to it *de facto*, and the third in a certain scheme and course of things, designed for the constitution and administration of the kingdom itself, when the time for its establishment should be come. The reference of such a parable, then, to the nature of the occasion which is said to have produced it—and what kind of correction it was intended to apply to the prevailing opinion respecting the immediate futurity of the

kingdom of God—must be evident without any further comment. It is manifest also, that at the time when it was delivered, the parable was an unmixed prophecy throughout; for the very first of its suppositions, the departure of the nobleman to receive the kingdom, was still matter of futurity when it was spoken. And though its fulfilment may speedily have begun, in the verification of this supposition by the departure of our Lord into heaven, the rest of the prophecy is still only in the course of its fulfilment; for the return of the nobleman, to take possession of his kingdom, which is also comprehended by it, has not yet taken place. And if we may assume, as it seems but just and reasonable we should, that the enjoyment and administration of a kingdom, so entered upon and asserted, for its proper term of being ever after, must be included in the fact of its establishment—the fulfilment of the prophecy may extend to the close of the millenary dispensation^q.

^q After having pointed out, in the preceding exposition, what I consider to be the true sense and meaning of the allegory in this present instance, it seems superfluous to dwell longer upon its consideration, in order to expose the falsehood of any other construction of it, which might be proposed instead of this. Among these constructions, the coming of Christ to the visitation of the Jews and the destruction of Jerusalem, may perhaps be one; because that coming is sometimes spoken of in scripture as a coming of Christ in his kingdom. But besides the difficulty which would be felt upon that construction, in explaining the rest of the circumstances of the parable; it is quite sufficient to disprove its truth, that though something like the destruction of the personal enemies of the possessor of the kingdom in the parable, might be said to have taken place, in the effects of such a coming of Christ in his kingdom, as that; yet no such thing as the economy of trial for the probation of his servants, could be said to have preceded it, nor any such thing

as the distribution of preferment and reward, according to the results of that trial, to have followed upon it.

That state of the case in the parable, with respect to the acquisition of the kingdom, according to which it was supposed to be in the gift of one power, before it became the personal property of another, or in other words, that the kingdom itself was but a part of a more extensive empire ; would apply to the existing political relations of various parts of the civilized world, to the Roman empire, as extending over the whole, and holding individual nations and provinces, at the disposal of the Roman emperor. Contemporary history supplies instances calculated to illustrate the supposition in the parable, when kings were sought for at Rome by the subjects of the empire in the provinces, or kingdoms were bestowed at Rome, extending over the provinces. But the most remarkable case in point, and one on which we may suppose it possible our Saviour might have his eye, even when he conceived and pronounced the parable, was the case of Archelaus, who had been appointed to reign in Judæa, about thirty years before this time ; and the circumstances which characterised that event. For Archelaus was a nobleman, being the son of Herod the Great. He also went into a far country, to receive his kingdom ; for he went to Rome, to obtain from Augustus the confirmation of his father's will, who had appointed him his successor. His citizens hated him too, and sent an embassy after him, saying " We will not that this man reign over us," in which even his own relations joined. He too returned, having received the kingdom ; for Augustus confirmed him in possession of the throne ; and he too, probably took ample vengeance on his adversaries ; for in less than ten years afterwards, such were the complaints made of his cruelty and oppressiveness, Augustus was obliged to depose and banish him, and to convert Judæa into a Roman province. See the Antiquities of Josephus, xvii. xi. ; and the History of the War, ii. vi.



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
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
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